

# INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

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INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1977

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## PREFACE

This is the eleventh annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine*, which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the University of Kuwait. The purpose of the series is to assemble in one volume major attitudes and policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict of the states and organizations directly and indirectly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (including Israel), and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Middle East, as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports in this volume cover a period from the middle of 1976 to the middle of 1977; the second half of 1977 will be covered in the annual reports of 1978. A selection from the General Assembly's debate on the question of Palestine has also been included in the United Nations section.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material, written or oral, originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a minor extent, from individuals and institutions which represent significant groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses.

In considering items for selection, the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of policy regarding the area or as a record of the events of the year. President Sadat of Egypt's visit to Israel, the ensuing talks between Egypt and Israel, and their repercussions on relationships in the Arab world are the dominant events of the year. Also reflected in the selection are the unsuccessful international efforts to reconvene the Geneva peace conference, the question of Palestinian representation and the obstacles created by Israeli and US positions towards the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries both in the International and Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions of those countries' involvement in, and influence on, events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the Conference of Islamic States and the Organization of African Unity.

The majority of documents in the Arab World section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection *Arab Documents on Palestine* published annually by the Institute in Arabic.

Documents in the International and the Arab World sections are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of "early", "mid", or "late" added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only UN documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization's internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

When documents have been reproduced only in part this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word "excerpt (s)" after the title of the document.

The term "joint communiqué" has been used loosely and does not necessarily imply that the document concerned is a joint communiqué in the diplomatic sense.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English, the material has either been translated especially for this volume, or English translations published by recognized journals or agencies of the country of origin have been used. In the latter case, the footnote simply states "English text" with no reference to the original language.

In addition to the appendices regularly incorporated in the series (Cabinet lists, chronology of events and voting tables of UN General Assembly resolutions), the editors have included in this volume a resolution passed at the Rabat Arab summit conference in 1974 which was not published until 1977.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in their original versions. In documents translated for this volume, familiar Arabic names appear in a form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

Abbreviations (e.g. PLO for Palestine Liberation Organization) in the text will be found in the index with a cross reference to the full name.

The Institute for Palestine Studies is pleased to express its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the libraries and various institutes in Beirut that have cooperated by providing information when requested, in particular the offices of the United Nations.

We extend our special thanks to the IPS research staff whose patient labour made this volume possible: to Anne Hilal, Albert Nehr, Jorgen Nielsen, Mary Onorato, Julie Peteet and Mary Starsinski for surveying sources and compilation of documents; to Laila Zakharia for the final selection of the UN and international documents; to the Arabic and Hebrew research staff for selection of relevant material; to Anne Hilal for cross-referencing; to Mary Onorato for copyediting the *Arab World* and *International* sections; to David Butter for indexing the volume; and finally to Melly Ziadé for typing the extensive preparatory material and the final manuscript.

## LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their publisher when relevant and not obvious, and their place and frequency of publication.

<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Akram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>Al-Akhbar</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>Al Hamishmar</i> (Mapam)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Amal</i> (Phalangist Party)	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Amal</i>	Tunis	daily
<i>American Journal of International Law</i>	Washington, D. C.	quarterly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Rabat	daily
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestinian Resistance</i> (Palestine Liberation Army)	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	twice a month
<i>L'Arche</i>	Paris	monthly
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>Australia Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Canberra	monthly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung</i> (Office of Information, Federal Government)	Bonn	irregular
<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	twice a month
<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i>	Ottawa	irregular

<i>Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism</i> (Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress)	London	6 times a year
<i>The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter</i> (World Council of Churches)	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D. C.	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i> (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Ohio State University)	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
<i>Davar</i> (Histadrut)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D. C.	weekly
<i>Dis Politika/Foreign Policy</i>	Ankara	quarterly
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	twice a month
<i>L'Express</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>al-Fajr al-Jadid</i>	Tripoli	daily
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Flash</i>	Damascus	monthly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> (Council on Foreign Affairs)	New York	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i> (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	East Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Indian Council for World Affairs)	New Delhi	monthly
<i>France Pays-Arabes</i>	Paris	monthly
<i>France-Soir</i>	Paris	daily
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>Granma</i>	Havana	weekly
<i>The Guardian Weekly</i>	Manchester	weekly
<i>Haaretz</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hadaf</i> (PFLP)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Hatzofeh</i> (National Religious Party)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hawadith</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Hurriya</i> (Communist Action Organization; DFLP)	Beirut	weekly



<i>Ila al-Amam</i> (PFLP-GC)	Beirut	weekly
<i>International Affairs</i> (All Union Society)	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	daily
<i>International Perspectives</i> (Ministry of External Affairs)	Ottawa	6 times a year
<i>Israel at Peace</i> (Communist Party of Israel-MAKI)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Israel Digest</i> (World Zionist Organization)	Jerusalem	twice a month
<i>Israel Magazine</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Israeli Mirror</i>	London	twice a week
<i>al-Ittihad</i> (Communist Party of Israel-RAKAH)	Haifa	twice a week
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i> (US Communist Party)	New York	6 times a year
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i> (Labor Zionist Alliance)	New York	monthly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i> (Institute for Palestine Studies)	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriyya</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bath	weekly
<i>Knesset Records</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>The Link</i>	New York	bi-monthly
<i>The Listener</i> (British Broadcasting Corporation)	London	weekly
<i>Maariv</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel Aviv	quarterly
<i>Merip Reports</i>	Washington	10 per year
<i>Middle East</i>	London	monthly
<i>Middle East Economic Survey</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Middle East International</i> (Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding)	London	monthly

<i>Middle East Journal</i> (Middle East Institute)	Washington, D. C.	quarterly
<i>Monday Morning</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>Moscow News</i> (Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries)	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Nahar al-Arabi wal Dawli</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i> (B'nai B'rith)	Washington, D. C.	monthly
<i>Near East Report</i> (America-Israel Public Affairs Committee)	Washington, D. C.	weekly
<i>New African</i>	London	monthly
<i>New Outlook</i> (Jewish-Arab Institute)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i> (Foreign Ministry)	Wellington	monthly
<i>Newsweek—international edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>al-Nida</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>14th October</i>	Aden	daily
<i>Orient</i> (Deutsches Orient-Institut)	Hamburg	quarterly
<i>L'Orient-Le Jour</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Pakistan Horizon</i> (Pakistan Institute of International Affairs)	Karachi	quarterly
<i>Palestine</i>	Beirut	monthly
<i>Palestine Digest</i> (Arab League Office)	Washington, D. C.	monthly
<i>Peace Courier</i>	Helsinki	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>La Politique étrangère de la France : Textes et documents</i> (Foreign Ministry, France)	Paris	twice a year
<i>Quick</i>	Munich	weekly

<i>al-Rai</i>	Amman	daily
<i>Rasd Idhaat Israel</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	twice a month
<i>Revista de Política Internacional</i>	Madrid	quarterly
<i>Revue Romaine d'Etudes Internationales</i>	Bucharest	quarterly
<i>al-Riyad</i>	Riyad	daily
<i>Rose al-Yusuf</i>	Cairo	weekly
<i>Sabah al-Khayr</i> (Parti Populaire Syrien)	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Safir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Sayyad</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>Shu'un Filastiniya</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	monthly
<i>al-Siyasa</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Soviet News</i> (Embassy of the USSR)	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Summary of World Broadcasts</i> (British Broadcasting Corporation)	London	daily
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i> (Central Office of Information, UK)	London	monthly
<i>Survival</i> (International Institute for Strategic Studies)	London	6 times a year
<i>al-Talai</i> (Saiqa)	Damascus	weekly
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>Time—international edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>UD-informasjon</i> (Foreign Ministry, Norway)	Oslo	irregular
<i>al-Usubu al-Arabi</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>USSR and Third World</i> (Central Asian Research Centre)	London	8 times a year

<i>Wafa</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	daily
<i>World Marxist Review Information Bulletin</i>	Toronto	monthly
<i>West Asia Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>Yediot Aharonot</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Zo Haderekh</i>	Tel Aviv	bi-weekly

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United Nations





## Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

### 1

#### **Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

September 1, 1977

In the Middle East also, the current year came in with a widespread feeling that real progress towards a peaceful settlement might be at hand. The desire for peace had never been more clearly expressed on all sides in recent years. There was a climate of moderation and reasonableness which appeared to favour the efforts of the United Nations, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East and others concerned with helping the parties to move forward to a just and peaceful settlement. There was a widespread feeling that the Geneva Conference might be resumed in the second half of this year.

I visited the area in early February to talk to all those concerned. My immediate object was to discuss ways and means of reconvening the Geneva Conference, but naturally our talks ranged over all the complexities of the Middle East problem. I concluded at that time that, while all concerned earnestly desired to move towards a negotiated settlement, the lack of confidence and the mutual distrust and fears of all the parties were a formidable barrier to progress. All seemed to be aware that an opportunity existed to resume meaningful negotiations and that, if it was not seized, the situation would almost certainly deteriorate, with incalculable consequences not only for the Middle East but for the international community as a whole.

In the report I submitted to the Security Council on this subject in February 1977,<sup>2</sup> I observed that the obstacles in the way of reconvening the Geneva

Conference were of a kind that could not be surmounted by purely procedural means. Changes of attitude on all sides were necessary. These would involve mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the claims of the different parties in suitable forms and with adequate guarantees, as well as an effort on all sides to define more clearly the shape of an ultimate peace settlement in the Middle East.

Since that time, contacts at various levels have continued with a view to finding the means to reconvene the Geneva Conference under conditions in which it could work constructively and effectively, and some advance has been made in clarifying the basic requirements for possible normalization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. A consensus already exists in the international community that the essential elements of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and that no agreement will be viable that fails to provide for a homeland for the Palestinian people in one form or another.

None the less, definite progress towards the reconvening of the Geneva Conference still eludes us. The immediate problem in this regard remains the question of the representation of the interests and rights of the Palestinian people and the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in this connexion. I continue to hope that this difficulty may be eventually overcome. The refusal of one side or the other to recognize the other party or parties to a dispute is not peculiar to the Middle East. Similar problems have arisen in the past and in a number of cases solutions were found by working out appropriate arrangements that met the objections of the parties while safeguarding their basic interests.

Meanwhile there has been some increase of tension in the area. Recently the Government of Israel took certain measures in relation to the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip which have been strongly protested by Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement no. 1* (UN doc. A/32/1) pp. 3-4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Doc. 10 below.

considered them as deliberate acts to consolidate Israeli occupation and to pave the way for annexation. There have also been a number of bombing incidents in Israel and the occupied territories, for which various Palestinian organizations have claimed responsibility. I view the latest developments with deep concern. At the present critical stage in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it is of vital importance that all the Governments and parties concerned should refrain from any moves likely to heighten tension or to affect the current efforts to resume the negotiating process.

It is now almost four years since the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (1973),<sup>3</sup> in which it called upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts. The Council also decided that, "immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East". In the intervening period since October 1973, various approaches have been tried to help promote a just and durable peace in the area. However, in spite of these approaches, no significant progress has been made in tackling the basic issues involved. The time may thus be opportune to attempt a general re-evaluation of how best to reactivate and sustain the negotiating process. Obviously, any re-evaluation will have to take into account the vital interests of the international community in the achievement of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Whatever the difficulties, there can be no question that the continuing stalemate in the Middle East imposes increasing risks on the international community as well as on the parties. It is more than ever urgent and vital that the parties preserve the spirit of moderation and realism and channel that spirit into the arduous and lengthy process of negotiation. If that were not to happen, I greatly fear that we shall be facing a major international crisis in the not too distant future.

In spite of the cease-fire which put an end to the strife in Lebanon last November, tension has persisted especially in the south of that country. While this very delicate and potentially explosive

situation has considerable international implications in the wider context of the Middle East problem, it continues to be handled for the most part on a regional basis, and United Nations involvement has been confined largely to humanitarian assistance. The United Nations military observers continue to carry out their limited functions in circumstances of great difficulty and considerable danger. It is vitally important in the interest both of Lebanon and of peace in the region that the process of conciliation between the various factions involved in this area should evolve speedily and effectively. This process cannot succeed while the fighting continues in the south. I therefore appeal to all concerned to co-operate in the efforts now being made to secure a ceasefire.

The situations in southern Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus are serious in themselves and also have very special implications for international peace and security. In all of them the multilateral approach of the United Nations, complemented by bilateral efforts and the initiatives of different groups of Member States, seems to present the best way of maintaining the momentum towards a settlement. In the meantime, the United Nations performs an indispensable daily task in maintaining quiet along the lines of potential conflict in the Middle East and Cyprus. This essential activity receives little publicity and is more or less taken for granted unless things go wrong. It is also a very considerable burden on the Organization and on contributing States. The essential daily services which our Organization and its Members perform to maintain international peace should not be forgotten.

In all the three situations I have mentioned the stakes are very high and the dangers of failure are increasingly ominous. I most earnestly hope that the great efforts being made through the United Nations and elsewhere to solve the basic problems involved will begin to bear fruit before the end of the year. If they do not, I fear that the outlook for 1978 will be a serious and unsettled one for the international community.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 34 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

## 2

**Report of the Security Council: Questions Concerning the Middle East<sup>4</sup>****November 29, 1977****A. The situation in the Middle East****1. THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF)****(a) *Extension of the mandate of UNEF until 24 October 1977*****(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 18 October 1976***

6. As the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was due to expire on 24 October 1976, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 18 October (S/12212) on the activities of the Force for the period from 17 October 1975 to 18 October 1976.<sup>5</sup>

7. In that report, the Secretary-General stated that throughout the period under review the situation in the UNEF area of operations had remained stable and the Force had continued efficiently to discharge its mandate. He noted that since the submission of his last report on 17 October 1975 (S/11849), UNEF had assumed new functions and responsibilities under the terms of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 4 September 1975 and the Protocol thereto of 22 September 1975 (S/11818 and Add. 1-5) that were far more extensive and complex than those it had assumed previously. Moreover, it was now deployed in an area more than four times the size of the former area of disengagement.

8. The Secretary-General also stated that with regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), efforts had been made at several levels to promote an early resumption of the negotiations aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East, as called for in that resolution, and as described in detail in his report of 18 October to the General Assembly and the Security Council (S/12210).

9. The Secretary-General observed that if there were a continuing lack of progress in efforts to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

the situation in the Middle East would inevitably remain unstable in spite of peace-keeping and other arrangements. In conclusion, the Secretary-General, taking into account the relevant factors involved and considering the continued presence of UNEF in the area to be essential, recommended the extension of the mandate for one year.

**(ii) *Consideration at the 1964th meeting (22 October 1976)***

10. At its 1964th meeting on 22 October, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/12212).”

11. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12219) which had been drawn up during consultations among the members of the Council, who had agreed that statements on it should be made after the vote. Additionally, the President made the following complementary statement (S/PV.1964) on behalf of the Council regarding the draft resolution: “Under the provisions of operative paragraph 1, subparagraph (c), of this draft resolution, the Security Council would request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of the period—that is, by 24 October 1977—a report on the developments in the situation and the steps taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973). Members of the Security Council have asked me to make it clear that, should developments occur which would lead the Secretary-General to consider it appropriate to report to the Council at an earlier date, they would of course expect him to do so and that he will continue his efforts to assist the early resumption of the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.” The President added that he had been asked by the delegations of China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to say that they would not participate in the vote on the draft resolution and that, as a result, they did not subscribe to the agreed statement which he had just read.

**DECISION:** *At the 1964th meeting on 22 October 1976, the draft resolution (S/12219) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 396 (1976). Two members (China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) did not participate in the vote.*

12. Resolution 396 (1976) read as follows:

<sup>4</sup> Part 1, Chapter 1 of *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1976–15 June 1977, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 2* (UN doc. A/32/2), pp. 2–10.

<sup>5</sup> Doc. 8 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

*The Security Council,*

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October, 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, 368 (1975) of 17 April, 371 (1975) of 24 July and 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/12212),

Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East (S/12210),

Recalling the Secretary-General's view that any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be dangerous and his hope that urgent efforts will be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at the comprehensive settlement called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),

Noting that the Secretary-General recommends the extension of the mandate of the Force for one year,

1. *Decides:*

(a) To call upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of one year, that is, until 24 October 1977;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973);

2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy.

13. Following the vote, the Council heard statements by the representatives of Romania, China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, Italy, the United States of America, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Sweden, Guyana, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan and Panama.

14. The President, with the consent of the Council, then invited the representative of Saudi Arabia, at his request, to address the Council. The representative of Saudi Arabia made a statement, after which the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Pakistan, made a statement.

(b) *Further communications received between 23 October 1976 and 15 June 1977*

15. In a note dated 12 January 1977 (S/12274), the President of the Security Council stated that on 7 January, the Secretary-General had informed him of his intention, if the Security Council so

consented, to appoint Major-General Rais Abin Commander of UNEF and that, after consultations with the members of the Council, the President had informed the Secretary-General on 11 January that the Council consented to the proposed appointment and that China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dissociated themselves from the matter.

2. THE UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF)

(a) *Communications received from the parties in July and August 1976*

16. In a letter dated 22 July (S/12151), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic charged that on 21 June Israeli military forces had twice opened fire at civilians conducting their work in the field. On 28 July, the representative of Israel replied (S/12156) that the charge was untrue.

17. By a note verbale dated 29 July (S/12159), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted a letter dated 10 July in which his Government had informed the Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) that on 2 July an Israeli military vehicle had entered the area of separation and opened fire on the Syrian civil police at a check point in the area, injuring one Syrian policeman. In a letter dated 10 August (S/12169), the representative of Israel denied the accusation.

(b) *Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 31 May 1977*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 22 November 1976*

18. As the mandate of UNDOF was due to expire on 30 November, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 22 November (S/12235), giving an account of the activities of the Force during the period from 25 May to 22 November 1976. The Secretary-General stated that UNDOF had continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the two parties. He further noted that during the period under review the situation in the area had remained quiet and that there had been no incidents of a serious nature.

19. Concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973), the Secretary-General directed the Council's attention to his detailed report of 18 October on the subject (S/12210).

20. The Secretary-General observed that despite existing quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East would remain unstable and potentially dangerous unless real progress were made towards a just and lasting settlement of the problem in all its aspects. The disengagement agreement, he stressed, was not a peace agreement but only a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). It was important, he believed, that renewed efforts be made to resume the negotiating process. Taking into account the factors involved and considering that the continued presence of UNDOF in the area was essential, the Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of UNDOF be extended for a further period of six months until 31 May 1977. He further indicated that the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel had expressed their agreement to the proposed extension.

21. In notes verbales dated 22 November (S/12237) and 23 November (S/12238), respectively, the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel confirmed the agreement of their Governments to a six-month extension of the mandate of UNDOF.

(ii) *Consideration at the 1975th meeting (30 November 1976)*

22. At its 1975th meeting on 30 November, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12235).”

23. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12246) which had been prepared during consultations among the members of the Council.

**DECISION:** *At the 1975th meeting on 30 November 1976, the draft resolution (S/12246) was adopted by 12 votes to none as resolution 398 (1976). Three members (Benin, China and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) did not participate in the vote.*

24. Resolution 398 (1976) read as follows:

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12235),*

*Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable*

*and just peace in the Middle East area and the urgent need to continue and intensify such efforts,*

*Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,*

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1977;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

25. In accordance with the agreement reached in consultations, the President read the following complementary statement (S/12247) regarding the resolution just adopted:

As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12235) states in paragraph 32 that ‘despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, there can be no question that the situation in the Middle East will remain unstable and potentially dangerous unless real progress can be made towards a just and lasting settlement of the problem in all its aspects’. This statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.

26. The President further noted that he had been asked by the delegations of Benin, China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to state that, as they had not participated in the vote on the resolution, they took the same position with regard to the statement read on behalf of the members of the Council.

27. Thereafter, statements were made by the representatives of China, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guyana, Sweden, Romania, Japan, Italy, France, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan, the United States and Benin, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Panama.

(c) *Extension of the mandate of UNDOF until 30 November 1977*

(i) *Report of the Secretary-General dated 23 May 1977*

28. As the mandate of UNDOF was due to expire on 31 May, the Secretary-General submitted a report on 23 May (S/12333), giving an account of the activities of the Force during the period from 23 November 1976 to 23 May 1977. The Secretary-General observed that UNDOF had

continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the two parties. He further indicated that during the period under review the situation in the area had remained quiet and that there had been no incidents of a serious nature.

29. The Secretary-General also stated that renewed efforts aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East as called for in Security Council resolution 338 (1973) had been undertaken since the adoption of resolution 398 (1976). At its thirty-first session, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 31/62 of 9 December 1976, calling for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. Early in 1977, he had undertaken a visit to the Middle East in that connexion. The results of his contacts with the parties to the conflict and with the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East were described in the report that he had submitted to the Security Council on 28 February (S/12290 and Corr. 1).

30. The Secretary-General observed that the prevailing quiet in the Israel-Syria sector should not obscure the fact that the main elements of the Middle East problem remained unresolved and that the situation in the area would continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress could soon be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects. He reiterated his belief that unless the opportunity was seized to resume negotiations in a meaningful way as soon as possible, there would be a growing and serious danger that the situation would deteriorate again. Taking into account all the factors involved and considering that the continued presence of UNDOF in the area was essential, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months until 30 November 1977.

(ii) *Consideration at the 2010th meeting (26 May 1977)*

31. At its 2010th meeting on 26 May, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

“The situation in the Middle East:

“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12333).”

32. The Secretary-General made a statement and informed the Council that since the circulation of his report he had been informed by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government of Israel of their assent to the extension of the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months.

33. The President drew attention to a draft resolution (S/12337) before the Council.

DECISION: *At the 210th meeting on 26 May 1977, the draft resolution (S/12337) was adopted by 12 votes to none as resolution 408 (1977). Three members (Benin, China and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) did not participate in the vote.*

[Printed as doc. 31 below]

35. The President made the following complementary statement (S/12338) on behalf of the Council regarding resolution 408 (1977):

“As is known, the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/12333) stated in paragraph 31 that ‘the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector should not obscure the fact that the main elements of the Middle East problem remain unresolved and that the situation in the area will continue to be unstable and dangerous unless real progress can soon be made towards a just and durable settlement of the problem in all its aspects.’ This statement of the Secretary-General reflects the view of the Security Council.”

36. The President added that he had been asked by the delegations of Benin, China and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to state that, as they had not participated in the vote on the resolution, they took the same position with regard to the statement read on behalf of the members of the Council.

37. Thereafter, statements were made by the representatives of China, Romania, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the United States, Canada, the USSR, Pakistan, India, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Mauritius, Panama and Venezuela, and by the President speaking in his capacity as the representative of Benin.

### 3. REPORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION ON THE SITUATION IN THE ISRAEL-LEBANON SECTOR

38. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject of periodic reports on the status of the cease-fire in the sector submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General. From 16 June 1976 to 15 June 1977, the Chief of Staff issued monthly reports, assessing the frequency of incidents in the sector, the number of incidents of firing across or of crossings of the armistice demarcation line as reported by UNTSO observation posts, the frequency of jet flights over Lebanese territory, the complaints submitted by the parties and the results of UNTSO investigations. Those reports were issued as addenda 28 to 39 to document S/11663.

39. The Chief of Staff reported that Israeli forces personnel had continued to occupy daily, during daylight hours, five positions on the Lebanese side of the armistice demarcation line in June and July 1976 and six positions in the period between August 1976 and June 1977.

40. In the months of June and July 1976, according to the reports (S/11663/Add.28 and 29), ground activity had remained at a low level, with 16 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, 3 crossing violations and 39 reported overflights by Israeli jets in June (S/11663/Add.28). During July, there had been few cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, and air activity had decreased to 23 overflights. In June and July, Lebanon had submitted seven complaints of these aerial and ground violations by Israel, which had been the subject of UNTSO inquiries. During the months of August and September, the reports (S/11663/Add.30 and 31) indicated that activity had remained at a low level, with 11 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line and 7 crossing violations. There had been also 22 overflights in August and 23 overflights in September.

41. In reports covering the months of October and November (S/11663/Add.32 and 33), the Chief of Staff indicated that activity in the sector had increased generally. There had been 34 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, 9 crossing violations and 60 reported overflights by Israeli aircraft and unidentified planes.

42. Reports on developments in December, January, February and March (S/11663/Add.34-37) indicated that ground and air activity had initially decreased and remained essentially at the same level. During that four-month period, the incidents had involved only a few cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line and fewer crossing violations and overflights. However, significant ground activity had occurred on 16 January in the vicinity of the village of Bent Jbail (S/11663/Add.35).

43. In the report dated 2 May (S/11663/Add.38) it was indicated that in April ground activity had increased significantly in the north-eastern part of the sector but air activity had decreased. The Chief of Staff reported 31 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, 2 crossing violations and 5 overflights by Israeli jet aircraft.

44. According to the report submitted on 1 June 1977 (S/11663/Add.39), ground and air activity in May had been at a low level, with 3 cases of firing across the armistice demarcation line, 3 crossing violations and 3 reported overflights.

### 4. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31/62 CONCERNING THE PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

#### (a) *Report of the Secretary-General*

45. By a letter dated 7 January 1977 (S/12272), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 31/62, entitled "Peace Conference on the Middle East", adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1976, in which the Council was requested to convene in order to consider the situation in the area in the light of a report which the Secretary-General was requested to submit to it under that resolution.

46. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/62, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/12290 and Corr.1) to the Security Council on 28 February on the results of his contacts with all the parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. After consultations in New York in December and January with all the parties concerned, the Secretary-General had visited Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel between 31 January and 12 February, where he had met with leaders

involved in the Middle East problem. He had also met in Damascus with the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). All the parties had expressed their desire for an early resumption of the negotiating process through the convening of the Peace Conference, but the problem was to find agreement on the conditions under which the Conference could be convened. The Secretary-General observed that it would be necessary, first, to make a determined effort to overcome the lack of confidence and the mutual distrust and fears of all the parties as to the consequences of making compromises and concessions. Diplomatic efforts were under way which might contribute to such changes, and it was vital that the prevailing spirit of moderation and realism be caught before it evaporated and that the parties be assisted to channel that spirit into the arduous process of negotiation.

47. By a letter dated 23 March (S/12306), the representative of Egypt requested that a meeting of the Council be held to discuss the situation in the Middle East in the light of the report of the Secretary-General.

(b) *Consideration at the 1993rd, 1995th and 1997th meetings (25, 28 and 29 March 1977)*

48. At the 1993rd meeting on 25 March, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General submitted under General Assembly resolution 31/62 concerning the Peace Conference on the Middle East (S/12290 and Corr.1)."

49. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

50. The President informed the Council that he had received a letter from the representative of Egypt requesting the participation of PLO in the debate, in accordance with the previous decisions of the Council in that regard. He understood that the proposal had not been put forward under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, but that if approved by the Council, the invitation would confer on PLO the same rights as were conferred when a Member State was invited to participate

under rule 37.

51. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, made a statement regarding that proposal, which he then put to a vote.

DECISION: *At its 1993rd meeting on 25 March 1977, the Security Council adopted the proposal by 10 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 4 abstentions (Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*

52. Accordingly, the President invited the representative of PLO to participate in the discussion.

53. The Secretary-General introduced his report to the Council. The Council began its discussion of the item with statements by the representatives of Egypt and Jordan. —

54. At the 1995th meeting, on 28 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Yemen, at his request, to participate in the discussion.

55. The Council heard statements by the representatives of Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic, Romania, Canada and the USSR, as well as by the representative of PLO. Further statements in exercise of the right of reply were made by the representatives of Egypt and Jordan.

56. At the 1997th meeting on 29 March, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Saudi Arabia, at his request, to participate in the discussion.

57. The Council continued its discussion with statements by the representatives of Pakistan, India, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and by the President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the United States. The representative of Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, as well as the representative of PLO, spoke in exercise of the right of reply. A statement was then made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

(c) *Other communications relating to the situation in the Middle East*

58. By a note dated 21 July 1976 (S/12146), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2 (XXXII), entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East", which had been adopted on 13 February by the Commission on Human Rights.

59. In a letter dated 23 August (S/12186), the



representative of Israel charged that a criminal attack had been carried out on 11 August against passengers of an El Al Israel Airlines plane in the Istanbul international airport. Four passengers had been killed and 21 injured. The organization called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed credit for that act, but, the representative of Israel charged, the guiding force behind the attack was Libya, which according to news reports had armed and financed the two terrorists.

60. In a letter dated 31 August (S/12191), the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya rejected the above charges and recalled that his Government had declared that it did not approve of hijacking and denounced it as an act that jeopardized innocent human lives. The attempt to slander his country was designed to create a climate of anarchy and cover up the terrorism exercised by Zionism against the Arab people of Palestine.

61. By a letter dated 7 October (S/12208), the representative of the USSR transmitted the text of a proposal by his Government concerning a settlement in the Middle East and the Geneva Peace Conference. The Soviet Union again appealed to all the parties directly involved in the Middle East conflict and to all the participants in the Geneva Peace Conference to resume the work of the Conference, and indicated its readiness to take part in the work of the Conference in October-November 1976. It set out a proposal for a four-point agenda of the Conference, which, in its opinion, covered all the key aspects of a settlement. It also reiterated the view that the Conference should be conducted in two phases, with PLO participating from the beginning with equal status.

62. On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/12210) in conformity with the General Assembly's request in resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 on the situation in the Middle East that he report to the Security Council on the implementation of that resolution. After setting out the action that he had taken in December 1975 following the adoption of the resolution, the consideration by the Security Council of relevant issues between January and June 1976, the views expressed by the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, the exploratory mission to the Middle East of his Personal Representative in February and March,

followed by meetings with senior Soviet officials in Moscow on 10 March and senior American officials in Washington on 26 March, and the replies by all parties concerned to identical aide-mémoires handed to them on 1 April, the Secretary-General stated that it seemed clear from those replies that, while there generally was agreement on the necessity of resuming negotiations for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem, there were still important differences of view among the parties concerned. The Secretary-General stated that he would continue his efforts towards the resumption of the negotiating process.<sup>6</sup>

63. In a letter dated 18 October (S/12213), the representative of Kuwait, as Chairman of the Arab Group for October, charged that there had been an escalation of Israeli acts of piracy against Arab civilians on the high seas. Numerous such acts had been reported in the mass media. He cited a recent incident involving the passenger ship *Niyazi*, en route from Lebanon to Cyprus, which had been hijacked to the port of Haifa and detained for 30 hours, while some of its passengers had been maltreated.

64. By a letter dated 7 January 1977 (S/12271), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 31/61 of 9 December 1976, entitled "The situation in the Middle East", and drew attention in particular to paragraph 6, in which the General Assembly had requested the Security Council to take effective measures, within an appropriate time-table, for the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council and the Assembly on the Middle East and Palestine.

## B. The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights

### 1. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1928TH AND 1933RD TO 1938TH MEETINGS (18 AND 24-29 JUNE 1976)

65. At its 1928th meeting on 18 June, the Security Council continued its consideration of the agenda item entitled:

"The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights:

"Report of the Committee established under

<sup>6</sup> Doc. 8 in *ibid.*

General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) (S/12090).<sup>7</sup>

66. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

67. The Council continued its debate with statements by the representatives of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, India and Saudi Arabia.

68. At the 1933rd meeting on 24 June, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mauritania and Morocco, at their request, to participate in the discussion. The Council continued its debate with statements by the representatives of Jordan, Turkey, Bahrain, Hungary and Afghanistan. Also, the President drew attention to a letter dated 24 June (S/12113) from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, requesting that Mr. Amin Hilmy, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States, be invited to participate in the discussion. The Council decided without objection, to extend an invitation to Mr. Hilmy under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

69. At the 1934th meeting on 25 June, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Algeria, Indonesia, Oman and Tunisia, at their request, to participate in the discussion. Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Pakistan, France, Tunisia, Indonesia and the USSR. The Council also heard a statement by Mr. Hilmy, in conformity with the decision taken at the 1933rd meeting. The representative of the United Kingdom and the USSR spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

70. At the 1935th meeting on 28 June, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Bulgaria, Guinea and Somalia, at their request, to participate in the discussion. The Council heard statements by the representatives of Benin, the USSR, Guinea, Italy, the Lao People's Republic, Sweden and Bulgaria.

71. At the 1936th meeting, also on 28 June, the

President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Cyprus, Iraq and Poland, at their request, to participate in the discussion. The Council continued its discussion with statements by the representatives of Panama, Mauritania, China, Japan, Algeria, Oman and Poland.

72. At the 1937th meeting on 29 June, the President with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Czechoslovakia, at his request, to participate in the discussion. The Council continued its debate with statements by the representatives of Romania, the Syrian Arab Republic, Democratic Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Czechoslovakia.

73. At the 1938th meeting on 29 June, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representative of Qatar, at his request, to participate in the discussion. The Council heard a statement by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. At the same meeting, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania introduced a draft resolution (S/12119) sponsored by Guyana, Pakistan, Panama and the United Republic of Tanzania which read as follows:

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the item entitled 'The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights', in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975,

*Having heard* the representatives of the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian people,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (S/12090), transmitted to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX),

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People;

2. *Affirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and

<sup>7</sup> See Doc. 2 in *ibid.*

sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Thereafter, statements were made by the representatives of Qatar, Cyprus, the United States, by the President, speaking as the representative of Guyana, and by the representatives of the USSR and Japan, as well as by the representative of PLO.

*DECISION: At the 1938th meeting on 29 June 1976, the four-Power draft resolution (S/12119) received 10 votes in favour and 1 against (United States of America), with 4 abstentions (France, Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

74. Following the vote, statements were made by representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, China, the USSR, Sweden, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Saudi Arabia. The President made concluding remarks.

## 2. SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

75. In a letter dated 2 July (S/12127), the representative of Chile complained that, in a statement made at the 1938th meeting of the Security Council on 29 June, the representative of the USSR had misrepresented the policy of the Government of Chile.

76. In a letter dated 7 July (S/12130), the representative of the USSR rejected the charges made by the representative of Chile.

77. By a letter dated 21 December (S/12259), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of General Assembly resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, entitled "Question of Palestine", and drew attention in particular to paragraph 4, in which the Assembly had urged the Council to consider once again as soon as possible the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, so as to achieve early progress towards a solution of the problem of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

78. In a letter dated 8 June 1977 (S/12345) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People referred to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 31/20 and expressed the Committee's strong belief that delay in action by the Council

would be prejudicial to progress then being made and that the Council should endeavour urgently to promote a positive approach which would lead tangibly towards the solution of the problem.

## C. The situation in the occupied Arab territories

### 1. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL REQUESTING A MEETING

79. In a letter dated 20 October 1976 (S/12218), the representative of Egypt requested a meeting of the Council to consider the dangerous and explosive situation in the occupied Arab territories resulting from continuing repressive measures by Israel against the inhabitants of those territories. He charged that curfews were still imposed by the Israeli authorities on several Palestinian towns in the West Bank, that many people in the West Bank and Gaza had been arbitrarily arrested or severely beaten and that the Israeli authorities had condoned acts of desecration of the Holy Places in Al-Khalil by extremist Israeli elements.

80. In a further letter dated 20 October (S/12220), the representative of Egypt requested the participation of PLO in the debate.

### 2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1966TH TO 1969TH MEETINGS (1, 4, 9 AND 11 NOVEMBER 1976)

81. At its 1966th meeting on 1 November, the Security Council included the following item in its agenda without objection:

"The situation in the occupied Arab territories:  
"Letter dated 20 October 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12218)."

82. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

83. The President also drew attention to the request of the representative of Egypt that PLO be invited to participate in the debate on the item. He added that the invitation was not being proposed under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, but if approved by the Council, it would confer on PLO the same rights of participation as were conferred on a Member State

when it was invited to participate in the debate under rule 37.

84. The representative of the United States made a statement concerning the proposal.

*DECISION: At its 1966th meeting on 1 November 1976, the Security Council adopted the proposal by 11 votes to 1 (United States of America), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).*

85. Following the vote, statements were made by the representatives of Sweden and the USSR.

86. In accordance with the Council's decision, the representative of PLO was invited to participate in the debate.

87. The Council then began its consideration of the item and heard statements by the representatives of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as by the representative of PLO.

88. At the 1967th meeting on 4 November, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Bangladesh, Mauritania and Saudi Arabia, at their request, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

89. The Council continued its discussion of the item and heard statements by the representatives of Israel, the USSR, Mauritania, Bangladesh, the United Republic of Tanzania, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The representatives of Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of PLO spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

90. At the 1968th meeting on 9 November, the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Indonesia, Morocco and Nigeria, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

91. Discussion was continued with statements by the representatives of the USSR, Morocco, Indonesia and Nigeria.

92. At the 1969th meeting on 11 November, the Council concluded its debate on the item with statements by the representatives of China, Pakistan, Romania and Guyana.

93. At the same meeting, the President stated that as a result of consultations he had held with all members of the Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

Following the request submitted by Egypt on 20 October 1976, the Security Council held four meetings between 1 and 11 November 1976 to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories, with the participation

of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After consulting all the members, the President of the Council states that the Council has agreed on the following:

1. To express its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation;

2. To reaffirm its call upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the territories and to facilitate the return to those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

3. To reaffirm that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying Power is called upon once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements are accordingly strongly deplored. Such measures which have no legal validity and cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace constitute an obstacle to peace;

4. To consider once more that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of populations which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status, and urgently to call upon Israel once more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. In this connexion the Council deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967;

5. To recognize that any act of profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security.

The Council decides to keep the situation under constant attention with a view to meeting again should circumstances require.

94. Following the statement by the President, statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Japan, Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The representative of the USSR spoke in exercise of the right of reply.

### 3. SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

95. In letters dated 1 and 3 November (S/12223 and S/12224), the representative of Israel referred to information that had been submitted by the Islamic Conference and circulated as annex II of a report to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General. He stated that in so far as it related to the situation at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, the information totally disregarded almost 4,000 years of Jewish connexions with the city of Hebron and its policy of guaranteeing access to the Holy Places by members of all faiths. He further stated that the plot of land containing the tomb of the Patriarchs and held holy by Jews throughout the ages as the Cave of Machpelah had been purchased by the Hebrew patriarch Abraham almost 4,000 years ago, as had been recorded in the Bible (Genesis 23:2–20).

96. By a letter dated 20 December (S/12261), the representative of Democratic Yemen, in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of December, requested the circulation of a letter from the Permanent Observer of PLO. In his letter, the representative of PLO stated that, since 6 December, Palestinian civilians under occupation had been subjected to barbarous treatment by the occupation troops, especially in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jericho, Kalandya and Nablus, where curfew had been imposed.

97. By a letter dated 17 February (S/12287), the representative of Egypt transmitted a statement issued on 16 February by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt. The statement charged that in spite of the Council's decision of 11 November 1976, a belt of settlements was being established by Israel in the north-eastern part of the Sinai, as a result of which 1,500 Arab families had been evicted from their homes.

98. In a letter dated 28 March (S/12308), the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestine People informed the President of the Security Council that at an informal meeting held by the Committee, the representative of PLO had set forth the position taken by the Palestine National Council at its recent meeting concerning the recommendations contained in the report submitted by the Committee to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly (A/31/35).<sup>8</sup>

99. By a letter dated 23 May (S/12332), the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya transmitted a letter dated 19 May from the Permanent Observer of PLO, in which he charged that on 3 May Israeli military occupation forces on the West Bank had opened fire on Palestinians, killing a 55-year-old woman and a 15-year-old, boy, who had been denied religious burial by the Israeli forces. Israeli authorities had declared extensive territory in the areas of Jenin and Qabatyia to be "closed", and farmers had been prevented from tilling their lands. There had been widespread reaction in the Palestinian towns of Nablus, Ramallah and Jenin, a general strike had been declared in protest of the practices of the occupying force and approximately 70 Palestinians had been detained.

### 3

#### **Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction)<sup>9</sup>**

**September 9, 1977**

1. The United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has existed as a temporary agency of the United Nations since 1950, with its mandate being renewed periodically by the General Assembly. As the current mandate will expire on 30 June 1978, the General Assembly will presumably consider the question of the mandate during its current session.

2. The Agency's *raison d'être* is to provide services to Palestine refugees, that is, persons or the descendants of persons whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that conflict, lost both their homes and their means of livelihood. One can scarcely read this definition of a Palestine refugee without being reminded that the refugee problem has dimensions which go far beyond the purely humanitarian. Since 1948, the General Assembly has annually recommended the return of the refugees to their original homes or the receipt

<sup>9</sup> Introduction to *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1976–30 June 1977, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 13* (UN doc. A/32/13), pp. 1–10.

<sup>8</sup> Doc. 4 in *ibid.*

of compensation in lieu thereof. The political significance of the mass displacement of human beings is obvious, particularly when the right of return and the right to restoration of their property are acknowledged by the international community. The Agency is keenly aware of the essentially political nature of the problem when considered in all of its ramifications and knows that the only solution is a just settlement in the Near East. However, the Agency's mandate does not extend to all of the ramifications of the problem. It is concerned with only a part of the problem, that is, the provision of services to Palestine refugees pending a settlement.

3. Of the persons who fall under the established definition of Palestine refugees, 1,706,486 are now registered with the Agency. They are distributed in the Agency's area of operations as follows:

Lebanon	201,171
Syrian Arab Republic	192,915
East Jordan	663,773
West Bank <sup>a</sup>	302,620
Gaza Strip <sup>a</sup>	346,007

a The West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip have been under military occupation by the Government of Israel since June 1967.

Not all refugees are eligible to receive services. Eligibility for different services varies and slightly less than half are eligible for and are actually authorized to receive all services. The services being provided, as they have evolved over the past 27 years, are not of the nature of a dole for the permanently destitute. On the contrary, they are directed towards establishing and maintaining levels of health, education and relief for a large part of the Palestinian people that help to make them productive, socially useful human beings who contribute to society rather than impose a burden on it. UNRWA's activities are one of the clearest practical examples of what international co-operation can achieve in pursuit of the United Nations goal of improving the human condition.

4. In the popular mind, refugees are associated with camps and the services provided them are generally thought of as confined to emergency relief assistance like temporary shelter, food and clothing. It is not surprising, therefore, that UNRWA is often thought of as an agency that manages camps and is primarily concerned with purely relief activities. Both are misconceptions.

5. Only 35.3 per cent of the registered refugees

live in camps and, even for that minority, the Agency is not a camp administrator nor does it police or otherwise control the camps. The Agency provides services to eligible registered refugees, whether they are in camps or not. The Agency provides virtually all of the services directly to the refugees, not through Governments, although it deals with Governments on matters of mutual interest affecting the Agency's activities. The Governments in the area of operations have reported that they provide assistance separately to refugees costing almost \$80 million a year (see table 18 of annex 1). The Agency provides three services: education, relief and health. It has its own school system, its own systems to procure and distribute rations and its own clinics and health centres. Through these means, it provides the kinds of services directly to Palestine refugees that are normally provided by education, health and welfare ministries of Governments. Its activities are institutionalized and continuing. It has quasi-governmental functions and is staffed and organized accordingly. The Agency is organized into a headquarters, five operational field offices (in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, east Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza) and three small liaison offices (New York, Geneva and Cairo). It employs 120 internationally recruited staff members and slightly more than, 16,000 area staff members, virtually all of the latter Palestine refugees.

#### *Agency programmes*

6. The Agency's programmes, described in detail in sections B, C and D of chapter 1,<sup>10</sup> may be summarized as follows (employee figures do not include the approximately 1,840 employees in common services):

(a) *Education and training services*, provided by approximately 10,700 employees (mostly teachers) at a total annual cost, including a share of common agency costs, of \$54.8 million in 1976 and \$66.1 million in 1977 (estimated), which include:

(i) The general education programme, under which about 300,000 refugee children receive elementary and preparatory education in 595 UNRWA/UNESCO schools;

(ii) The vocational and teacher-training programme, under which 4,141 trainees are trained at eight UNRWA training centres;

<sup>10</sup> Not included in this excerpt.

(iii) A programme of subsidization of secondary education, under which 29,272 refugee students are educated at government secondary schools;

(iv) A university scholarship programme under which 326 young refugee men and women are educated at universities in Arab countries;

(v) A modest programme of pre-school and youth and women's activities and adult training in crafts; and

(vi) Participation by the Agency in the financing and staffing of a regional Institute of Education, through which teachers appointed to posts in UNRWA/UNESCO schools receive in-service professional and other kinds of training. The Institute also provides extension services (without UNRWA participation) to government educational systems in the Near East.

(b) *Relief services*, provided by approximately 1,250 employees at a total annual cost, including a share of common costs, of \$36 million in 1976 and \$37 million in 1977 (estimated), through which the Agency provides monthly basic rations of flour, rice, sugar and oil to about 831,000 refugees. It also provides assistance in shelter repairs and special hardship assistance. The ration rolls (and other records of eligibility for other services) change constantly, of course, depending upon such considerations as income, presence in the area, births and deaths. This information, to the extent that it is available to the Agency, is computerized. Deletions and additions to ration rolls are made each month based on computer print-outs. As will be seen from table 2 of annex 1,<sup>11</sup> some 1,330,000 names have been added to ration eligibility rolls since 1950 and about 946,000 names have been deleted. Of the approximately 1,341,000 refugees registered for rations, only 831,000 actually receive them, because of ration ceilings. The difference is made up of some 510,000 children (of any age, including infants below one year) of refugees whose names are added to the list of those authorized actually to receive rations only as names are deleted from the list.

(c) *Health services*, provided by approximately 2,330 employees at a total annual cost, including a share of common costs, of \$17.3 million in 1976 and \$21.2 million in 1977 (estimated). The Agency medical services are available to approximately 1,500,000 refugees at its own 98 clinics and health

centres and at government and private hospitals. The Agency subsidizes the private hospitals and, when government hospitals charge fees for refugee patients, the Agency either subsidizes the hospitals or reimburses the patients. Mostly in support of its preventive medical services, the Agency provides supplementary food to some 123,000 refugees in vulnerable categories, for example, young children and expectant and nursing mothers. The health programme also includes environmental sanitation in refugee camps.

### *Financing the programmes*

#### *The financial position, July 1976 to June 1977*

7. The United Nations and certain specialized agencies contribute about 4 per cent of UNRWA's income and non-governmental organizations about 1 per cent. The remaining 95 per cent must come from voluntary contributions by Governments.

8. Contributions received in 1976 did not provide income sufficient to meet all budgeted expenditures. Twice during the year the projected financial position required the Agency to plan to suspend operations and terminate the services of virtually all staff members. The first contemplated suspension—in July—was averted by the pledging of special contributions by a number of Governments in May and June made in response to a special appeal by the Secretary-General. At the beginning of September, the financial position had again become so grave that the Commissioner-General was forced to establish a six-weeks schedule for action culminating in the suspension of operations and discharge of staff. Only a last minute contribution by a major contributor avoided the necessity of setting such drastic action in motion. Subsequently, total budget reductions of about \$7.2 million, made possible by the temporary suspension of some services and the deferment of most of the budget provisions for capital improvements (undesirable as both of these actions were) plus certain additional contributions, enabled the Agency to close the year with, as it assumed, only a small deficit. Later, a delayed special contribution by the United States of \$6 million for 1976 effectively left the Agency in surplus for the year by approximately that amount, as shown in section G of chapter 1 below.

9. At the start of 1977, the Agency's estimated deficit was of the order of \$45 million, based on

<sup>11</sup> Not included in this excerpt.

estimated expenditure of \$139.7 million and estimated income of \$94.7 million. In subsequent months, the Agency carefully re-examined its budget, in particular its assumptions regarding unit costs, inflation and exchange rates, and concluded that it would be possible to reduce its budget for 1977 to \$134 million without reducing services. During the same period, expected income for 1977 rose to \$117.6 million. Consequently, the deficit for 1977 at the end of the reporting period (30 June 1977) was estimated at \$16.4 million, or the equivalent of the cost of approximately seven weeks' operations. Not included in these figures is the extraordinary, one-time cost of a new camp in Lebanon (see para. 79 below), which has been kept separate from the regular budget. The camp will be built in two stages, each costing about \$6 million. As at 30 June 1977, \$3.3 million was expected to be available leaving a shortfall for the first stage alone of \$2.7 million. The Agency is unable to use any of its general funds to help meet the cost of the camp until it has covered the deficit of \$16.4 million in its budget for regular programmes.

10. The working capital position of the Agency is such (\$17.8 million at the close of 1976) that the Agency, in theory, could cover the presently estimated deficit by drawing down virtually all of its working capital. However, this would leave the Agency with no working capital to cover operations in the early months of 1978 when, as the experience of the Agency clearly indicates will be the case, very few contributions will be received. More important, perhaps, it would also leave the Agency totally without reserves to deal with the financial crisis that is expected to arise in 1978 because the prospect is for lower total contributions in that year than in 1977.

11. Consequently, if additional contributions are not received for 1977, the Agency will have to reduce the deficit, if not completely then at least substantially, by the same means as were employed in 1976, namely, temporary suspension of certain services and further deferment of even essential capital and other improvements. Such action would, of course, bear heavily on the refugees affected by the temporary suspension of certain services, and the further deferment of essential capital and other improvements would mean a continued decline in the quality of the Agency's education and health services, which are already at a minimum.

### *The budget for 1978.*

12. Chapter 11<sup>12</sup> below contains the Agency's proposed budget for 1978 totalling \$148 million as compared with the adjusted budget of \$134 million for 1977 and actual expenditure in 1976 of approximately \$115 million. The projected increase for 1978 over 1977 is less than that envisaged for 1977 over 1976. The latter increase, however, is somewhat misleading in that the rather low expenditure level for 1976 was achieved, as pointed out in paragraph 9 above, only by temporarily suspending some services and deferring certain capital improvements.

### *Special problems*

#### *A thoroughly unsatisfactory method of providing income*

13. UNRWA has been assigned quasi-governmental responsibilities by the international community, but it does not have the authority Governments have to acquire resources to meet these responsibilities. The critical difference is that Governments have the authority to tax and to borrow. UNRWA has no such authority. Nor does it have a responsibility, in any case, to provide itself with revenue by any means. Despite these facts, fund-raising has become a major preoccupation of the Agency and, in particular, of senior UNRWA officials. The governing consideration is that it is meaningless to assign responsibilities the meeting of which require large amounts of money unless provision is made for the money. By default, therefore, the Agency has assumed non-assigned fund-raising responsibilities so that it can meet its assigned programme responsibilities.

14. In its financial operations, the Agency, again like Governments, must engage in the elaborate staff work required to allocate resources among different programmes competing for funds. To do so with any reasonable degree of effectiveness, it must, like Governments, conduct its financial operations on the basis of reliable estimates of expenditures and income in the current financial year and must, like Governments, be in a position to project both expenditure and income into the future.

15. The expenditure side of the UNRWA budget meets the requirements of orderly financial operations. The income side is disorderly and unpredictable and fails to meet requirements in

<sup>12</sup> Not included in this excerpt.



many important respects. It is probably fair to state that no Government would even consider requiring its financial managers to budget and to plan in the uncertain framework imposed on UNRWA. The Agency is not concerned with orderliness *per se*, but rather with the adverse effect of disorderliness on the provision of services to the refugees. It is willing to cope as best it can only because it feels a responsibility to carry out its mandate as the instrument of an international community that has decided to provide services to Palestine refugees presumably until the community removes them from the refugee category by arranging a general settlement in the Near East.

16. *The principal defects of the present system of providing income for UNRWA are:*

(a) Income to maintain services at existing levels has been insufficient in recent years, thus forcing the Agency to reduce services (for example, rations in 1976) and to forego expenditures (such as school construction) thereby adversely affecting services in the future.

(b) No provision can be made for improvement of refugee living conditions or for expansion of facilities (for example, vocational training centres) which not only benefit the refugees, but also improve conditions (e. g. economic development) in the area.

(c) The Agency does not know what income it will receive in any given year until well into the year, usually in the last quarter, and occasionally (as in 1976) until after the end of the year. In such circumstances, effective allocation of resources is impossible, even to the extent of not being able to spend income in the year it is required because it is pledged too late.

(d) Late pledging leads to late disbursement by contributors and the Agency is never sure of having enough cash or commodities at the time they must be used to meet current obligations.

(e) A large amount of the time of key staff is spent in preparing for the contingencies of reduction or suspension of services and the related reduction or discharge of the Agency's 16,000 employees. Twice during 1976, when it appeared that the Agency would have to suspend its activities entirely because its liabilities would exceed its assets, hundreds of man-hours were spent by the Commissioner-General, the Deputy Commissioner-General and the directors of the Finance, Personnel and Legal Departments and their staff in preparing

for the discharge of all staff. Both crises were averted by pledges of special contributions, in the second case (in September) literally a few hours before the absolute deadline for setting the process in motion.

(f) The Commissioner-General's fund-raising activities require him to travel frequently and to devote much of his time while not away from headquarters to the personal preparation of papers and correspondence. He must also spend much time reviewing the budget and changing decisions on resource allocations. Altogether, he probably spends on this activity a total of at least two months each year that he would not have to devote to it if there were an orderly system of providing income. The time must be taken from the time that he could otherwise profitably devote to meeting his other management responsibilities.

(g) The Agency believes that the present system may be defective from the points of view of contributors in that they feel a need to know in more detail and further in advance the Agency's requirements and the combination of individual contributions that the Agency considers necessary to permit the requirements to be met. The Agency is aware that many Governments have budget cycles of two or three years and that relatively firm decisions on financial commitments must be taken in the early stages of the cycles.

17. To correct these defects to the extent possible, the Agency proposes to adopt the forward planning procedure described below. It has consulted the Advisory Commission on the procedure and is taking into account the views expressed by members of the Commission. It has also informed the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East of its intention to adopt the new procedures and will, as in the past, keep the Working Group informed of its financial position and the results of its fund-raising activities. As contributions to the Agency are voluntary, the Agency believes that participation by contributors in the planning process must also be voluntary. If any Government approached by the Agency does not wish to participate or wishes to participate only in part, the Agency will, of course, respect its wishes and will thereafter simply keep the non-participating Government informed of the Agency's financial position. However, the Agency wishes to point out that, beginning in 1978, it will take

no other initiative to raise funds than to follow the proposed procedure, except in response to specific requests from Governments for further information or proposals on levels of contributions.

18. The Agency is already engaging in forward financial planning with some Governments and with the European Economic Community. It will maintain established practice, including those elements not a part of the general system described above.

19. Solicitation of contributions from non-governmental organizations will continue as at present, outside the system proposed for Governments.

20. The Agency intends to put the proposed system into effect for the years 1979–1981 beginning in June 1978, if the General Assembly extends the Agency's mandate. It intends to put as much as possible of the system into effect for 1978–1980 in 1977, but the schedule will necessarily be compressed and not all Governments may be included. Priority in 1977 is, of course, being given to solicitation of special contributions urgently required (a) to eliminate the deficit for this year, which, as of 30 June, was \$16.4 million in the Agency's regular budget totalling \$134 million, and (b) to provide the \$2.7 million still lacking of the \$6 million required outside the regular budget to cover the extraordinary cost of the first stage of construction of a new camp to accommodate displaced refugees in Lebanon.

21. No significance should be attached to the fact that the proposed forward planning will usually extend beyond the period of the UNRWA mandate. Any agreements reached with Governments would, of course, be subject to review in the case of expiration of the mandate.

22. The new procedure the agency proposes to follow and the timing of its actions are as follows:

(a) *June*. Consistent with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 31/15 A,<sup>13</sup> the Agency will communicate with the permanent representatives of all Governments who have not contributed to UNRWA in the past. The Agency will ask each representative whether his Government wishes to begin contributing to the education, relief and health of the Palestine refugees through UNRWA. The Agency will inform each representative of its budget expenditures by major programme and any extrabudgetary needs for the

following year, of actual contributions received from each Government and other sources in the preceding year and of total expected income in the current and following years. The Agency will seek to reach agreement with the Government on an amount for pledging in November of that year for the following year, should the Government wish to begin contributing.

(b) *July/August*. The Agency will communicate with the permanent representatives of all Governments who have contributed in the past or, in the case of non-member Governments who contribute, other appropriate representatives. It will inform them of the results of its solicitations of previously non-contributing Governments. It will provide the same information to them as it will have provided to previously non-contributing Governments on past, current and future financial needs and income and, in addition, will inform them of projected totals of gross financial needs and of expected income for two years after the following year. In the light of this information and the past record of contributions by the Government concerned, the Agency will seek to reach agreement with the Government on (i) an amount for pledging in November of that year for the following year, (ii) an amount to be used as a reasonable estimate for active consideration by the Government as a contribution in the year after the following year and (iii) a tentative planning figure for the third year. The figures thus arrived at for these various uses may be changed during the process of solicitation in the light of adjustments in financial needs and decisions by contributors.

(c) *September through May*. At least every three months, the agency will inform all representatives of contributing Governments of the results of its solicitations and of any adjustments in its budgeted expenditures. As Governments inform the Agency of firm pledges for the following or current year of reasonable estimates that may be used for the next year and of tentative planning figures that may be used for the third year, the Agency will include the agreed figures in the total of expected income for the year in question. No individual pledges, estimates or planning figures agreed by a Government will be reported to other contributors without the agreement of the Government concerned. Beginning in January or as soon thereafter as possible, the Agency will include in its reports to contributing Governments infor-

<sup>13</sup> See Doc. 18 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

mation on the level of services that can be provided in the current year with the income expected in that year. If income is insufficient, the Agency will explain to Governments, the Advisory Commission and the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA what services will have to be reduced or suspended.

### *The conflict in Lebanon*

23. The situation in Lebanon continued seriously to affect the Agency's activities throughout the area of operations during the reporting period 1 July 1976 to 30 June 1977. The achievement of an effective cease-fire in most of the country in October 1976 with the help of the Arab Peace Force greatly improved the situation, but, even with the end of most armed conflict, much still remained to be done to assure the personal security of individuals and to put back into operation the local and international communications and other facilities required by the Agency (particularly headquarters) to function. By the end of the reporting period, improvement was great enough, however, for the Agency to lease the additional office space required to permit the return to Beirut of Agency headquarters. The position is that adequate office space is expected to be available in Beirut, possibly as early as mid-October 1977, and the long-delayed construction required to provide adequate space in Amman is now expected to be completed some time during the same month. As soon as the time when adequate office space will be available is reasonably certain, a decision will be taken, in the light of conditions then obtaining in Beirut, whether to reunite headquarters in Beirut or Amman. Actual implementation of the decision will, of course, depend upon developments in Beirut between the taking of the decision and the date fixed for the return. Meanwhile, two thirds of headquarters will remain in Amman and one third in Vienna.

24. The Agency will probably never be able to determine precisely how many refugee casualties the conflict in Lebanon produced, but there were doubtless many hundreds. Up to 30,000 refugees were displaced by the fighting and forced to find new places to live. Of these, about 12,000—mostly from the totally destroyed camps of Dikwaneh and Jisr el-Basha on the outskirts of Beirut—settled in Damour, a town south of Beirut. It is not known at the present time how many displaced

refugees must be provided with housing, but the Agency, at the request of the Lebanese Government, is planning the construction of a new camp at Bassriyeh, which will initially accommodate about 8,500 displaced refugees now in Damour. The cost of this first stage will be about \$6 million. The camp will be so constructed that it can later be expanded, if adjacent land is made available, to accommodate up to 20,000 displaced refugees.

25. Thirty staff members employed by the Lebanon Field Office and one employed by headquarters are missing and presumed to have been killed in the whole period of sustained conflict from September 1975 to October 1976 inclusive. The normal operations of the Lebanon Field Office were understandably curtailed, but continued, often under very hazardous conditions, at a much higher level than had been considered possible. In addition to normal services (provided at times in improvised installations as part of the refugee population moved), emergency assistance in the form of food, blankets, mattresses, children's clothing and cooking kits, was provided to those in need, largely from donations made by voluntary agencies. By the end of the year under review, operations in Lebanon had returned nearly to normal.

### *Problems relating to staff and premises*

26. As United Nations employees, UNRWA staff members, subject to their respective rules governing their conduct, should be free from arrest and detention and free to travel on official duty. Agency installations are premises protected by international agreements and should not be entered or removed from its control except by its permission. These principles are violated, albeit infrequently, by some of the Governments in the area (for further details, see chap. 1, sect. F).<sup>14</sup>

### *Conclusion*

27. In the concluding paragraphs of the introduction to his last annual report as Commissioner-General, covering the period 1 July 1975–30 June 1976, Sir John Rennie pointed out that, in his two preceding reports, he had

“expressed concern about the agency's ability to maintain its regular programmes, under its

<sup>14</sup> Not included in this excerpt.

mandate from the General Assembly, in conditions of chronic financial instability and in a turbulent operating environment".<sup>15</sup>

He went on to say that:

The exclusive identification of UNRWA with camps and relief is out of date and the time long past when UNRWA's financial problems could be dealt with as if it were a purely temporary relief organization, to be financed on a hand-to-mouth basis by periodic appeals to humanitarian sentiment. Over the 25 years of UNRWA's existence it has developed services of a recurrent, quasi-governmental kind, notably in education and training, which cannot be accommodated to an uncertain income."<sup>16</sup>

The present Commissioner-General agrees entirely with Sir John's expression of concern and with his observations. The Agency was created in the aftermath of one war and has continued to provide its services through two more international wars and one civil war. It has coped with the turbulence mentioned by Sir John and with the political complexities encountered in the area. It would be tragic if, having surmounted those formidable obstacles, it were to be prevented from fulfilling its mandate by the unwillingness of the international community to provide the resources required to do so.

28. I cannot conclude the introduction to this my first report to the General Assembly as Commissioner-General of UNRWA without paying special tribute to my predecessor Sir John Rennie. Sir John, who joined UNRWA as Deputy Commissioner-General in November 1968 and was appointed Commissioner-General in May 1971, retired on 31 March 1977. Sir John led the Agency through the most difficult period of its 27-year existence. He gave of himself unstintingly and, if it had not been for his skilled leadership, it is most unlikely that the Agency would have survived. When the Palestinian people look back on their long years of travail and frustration, it is hoped that they will keep in mind the major role this dedicated, humane man played in meeting an important part of the basic needs of perhaps more than half of the Palestinian people during a critical period of their history. They are in a far better position to pursue the goals they set for themselves because they are better trained and educated and much less debilitated by poverty and disease than would have been the case if UNRWA had not had the benefit of Sir John's leadership.

<sup>15</sup> See Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

# Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

## 4

### Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>17</sup>

September 23, 1977

#### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

19 September 1977

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for submission to the General Assembly in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 31/20.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL

Chairman, Committee on the Exercise  
of the Inalienable Rights of  
the Palestinian People

His Excellency

Mr. Kurt Waldheim

Secretary-General of the United Nations

#### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, established by the General Assembly in resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, submitted its first report to the Assembly at its thirty-first session.

2. In its resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, adopted by 90 votes to 16, with 30 abstentions, the General Assembly took note of the report of the Committee and endorsed the recommendations contained therein, as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. Those recommendations are reproduced in annex I to the present report. Subsequently, by its decision 31/318 of 22 December

1976, the General Assembly enlarged the membership of the Committee by the addition of Guyana, Mali and Nigeria.

3. The following States were members of the Committee in 1977: Afghanistan, Cuba, Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia.

#### II. MANDATE OF THE COMMITTEE

4. The present mandate of the Committee was specified in paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 31/20. In paragraph 5, the General Assembly authorized the Committee to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations and to report thereon to the Assembly at its thirty-second session. In paragraph 6, the Assembly requested the Committee to promote the greatest possible dissemination of information on its programme of implementation through non-governmental organizations and other appropriate means.

#### III. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

##### A. Election of officers

5. At its 19th meeting, on 26 January 1977, the Committee unanimously re-elected the following officers:

*Chairman:* Mr. Médoune Fall (Senegal)

*Vice-Chairmen:* Mr. Ricardo Alarcón Quesada  
(Cuba)

Mr. Mir Abdul Wahab Siddiq  
(Afghanistan)

*Rapporteur:* Mr. Victor J. Gauci (Malta)

##### B. Participation in the work of the Committee

6. The Committee decided that those States Members of the United Nations and permanent observers to the United Nations which had participated in the work of the Committee as observers in 1976 could, if they so wished, continue to participate in that capacity in 1977. These were: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Syrian Arab Republic, the League of

<sup>17</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 35* (UN doc. A/32/35), excluding list of contents and Annex I (Recommendations of the Committee endorsed by the General Assembly at its Thirty-first Session—see UN doc. A/31/35). The previous report of the Committee was published as doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which continued in 1977 to participate in the work of the Committee as observers.

7. In order to encourage the contribution of all sectors of opinion to its work, the Committee authorized the Chairman to request the Secretary-General again to invite all States Members of the United Nations and the permanent observers to the United Nations which were not already participating in the work of the Committee to do so, if they so wished, as observers; they were also to be informed that the Committee was ready to receive and to study their suggestions and proposals made either orally or in writing. This invitation was to be brought to the particular notice of all those States directly interested in the Middle East situation and the members of the Security Council, especially its permanent members.

8. The Secretary-General's letter conveying this invitation and the replies received are contained in documents A/AC. 183/L.31 and Add. 1-4.

#### *C. Establishment of a Task Force*

9. To facilitate its work, the Committee appointed a Task Force composed of nine members. It was entrusted with the task of: (1) keeping up to date with events which affected the work of the Committee and suggesting to the Committee action which it could usefully undertake, and (2) assisting the Committee in any other specific assignment related to its work. The following were appointed members of the Task Force: Malta (Chairman), Afghanistan, Cuba, Guinea, Guyana, India, Senegal, Tunisia and Palestine Liberation Organization.

### IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE

#### *A. Efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations in accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 31/20*

##### *1. Review of the discussion in the General Assembly at its thirty-first session*

10. The Committee studied and analysed the views expressed in the discussion of its report and recommendations at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. It noted the concurrence of opinion that the question of Palestine was a central element of the Middle East conflict and that, therefore, a just and lasting peace in the area could be achieved only if the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people were taken into account. It noted also the emphasis made

that a satisfactory and equitable solution to the question of Palestine could only be achieved within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. The Committee noted that these major trends of opinion emerging from the debate confirmed the basic considerations presented by the Committee in its report.

11. On the other hand, a noticeable trend of opinion had also held that the Committee had given detailed consideration only to one aspect—though an important one—of the Middle East problem, and that, in consequence, the report and recommendations lacked a sufficient balance. However, the Committee maintained that this was a question of the mandate assigned to it; the Committee could not go beyond its mandate, while recognizing that other aspects of the wider problem were dealt with elsewhere within the United Nations system.

12. The Committee noted that under the terms of General Assembly resolution 31/62, the Secretary-General had had contacts with all parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. Taking into account its mandate, the Committee felt that a fuller report on those contacts might have been made available to it, and expressed the hope that it would be kept fully informed should such contacts take place in the future.

##### *2. Contacts with the Security Council and consideration of possible action.*

13. The Committee noted with appreciation the information conveyed by the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization on 28 March 1977 that the Palestine National Council, at its meeting in Cairo, in March 1977, had decided (a) to consider the recommendations contained in the report submitted by the Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session as a positive and progressive step towards the achievement of the aspirations and rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty; (b) to declare that any settlement or agreement affecting the rights of the Palestinian people concluded in its absence would be null and void.

14. As an expression of the views of the people directly concerned, the Committee decided to

bring this information to the attention of the Security Council; a letter was accordingly addressed to the President of the Security Council on 28 March 1977.<sup>18</sup> The Committee wishes to stress the importance of this matter, and also desires to bring it to the attention of the General Assembly.

15. At the invitation of Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Chairman of the Committee visited Lebanon in August 1977 and met with Mr. Arafat and other leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Reporting to the Committee on these meetings, the Chairman stated that Mr. Arafat had expressed his appreciation of the work of the Committee and had stated that, despite certain reservations, the Palestine Liberation Organization considered the Committee's recommendations, especially if adopted by the Security Council, as an equitable basis for the solution of the question of Palestine.

16. The Chairman also visited some of the refugee camps, where he was able to see for himself the unacceptable plight of the refugees. He was impressed by their wish for a better future and for a peaceful and just solution to their problem as well as by their determination to continue the struggle if a peaceful solution was not forthcoming.

17. Consideration was given by the Committee throughout its deliberations as to the most propitious time for the Security Council to take up the item entitled "Question of Palestine", as it was requested to do in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 31/20, which urged the Security Council to consider again as soon as possible the recommendations contained in the Committee's report, taking fully into account the observations made thereon during the debate in the General Assembly. It was evident that the question of timing of such consideration could not be looked at in isolation, and that the situation in the region itself had to be taken into account. It was clear too, that there was need for continuing consultations so that a meeting of the Security Council could be called for under favourable conditions.

18. The Committee attached particular importance to this matter, first, because implementa-

tion of the Committee's recommendations required the active involvement of the Security Council and, secondly, because the discussion in the General Assembly had revealed that there was virtual unanimity of opinion that the Palestinian issue was a fundamental element in the search for a settlement of the Middle East conflict. The Committee therefore felt that, to the extent possible within its own mandate, it should strive to facilitate the work of the Security Council in taking positive action when the latter was next called upon to reconsider the problems of the area.

19. The attention of the Committee was drawn to the fact that the political communiqué<sup>19</sup> issued after the Ministerial Meeting of the Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 11 April 1977, had noted with satisfaction that the General Assembly had adopted the Committee's report and had also called upon the Security Council to take measures for the immediate implementation of the Committee's recommendations. That communiqué had also referred to the decision<sup>20</sup> taken at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries on the need to bring pressure on Israel, especially in the Security Council, with a view to securing Israel's compliance with United Nations resolutions. Communiqués on the question of Palestine issued at other international meetings of countries, political parties and organizations were also noted with satisfaction.

20. It was felt that there was a wider recognition by certain members of the Security Council of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, and of the crucial relevance of this aspect within the Middle East situation. The urgency of reconvening the Geneva Conference had been acknowledged; one of the main points at issue was still whether the Palestine Liberation Organization should be allowed to participate in that Conference on an equal footing with the other parties. On both these points the position of the Committee was very firm; it had repeatedly stressed the urgency of constructive efforts towards a just solution guaranteeing the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and insisted on the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the representatives of the Palestinian people, on an

<sup>18</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1977*, document S/12308. [orig. note.]

<sup>19</sup> Doc. 80 below.

<sup>20</sup> See doc. 141 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

equal footing in any such efforts. It was considered useful, therefore, for an active dialogue to be established between the Committee and the participants in the Geneva Conference with a view to promoting a negotiated solution, since it was felt that the Committee, having already demonstrated its impartiality, was well placed to promote its recommendations on implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people.

21. The Committee decided that it would be useful if those members of the Security Council which had been unable to support the report and recommendations of the Committee would indicate their latest thinking on the question of the rights of the Palestinian people; the Committee accordingly authorized the Chairman to address letters to the Permanent Representatives of Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America seeking this information. At the same time, the Chairman was authorized to address a similar letter to the Permanent Representative of Israel, as a principal party to the issue. Copies of these letters are reproduced in annex II to the present report.

22. Since no replies had been received to these letters the Committee decided that its Chairman should meet the permanent representatives of those countries which were members of the Security Council and seek to obtain oral replies from them.

23. The Chairman reported on his contacts at the 22nd meeting of the Committee on 7 June 1977. In those meetings the Chairman had emphasized that the Committee's sole objective, within its terms of reference, was to make a constructive contribution to the heart of the problem in the Middle East, and that it had invariably sought the views of all Member States in carrying out its mandate as determined by the General Assembly; furthermore, as a body duly constituted by the General Assembly, its recommendations carried the authority of a United Nations resolution. The Permanent Representatives of the five States had all adduced the fact that they had not voted for General Assembly resolutions 3376 (XXX) and 31/20 as their main reason for not replying to the Chairman's letter. In the Chairman's view, this argument involved a dangerous contradiction. It not only risked paralysing the Organization but could also undermine the *de jure* status of Israel which had been established by General Assembly

resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949, for which certain countries had not voted.

24. Summarizing the outcome of his contacts with the five Powers concerned, the Chairman stated that they had evidently appreciated the fact that the Committee's report would figure largely in the deliberations of the Security Council when it considered the question of Palestine, but had felt that in view of the efforts being made at the time it would be better if such consideration by the Council were deferred to a more appropriate moment.

25. The Committee was convinced that its aim should be to seek to consolidate the positive trend that was apparently developing in the views of certain countries and to contribute towards the creation of a climate which would favour the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. To this end, it felt that it was important that the work of the Committee should be the subject of a thorough exchange of views in the light of the evolution of the situation and the contacts which were taking place.

26. In view of the urgency of the matter, and in order to highlight the relevance of the Committee's recommendations, the Chairman was authorized, with the full backing of the Committee, to address a letter to the President of the Security Council.

27. Accordingly, on 8 June 1977 the Chairman addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, which though not suggesting a definite date for a Security Council meeting, drew attention to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 31/20, and conveyed the Committee's strong belief that delay in action by the Council would be prejudicial to progress, and that the requirements of the present situation demanded that at its next meeting on the question of Palestine the Security Council should endeavour urgently to promote a positive approach which would lead tangibly towards a solution of the Palestinian problem (S/12345).

28. On 12 September 1977, the Committee decided to authorize the Chairman to address another letter to the President of the Security Council which would again recall paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 31/20 and stress that the recommendations contained in the Committee's report in 1976 had been endorsed by the General Assembly and were therefore recommendations of



the General Assembly. While no specific date was suggested for a Security Council meeting on the question of Palestine, the President of the Council was requested to ensure that this item was discussed by the Council before being taken up by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. The letter also contained a request that it be published as a document of the Security Council (S/12399), while a copy was sent to the Secretary-General with the request that it be published as a document of the General Assembly (A/32/217).

### 3. *Reaction to developments in the occupied territories*

29. The Committee viewed with extreme concern the actions taken by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories, especially the administrative measures it had announced and which seemed to imply a continuation of the policy aimed at permanent annexation of those territories. Strong condemnation was expressed against these actions of the Government of Israel which could only encourage the establishment of even more such settlements and create greater tension in the area, against the wishes of the international community.

30. Accordingly, on 28 July 1977, the Chairman again addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council expressing his deep concern at the action taken by the Government of Israel to approve settlements at Camp Kadum, Ofra and Maale Adumin, situated in the territories illegally occupied since June 1967. In this letter, the Chairman also pointed out that this decision of the Government of Israel was incompatible with the recommendations contained in the Committee's report, which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session; the decision furthermore constituted a violation of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949<sup>21</sup> of General Assembly resolutions 3525 (XXX) of 15 December 1975 and 31/106 of 16 December 1976, of Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, and of statements made on behalf of the Security Council by its President at the 1922nd meeting, on 26 May 1976<sup>22</sup>, and the 1969th meeting, on 11 November 1976.<sup>23</sup> The Chairman also expressed the

view that such a decision merely aggravated the tensions in the region, artificially erected an additional obstacle to the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and undermined efforts to promote a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem (S/12377).

### 4. *Other action taken by the Committee*

31. With respect to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 31/20 which urged all competent bodies of the United Nations to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with its programme of implementation, the Committee was of the opinion that those bodies should stand ready to implement the recommendations of the Committee, and should take whatever intermediate steps were necessary at this stage to avoid delays in implementation of those recommendations. At the request of the Committee, this view was brought by the Secretary-General to the attention particularly of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, which were likely to have specific responsibilities in the implementation of the programme.

### B. *Dissemination of information in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 31/20*

32. As requested in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 31/20, the Committee attached the greatest importance to dissemination of information on its work, and on the various aspects of the problem of the implementation of its recommendations concerning the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. It was felt important that the public should realize that the Committee's function was not to support any one country against another but to deal fairly and objectively with a problem affecting international peace and security. The view was expressed that no opportunity should be missed to bring to the attention of the world public all the facts of the Palestinian problem which had long been ignored.

33. With this end in view, the Chairman of the Committee addressed the Economic and Social Council at its sixty-second session, held in New York, and the Committee was represented by a delegation of two members at the World Conference on Action Against Apartheid, held at Lagos from 22 to 26 August 1977. In addition, the report and recommendations of the Committee were brought to the attention of the World Health

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig.]

<sup>22</sup> Doc. 13 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>23</sup> Doc. 14 in *ibid.*

Assembly when it met at Geneva in May 1977. The Committee also decided that the resolution on the question of Palestine adopted by the Council of Ministers and approved by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at Libreville in July 1977 should be published as a document of the General Assembly (A/32/160).<sup>24</sup>

34. At its 23rd meeting, on 9 August 1977, the Committee decided that the issue by the United Nations of a series of commemorative stamps relating to the question of Palestinian rights would be an appropriate method of highlighting those rights, and accordingly authorized the Chairman to request the Secretary-General to initiate steps to issue such a series of stamps.

35. The Committee considered a suggestion that an international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people be designated and observed, and decided that this proposal could be included in a resolution at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

36. In considering ways and means of obtaining the widest possible radio and television coverage of the Palestinian question, the Committee recalled that, at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo in August 1976, a resolution<sup>25</sup> adopted by that Conference referred to the need to strive in all fields, at the widest international level, to realize the objective of recognition of and respect for the rights of the Palestinian people (see A/31/197, p. 121). It was decided therefore that the Committee should approach the Co-ordination Council of the Pool of Press Agencies of Non-Aligned Countries with the request that maximum coverage be given by national and international media to the various aspects of this question.

37. The Chairman accordingly addressed the Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries in New York requesting him to bring the Committee's decision to the notice of the Co-ordination Council of the Pool of Press Agencies of the Non-Aligned Countries so that it might take steps to improve coverage of the question of Palestine by national and international mass media.

#### V. APPRAISAL OF ACTION TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31/20

38. In its consideration of action taken by the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat to disseminate information on the work of the Committee, as required by paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 31/20, the Committee agreed that the Office of Public Information could, through its network of information centres throughout the world, play an influential role by making available to the public an objective presentation of the Palestinian question. The opinion was expressed that the Office of Public Information in particular was in the best position to state the truth about decisions on this question in the United Nations, and about the history of the United Nations involvement with the Palestinian question—facts which would otherwise be buried in the archives of the United Nations and utilized only by specialists or by Governments in pursuit of their own interests.

39. It was felt that there was genuine public interest in the question of the Middle East and in the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, although many seemed unable to distinguish between a resolution dealing with refugees and a resolution dealing with a people's right to independence. Publications on the question should be strictly documentary in nature, simple and accurate in their coverage of significant and historical events.

40. The Committee noted that the Office of Public Information had recorded interviews with members and observers of the Committee which were broadcast in English, French, Spanish and Arabic and that the United Nations Monthly Chronicle had carried articles on the proceedings of the Committee.

41. The Committee was agreed that this campaign should be intensified in the coming months through the publication of pamphlets dealing with individual aspects of the problem, and through more television and radio broadcasts in several languages aimed at reaching the widest possible audience throughout the world. The United Nations Monthly Chronicle could also extend coverage to articles on events beyond the work of the Committee and take in events and developments in the Middle East region.

<sup>24</sup> Doc. 124 below.

<sup>25</sup> See doc. 141 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

42. It was also felt that the publication of pamphlets on the various aspects of the problem would be particularly useful in making the facts concerning the rights of the Palestinian people more widely disseminated and better understood.

## VI. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

43. Having taken into account the various observations made on its report and recommendations and in the light of current events in the region, the Committee unanimously decided to reaffirm the validity of its recommendations, endorsed by the General Assembly, which are reproduced as annex I of this report. It agreed that the date suggested for the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from territories occupied in 1967, although now passed, should be retained for its symbolic significance and as a timely reminder of the urgency of a peaceful solution under the auspices of the United Nations, and particularly on the basis of resolutions unanimously adopted but not yet implemented.

44. It was also agreed that an intensification of efforts was necessary to implement those recommendations with the minimum delay, and that the various sectors of the United Nations system should act in concert to promote their implementation by peaceful means.

45. In the course of the discussion in the Committee, suggestions were made as to ways and means by which the objectives of the Committee could be further advanced. It was felt, however, that a decision on these suggestions should be deferred until such time as the Security Council had considered the question of Palestine.

## ANNEX II

### *A. Letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations*

I have the honour to inform you that on 15 April 1977 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People held a meeting in the course of which its members noted certain statements concerning your Government's official position on the question of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

In this connexion, reference was made to the

statement delivered by the representative of Canada on 24 November 1976 in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly and, in particular, to the observation contained therein to the effect that the agreed framework for Middle East negotiations laid down in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) "has in recent years been supplemented by a universal recognition of the political dimensions of the Palestinian issue".

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have been asked to request you to transmit to me any additional information which may be available to you concerning the current official position of the Government of Canada on the question of Palestine.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL

Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable  
Rights of the Palestinian People

### *B. Letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations*

I have the honour to inform you that on 15 April 1977 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People held a meeting in the course of which its members noted certain statements concerning your Government's official position on the question of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this connexion, reference was made, in particular, to the press conference given by the President of France, His Excellency Mr. Valéry Giscard D'Estaing at Cairo on 14 December 1975, in the course of which he said:

I should like to tell you what our position is on the nature of the Palestinian homeland. It is not for us to take decisions in the stead of those personally concerned, and when we speak of an 'independent State', we mean 'a State which will determine its own destiny'. If it emerges that, in view of the outlook for the future in this area, it wishes to establish any particularly special relationship or any particular special institutional arrangement with a State in the area, we have no objection.

The attention of the Committee members was also drawn to the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Mr. Louis de Guiringaud, on 29 September 1976 in the plenary of the United Nations General As-

sembly and, in particular, to the following observations contained therein:

...we reaffirm both the necessity to implement Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the basic nature of the three principles upon which any lasting settlement must necessarily rely: withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, recognition of the Palestinians' right to a homeland, and the right of all States in the area, including Israel, to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed boundaries.

The basis of any just and lasting settlement can be found in the application of those principles, especially as regards the Palestinians. That people, raised in hardship and made strong by suffering, has now taken its place as a necessary partner in any negotiation. It has become quite obvious that no solution to the conflict is possible unless the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to express its national identity becomes a reality. But how can that right be exercised without a territorial base which, at the proper time, could be given the structures of statehood?

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have been asked to request you to transmit to me any additional information which may be available to you concerning the current official position of the Government of France on the question of Palestine.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL

Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable  
Rights of the Palestinian People

*C. Letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations*

I have the honour to inform you that on 15 April 1977 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People held a meeting in the course of which its members noted certain statements concerning your Government's official position on the question of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this connexion, reference was made to the statement delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. van der Stoep, on 28 September 1976, on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly and, in particular, to the following observations contained

therein:

With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the members of the European Community are convinced that negotiations based on a minimum of consensus among all the parties concerned are essential for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this respect they reiterate their continuing firm attachment to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council and to the principles which are the basis of their position and which I repeat: first, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; secondly, the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; thirdly, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and fourthly, recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

I should like to emphasize that a solution of the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact.

The attention of the Committee members was also drawn to the press conference given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Mr. Helmut Schmidt, on 1 April 1977, in the course of which he stated that the Geneva Peace Conference should be resumed before the end of the year with the participation of the Palestinians.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have been asked to request you to transmit to me any additional information which may be available to you concerning the current official position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the question of Palestine.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL

Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable  
Rights of the Palestinian People

*D. Letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations*

I have the honour to inform you that on 15 April 1977 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People held a meeting in the course of which its members noted

certain statements concerning your Government's official position on the question of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this connexion, reference was made to the statement delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. van der Stoep, on 28 September 1976, on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly and, in particular, to the following observations contained therein:

With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the members of the European Community are convinced that negotiations based on a minimum of consensus among all the parties concerned are essential for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this respect they reiterate their continuing firm attachment to resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council and to the principles which are the basis of their position and which I repeat: first, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; secondly, the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; thirdly, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; and fourthly, recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

I should like to emphasize that a solution of the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have been asked to request you to transmit to me any additional information which may be available to you concerning the current official position of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the question of Palestine.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable  
Rights of the Palestinian People

*E. Letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations*

I have the honour to inform you that on 15 April 1977 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People held

a meeting in the course of which its members noted certain statements concerning your Government's official position on the question of Palestine and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this connexion, reference was made, in particular, to the statement delivered by the President of the United States of America, His Excellency Mr. Jimmy Carter, at Clinton on 16 March 1977, in which he said, *inter alia*:

"There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years."<sup>26</sup>

The attention of the Committee members was drawn to the statement made on 23 November 1976, on behalf of the United States of America, in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly and, in particular to the following observations contained therein:

That the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Palestinian people must be taken into account in working out a settlement in the Middle East is an elementary truth. Without doubt this is one of the central issues that must be resolved in the negotiations to have a just and lasting peace, which is what we all seek for the Middle East.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have been asked to request you to transmit to me any additional information which may be available to you concerning the current official position of the Government of the United States of America on the question of Palestine.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable  
Rights of the Palestinian People

*F. Letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Chairman of the Committee to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations.*

I have the honour to inform you that on 15 April 1977 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People held a meeting in the course of which its members noted certain statements concerning your Government's official position on the Palestinian problem and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In this connexion, reference

<sup>26</sup> See doc. 73 below.

was made to the speech delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, His Excellency Mr. Yigal Allon, on 16 February 1977 on the occasion of the dinner in honour of the Secretary of State of the United States of America and, in particular, to the statement contained therein to the effect that:

"For Israel, peace in the Near East is through a solution to the Palestinian problem which must be approved by the Jordanians and the Palestinians, on the one hand, and by Israel, on the other."

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I have been asked to request you to transmit to me any additional information which may be available to you concerning the current official position of the Government of Israel on the Palestinian question.

[Signed] MÉDOUNE FALL  
Chairman of the Committee on the  
Exercise of the Inalienable  
Rights of the Palestinian People

## 5

### Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine<sup>27</sup>

September 30, 1977

#### ANNEX

#### *Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine*

1. In paragraph 3 of resolution 31/15 A of 23 November 1976, the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1977. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. In its twenty-fourth<sup>28</sup> and twenty-fifth<sup>29</sup> reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October

1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to earlier requests by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, in connexion with the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. The events which had occurred in 1967 and thereafter complicated an already very complex problem.

3. In the course of 1972, in response to formal requests from interested parties, and after consultation with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the Commission decided that these interested parties could have access to certain documents<sup>30</sup> of the Commission with the understanding that the recipient Governments would continue to treat valuation figures contained therein on a confidential basis. Copies of such documents would be furnished on the understanding that any expenses would be borne by the delegation concerned.

In accordance with the Commission's decision to make available to the interested parties, upon request, copies of certain documents and materials in its possession, and in pursuance of such a request by Egypt, the duplication work was undertaken and completed in June 1974, at which time copies of the relevant set of documents were transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Egypt. On 31 May 1974, the Commission received a request from Jordan for copies of the same set of documents and the Commission agreed that the Permanent Mission of Jordan should be supplied also with the same set of documents as Egypt. These were subsequently supplied to Jordan. The Commission also agreed to supply the Permanent Mission of Egypt, at its request, additional sets of microfilm copies of these documents at the Mission's expense.

<sup>30</sup> These documents were the following:

- (i) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government;
- (ii) RP-1 forms (identification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);
- (iii) Index of owners' names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner). [orig.]

<sup>27</sup> UN doc. A/32/238, Annex.

<sup>28</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/6451. [orig.]

<sup>29</sup> Doc. 273 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

5. In accordance with a decision taken by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People at its 9th meeting on 30 March 1976, the Chairman of that Committee, by a letter dated 31 March 1976, requested the Secretary-General to invite members of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to communicate to it their views and observations on those aspects of the Commission's work which they considered useful for the work of the Committee.

6. In reply to the Chairman's letter, the Secretary-General, by a letter dated 30 April 1976, transmitted to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People a statement summarizing the work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine from its inception to date. In his letter, the Secretary-General stated that the summary had been checked for accuracy by members of the Commission. Subsequently, this summary was issued as a document of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (A/AC. 183/4).

7. In response to a further request from the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People "to obtain from the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, an inventory of Arab property in Israel and the territories occupied by Israel", the Commission decided that it had no objection to that Committee, an organ of the United Nations, having access to the following documents in its possession:

(a) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government;

(b) RP-1 forms (identification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);

(c) Index of owners' names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner).

8. In its last report, the Commission noted that, during the period 1974-1975, there was intensive diplomatic activity directed towards a Middle East settlement.<sup>31</sup> It noted that that momentum had not been maintained during the year 1976, owing in part to the developments in the area.

9. The Commission notes that the diplomatic activity directed towards finding a just and lasting

peace in the Middle East has been resumed and hopes for the fruitful conclusion of the current initiatives and diplomatic efforts made in this regard. The circumstances governing the possibilities open to the Commission have remained up to now essentially unchanged. Nevertheless, the Commission hopes that the situation in the region will improve considerably in the near future, enabling it to carry forward its work vigorously.

## 6

### **Report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories<sup>32</sup>**

**October 4, 1977**

#### UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME

##### LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

##### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. It further requested the Secretary-General, in preparing the report, to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people.

2. At the 45th meeting of the Second Committee, on 17 November 1976, when the draft resolution on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories was scheduled to be voted on, the Committee was informed that, if the Secretary-General were requested to prepare a report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, the task would be entrusted to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The Second Committee was further informed that while the task would present certain difficulties every effort would be made to prepare and submit the report if it were requested. Since the Secretariat had no independent source of

<sup>31</sup> See doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*

<sup>32</sup> Un doc. A/32/228.

information about the occupied territories, it would have to look to the Governments and organizations concerned to provide the necessary information to enable it to submit a report to the General Assembly at its next session (see A/C.2/31/SR.45).

3. In accordance with the statement made by the Secretary-General's representative at the Second Committee referred to above, a note verbale was sent on 16 May 1977 to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to the permanent observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, drawing attention to the resolution and requesting such information as might be made available on the subject-matter of the report requested by the General Assembly. This was followed by a second note verbale dated 21 July 1977 which requested that the necessary information be submitted by 15 August 1977.

4. Pertinent information for the report was requested from the International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, Economic Commission for Western Asia, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and from the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

5. On 19 August 1977, the Permanent Representative of Egypt transmitted a report prepared by the Egyptian authorities. This report is reproduced in its entirety in annex I.A.

6. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations in a note verbale dated 16 August 1977 addressed to the Secretary-General stated that the position of Israel on the subject-matter of the resolution in question was made clear by the delegate of Israel in the Second Committee on 17 November 1976, and was reflected in document A/C.2/31/SR.45, the relevant paragraphs of which (paras. 54 to 61) were attached. These paragraphs are reproduced in annex I.B.

7. The Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations, in a note verbale dated 10 August 1977, submitted a report which dealt primarily with the situation in the occupied parts of Jerusalem and requested that, in view of the various references

to the Security Council resolution on the subject, the report be circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/12378). Further, the note verbale indicated that the Government of Jordan would, in due course, transmit further reports covering the situation of the rest of the occupied West Bank and the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees, in addition to those of the indigenous inhabitants. These additional reports had not been received at the time of writing this report.

8. The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted the report prepared by the competent authorities of the Republic with a note verbale dated 25 July 1977. Subsequently, in a note verbale dated 23 August 1977, the Permanent Mission requested, upon instructions from its Government, that this study be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under items 30, 31 and 62 (A/32/189).

9. The Palestine Liberation Organization has, to date, made no information available directly to the Secretary-General. However, the statement of the FAO includes a note verbale from the Political Department of PLO to the Director-General of FAO informing him of the hardships experienced by the Palestinians within the occupied territories. This note verbale is included as part of annex II. B.

10. The Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories referred in his reply to the report submitted by the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session (A/31/218), and drew attention in particular to sections IV and VI which contained information on the situation of civilians in the territories occupied by Israel. Since this report is available as a document of the General Assembly, it is not reproduced.

11. The ILO drew attention to a report on the situation of workers in the territories occupied by Israel, which was included in the report of the Director-General on the activities of the ILO in 1976, presented to the International Labour Conference at its sixty-third session (1977). Relevant sections have been excerpted therefrom and constitute annex II. A of this report.

12. A formal statement from the Director-General of FAO is included in full in annex II. B.

13. UNESCO stated that it did not have any



recent information collected directly from the occupied territories. An expert mission to collect information on education and cultural life in the occupied territories is being planned and the findings will be made available in due course. UNESCO did submit, however, a copy of the report of the Director-General on the implementation of resolution 13.1, adopted by the General Conference at its eighteenth session, concerning the educational and cultural institutions in occupied Arab territories (document 19C/73, and its annex 99 EX/50). Pertinent excerpts from these documents are included in annex II C.

14. WHO stated that the Thirtieth World Health Assembly, which took place at Geneva in May 1977, had on its agenda the question of "Health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East", for which the background documentation included the progress report of the Sub-Committee of Experts set up by the Director-General to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East (document A.30/36) and, as an annex to that document, the abbreviated annual report of the Director of Health of UNRWA for the year 1976 (document A.30/WP/1). Selected paragraphs from the latter document have been excerpted on the basis of their pertinence to the matter at hand and are transcribed in annex II. D.

15. UNICEF stated that, as it did not have projects specifically dealing with the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, it was unable to provide information relevant to the subject.

16. The statement received from UNRWA is reproduced in annex II. E.

17. The statement received from the Executive Secretary of ECWA is included in full in annex II. F.

## ANNEX I

### REPLIES RECEIVED FROM MEMBER STATES

*A. Note verbale dated 19 August 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General containing information on living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories*

#### I. Situation of the Arabs in the occupied territories

1. Ramallah prison is overfilled with citizens from the West Bank who were arrested by the Israeli authorities on charges of resisting the oc-

cupation. These authorities persist in their oppressive policy towards Arab detainees, which led those jailed in Al Khalil (Hebron) Prison to threaten to go on a hunger-strike to the death. The head of Al Khalil Municipality has appealed to the Israeli Military Governor to take measures to improve the conditions of those prisoners, and even expressed willingness to provide them with food and clothing at the expense of the Municipality.

2. The occupation authorities barred the delegations of Nablus and Ramallah from visiting the Arab Gulf States, thus raising obstacles to the idea of fraternity between the towns of the occupied territories and other Arab towns. Those authorities further banned the head of Ramallah Municipality from going to the United States, where he was due to attend the annual congress organized by the emigrants from that town, lest their colonial methods should be exposed. The occupation authorities further refused to allow the head of Nablus Municipality to travel to Rome to attend a meeting of heads of democratic municipalities.

3. The Israeli authorities levy heavy taxes on consumer goods in the occupied territories, causing a flight of Arab capital to Jordan, which in turn has contributed to a further deterioration of economic conditions.

4. Unemployment increases among the Arabs because of the Israeli designs to force Arabs to leave the occupied territories. In this respect, the occupation authorities pensioned off a large number of teachers in the West Bank. The number of citizens who left the West Bank during last year is estimated at 15,000, most of them youths who were forced to emigrate by various Israeli pressures. The population has actually declined to 681,000, compared to 854,000 before the 1967 aggression.

5. The Military Governor of the West Bank banned the establishment of any projects there under the pretext of examining their sources of financing and ascertaining that such projects were not funded by the Palestine Liberation Organization. This measure has resulted in a freezing of funds supplied by some Arab Gulf States to support the West Bank municipal councils.

6. Israeli authorities impose exorbitant custom duties on Arab citizens when they go to visit their relatives in the occupied territories during the summer holidays. This action is meant to enrich

the Israeli treasury, on the one hand, and to make life harder for Arab citizens, on the other.

7. The occupation authorities have prevented the residents of the Al Maareh area in Sinai from going near water wells. As a result, rates for fresh water soared and living conditions became even more difficult, which forced the population to leave the area.

## II. *Israeli settlements in the occupied territories*

1. In the field of settlement operations, the occupation authorities continue to expropriate large areas of Arab land, particularly in the Tulkrum and Jenin areas, prior to the establishment of settlements on that land. The victory of the Likud bloc has encouraged pro-settlement groups, especially the Gosh Emonim, to proceed with the establishment of settlements on Arab land. The above-mentioned group plans the establishment of 10 settlements in the West Bank over the next few months. The same group is about to set up a settlement on the Jerusalem Road. Work is under way to set up two other settlements, one on the hills of Nablus and the other in the Abul Forneh area in Nablus.

2. The Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs has allocated 30 million Israeli pounds for the implementation of a new project that envisages the establishment of 110 new settlements in the Rafah area over the next 10 years.

3. The Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, announced that a team of experts from Likud had elaborated a programme for the creation of five new Israeli towns in the West Bank to accommodate 150,000 persons. The programme envisages linking these towns with Jerusalem and Tel Aviv via a network of highways. The programme further calls for the establishment of 43 industrial and agricultural settlements in the West Bank.

4. Teddy Kolek, the Mayor of occupied Jerusalem, has announced that Israel will never give up Jerusalem, whatever the solutions to be reached, nor will Jerusalem be divided again under any circumstances.

5. The Israeli Minister of State, Israel Galilee, announced that the number of settlements established since the 1967 war totalled 100, at a cost of 4 million Israeli pounds. He added that the United States had not exercised any pressure on Israel in this respect, and that the Israeli Govern-

ment's decisions were not dependent upon the position of the United States.

6. The Israeli Minister of Defence, Ezra Weizmann, visited Kiryat settlement near Al Khalil and urged Israeli settlers to exert efforts to turn their settlement into a large city.

7. Rabbi Meir Kahane of Israel (a fanatical rabbi) demanded that the Israeli Government should implement Menahim Begin's promises of considering the West Bank a liberated Israeli land, and allow the establishment of settlements there. He declared his intention to set up a settlement within the borders of Nablus.

8. The Israeli authorities proceeded to survey the land in the vicinity of Beit Amer village in Al Khalil, in preparation for the establishment of a number of settlements in that region.

9. The region of Khan Al Ahmer in the West Bank is being transformed into an industrial region. Industrial establishments are being set up, among which is a plant for sophisticated military industries that will begin production during the next few months. Moreover, 5,000 residential units are to be set up in the above-mentioned region to accommodate Jewish settlers.

10. The Israeli authorities are planning to set up a number of banks in the region of Khan Al Ahmer near the bridges connecting the West Bank and the East Bank, so that citizens would not be allowed to bring in any foreign currency and would have to change whatever currencies they might have into Israeli currency at the branches of those banks situated in the area of residence of all arrivals in the occupied territories.

## B. *Note verbale dated 16 August 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.*

1. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that "That resolution [General Assembly resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976], which was based on resolution 3 adopted at Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements on 11 June 1976, completely prejudices the issue, and leaves no room for an objective report". The Permanent Representative of Israel further stated that "The position of Israel on the subject-matter of the resolution in question was made clear by the delegate of Israel in the Second Committee on 17 November 1976 and is reflected in document A/C.2/31/SR.45, the relevant para-

graphs of which (paras. 54 to 61) are attached.”

2. These paragraphs are herewith quoted verbatim:

54. Mr. *ELIASHIV* (Israel) said that the initiators of draft resolution A/C.3/31/L.13 had singled out a so-called economic issue which could not be divorced from the complex Middle East problem as a whole. Moreover, the questions referred to in the draft resolution were being dealt with by other United Nations bodies.

55. The first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution recalled resolution 3 of the Vancouver Conference, which referred to a so-called ‘fact’, namely, that ‘the Palestinian people have been forced to abandon their indigenous homeland’. That baseless and false assertion was politically motivated and aimed at attributing to Israel exclusive responsibility for all the consequences of the continuous aggression committed by Arab States against Israel since 1948. Israel had not created the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian tragedy was a direct result of the aggression launched by the Arab States in 1948. To refer to the Israeli presence in the occupied areas since 1967 while ignoring the fact that Israel had arrived there in the course of a war of Arab making was to pervert fundamental truth. The continuation of that occupation was a direct consequence of the refusal of the Arab States of enter into negotiations with Israel to establish a firm and just peace in the area. Israel’s Declaration of Independence had contained an appeal for friendship addressed to the Arab people in Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. In response, the Arab States had proclaimed war against Israel, and their armies had crossed the borders in an attempt to crush it at birth. At that time, the Arab population of Israel had been urged and incited by the Arab leadership to leave their homes and seek temporary shelter in neighbouring Arab countries. Several hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arabs had heeded those orders. In that connexion, he read out quotations from articles which had appeared in Lebanese, Jordanian and Egyptian publications and which demonstrated that those facts had been recognized and admitted by Arabs and others. The Jewish authorities on the other hand, had launched appeals to Arab residents in Israel in an attempt to prevent that flight.

56. In view of those historical facts, the attempts of Arab spokesmen to blame others for the creation of the problem and their professed interest in the well-being of the refugees rang hollow, when those people could have become independent and self-sufficient many years ago but for the calculated opposition of the Arab States to any constructive approach. As a consequence of Arab aggression, a massive exchange of population had taken place in the Middle East. A practically equal number of Jews from the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa had come to Israel, the vast majority of them forced out of their former homes in a

state of destitution. Israel had welcomed its refugees and made them an integral and vigorous part of the nation. The Arab States had left brethren in camps so as to use them as a political weapon against Israel. Jordan had paid the price for that inhuman and short-sighted policy in September 1970, when a Palestinian Arab uprising had been suppressed in a massacre which had cost thousands of lives and destroyed thousands of human habitations. Lebanon was also paying the price in the fratricidal struggle in which that entire nation was engaged.

57. While that terrible human tragedy was going on in Lebanon, the majority of the Palestinian Arabs in the administered areas were living in conditions of widening contact with the Israeli population on a basis of mutual human respect and dignity which, though still clouded by a lack of political definition, offered the prospect of a peaceful future. His country was fully conscious of the problem of the Palestinian Arabs and did not require persuasion or preaching on the need to solve it peacefully and honourably. Such a solution could only be achieved in the context of a genuine peace settlement in the Middle East, which his country would make every effort to achieve. Fanciful allegations and reports would not deter Israel from pursuing its positive policy of economic and social progress in the administered areas, maintaining the laws in force in the territories and conducting its administration in accordance with the relevant rules of international conventions until a just and durable peace was achieved. Objective observers, including hundreds of thousands of visitors from the Arab States, affirmed the success of that policy. There had been a real growth of an average of 18 per cent per annum in the GNP in both territories, and *per capita* income had increased by 80 per cent in the West Bank and by 120 per cent in Gaza in eight years. The unemployment rate had dropped from 10 per cent in the West Bank and almost 30 per cent in the Gaza Strip in 1967 to zero by June 1976. Educational facilities within the free education system in the West Bank and Gaza had been increased by 46 per cent. Over 1 billion Israeli pounds had been spent on the rehabilitation of refugees in Gaza. Construction plans to provide housing for tens of thousands of families would continue, and the area of construction in the West Bank and Gaza had expanded from 880,000 square feet in 1968 to 6.9 million square feet in 1974. The administration had spared and would spare no effort to improve the structure of the camps, install water and electricity, prepare playgrounds, pave sidewalks and provide sewage works and other facilities. One thousand housing units were being constructed every year in both territories, and 70 million Israeli pounds had been earmarked for new schemes to provide community services such as schools, shopping centres and clinics.

58. Israel’s concern for the well-being of the Palestinian Arabs in the territories had been impugned

and ridiculed by certain Arab Governments. It would appear that those Governments would rather see stagnation and misery prevail and would seek a restoration of the situation prior to 1967, when during 19 years of oppression and persecution the inhabitants of Gaza had been kept in deplorable living conditions by the Egyptian military authorities.

59. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution requested the Secretary-General, in preparing the report, to consult and co-operate with the so-called 'Palestine Liberation Organization'. That request made a mockery of the United Nations Charter, since PLO was a notorious organization which made no secret of its avowed objectives of destroying Israel, a State Member of the United Nations, and depriving its people of their independence, sovereignty and self-determination. Article 19 of the PLO Covenant openly declared that the existence of the State of Israel was null and void, article 20 denied any historical links between the Jewish people and the Holy Land, and article 21 rejected any form of solution for the problem, apart in effect from the destruction of Israel. Any report produced with the co-operation of the so-called PLO would contain false assertions, such as the 'big lie', already contained in resolution 3 of the Vancouver Conference, that 'the cultural habitat has been wilfully destroyed'. Israel would not co-operate in such a vicious propaganda exercise.

60. His delegation strongly rejected the resolutions enumerated in the preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. Furthermore, it wished to place on record its firm objection to any kind of co-operation and consultation with PLO, a terror organization which pretended to speak for the Palestinians and which had brought misery, murder and assassination to the Middle East, including the terrifying human tragedy in Lebanon.

61. Draft resolution A/C.2/31/L.13 was of a political, propagandistic nature extraneous to the Committee. It singled out an issue which could not be divorced from the complex Middle East problem. Furthermore, it ignored the responsibility of the Arab States, which could not escape the consequences of their own aggression against Israel. It was biased and one-sided. It was based on false assertions and distorted quasi-historical allegations, and it ignored the plight of Jewish communities in Arab countries. His delegation rejected it completely, hoped that those delegations which had refused to support resolution 3 in Vancouver would also reject the present resolution, and called on other delegations to do so.

*C. Note verbale dated 10 August 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*

[The reply of Jordan was issued on 10 August 1977 under the symbol S/12378.]

*D. Note verbale dated 23 August 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*

[The reply of the Syrian Arab Republic was issued on 25 August 1977 under the symbol A/32/189.]

## ANNEX II

### REPLIES RECEIVED FROM SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND OTHER ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

#### *A. Reply submitted by the International Labour Organisation*

The ILO drew attention to the Director-General's report on the activities of the ILO in 1976, which was presented to the International Labour Conference at its sixty-third session (1977).<sup>33</sup> This report included a progress report on the study of the situation of workers in the territories occupied by Israel. The following statements are taken from this progress report, as reproduced in the report of the Director-General on the activities of the ILO in 1976:

Report Submitted by the Director-General to the 199th Session of the Governing Body.

Progress Report on the Study on the situation of Workers of the Territories Occupied by Israel.

#### I. Opportunities for employment and vocational training

##### Employment

3. The aims and effects of official economic and social policy, particularly employment policy, as analysed in some of the studies,<sup>34</sup> may be summarised as follows: because of an acute shortage of labour in Israel after the 1967 war the authorities suddenly reversed their earlier policy of refusing Arab workers from the occupied territories admission to Israel; recruitment was officially organised through a system of labour exchanges in the territories and was facilitated by the existence of a reserve

<sup>33</sup> "Activities of the ILO 1976". Report of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference, 1977 (Part 2), ILO, Geneva, 1977 (ISBN 92-2-101724-9).

[This and following notes are part of the original documents.]

<sup>34</sup> "Rapport sur la situation des travailleurs arabes dans les territoires de la Palestine occupée", in Dossier Palestine 1, Geneva (undated), pp. 63-75; "Conditions of work for Arabs under the yoke of Israeli occupation", Beirut (undated); and note on condition of Arab workers in the territories occupied after 1967, communicated to the Director-General by the Palestine Trade Union Federation (8 February 1976).

of poor and unemployed workers; there resulted a migratory movement from the occupied territories to Israel, the number of Arab workers employed in Israel having risen from just over 10,000 in 1969 to nearly 70,000 or about 21.5 per cent of the total labour force of the territories in 1974... The studies here quoted take the view that the fall in unemployment and the rise in purchasing power in the occupied territories have been due not to the development of the local economy but to the employment of Arab workers in Israel. Government policy, it is claimed, is having adverse consequences such as the breakdown of the occupational structure and of small-scale agriculture in the territories, the appearance on the employment market of women and of young people who have given up school, and a drain on the human resources required by the economy of the territories, which are suffering from a labour shortage. The drain on manpower is said to be accompanied by other measures such as the displacement of population, the establishment of Israeli agricultural settlements in the occupied territories and the appropriation of land, which aggravate the situation of the local population.<sup>35</sup>

4. As for employment itself, and in practice, some sources<sup>36</sup> maintain that Arab workers in the occupied territories suffer from discrimination in access to employment and occupation. Since they do not have free choice of employment they are being channelled by the labour exchanges into particular branches and types of work... According to the same sources Arab workers in Israel have little security in their employment, which is dependent on the needs of the Israeli economy and on political decisions. In the event of collective mass dismissal, it is said, they stand little chance of finding new jobs in the territories, where the economy is so structured as to be unable to absorb much more labour.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> In a communication of 8 February 1976 the Palestine Trade Union Federation mentioned, among other things, the 1971 report of the special United Nations committee set up to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and pointed out that that committee had not been admitted to Israel and the occupied territories. A study by the General Federation of Jordan Trade Unions (Damascus, 1973), which is appended to the above-mentioned communication, also gives information on the subject.

<sup>36</sup> For example, the extract from Mr. Nasr's statement at the Governing Body's 195th Session (GB.196/20/2, Appendix III); the note of 5 October 1975 addressed by the Arab Labour Office to the Director-General, and the above-mentioned note communicated (8 February 1976) by the Palestine Trade Union Federation.

<sup>37</sup> In its note of 8 February 1976 the Palestine Trade Union Federation refers to the current difficulties of the Israeli economy (particularly in the building industry) and the threat they pose mainly to the employment of Arab workers. It considers that the mass repatriation of unemployed Arabs will cause an economic crisis in the territories, where half the

5. Other sources of information give a different account of the objectives and practical application of employment policy.<sup>38</sup> According to those sources the major principles underlying that policy are the maintenance of full employment in the occupied territories and ensuring that workers from those territories in Israel enjoy the same conditions as do Israeli workers, while maintaining the integrity of the labour force in the territories. Substantial changes are alleged to have occurred since June 1967 in the volume and structure of employment.

7. The growth of employment opportunities in Israel, it is said, has made a great impact on the traditional distribution of labour by branch of activity. According to the statistics supplied on the distribution of the working population by branch of activity in the territories, half the workers are engaged in agriculture, and 6 per cent in the building industry, as against 20 and 50 per cent respectively in Israel. As regards access to skilled employment, it is stated that Arab workers in general have no difficulty, demand having exceeded supply for some years. In January 1975 over half the Arab workers in the building industry were skilled or semi-skilled.

#### Vocational education and training

9. Some information is available on secondary vocational education in the territories. There is information, revealing different trends, on rates of increases in the number of pupils on the West and East banks of the Jordan between 1965-66 and 1972-73.<sup>39</sup> It is also alleged that secondary commercial education is disappearing on the West bank.<sup>40</sup> It is also reported that there has been a general increase in the number of pupils, teachers and schools on the West bank since the 1967 war, and in particular the organisation of courses of basic vocational education and pre-vocational training and a course in commercial education which in 1971 was

national revenue comes from earnings from employment in Israel.

<sup>38</sup> The information given below is drawn mainly from notes addressed to the Director-General by the Ministry of Labour of Israel (19 June 1975) and by the Histadrut (20 May 1975) and from a study entitled "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel" (Tel Aviv, May 1975) by the Ministry of Labour, the Executive Committee of the Histadrut and the Industrialists Federation in Israel. Use has also been made of the periodic reports of the Ministry of Defence on the territories ("Four years of military administration", 1967-71; and "The administered territories", 1971-72 and 1972-73) and a study by the Bank of Israel entitled "Economic growth in the administered areas, 1968-1973" (Jerusalem, 1975).

<sup>39</sup> Information supplied by the Government of Jordan to UNESCO and reproduced in paragraph 68 of the Report of the Director-General on the situation of the national education and the cultural life of peoples in the occupied Arab territories" (UNESCO, Paris, 1974).

<sup>40</sup> Report of the Director-General of UNESCO, *op. cit.*, para. 91.

followed by 1,800 pupils in Judea and Samaria.<sup>41</sup> Vocational training schools are reported to have been established in 1973 and others to be planned.<sup>42</sup>

10. Differing opinions are given of the aims and the system of vocational training in the occupied territories. According to certain studies the establishment of apprenticeship centres in the territories is just one of a series of measures designed to "exploit cheap Arab labour for the benefit of the Israeli economy".<sup>43</sup> In support of that charge attention is drawn to the kinds of training provided, the channelling of pupils and trainees into certain industries or trades, such as building, which, it is said, are precisely those in which there is a serious shortage of labour in Israel. Discrimination against Arabs in access to employment<sup>44</sup> in Israel, it is said, is leading to a decline in their levels of skill or hampering their acquisition of job skills and experience.<sup>45</sup>

11. According to the authorities' own explanation of the principles underlying manpower policy in the territories, vocational training is one of its basic aims and major aspects.<sup>46</sup> The information received refers to the establishment since 1968 of 20 vocational training centres in Judea and Samaria (where there were only three before 1967) and seven in the Gaza Strip and Sinai (where there was only one before 1967). The centres provide training for 18 trades and between 1968 and 1975 produced a number of graduates<sup>47</sup> which, it is said, accounts for about 15 per cent of the total labour force in the territories. Special programmes and efforts are reported to have been devoted to the training of young people and women, and since 1971 certificates have been issued to building workers entitling them to the lowest grade on the skilled worker scale in Israel. Apart from traditional vocational training programmes, other forms of activity are mentioned, such as the supply of advice, technical assistance and services to Arab farmers in the territories.<sup>48</sup>...

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 69; Ministry of Defence of Israel: "Four years of military administration", 1967-71, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102; and "The administered territories", 1971-72, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139, and 1972-73, p. 178.

<sup>42</sup> See "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel", *op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> "Rapport sur la situation des travailleurs arabes dans les territoires de la Palestine occupée", *op. cit.*, p. 71.

<sup>44</sup> See para. 4 above.

<sup>45</sup> Mr. Nasr's statement at the Governing Body's 195th Session, and note of 5 October 1975 addressed by the Arab Labour Office to the Director-General.

<sup>46</sup> Note of 19 June 1975 from the Ministry of Labour to the Director-General; see also "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel", *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> That is: 18,582 graduates, 45 per cent of them in the building trades, 24 per cent in industrial occupations and 20 per cent in tailoring and embroidery: "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel", *op. cit.*, Appendix A, table 4.

<sup>48</sup> See the reports of the Ministry of Defence: "Four years of military administration", 1967-71, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6; "The administered territories", 1971-72, *op. cit.*, pp. 60 and 240.

## Remarks

12. The information supplied by different sources on employment and vocational training concurs in some respects. In some cases, however, it is difficult to interpret or calls for clarification.

13. In short, there seems to be a need for further analysis of several problems, which in the main relate to: (a) the organisation of recruitment and free choice of employment; (b) the extent of equality of opportunity and treatment in regard to vocational guidance and training, access to employment and occupation, promotion and security in employment, and (c) more generally, policy regarding the use and development of the human resources of the occupied territories.

## II. Wages, social benefits and working conditions

Situation of workers from the occupied territories employed in Israel

14. According to information from Israeli government and trade union sources, the general principle of equality in regard to wages, social benefits and working conditions for Israeli workers and Arab workers from the occupied territories in Israel has been officially proclaimed.<sup>49</sup> In particular, the principle of equal pay for equal work is stated to apply not only to the gross wages paid by the employer but also to the net wages actually received by the worker. For this there are two reasons: a desire to prevent adverse effects on the employment of Israelis and a desire to protect Arab workers from exploitation. The application of the principle is closely supervised by the Israeli trade union movement.<sup>50</sup> The study mentioned above on economic growth in the administered territories also refers to the difficulty of evaluating data on average wage levels in determining whether the principle is applied.<sup>51</sup>

15. According to other sources of information actual wage rates are much lower for Arab workers than for Israelis.<sup>52</sup> It is alleged, in particular, that wages are paid through the authorities, who make deductions variously assessed at 33 to 40 per cent. These deductions, it is said, are paid into a special fund<sup>53</sup> and are con-

<sup>49</sup> For example, note of 19 June 1975 from the Ministry of Labour to the Director-General; and a statement of 13 December 1972 by Mr. Moshe Dayan, former Minister of Defence, and a decision of February 1973 of the Central Committee of the Histadrut, cited in "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel", *op. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> More particularly, the special team set up by the Histadrut in co-operation with the Employment Service mainly to guide and instruct Arab workers coming to Israel (see para. 34 below).

<sup>51</sup> Arie Bregman: "Economic growth in the administered areas", Bank of Israel, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>52</sup> Note of the Arab Labour Office of 5 October 1975.

<sup>53</sup> According to some sources the sums deducted from wages are paid into a fund in the name of the State of Israel and between 1968 and 1974 totalled 1,090 million Israeli pounds (US \$260 million at 1973 prices) ("Conditions of work for Arabs under the yoke of Israeli occupation", *op. cit.*).

tributions to the social security system and also to the war effort.<sup>54</sup> However, the Arab worker allegedly does not receive all the benefits enjoyed by the Israeli worker in return for the same deductions legally made from his wages... on the grounds that he is not a member of the Histadrut.<sup>55</sup>...

17. Several sources of information also refer to the residence rights and transport and housing conditions of nationals of the occupied territories who work in Israel. According to those sources<sup>56</sup> Israeli regulations forbid workers from the territories to reside in Israel. Instead they must make a long arduous journey every day which adds to the duration of the working day. The cost of transport, borne by the worker himself, may amount to a quarter of his wages. Some Arab labourers, for example, from Gaza, are compelled by the distance from home to workplace and by transport conditions to live in Israel in conditions of hardship, sometimes in rest camps run by the employers.

19. According to certain sources of information, differences in treatment may be found in Israeli undertakings. They relate, for example, to systematic assignment of Arab workers to night shifts or even discrimination in the use of plant facilities. Reference is also made to the dangers facing workers who lodge complaints about their working conditions.<sup>57</sup> According to other sources only a very low percentage of Arab workers from the territories (2 per cent) is assigned to shift work, plant facilities are available to all workers without discriminations, and working conditions in any given undertaking are determined by collective agreement applicable to all workers without distinction.<sup>58</sup>

Situation of workers in the occupied territories

20. It has been said that "there is a great disparity between the wages which the Arab worker of the occupied territories receives in those territories and the wages he

can earn in Israel".<sup>59</sup> Available statistics show that the disparity diminished between 1969 and 1973 but remains wide. The Arab worker's daily wage was on the average 80 per cent higher in Israel than in the territories in 1969 and still 50 per cent higher in 1973.<sup>60</sup> Even though there has been a large increase in nominal wages in the territories, certain sources of information point out that in real wages there has not. Any increase in the cost of living in Israel has a direct effect in the territories, where the substantial increase in prices between 1969 and 1974 hit the poorer workers particularly hard.<sup>61</sup> Other sources of information indicate a rapid rise—even more rapid than in Israel—in prices in the territories, but at the same time an average yearly rate of increase in real wages higher than that recorded in Israel for Arab workers from the territories.<sup>62</sup>

21. Little information is available on the matter of social benefits and allowances enjoyed by workers in the territories.

22. As regards working conditions in the administered territories, according to information received<sup>63</sup> the competent authorities are enforcing Jordanian labour law on the West bank (for example in regard to occupational safety, work disputes, hours of work, leave and so on) and Egyptian labour law in the Gaza strip. According to the same sources of information officials in the competent ministry are co-operating closely with some 400 local employees. In Judea and Samaria Arab officials continue to perform the functions prescribed under Jordanian law in regard to the supervision of working conditions.

#### Remarks

23. Initial study of remuneration and working conditions reveals certain points requiring further clarification and examination. In the main the problems relate to:

(a) the application in practice of the principle of equal remuneration for Israeli workers and workers from the territories employed in Israel, remuneration being understood to include social benefits and various allowances and forms of compensation;

(b) the trend of official policy in regard to residence rights, housing and the cost and conditions of transport for Arab workers employed in Israel;

<sup>54</sup> Mr. Nasr's statement at the Governing Body's 195th Session.

<sup>55</sup> See, for example, the note of the Arab Labour Office of 5 October 1975, "Rapport sur la situation des travailleurs arabes dans la Palestine occupée", *op. cit.*, and the note of 8 February 1976 communicated by the Palestine Trade Union Federation.

<sup>56</sup> For example, the note addressed on 5 October 1975 to the Director-General by the Arab Labour Office; "Rapport sur la situation des travailleurs arabes dans la Palestine occupée", *op. cit.*; memorandum of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, mentioned in that report; the note of 8 February 1976 communicated by the Palestine Trade Union Federation, which refers in particular to information in Israeli newspapers; Mr. Nasr's statement at the Governing Body's 195th Session.

<sup>57</sup> Note of 8 February 1976 of the Palestine Trade Union Federation and statement by Mr. Nasr at the Governing Body's 195th Session.

<sup>58</sup> Ministry of Labour in Israel, note of 19 June 1975 to the Director-General.

<sup>59</sup> "Rapport sur la situation des travailleurs arabes dans les territoires de la Palestine occupée", *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>60</sup> The Bank of Israel study on economic growth in the administered territories, table III. 6, p. 37. Figures relate to net wages.

<sup>61</sup> "Conditions of work for Arabs under the yoke of Israeli occupation", *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>62</sup> See the Bank of Israel study on economic growth in the administered territories, p. 13 and table III.6, p. 37.

<sup>63</sup> Note of 19 June 1975 from the Israeli Ministry of Labour to the Director-General; note by the Histadrut of 18 May 1975 addressed to the Director-General; and "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel", *op. cit.*

(c) the supervisory and other measures taken to ensure that Arab workers do not suffer forms of discrimination in certain undertakings in regard to working conditions; and

(d) trends in wages in relation to the cost of living, in other working conditions and in social benefits in the occupied territories themselves.

### III. Trade union rights

#### Trade union rights in the occupied territories

25. According to certain sources of information the right to organise is not respected in the occupied territories, where trade unions and occupational associations are subject to pressure and repression of various kinds.<sup>64</sup> Items of information concerning, among other things, the arrest and expulsion of trade union leaders and members have been submitted to the Governing Body or addressed to the Director-General.

29. The Israeli Government has stated<sup>65</sup> that no trade unionist is penalised or punished because of his trade union activities....According to an Israeli source the emergency regulations of 1945 are still in force on the West Bank since they have never been repealed by Jordan.<sup>66</sup>

30. In examining similar complaints submitted to it concerning the exile or arrest of members or leaders of trade unions in the territories occupied by Israel, the Committee on Freedom of Association found that the complainants had not exercised their right to submit more detailed information concerning the relationship between the above-mentioned measures and trade union activities, and the Committee was unable to carry out a more detailed examination of the complaints.<sup>67</sup>

Trade union rights of workers of the occupied territories employed in Israel

32. The salient features of trade union organisation in Israel are the unity in fact achieved by the Histadrut and the scope of its activities, which extends largely beyond the scope of trade union protection in the strict sense and includes social protection as well.<sup>68</sup>

33. According to some sources of information, workers of the occupied territories neither enjoy nor exercise trade union rights. Thus it has been stated that "the workers, when they come from the occupied territories to work in the other territories, are denied the protection of the Arab labour union in their home country because they are working in factories in the other part. And of course they are not protected by the trade unions in the other part because they are residents of the occupied territories."<sup>69</sup> The right to join or to form a trade union is allegedly not granted to Arab workers from the occupied territories who are employed in Israel.<sup>70</sup> It is alleged that the Israeli authorities are trying to secure Histadrut membership for Arab workers, but that such membership does not protect them against discrimination.<sup>71</sup>

34. According to other sources Arab workers from the administered territories who are employed in Israel enjoy freedom of association and the right to organise. They may join the Histadrut, "though understandably they are under pressure not to join..."<sup>72</sup> Their eligibility for membership in the provident funds affiliated with the Histadrut is expressly provided for by a decision of February 1973 of the Central Committee.<sup>73</sup> Express instructions have been given to all labour councils and workers' committees to ensure equality of treatment with regard to assistance and protection. At the level of production units the workers' interests are represented without discrimination and collective agreements are applicable to all workers without distinction.<sup>74</sup> It is also reported that the Histadrut has taken special measures for the information and education of such workers.<sup>75</sup> Finally, the Histadrut points out that building workers in Israel fare comparatively well because of the strength of the unions in that industry and that many Arab workers

<sup>69</sup> Mr. Nasr's statement at the Governing Body's 195th session.

<sup>70</sup> Report on "Conditions of work for Arabs under the yoke of Israeli occupation", *op. cit.*, p. 13. In its note of 8 February 1976 the Palestine Trade Union Federation states that at the end of 1971 the Israeli authorities considered the question of admitting Arab workers from the occupied territories to membership of the Histadrut, but that the temporary nature of Arab employment has so far prevented the taking of any decision.

<sup>71</sup> In the above-mentioned study by the General Federation of Jordan Trade Unions (Damascus).

<sup>72</sup> Statement by the General Secretary of the Histadrut in 1973, quoted in the study "Labourers from the administered territories working in Israel", *op. cit.* In its conclusions the study states that 8,000 workers from the administered territories who are employed in Israel have become members of the Histadrut. The study gives a similar figure for the east side of Jerusalem (See note to para. 31.)

<sup>73</sup> This decision also relates to equality of remuneration and working conditions, referred to in the previous chapter.

<sup>74</sup> According to the reply by the Ministry of Labour to Mr. Nasr's allegations (note of 19 June 1975 to the Director-General).

<sup>75</sup> See the second footnote to para. 14, which refers to the establishment, in co-operation with the employment service, of a special team with mainly educational functions.

<sup>64</sup> Note of 8 February 1976 of the Palestine Trade Union Federation. Mr. Nasr's statement at the Governing Body's 195th Session, Mr. Nasr's letter of 6 March 1975 to the Director-General and note from the Arab Labour Office of 5 October 1975.

<sup>65</sup> Note of 19 June 1975 to the Director-General.

<sup>66</sup> Meir Shamgar, Attorney-General of Israel: "The observance of international law in the administered territories", in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Vol. 1, 1971, pp. 262 ff.

<sup>67</sup> See the 114th, 122nd and 147th Reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association: *Official Bulletin*, Supplement, Vol. LIII, 1970, No. 2, paras. 124-141; Vol. LIV, 1971, No. 2, paras. 55-83; and GB.194/11/27, paras. 91-98.

<sup>68</sup> See "Social security in Israel", Histadrut, Tel Aviv, 1973, especially pp. 3, 45 and 46.



have benefitted as a result since about half of them, as has been said, are employed in building in Israel.

#### Remarks

35. As regards trade union rights, a more detailed examination on the basis of further information appears to be necessary, in particular on the following points:

(a) the precise reasons underlying any repressive measures taken with regard to leaders or members of trade unions in the occupied territories and any connection which those reasons may have with the lawful exercise of trade union freedoms and rights;

(b) the conditions for the formation and operation of trade unions in the occupied territories both in law and in practice and their scope for action and collective bargaining;

(c) the extent to which workers from the occupied territories who are employed in Israel enjoy equality of treatment in regard to freedom of association, the right to organise and benefits provided for under collective bargaining.

Geneva, 17 February 1976.

#### *B. Statement by the Director-General of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations*

The following statement dated 4 August 1977 was received in the form of a letter to the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs:

In your letter dated 16 May 1977, you drew my attention to General Assembly resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976 concerning living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and invited me to supply you, by 1 July, with any information that might be useful in the compilation of the report which the General Assembly had asked the Secretary-General to prepare.

In my letter of 15 June 1977 I informed you that we were not yet in a position to provide very detailed information on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. However, in view of the general subject-matter and the fact that the second preambular paragraph of the General Assembly resolution also referred to the Economic and Social Council resolution 2026 (LXI) on the assistance to the Palestinian people, I considered it appropriate that the report of the Secretary-General, in response to the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, could also reflect the action I had taken regarding the assistance to the Palestinian people.

Accordingly, I informed you of the process of consultation which I had with both the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Western Asia and the Chairman, Palestine National Fund, Palestine Liberation Organization, on action that FAO might take to assist the Palestinian people.

I had also informed you of the emergency food aid

from the World Food Programme resources which I had sanctioned for Palestinian refugees in the Lebanon and those under the care of UNRWA. I do not wish to repeat the details of this action as they have already been reported in full in the Secretary-General's report to the sixty-third session of the Economic and Social Council (E/6005).

Since writing that letter, I received a note verbale from Farouk Kaddumi, President of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization informing me of the hardships being experienced by the Palestinians within the Israeli occupied territories whose livelihood depends mainly on agriculture. As this note verbale was relevant to the Secretary-General's report, I quoted it in full in my cable to him of 15 July 1977, in the original Italian language in which it was couched together with an unofficial English translation for facility of reference. I reproduce hereunder the unofficial English translation.

"The PLO (Political Department) presents its compliments to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and wishes to inform that Organization that the Israeli occupation authorities have persisted, ever since the time of their occupation of Palestine, in varied and continuing attempts to force the sons of our Palestinian people to abandon their lands, either by the use of force or by the promulgation of unjust laws.

"Besides these inhuman and aggressive practices of the Israeli occupation authorities, which have been occurring for many years without interruption, these same authorities have now tightened the circle around the sons of our people by confiscating thousands of dunums of fertile lands owned by Palestinian citizens and by aggression against the sources of water, as has recently occurred at the aqueduct of Ein Samia, which serves more than 80 towns and villages in the regions of Ramallah and Bireh, so that the inhabitants of those areas have been deprived of water.

"Furthermore, the Israeli occupation authorities, persisting in their policy of land confiscation, have promulgated, through the Military Governor of the Gaza region, Ordinance No. 498 on the use of water resources, which compels the owners of wells, excavated by Palestinian farmers at their own expense and on their own land, to use only part of the water of such wells, thereby limiting the area of land which can benefit from these waters, leaving the remainder impossible to cultivate.

"These acts committed by the Israeli occupation authorities, are considered by us as flagrant acts of oppression against our people in the occupied territories, aimed at compelling the sons of our people to abandon their own lands, in order to requisition them afterwards through repressive laws based on the right of might.

"In registering these facts with FAO, we hope this organization will intervene in order to put an end to such criminal acts against our people and our motherland.

"PLO avails itself of this opportunity to present to FAO its best salutations and compliments. [signed] FAROUK KADDUMI, President of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization."

In the same cable I had suggested to the Secretary-General that as he had already asked the Governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization to supply information relevant to his report, he might wish to take this note verbale also into account in compiling his report. I had also assured him that he could count on my full support in whatever action he wished to take to respond adequately to the objectives of the General Assembly resolution.

*C. Reply submitted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*

1. The reply submitted by UNESCO states that pursuant to resolution 13.1 adopted at the eighteenth session of the General Conference of UNESCO, the Director-General submitted to the Executive Board at its ninety-ninth session a report on the implementation of this resolution concerning educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories. Subsequently, the Executive Board in its resolution 9.2 invited the Director-General to report to the General Conference at its nineteenth session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In his report to the nineteenth session of the General Conference (October 1976), the Director-General outlined the steps he had taken to implement 18C/resolution 13.1 concerning access to national education and culture by the population of the occupied Arab territories.

3. The reply further states that in the period between the eighteenth session of the General Conference and the opening of the ninety-ninth session of the Executive Board, in order to ascertain directly the situation with regard to education and culture in the occupied Arab territories, the Director-General made a number of unsuccessful approaches to the Israeli authorities, the Israeli Government being unable to extend to UNESCO the requisite facilities.

4. In the period between the ninety-ninth session of the Executive Board and the nineteenth session of the General Conference (29 May to 25 October 1976), the Director-General continued his efforts to obtain the necessary facilities from the Israeli Government in order to implement 18C/resolution 13.1.

5. Shortly before the announcement of the nineteenth session of the General Conference, the Director-General received a communication informing him of the Israeli Government's "agreement in principle" for the sending of a mission to gather information on the state of education and culture in the "territories administered by Israel", and stating further that all the necessary facilities would be extended to the representatives of the Director-General to enable them to perform their tasks. It was, however, not possible for the mission to take place until early in 1977.

6. In view of the absence of a report reflecting an on-the-spot assessment of the functioning of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied territories, the report to the Executive Board, which forms annex I of the Director-General's report to the General Conference is confined to the communications addressed to him directly by the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the League of Arab States and the Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO), as well as by some Governments of Arab States concerned about the situation of historical and religious monuments in the occupied territories. Below are extracts from this document (99 EX/50) which reports information on Sinai and the Gaza Strip communicated by the Egyptian Government; on the situation on the West Bank of the Jordan communicated by Jordan, Israel, PLO and ALECSO; and on the Golan Heights communicated by the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the comments on the occupied territories as a whole which Egypt, PLO and ALECSO addressed in letters and reports to the Director-General:

*A. Information concerning Sinai and the Gaza Strip*

37. The Egyptian Government has sent the Director-General a list of the educational and cultural institutions situated in the occupied territories of Sinai and the Gaza Strip (primary schools, preparatory schools, secondary schools, a religious education institute, an agricultural training institute, vocational training centres, a teacher-training college, cinemas, public and private libraries, sports clubs, clubs for young people, magazines).

38. With regard to the operation of the institutions and activities mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the Egyptian Government listed a number of difficulties stemming from the fact of the occupation and preventing these institutions from carrying out their work fully.

The facts brought to the Director-General's attention are the following:

39. In the schools situated in the Gaza Strip and not controlled by UNRWA/UNESCO, pupils do not have the necessary textbooks because the Israeli authorities do not allow textbooks printed in Egypt to be imported for these schools. Students must therefore make do with summaries and notes prepared for them by the teachers, though these summaries and notes are in most cases insufficient.

40. The schools in the Gaza Strip are to a large extent short of teachers. Before the occupation there was an average of one teacher for every 35 pupils; since 1971–1972 this has fallen to one teacher for every 47 pupils. Educational personnel who had been able to specialize in higher educational establishments in Egypt and who have returned to Gaza are prevented by the occupation authorities from practising their profession.

41. Most of the teachers in the Gaza schools have received insufficient teacher training, especially those at the secondary level where the qualified staff are supplemented by, among others, student teachers from the intermediate teacher-training centre in Ramallah. Some schools have even taken on as teachers civil servants who have had no teacher training whatever.

42. To this must be added the fact that since the buildings destroyed in 1967 have not been rebuilt, the Gaza sector is suffering from a shortage of schools and, in the schools that do exist, a shortage of classrooms. Before the occupation the average for the year 1966–1967 was 48 pupils per classroom; since 1971–1972 it has been 55 pupils per classroom.

43. The only three cultural centres in the sector, which were in the towns of Gaza, Khan Yunis and Rafah, have been closed. Those three centres, each of which possessed a large library, attracted large numbers of inhabitants in the sector and served as cultural meeting places.

44. The one commercial college at secondary level that existed in the Gaza sector has likewise been closed on the pretext that it constituted a threat to public security.

#### *B. Information regarding the West Bank of the Jordan*

47. The Jordanian Government stated that a radio-broadcasting station used to operate under its control in Arabic at Ramallah. Since the occupation of the territory that station has formed part of the Israeli broadcasting network.

48. While pointing out that in the present circumstances it is impossible for the Jordanian Government to obtain accurate figures and information regarding the situation and functioning of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied territories, and that in its view UNESCO was in a better position to carry out such

investigation work, the Jordanian Government informed the Director-General of the following:

49. The occupation authorities have demolished several school buildings in the territories situated on the West Bank of the Jordan, including two schools at Imwas, two schools at Yalu and two schools at Beit Nuba, all within the district of Ramallah.

50. Two schools have been closed by the occupation authorities: the Institute of Business Administration at Beit-Hanina and the "Al Aqsa" girls schools. As a pretext for the demolition of the latter, the occupation authorities alleged the cracks that were visible in the walls of the school. The Jordanian Government points out that the fissures in question were caused by the excavation work carried out by the occupation authorities in the vicinity of the school.

51. A number of pupils and teachers have been interned by the occupation authorities in the territories of the West Bank or sent away from those territories.

52. As regards the report which ALECSO has sent to the Director-General containing the conclusions of a group of experts on education in the occupied Arab territories, the following facts have been brought to the attention of UNESCO.

53. In the West Bank territory the occupation authorities have made changes in the curricula and textbooks—which used to be the same as were used in Jordan—which have altered their nature.

54. On the pretext that most of the textbooks being used contained chapters or paragraphs that might generate hatred towards Israel in the minds of Arab pupils, these textbooks have either been banned and replaced in most cases by "notes" and "summaries" which are quite often poorly printed, or else modified after whole chapters or paragraphs were deleted or rewritten, particularly in textbooks of history, geography, literature and religious instruction. Many textbooks—including some which were used in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools—have however been retained after a committee of international experts appointed by UNESCO found that nothing in them was of such a nature as to jeopardize the spirit of international understanding.<sup>76</sup>

55. The changes and alterations made in curricula and textbooks in the occupied territories of the West Bank of the Jordan tend, according to the ALECSO report, to:

(a) create a new generation of Palestinians in whose minds the religious and national heritage will no longer exist;

<sup>76</sup> This question was included in the agenda of eight sessions of the Executive Board between 1967 and 1971. It gave rise to a number of decisions on the part of the Board: 77/EX/Decision 6.8; 78 EX/Decision 7.4; 82 EX/Decision 4.2.5; 83 EX/Decision 4.2.3; 84 EX/Decision 4.2.1; 85 EX/Decision 4.1.2; 87 EX/Decision 4.2.4; 88 EX/Decision 4.1.1.

(b) weaken the links that young Palestinians have with their native land through the elimination of all reference to their past in books on sociology, the Arabic language and Islamic religion;

(c) weaken the spirit of resistance to the occupation, by deleting from all the textbooks poems and even expressions of a national or patriotic character;

(d) weaken links with Jordan and everything related to Arab and Islamic unity;

(i) by doing away with the emblem of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the name of the Ministry of Education of that country which appeared on textbook covers, and

(ii) by eliminating references to the Jihad, the life of the prophet and the sacred character of the holy places.

56. For each of the facts adduced in the report<sup>77</sup> the ALECSO experts have given relevant references to legislative texts, administrative decisions and book titles, and have quoted the paragraphs that have been criticized in the school textbooks.

57. As regards the Al-Ibrahimi Mosque (Hebron), the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States considers that Israel's decision to divide the buildings of the Mosque between the Moslem and Jewish communities constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions and a rejection of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the UNESCO General Conference, and a serious affront to Moslem sensitivity and to the sacred character of these places of prayer.

### C. *Jerusalem*

58. According to the ALECSO report and the communication from the Jordanian Government, the Arab educational institutions situated in the city of Jerusalem, which prior to the occupation followed the curricula in use in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, have been purely and simply brought under the general education system of the State of Israel. That system is governed by Act No. 5713 of 1953, which stipulates, according to the analysis made of it by the authors of the report, that one of the aims of public education is "to base education on the values of Jewish culture".

59. Far from fostering the access of Arab pupils to their national culture and education, as the resolution of the UNESCO General Conference prescribes, the fact of imposing Israeli curricula on Arab pupils constitutes, in the view of the ALECSO experts, a serious threat to their cultural identity, because these curricula tend to:

(a) make the Arab pupils believe that Palestine was a Jewish land from remote times, persuade them to accept

the expansionist intentions of the State of Israel and make them admit such expansion is natural;

(b) constitute an affront to Arab dignity, sociologically and economically, and make their underdevelopment obvious;

(c) make Arab pupils feel that the Jewish race is superior in all respects so that they lose confidence in themselves and their people;

(d) describe Arab history as a catalogue of conquest and piracy perpetuated against the countries where the Arabs settled;

(e) inculcate and develop in the pupils the feeling of belonging to a religious denomination;

(f) deprive Arab pupils of scientific and technological culture, especially at the levels of secondary and higher education; and

(g) strip Arab pupils of the values and traditions of Arab and Islamic culture so as to undermine their feeling of belonging to the Arab nation.

60. The ALECSO committee of experts also points out that all Arab pupils studying in schools situated in Jerusalem are obliged to do twice as much school work since, on the one hand, they must follow the official Israeli curriculum and sit for the end-of-course State examinations while, on the other, they are impelled to prepare privately for the West Bank examinations which will enable them later to enter Arab universities. This double burden is for the Arab pupils, in ALECSO's words, a cultural and educational torture which is not to be found anywhere else.

61. With regard to the historic monuments of Jerusalem which represent an essential feature in the spiritual and cultural life of the Moslem community, the Government of Kuwait, in a communication dated 8 March 1976, expressed concern about the serious threat which it considers the excavation work undertaken by the occupation authorities is causing to a number of historic buildings of great importance, especially those housing the Arab Orphanage and the Al-Othmanya School (which constitutes the central part of the western wall of Al-Haram Ash Sharif and which is situated in the immediate vicinity of two incomparable components of that unique group, namely the Gate of Al-Kattanine and the Minaret of Quaitabay).

62. The Government of Kuwait also reports that the Israeli authorities intend to build a new road running beside the old ramparts of Jerusalem. According to the plan which has been drawn up, this would entail the desecration of two ancient Moslem cemeteries (Bab Al-Rahma and Yusufiah).

63. As regards the Technical High School of Jerusalem, the Jordanian Government, in a communication dated 9 March 1976, sent a statement to the Director-General, together with photographs and a report of an Israeli expert, on the damage done to the school, which is, in the Government's view, the most important specialized Arab establishment in the city, as a result of work

<sup>77</sup> The ALECSO report as well as the communications received by the Director-General are at the disposal of the Executive Board.

(excavations using dynamite and earthworks) undertaken by the Israeli authorities in the immediate vicinity of the school, where a road and an industrial complex are being built.

64. In addition to the large and dangerous cracks in the walls of the buildings, the Jordanian Government has drawn the Director-General's attention to a number of facts which, in the Government's view, constitute pressures brought by the occupation authorities on the students and teaching staff of the school as part of their policy of encouraging the Arab inhabitants to leave the country. Thus the occupation authorities have refused to allow the opening of the hotel management section of the school, for which equipment and material have been available since 1967, and they have also closed the main road leading to the school.

#### D. Golan Heights

65. In a letter dated 18 March 1976, the Permanent Delegate of Syria to UNESCO complained, on behalf of his Government, that the occupation authorities will not let the Syrian students in the territory of the Golan Heights continue their studies in Syrian universities as Arab students in the other sector of the occupied Arab territories have been allowed to do.

66. In calling the Director-General's attention to this prohibition and to various difficulties met with by Syrian students in the Golan Heights—such as the destruction of houses and the lack of educational and scientific facilities—the Syrian Government hoped that UNESCO would intervene with the Israeli Government to put an end to this serious situation.

#### E. Remarks concerning the occupied territories as a whole

67. In concluding its report, the ALECSO committee of experts expresses the view that the policy followed by the occupation authorities with regard to the education of young Palestinians is contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially Article 26 which states in paragraph 3 that "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children".

68. The PLO, for its part, has called the Director-General's attention to facts which it considers infringements of the Palestinians' rights to a national education. It has referred in particular to the decision of the Israeli Government to forbid Palestinians between the ages of 16 to 35 from leaving the occupied territories unless they agree to spend a period of at least six months outside those territories.

69. Since this measure affects, among those belonging to the age group in question, the many Palestinian students enrolled with Arab universities (in which they are following correspondence courses) who leave the occupied territories every year for short periods in order to sit for examinations in those universities, the PLO considers that such a measure in reality constitutes pressure

which the occupation authorities are bringing to bear on the students so that they will leave the country.

70. In the same communication, the PLO informed the Director-General that the occupation authorities are taking pupils from schools of general education and forcing them to enroll in special centres for manual work. This practice is apparently increasing and the PLO considers that it is meant to lower the cultural level of the peoples in the occupied territories in order to make them a reserve of manpower for Israeli industry.

#### D. Reply submitted by the World Health Organization

The reply of WHO was submitted in the form of extracts from the annual report of the Director of Health of UNRWA for the year 1976, which was submitted as a document to the Thirtieth World Health Assembly.<sup>78</sup> The relevant paragraphs are quoted verbatim:

14. The long civil war in Lebanon claimed many victims, Palestine refugees as well as Lebanese. Precise figures are not yet available. Many were killed, many more injured. There was also widespread displacement of refugee families, who either had been living in camps (about 50 per cent) or who had been living in towns and villages. Several camps have been partially or totally destroyed and the number of displaced refugees is estimated at 30,000. Emergency assistance in the form of mattresses, blankets, clothing, shoes, kitchen kits, food, commodities, skim milk and soap has been distributed where needed and to the extent that funds, including generous contributions from voluntary agencies, permitted. Many of the Agency's installations have been damaged or destroyed. School buildings had to be repaired and many desks, benches, textbooks and scholastic supplies replaced. This task is not yet completed. Apart from schools, other UNRWA installations must be repaired, including the Agency's central warehouse in Beirut, which was hit by rockets and seriously damaged by fire. Many of the general supplies stored there were lost and have to be replaced. The Agency is unable, in present circumstances, to estimate precisely the cost of repairs and replacement.

#### CURATIVE MEDICAL SERVICES

##### *Outpatient medical care*

16. These services were made available in 131 health centres and health points (98 UNRWA, 17 government and 16 voluntary agencies). Two new diabetes and dermatology clinics were established during the year in addition to the existing ones. Attendances for medical consultation continued almost at the same rate, except

<sup>78</sup> Health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East (A30/WP/1). 27 April 1977.

in Lebanon. In Beirut, the majority of the refugees residing in Dbayeh, Dikwaneh and Jisr el-Basha camps fled to the western sector of the city where they shared accommodation with relatives and friends or occupied deserted apartments and unfinished buildings. An emergency service was established to provide them with basic medical care services.

#### *Outpatient dental care*

18. This consists of consultations, dental X-rays, tooth extraction and simple fillings, gum treatment and minor oral surgery. More emphasis was given to the preventive aspects of dental health and hygiene among school children and pregnant women. During the year a new dental clinic was established in New Amman Camp, east Jordan, increasing the number of dental clinics providing this service to the refugees to 21. Dental care was also improved by the provision of an additional dental unit in Jaramana Camp in Syria.

#### *Mental health*

23. The demand for outpatient services for mental illness continued to increase. Consequently, the Agency is giving more thought and attention to the preventive aspects of mental health.

### PREVENTIVE MEDICAL SERVICES

#### *Epidemiology and control of communicable diseases*

28. Early in July there was an outbreak of cholera in Syria, which started in the north-east district of Hasaka and soon spread to other localities. Prompt control measures were taken by the UNRWA Field Health Department in coordination with the national health authorities, particularly in refugee camps. These included chlorination of water sources, suspension of distribution of reconstituted milk and of serving fresh fruits and vegetables in the supplementary feeding centres, mass vaccination of the population at risk, and promulgation of health guidance on food and personal hygiene in Agency schools, health centres and other installations. These control measures proved effective: only two cases were reported among the refugee population in spite of the widespread nature of the epidemic, and both cases were cured. The other Fields were immediately put on the alert and the necessary precautionary measures were taken. Cholera was transmitted, however, to Jordan and later to the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where 19, 4 and 14 cases respectively occurred among the refugees, though no fatality was reported. The situation in Lebanon remained obscure due to lack of communications, both internally and externally, as a result of the civil war. It was, however, possible to vaccinate the refugee camp population in the Tripoli area through the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross and to apply strict sanitary measures in these camps. No confirmed case was reported.

29. Compared with 1975 there was little change in the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases and dysentery in the area of operations as a whole. Typhoid and paratyphoid were further reduced from 64 cases in 1975 to 53 cases in 1976, of which 47 were reported from Syria. The incidence of infectious hepatitis, on the other hand, showed a remarkable increase in all Fields, from 596 to 1097 cases following the general trend in the area. Poliomyelitis has surprisingly reached moderate epidemic proportions in Gaza, similar to those of 1974, despite the primary and booster doses of oral polio vaccine given routinely to children below three years of age attending the Agency's child health clinics. Fifty-five cases were reported, mainly in July and August, as against only six cases in 1975. The epidemic subsided towards the end of the year. The efficacy of the vaccine and the level of protection are being investigated in an attempt to find an explanation for the outbreak. There was a substantial drop in the incidence of measles, from 2840 to 1447 which could be attributed to a more extensive immunization coverage of the children at risk. Communicable eye diseases, mainly in the form of acute conjunctivitis occurring particularly during summer months, have continued to show a modest downward trend which could, in part, be accredited to improvement of sanitary facilities in camps and health education centred on personal hygiene.

30. Influenza showed an upward trend, mainly observed early in 1976 but resuming again late in the year, with Gaza and Syria principally accounting for the increase. While no indigenous cases of malaria were reported during the year, only two imported ones were discovered in Gaza. Newly detected cases of respiratory tuberculosis dropped from 175 last year to 141 this year. Reporting from Lebanon Field may be considered as incomplete.

#### *Maternal and child health services*

33. In the prenatal clinics, 29,006 women were registered for maternal care, which included regular health supervision and the issue of extra rations, milk and iron-folate tablets through pregnancy and the nursing period. For the 29,397 deliveries, care was provided in the homes mainly by the Agency-supervised dayahs (for 61 per cent), in UNRWA maternity centres (mainly in Gaza) by UNRWA nursing staff and in hospital for women with difficulties or increased risk. In all, five maternal deaths were reported, i. e. 0.02 per 1000 live births, while the reported still-birth rate was 10.2 per 1000 total births.

34. A total of 85,618 children 0-3 years of age have benefited from the services provided at the 79 child health clinics.

### ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

43. The programme is concerned mainly with the provision of potable water supplies, sanitary disposal

of solid and liquid wastes, storm water drainage and control of insect and rodent vectors of disease. A total of 651,736 refugees and displaced persons living in 63 refugee camps benefitted from the programme, which has been maintained at a satisfactory level in most of the camps. However, due to prolonged civil warfare in Lebanon, the services were adversely affected. Furthermore, in the West Bank, the sanitation services continued to suffer from difficulties encountered in the recruitment of sanitation labourers. *Ad hoc* arrangements had to be made to prevent any serious health hazards. Due to the serious financial situation faced by the Agency throughout the year, support of the self-help camp improvement scheme had to be reduced considerably. The programme was barely maintained through a subsidy of approximately \$25,000 against a total requirement initially estimated at \$ 171,000. Nevertheless, with the cooperation of local authorities and the sustained participation of refugee camp communities, a number of improvements were carried out as detailed in the following paragraphs.

44. Schemes for providing private water connexions to refugee shelters have been progressing very satisfactorily. Through a self-help programme, three camps in the West Bank have been provided with private water connexions and two camps in Gaza are to benefit from a similar programme very shortly. Municipal water supply schemes for two camps in the West Bank and three camps in Gaza are progressing steadily. The Government of Jordan has overcome the chronic water shortage of Suf camp with a newly drilled well and the Syrian Government (General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees) is planning to drill an additional well to complete the private water connexion scheme at Khan Eshieh camp. Three camps in Lebanon and two in Syria continue to experience water shortages, but augmentation schemes for the two camps in Syria are in progress.

45. Replacement of public latrines with private ones continued to progress satisfactorily and currently about 94 per cent of the refugee population in camps have been provided with private latrine facilities.

46. In Syria, on completion of the construction of lateral sewers in three camps, about 75 per cent of the camp inhabitants are now served by sewerage systems. The Agency is planning to extend the sewerage facility at Dera'a camp to cover the additional shelters recently constructed by the refugees.

47. The ongoing self-help scheme for the construction of surface drains and pavement of pathways benefitted 15 camps in the West Bank, two camps in Gaza, one camp each in Jordan and Syria and a few camps in Lebanon. The scheme solves waste-water disposal problems, facilitates refuse collection, provides better access to refugee shelters and camp installations and helps in the abatement of dust and mud. Consequently it continues to be very popular with the refugees. Efforts

are being made to provide adequate support from the Agency in the form of building materials.

48. With the provision of a scooter cart at Neirab camp for the transport of refuse, only three camps in Syria are left with mule carts; a tipper-truck is under procurement for improving the efficiency of the refuse collection services. Further improvement of garbage collection and disposal services is envisaged by the provision very shortly of additional vehicles in the Lebanon and West Bank Fields to meet the workload.

#### NUTRITION AND SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING SERVICES

49. The Department of Health attaches great importance to the supervision, protection and promotion of the nutritional status of the refugees. These functions are entrusted to the Nutrition and Supplementary Feeding Division. The services provided by this Division are directed particularly towards the most vulnerable groups among the refugees, namely infants, pre-school and elementary school children, pregnant and lactating women, non-hospitalized tuberculosis patients and medically recommended hardship cases. The services comprise the distribution of (a) milk, (b) midday hot meals, (c) extra dry rations and (d) vitamins. The emergency feeding programme established after the 1967 hostilities for the benefit of the displaced refugees and others affected by the conflict and its aftermath, was also maintained during 1976, but with minor changes (for details of the programme see Appendix 2).

#### *E. Reply submitted by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*

1. UNRWA provides essential services to Palestine refugees in the Near East, including the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The primary task, the determination of the needs of the Palestine refugee population in the area of operations and the implementation of programmes to meet them in the fields of education, health and relief, is a continuous process. This is reflected in the Commissioner-General's annual report to the General Assembly.<sup>79</sup> The report gives an account of the services rendered by the Agency and also forecasts in the Agency's budget the requirements to help ensure adequate living conditions for the refugees—albeit at a minimum level.

2. The 648,627 registered Palestine refugees in the occupied territories, like the other 1,057,859 living in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and East Jordan, benefit from UNRWA education,

<sup>79</sup> Doc. 3 above. [ed. note.]

health and relief services. UNESCO and WHO respectively provide technical expertise and professional guidance for the education and training programmes and the health services (including, among others, supplementary feeding and sanitation) which are aimed at maintaining a standard at least equivalent to that established by the Arab host Governments for the indigenous population. Relief services include distribution of basic dry rations to about one half of the registered refugee population (about 324,000 in the occupied territories), limited assistance in the provision of shelter (about 272,000 registered refugees live in camps in the occupied territories), and welfare services on a small scale to hardship cases (about 14,500 in the occupied territories).

3. In 1977, UNRWA expenditure is estimated at \$134 million, approximately \$42 million of which will be spent for the occupied territories. In 1978, merely to maintain services at their present level, the Agency estimates its requirements at \$148 million, of which approximately \$46 million is for the occupied territories. These estimates take into account extrapolations of population figures which have a direct effect on education requirements and also—though not as direct—on health, relief and support services. Whether all the programmes can be executed to the full extent will depend on the receipt of sufficient voluntary contributions for the purpose. As at 30 June 1977, the shortfall of contributions against the budget for 1977 is estimated at \$16.4 million.

#### *F. Statement submitted by the Economic Commission for Western Asia*

Information obtained by ECWA indicates the following trends in these living conditions:

##### *1. Land ownership and use*

Large amounts of land have been reserved by the occupation authorities for various purposes, including military uses. The owners of these lands are denied access to them. Agricultural development of the occupied territories has been adversely affected.<sup>80</sup>

##### *2. Population movement and migration*

At the beginning of the period of occupation, about 25 per cent of the population of the occupied territories left these territories. Only a small fraction of these people have returned. Controls on movement in and out of the occupied territories are strict, especially for certain groups of Palestinians. There is continued migration for economic reasons, to the rapidly developing Arab countries and to the developed countries. In addition, there has been a large number of forcible deportations, often of community leaders.<sup>81</sup>

##### *3. Changes in settlement patterns*

During and immediately following the 1967 war, a number of villages were totally or partially destroyed. Some of these have been rebuilt, while others have not.

An important development is the establishment of new non-Palestinian settlements in the occupied territories. In a number of cases, the establishment of these settlements has been officially approved by the occupation authorities. These new settlements, in some instances, have military and strategic significance. Their establishment tends to change the character of the occupied territories.<sup>82</sup>

##### *4. Housing*

Two trends in the housing field may be noted. One is the deliberate destruction of houses by the occupation authorities as an act of punishment. The number of houses destroyed is large.

A second trend is the construction of new housing projects reserved for non-Palestinian individuals. This has taken place especially in the area around Jerusalem.<sup>83</sup>

##### *5. Urban change*

The legal status of east Jerusalem has been changed by the Government of Israel, separating this area from the "West Bank" sector of Jordan.

East Jerusalem has great religious and cultural significance, as well as being an important urban

<sup>81</sup> United Nations General Assembly and Security Council debates for June to December 1967. Note also various reports of the *United Nations Special Committee Investigating Israeli Practices Affecting Human Rights in Occupied Territories*, 1969–1976, Geneva.

<sup>82</sup> *Reports of Special Committee, op. cit.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.* In addition note U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. *Problems of Protecting Civilians Under International Law in the Middle East Conflict*, 4 April 1974, p. 36, Governmental Printing Office, Hearings.

<sup>80</sup> *Middle East International*, London, May 1975, p. 22. See also *Israeli Official Gazette* No. 2064, 28 June 1967, pp. 2690–2691 regarding various laws on confiscation of land.



centre in the West Bank. Clearing of buildings from parts of east Jerusalem has resulted in large-scale urban change. At the same time, the construction of high-rise apartment houses has altered the environment and the character of the city.

Several of the refugee camps have also been affected by the clearing of large numbers of buildings. UNRWA reports that inadequate provision was made for the resettlement of families displaced by the process of urban clearance.<sup>84</sup>

## 7

### **Report of the Secretary-General concerning Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip<sup>85</sup>**

October 6, 1977

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR  
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

#### *Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip Report of the Secretary-General*

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of paragraph 2 of its resolution 31/15 E of 23 November 1976, concerning Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to report to it at its thirty-second session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 of the resolution. In paragraph 1 of that resolution, the Assembly reiterated its call upon Israel (a) to take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation and (b) to desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters.

2. By a note verbale dated 13 January 1977, addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 31/15 E and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of the respective

provisions of the resolution.

3. By a note verbale dated 8 September 1977, the Permanent Representative of Israel conveyed to the Secretary-General his Government's comments on resolution 31/15 E, which, as in previous reports on this matter, are reproduced verbatim below:

The Government of Israel wishes to draw attention not only to the greatly improved security situation in the Gaza Strip and the public order and tranquillity prevailing there in general, but also to the full employment and the vast amelioration in the economic condition of the refugees and the accelerated rate of development and building.

Of the Gaza Strip's labour force numbering approximately 70,000, about 30,000—refugees and non-refugees alike—travel every day to work in Israel. The wages which they earn, equal to those of Israeli workers, enable them to achieve a standard of living never enjoyed by them before.

The public order and the economic prosperity are a direct result of the security measures taken by the authorities against Arab terror, which was rife in the Gaza Strip until 1971, and which for the most part struck at, and grievously harmed, the local population.

In the last few years, housing projects have been initiated by Israeli authorities to enable refugees to move out of the camps into relatively spacious one-storey homes of their own (between 750 and 850 square feet of floor space), with electricity and indoor plumbing, at modest cost (about \$6,000 per housing unit) and on favourable financial terms (one third down-payment and mortgage arrangements for the balance). More recently, the authorities, in the light of their experience to date, are tending to favour projects designed to allow the refugees to build their new homes by themselves. This is done by making over to the refugees plots of land already prepared with the infrastructure for building, plus a grant of about \$2,000 in cash, so that the family can build a home to its own specifications.

Hence, for the first since 1948, refugees in Gaza have been given the possibility of moving out of the squalid conditions of the camps into decent housing, equipped with all the amenities normally available in modern dwellings. Indeed, Israel has been the first country in the Middle East to lend a hand to the refugees and assist them, through land and monetary grants, together with other forms of subsidies, in rehabilitation and the improvement of their standards of living. Israel can have no part in any attempt to perpetuate the untold misery which prevailed in the refugee camps, and thus it will abide by its policy of offering the refugees houses outside the camps. Similarly, it will not evict any refugees already installed in their new homes, which have been purchased with their own money and, in a growing

<sup>84</sup> *Israeli Official Gazette, op. cit.*

<sup>85</sup> UN doc. A/32/264

number of cases, built with their own labour. In so doing, Israel is not detracting from the formal status of the individuals concerned as refugees entitled to the services of UNRWA, and accordingly sees no grounds whatsoever for the protestations reflected in resolution 31/15 E, at a time when refugees are being enabled, without pressure or coercion, to move to far superior accommodation than they have known for over a quarter of a century, and when the refugees themselves are delighted to take advantage of this opportunity to better their lives.

By contrast, it is impossible to turn a blind eye to the situation in the refugee camps in Lebanon today. The civil war in that country during 1975 and 1976 exposed the complete falsity of the Arab charges against Israel, which have been incorporated into countless General Assembly resolutions condemning Israel without reason or justice.

The events in Lebanon proved what the Government of Israel had been saying for a number of years, namely, that the Arab terror organizations took over the refugee camps and set up in them their operational bases, ammunition dumps, arms stores and training facilities. The terror organizations deliberately and callously turned the civilian population of the camps into hostages, using them as cover for their murderous activities and tools of their propaganda. The tragic fate of the inhabitants of Tel el-Zaatar last year is very much a case in point.

The territories continue to maintain their armed presence in the camps in Lebanon, against the will of the refugees, as witnessed by James Markham, writing in the *New York Times* on 1 September 1977. He quoted a Palestinian terrorist as saying "There is great deal of malaise in the camps today. People are asking, 'If we could not save Tell Zaatar, how can we save Palestine?'"

While the civil war was raging in Lebanon, and while the PLO presence in the camps was paralysing UNRWA's activities in the country to the extent that the Agency was forced to move its headquarters to Vienna and Amman (where they still remain), Israel opened its northern border with Lebanon and offered extensive humanitarian help to villagers who had suffered in, and as a result of, the civil war. The PLO, not content with intimidating refugees in the camps, is now terrorizing Christians in southern Lebanon, and Israel is continuing to keep its border open and to extend considerable medical and economic aid to those in need.

It is enough to compare the tragic fate suffered by Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and indeed by the population of Lebanon as a whole, with the peace, tranquility, prosperity and progress enjoyed in all fields of life by the Arab population, including former refugees in the areas administered by Israel, in order to organize resolution 31/15 E for what it is: namely, a worthless piece of Arab political warfare, inspired through fear that Israel may go far towards solving the refugee prob-

lem in the Gaza Strip and in other areas, and thus deprive the Arab States, which for almost thirty years have done little or nothing for the refugees, of a sordid propaganda tool against Israel.

4. The following information concerning Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 31/15 E is based on reports received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

5. Since the Secretary-General's report was submitted last year,<sup>86</sup> there have been no cases of punitive demolition of refugee shelters in the Gaza Strip. However, the Agency's claims for compensation referred to in paragraph 6 of last year's report still remain unpaid.

6. In paragraph 7 of last year's report, it was stated that only 67 families of the refugees whose shelters had been demolished by the Israeli occupying authorities in July-August 1971<sup>87</sup> had received free alternative accommodation from the Israeli authorities. There has been no change in this figure. Further details with regard to the rehousing of the families affected by the demolitions are given in paragraph 8 below.

7. In paragraph 8 of last year's report, reference was made to the offer which the Israeli occupying authorities proposed to make to families in need of rehousing. Pursuant to an oral communication in June 1977, the Agency was advised by the authorities in writing on 17 July 1977 that families in need of housing as a result of the road-widening in 1971 (in effect the 138 families referred to in para. 8 below) would have the following three options open to them: (a) to obtain free of charge a plot of land in Beit Lahia (north of Jabalia)

<sup>86</sup> Doc. 6 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>87</sup> In July-August 1971, the Israeli occupying authorities demolished a number of shelters in the Jabalia, Beach and Rafah camps, the stated purpose being to construct access roads within the camps. These demolitions affected 2,554 refugee families comprising 15,855 persons; a total of 7,729 shelter rooms were demolished. The developments in regard to the rehousing of these families are referred to in the Commissioner-General's report to the Secretary-General, which was transmitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session (A/8383 and Add.1), and in the Secretary-General's reports to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 40, document A/8814), its twenty-eighth session (A/9155), its twenty-ninth session (*ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 38, document A/9740), its thirtieth session (*ibid.*, *Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54, document A/10253) and its thirty-first session (*ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session Annexes*, agenda item 53, document A/31/240). [This and following notes are part of the original document].

and a cash grant of £I 20,000 to build a house; (b) to obtain a house in Sheikh Radwan at the cost price less £I 20,000 as a contribution from the Israeli authorities; and (c) to obtain a house in Khan Yunis at a cost of £I 10,000, the balance to be contributed by the Israeli authorities. The Agency has informed the Israeli authorities that, whilst it has no objection to refugees being offered any options in regard to accommodation, it expects the Israeli authorities to live up to their commitment to provide the refugees with free accommodation which measures up at least to the standard of Agency accommodation and that this option too should be given to the refugees. All the three options now offered entail out-of-pocket expenditure by the refugees in order to complete acquisition of the new house (see also para. 14 (b) below).

8. The present position is that, of the total of 2,554 families affected by the demolitions in July-August 1971, it is still the case that only 67 have been provided with free alternative accommodation by the Israeli occupying authorities; that of the 266 families who were found by the Joint Survey of March-July 1973<sup>88</sup> to be in hardship, 138 families still remain in the same state since 70 families on the hardship list have been given accommodation at reduced prices. Another 106 families have purchased new houses in the Gaza housing projects and four families have purchased plots of land in housing projects and have constructed their own shelters. In all, therefore, only 247 families have been provided with accommodation, leaving a balance of 2,307 families, made up of 138 families on the hardship list and 2,169 families of other categories affected by the 1971 demolitions, not provided for.

9. The Agency is still concerned at the lack of progress in the rehousing of the refugee families affected by the 1971 demolitions. It has continued to press the Israeli occupying authorities in the

Gaza Strip and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for urgent action on this matter and has again suggested that an immediate practical step would be to make available free of charge to those refugees who are still in need, as a result of the 1971 demolitions, existing vacant accommodation in the housing projects established by the Israeli authorities.

10. As stated in paragraph 5 above, there have been no demolitions on punitive grounds since last year's report. However, the Israeli occupying authorities have continued to inform refugee families that their shelters are to be demolished and to offer them the options of purchasing accommodation in a government housing project (or purchasing land for the construction of housing) or, alternatively, of being allocated shelters vacated in another section of the camp by families who have voluntarily opted for the purchase of new housing. Instead, the practice of demolishing the shelters of those purchasing new accommodation has continued with the result that, as stated in last year's report, the available stock of shelter accommodation in the Gaza Strip has been reduced, although there is still a pressing need for housing of refugees. The authorities have continued to grant the refugees concerned permission to salvage materials from their demolished shelters.

11. In connexion with the practices referred to in the preceding paragraph, in the period from 1 July 1976 to 30 June 1977, a total of 342 families, comprising 2,064 persons, moved from their shelters in the camps—Rafah, Khan Yunis and Beach camps—to new housing (against payment) in one or the other housing projects established by the Israeli authorities; 55 other refugee families, comprising 357 persons (out of 108 refugee families who purchased plots of land in one of the projects on the basis that they would construct houses to a standard design), have constructed and moved into new housing. A total of 619 shelter rooms were demolished in the camps in this connexion. One vacated shelter which had been constructed by the Agency was spared and allocated to a family who had lost its shelter.

12. Several families in Beach camp referred to in paragraph 16 of last year's report have purchased houses in government housing projects and have demolished their shelters. Concerning Khan Yunis camp, all refugees have been invited during the year to apply for houses in a government housing

<sup>88</sup> This survey was conducted jointly by the Agency and the Israeli occupying authorities in order to establish the facts regarding the condition of those families affected by the July-August 1971 demolitions who, in the Agency's opinion, were still in need. The survey covered 942 families selected by the Agency on the basis of preliminary surveys made by the Agency of the conditions at that time of the 2,554 families affected by the 1971 demolitions. The Joint Survey established that 706 of the 942 families surveyed were inadequately housed, of whom 266 were considered to be in serious cases of hardship; see A/9155, paras. 6, 7 and 8.

project near by. A further development is that refugees living in Block 1 at Rafah camp were offered shelters at Rafah housing project (against payment) by the Israeli authorities. Also, 19 families from Block H at Khan Yunis camp were informed by the authorities that their 13 shelters were to be demolished and were offered an opportunity to buy shelters in the new housing project. Those who could not afford the cost were told they would be moved to Agency shelters which were expected to fall vacant in the future. However, the authorities subsequently advised that these 13 shelters would not be demolished for the time being.

13. The Israeli occupying authorities have expressed their wish to receive applications for the purchase of new houses at El Amal Housing Project (Khan Yunis) from refugees living in the middle camps, preferably from those living in Deir el Balah camp, presumably, to continue the construction of a road through Deir el Balah camp to the south.

14. With regard to the comments of the Government of Israel relating to resolution 31/15 E, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA has made the following observations for the purpose of clarification:

(a) The Government of Israel describes one of the options offered to refugees as "plots of land already prepared with the infrastructure for building, plus a grant of about \$2,000 in cash, so that the family can build a home to its own specifications". As recently as 17 July 1977, the Agency inquired of the occupation authorities whether a refugee who chose this option could build to his own design. The answer given was that construction would have to be according to the Government's standard design, but arrangements might be possible for a house to be built and occupied in phases.

(b) References in the comments to "squalid conditions of the camps" and "untold misery which prevailed in the refugee camps" and, by contrast, the "decent housing" in the housing projects are, in the Agency's view, more generalized than is warranted by the facts. Refugees in and outside camps live under widely differing conditions and the opportunity is always open to them to move to better housing if they can afford to do so. Better housing—whether in a housing project, in a camp (by improvements to existing shelters), or elsewhere—can be obtained by paying for it. As

pointed out in paragraph 7 above, the Agency sees no objection to the options offered to refugees as one means—relocation to housing projects—of obtaining better housing. However, it believes not only that it would be desirable but also that the Government of Israel is committed to extend the programme by adding the option of free housing built to UNRWA standards for those whose shelters have been demolished and those who are told that their shelters are to be demolished. For those refugees who prefer housing above UNRWA standards and are willing to pay the difference, this condition would be met if the subsidy paid to those who relocate to housing projects or elsewhere were the same as the cost of an UNRWA shelter, which is at present about £1 30,000 (three rooms without water or electricity). Many shelters in camps which are vacated by refugees moving out of them to housing projects are considered by the refugees and the Agency to be quite adequate. The Agency believes that such shelters should not be demolished as a condition of moving into a housing project but should instead be turned over to other refugee families, particularly those whose shelters were demolished in 1971, in cases where they are living under worse conditions than such shelters would provide (see para. 9 above).

(c) With reference to whether refugees move from their present housing "without pressure or coercion", except for refugees who have voluntarily purchased new housing, the procedure is that refugees are informed that their shelters are to be demolished and are then offered various options, not including free housing. The Commissioner-General has suggested to the Government of Israel that the refugees be informed, either by the occupying authorities or by the Agency, that the demolition is not compulsory (if that is the case) and that no one of the options need be selected. This practice has not been adopted.

(d) In the Israeli comments on the conflict of the Government of Israel situation in refugee camps in Lebanon, a connexion is asserted between PLO presence in the refugee camps, an alleged paralysis of the activities of UNRWA in Lebanon and the temporary relocation of UNRWA headquarters in Amman and Vienna. The PLO, whose presence in the camps was established by agreement with the Government of Lebanon and with whom UNRWA deals on operational matters in Lebanon at the request of the Government,

played no role in the decision to relocate headquarters temporarily in Amman and Vienna. As pointed out in paragraph 19 of last year's corresponding report of the Secretary-General,<sup>89</sup> the activities of UNRWA in Lebanon have not been paralysed at any time during the conflict. Far from paralysing UNRWA activities, PLO has continued to assist the Lebanon Field Office in

meeting specific operational needs. It is the staff of about 2,200 employees in the Lebanon Field Office who conduct UNRWA activities in Lebanon, not the staff of about 425 at UNRWA headquarters. Hence, the location of UNRWA headquarters is not relevant to the level of services provided refugees in Lebanon.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>89</sup> See doc. 6 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*. [ed. note]

<sup>90</sup> For an account of the effect of the conflict on Agency activities in Lebanon, see paras. 23–25 and pertinent paragraphs of sects. B,C and D of chap. 1 of the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for the period 1 July 1976–30 June 1977 (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/32/13)*). Para. 23 of that report describes the considerations relating to the location of UNRWA headquarters, which the Agency has now decided to reunite in Beirut in November 1977. [See doc. 3 above]

## 8

# Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories<sup>91</sup>

October 27, 1977

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<sup>91</sup> UN doc. A/32/248 excluding Letter of Transmittal and Annexes. Previous reports of the Special Committee have been published as doc. 317 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*, docs. 409 and 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*, doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*, doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*, doc. 6 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*, doc. 8 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975* and doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. By that resolution, the General Assembly decided to establish the Special Committee, composed of three Member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, to co-operate with it and to facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter; and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Mr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and Member of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Somalia appointed Mr. A. A. Farah and subsequently Mr. H. Nur-Elmi, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 26 April 1974, the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session informed the Secretary-General that Somalia had decided to withdraw from the Special Committee and that, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), he had appointed Senegal a member of the Special Committee. On 30 April 1974, the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that his Government had appointed Mr. Keba M'Baye, Chief Justice of Senegal (*Premier Président de la Cour suprême du Sénégal*), as its representative on the Special Committee. On 21 September 1976, the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations informed the

Secretary-General that Ambassador H. S. Amerasinghe had resigned from the Special Committee upon his election as President of the Assembly at its thirty-first session. On 18 February 1977, the Government of Sri Lanka informed the Secretary-General that Ambassador V. L. B. Mendis, Sri Lanka High Commissioner to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, would serve on the Special Committee at the meetings in Geneva from 22 February to 1 March 1977.

3. On 26 April 1977, the Government of Sri Lanka again informed the Secretary-General that it had appointed Ambassador I. B. Fonseka, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 8 July 1977 the Government of Senegal informed the Special Committee that Mr. Keba M'Baye had resigned from the Special Committee and nominated in his stead Mr. Ousmane Goundiam, *Procureur général près la Cour suprême* as its representative on the Special Committee.

4. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee submitted its first report in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 and 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969. The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings, from 7 to 11 December 1970. On 15 December 1970, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2727 (XXV).

5. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee submitted its second report (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2), prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV). On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee submitted a third report (A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2) containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report. These reports were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings, from 13 to 16 December 1971. On 20 December 1971, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI).

6. On 25 September 1972, the Special Committee submitted its fourth report (A/8828) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV) and

2851 (XXVI). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 849th to 855th meetings, from 30 November to 7 December 1972. On 15 December 1972, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 3005 (XXVII).

7. On 15 October 1973, the Special Committee submitted its fifth report (A/9148) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI) and 3005 (XXVII). On 20 November 1973, the Special Committee submitted a supplement to its fifth report (A/9148/Add.1). The report and its supplement were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 890th and 892nd to 897th meetings, from 19 to 26 November 1973. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9237) submitted pursuant to Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII). On 7 December 1973, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII).

8. On 25 October 1974, the Special Committee submitted its sixth report (A/9817) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII) and 3092 B (XXVIII). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 927th to 932nd meetings, from 6 to 12 November 1974. In addition, the Special Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9843) submitted pursuant to Assembly resolution 3092 B (XXVIII). On 29 November 1974, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3240 A to C (XXIX).

9. On 13 October 1975, the Special Committee submitted its seventh report (A/10272) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 3443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII) and 3240 A and C (XXIX). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 985th to 991st meetings, from 26 November to 5 December 1975. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/10370) submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 3240 A and C (XXIX). On 15 December 1975, the Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3525 A to D (XXX).

10. On 17 September 1976, the Special Committee submitted its eighth report (A/31/218) in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX), 3525 A and C (XXX) and 31/106 C and D. The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at the 17th to 19th, 22nd to 26th and 28th to 32nd meetings of the thirty-first session, from 10 November to 6 December 1976. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the reports of the Secretary-General (A/31/235 and Add.1 and 2 and A/31/302), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 3525 A, C and D (XXX). On 16 December 1976, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 31/106 A to D.

11. The present report has been prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII), 3092 B (XXVIII), 3240 A and C (XXIX), 3525 A and C (XXX) and 31/106 C and D.

## II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

12. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure contained in its first report to the Secretary-General.

13. The Special Committee held meetings from 22 February to 1 March 1977 at Geneva. At these meetings the Special Committee reviewed its mandate consequent upon the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 31/106 C and D. It decided on the organization of its work for the year. The Special Committee decided to continue its system of monitoring information on the occupied territories and to hold periodical meetings to analyse the information to keep track of the occupying Power's policies and practices in the occupied territories. At these meetings the Special Committee reviewed information on the occupied territories which had become available since 17 September 1976, the date of the adoption of its eighth report (A/31/218). The Special Committee examined communications received from Governments and individuals containing information on the situation in the occupied territories. It held consultations with the expert engaged for the purpose of carrying out the survey requested by the General Assembly in resolution 31/106 D.



The Special Committee decided to continue its consultations with the International Committee of the Red Cross on the same basis as in previous years as requested by the Assembly in paragraph 9 of resolution 31/106 C. In deciding to continue its system of monitoring information, the Special Committee agreed to pay particular attention, given the nature of the reports before it, to policies and measures adopted by the occupying Power and to do so in the context of the occupying Power's obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,<sup>92</sup> which required the occupying Power to refrain from any measure other than those required for the day-to-day administration and preservation of good order, pending a final peace settlement. The Special Committee also decided to address itself to the parties concerned. The Special Committee examined numerous allegations received from Governments and from non-governmental bodies and individuals. Several of these allegations reflected a deterioration in the situation of detainees, including a marked increase in reports on further deterioration in prison conditions and reports of hunger strikes and other manifestations in certain prisons. The Special Committee agreed to give special attention to the situation of detainees and gave the Chairman a mandate to make a special report should this be warranted by information received subsequent to its meetings. The Special Committee decided to request an affidavit from Mrs. Felicia Langer, lawyer for one of the reported leaders of the hunger strike. It decided to invite Mrs. Lea Tsemel and Mr. Eytan Grosfeld, authors of reports received from the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, to testify before it with regard to the reports received from them. Other decisions were taken regarding the follow-up required for certain allegations that the Special Committee was still investigating, and to improve the system for monitoring the Israeli press and the organization of information derived therefrom. With regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 31/106 D, the Special Committee decided on the terms of reference of the expert engaged by it for the purpose of undertaking the supplementary survey requested by the Assembly in that resolution.

14. On 1 March 1977, a letter was sent to the Secretary-General stating, *inter alia*, the following:

The Special Committee has considered the information which it has received since 17 September 1976, the date of the adoption of its previous report, and in particular the information emanating from the occupied territories during recent weeks.

The Special Committee fears that the situation of civilians in the occupied territories, especially the situation of the detainees which has been shown during recent months to be a matter of particular concern, may deteriorate still further in the near future. The international community must assume its responsibilities to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of civilians in the occupied territories. In that connexion, the Special Committee believes that it would be desirable, despite the statements made by the representatives of Israel at the previous session, to try once again to obtain the co-operation of the Government of Israel which would enable the Special Committee to visit the occupied territories in order to carry out the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

15. On 5 March 1977, the Chairman of the Special Committee, in accordance with the Special Committee's decision, sent a telegram (see annex III) to the Secretary-General drawing his attention to the latest reports on the serious plight of detainees in the occupied territories and requesting him to undertake appropriate action.

16. On 8 March 1977, letters were sent to the Governments of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic and to the Palestine Liberation Organization referring to Assembly resolution 31/106 C and requesting information relevant to the mandate of the Special Committee. Reports were received from the Governments and from the Palestine Liberation Organization transmitting information on the situation in the occupied territories.

17. On 11 April 1977, the Secretary-General informed the Special Committee that the matter of co-operation by Israel had been raised with the Government of Israel, in accordance with the wishes of the Special Committee, and that that Government had informed him that its position remained unchanged.

18. The Special Committee held a second series of meetings at Geneva from 16 to 26 May 1977. At these meetings the Special Committee reviewed information that had become available since its February meetings and examined a number of communications sent by Governments and by

<sup>92</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [This and following notes are part of the original text]

private sources that it had received directly or that had been referred to it by the Secretary-General. The Special Committee heard the testimony of Mrs. Lea Tsemel and Mr. Eytan Grosfeld, who were invited by the Special Committee to appear before it. The Special Committee also heard a report on the progress of the supplementary survey of the destruction in Quneitra, requested by the General Assembly in resolution 31/106 D. At these meetings, the Special Committee confirmed decisions it had taken at its February meetings to pay special attention to the situation of detainees and to the treatment of youths; it inquired of the Secretary-General as to what action had been taken consequent to the telegram (see annex III) sent to him on 5 March 1977 by the Chairman of the Special Committee.

19. The Special Committee held a third series of meetings from 5 to 7 September 1977 at Geneva. At these meetings, the Special Committee examined information on the occupied territories that had become available since its May meetings and heard the testimony of Mr. Peter Gillman and Mr. Paul Eddy from the *Sunday Times* of London. They were invited by the Special Committee to appear before it in connexion with a report published in the *Sunday Times* of London on 19 June 1977 entitled "Israel and torture: an Insight inquiry" (see A/32/132-S/12356, annex). The Special Committee decided to extend invitations to Mr. David Krivine, author of a report appearing in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* of 5 August 1977 entitled "Flawed Insight on torture", purporting to rebut the *Sunday Times* report, and to Mr. Bernard Edinger, a correspondent of Reuters World News Service, author of two articles appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 and 10 July 1977 on a visit to Gaza prison. It also decided to invite Professor John Quigley of Ohio State University, who participated in a delegation of the National Lawyers Guild of the United States of America when it visited the occupied territories during July 1977. It examined a number of reports received from the Governments of Egypt and Jordan containing information on the situation in the occupied territories. The Special Committee received the report of the expert engaged by it to undertake the supplementary survey requested in resolution 31/106 D. In addition, it discussed and agreed on the general outline of its report. It considered what further action, if any, should be

given to the request made in its telegram to the Secretary-General of 5 March 1977.

20. The Special Committee met again at United Nations Headquarters from 10 to 14 October 1977. At these meetings the Special Committee examined information on the occupied territories that had become available since its September series of meetings and heard the testimony of Professor John Quigley and the Reverend L. Humphrey Walz, who had been invited by the Special Committee to appear before it and of Miss Barbara L. Shafer and Messrs. Denis Payot and Lawrence Moutinot, who testified on behalf of the Swiss League for Human Rights. At these meetings the Special Committee considered and adopted its report to the Secretary-General as requested by the General Assembly in resolutions 31/106 C and D.

### III. MANDATE

21. The General Assembly, in resolution 2443 (XXIII) entitled "Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories", decided to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States.

22. The mandate of the Special Committee, as set out in the above resolution, was to "investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories".

23. In interpreting its mandate, the Special Committee determined, in its first report, that:

(a) The territories to be considered as occupied territories referred to the areas under Israeli occupation, namely, the Golan Heights, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Following the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces of 18 January 1974 and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974, the demarcation of the areas under occupation were altered as indicated in the maps attached to those agreements;

(b) The persons covered by resolution 2443 (XXIII) and therefore the subject of the investigation of the Special Committee were the civilian population residing in the areas occupied as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 and those persons normally resident in the areas that were under occupation but who had left those areas

because of the hostilities. However, the Special Committee noted that resolution 2443 (XXIII) referred to the "population", without any qualification as to any segment of the inhabitants in the occupied territories;

(c) The "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories consisted of two elements, namely those rights which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable human rights" in its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967 and, secondly, those rights which found their basis in the protection afforded by international law in particular circumstances such as occupation and, in the case of prisoners of war, capture. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII), the Special Committee was also required to investigate allegations concerning the exploitation and the looting of the resources of the occupied territories; the pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage of the occupied territories; and the interference in the freedom of worship in the holy places of the occupied territories;

(d) The "policies" and "practices" affecting human rights that came within the scope of investigation by the Special Committee referred, in the case of "policies", to any course of action consciously adopted and pursued by the Government of Israel as part of its declared or undeclared intent; while "practices" referred to those actions which, irrespective of whether or not they were in implementation of a policy, reflected a pattern of behaviour on the part of the Israeli authorities towards the Arab population of the occupied areas.

24. Since its inception the Special Committee has relied on the following international instruments in interpreting and carrying out its mandate:

(a) The Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(c) The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

(d) The Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949;<sup>93</sup>

(e) The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, of 14 May 1954;<sup>94</sup>

(f) The Hague Conventions of 1899<sup>95</sup> and 1907<sup>96</sup> respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

25. The Special Committee has also relied on those resolutions relevant to the situation of civilians in the occupied territories adopted by United Nations organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights, as well as the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization and the International Labour Organisation.

#### IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

26. In this section of its report the Special Committee gives a breakdown of the information received by it from 17 September 1976 to the date of the adoption of this report. It constitutes evidence of policies and practices followed by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories. Though by no means exhaustive, it extends over the entire period covered by this report and constitutes a representative cross-section of the information received by the Special Committee. The subdivision of this evidence under three headings is solely for purposes of analysis, the main purpose being to reflect, as completely as possible, the reality facing the civilian population of the occupied territories.

27. The Special Committee continued to monitor events in the occupied territories in the best available manner in the absence of the co-operation of the Government of Israel. It has done so by:

(a) Hearing the testimony of persons with first-hand knowledge of the situation of civilians in the occupied territories;

(b) Examining reports in the Israeli press of events in the occupied territories and of pronouncements by the Government of Israel;

(c) Following reports appearing in other news media, including the Arab language press and other sectors of the international press;

(d) Examining reports submitted to it by Governments and non-governmental bodies on the situation in the occupied territories.

28. The Special Committee heard the testimony

<sup>95</sup> William M. Malloy, compiler, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. II, p. 2,042.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2,267.

<sup>93</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, p. 135.

<sup>94</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, p. 215.

of Mrs. Lea Tsemel and Mr. Eytan Grosfeld during its meetings from 16 to 26 May 1977 (reproduced as documents A/AC.145/RT.82-86 and A/AC.145 R.112 and R.113 and Add.1.). During its meetings from 5 to 7 September 1977 the Special Committee heard the testimony of Mr. Paul Eddy and Mr. Peter Gillman (reproduced as documents A/AC.145/RT.87-90). During its series of meetings from 10 to 14 October 1977, the Special Committee heard the testimony of Professor John Quigley, the Reverend L. Humphrey Walz, Miss Barbara L. Shafer and of Messrs. Denis Payot and Lawrence Moutinot of the Swiss League for Human Rights (reproduced as documents A/AC.145/RT.91-93).

29. In addition, the Special Committee received reports from the Government of Egypt and of Jordan, the League of Arab States, the International Committee for Palestinian Human Rights, Paris, and from the Swiss League for Human Rights on the situation in the occupied territories.

30. The Special Committee received information from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in connexion with the implementation of Assembly resolution 31/106 D on Quneitra.

31. The information received by the Special Committee during the period covered by this report, namely since 17 September 1976, is analysed in subsections A, B and C in paragraphs 32 to 241 below.

#### A. POLICY OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT

1. *Information relative to the existence of a policy of annexation and settlement in the occupied territories*

32. On 30 September 1976, *Ha'aretz* reported on a statement by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin, to the effect that he did not foresee any political obstacles to expanding settlements in the "Etzion bloc" area (see annex I to this report reproducing a map of the settlements established in the occupied territories)<sup>97</sup>. In the same report, Mr. Rabin referred to a "settlement policy of the Government" which included an order of priorities of areas where settlements were to be established, namely, the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and the area between the Dead Sea and Sharm El-Sheikh and the Rafah Salient.

33. On 8 December 1976, *Ha'aretz* reported on a proposal by the then Minister of Social Affairs,

Mr. Z. Hammer, to construct new settlements in the West Bank that would have the character of "security settlements" of which one, Qaddum, then the subject of controversy but subsequently "legalized" by the new Government, could be considered a "security settlement".

34. On 29 December 1976, *Ha'aretz* reported on a statement by the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Alon, that it was an urgent necessity to strengthen existing settlements in the Jordan Valley and to establish more settlements in that region. The report added that Mr. Alon stressed the need to set up two towns: Maaleh-Adumim and Maaleh-Efraim (subsequently established by the new Government).

35. On 9 January 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* and, on 13 January 1977, *Ha'aretz* issued reports according to which Professor R. Weitz, Chief of the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization (member of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs), spoke of a four-year plan on rural settlement for the establishment of 56 new settlements, including 27 in the occupied territories. These reports contained details of proposed settlements which were authorized by the new Government, for example, the settlement at Mes'ha, authorized on 17 April 1977; Mevo Horon 'B' on 17 August 1977, and Yatir on 17 August 1977.

36. On 14 January 1977, *Ma'ariv* reported on a plan submitted by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency to the Government's Committee on Settlement Affairs for the creation of 15 settlements in the Rafeh Salient area and, on 3 January 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the completion of a plan for a deep-water harbour at Yamit, in the same area.

37. On 12 and 20 January 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on the construction of a new highway in the Sinai, in the east-west direction, at the level of the Santa Catherina Monastery, and the construction of a new hospital at the Israeli settlement in Sharm El-Sheikh, known as Ophira. These measures were also mentioned in a complaint received from the Government of Egypt by the Special Committee.

38. On 14 January 1977, *Ha'aretz* issued a report to expand the Israeli settlement at Hebron, known as Kiryat Arba.

39. On 31 January 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the continued purchase of land in the occupied territories by the Land of Israel Authority and on

<sup>97</sup> Not included in this excerpt. [ed. note].

the expropriation of land in the occupied part of Jerusalem and the area around it.

40. On 5 April 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the so-called "Southern Project", according to which it is proposed to establish 10 new settlements during 1977 in the Rafah area, the first of a total of 150 agricultural settlements to be built in that area, planned over the next 15 years, and giving details as to the manner in which the project is to be undertaken.

41. On 25 April 1977, *Ma'ariv* reported on a decision by the Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs to establish five more settlements in the West Bank, giving details of their location.

42. On 28 April 1977, *Ma'ariv* reported on the authorization being granted by the Government for settlement in the Dotan Valley (northern West Bank, near Jenin) and on details of the programme undertaken in the realization of this project.

43. On 8 May 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on a new programme for construction in Jerusalem intended to accelerate the expansion of quarters situated in the Arab part of the city, by the construction of 18,000 apartments in Ramot, Gilo and Talpiot and the area between French Hill and Neve Yaacov.

44. On 24 May 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on a statement by the newly elected Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, that the West Bank is an integral part of Israel.

45. The French weekly *L'Express* (23-29 May 1977) reported on a statement by Mr. Begin to the effect that "Cisjordan meant nothing; that Judea and Samaria are Israeli lands belonging to the Jewish people, and that there was no longer any purpose in establishing settlements since the new Israeli Government would ask the Jewish people to settle on its own land."

46. On 6 July 1977, *Ma'ariv* issued a report giving the new composition of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, under the chairmanship of the Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Sharon, composed of seven ministers in the Government of Israel and seven members of the World Zionist Organization.

47. On 27 July 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on the "legalization" by the Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs of the Israeli settlements established at Qaddum, Ofra and Maaleh-Adumin.

48. On 1 August 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the

setting up of a team by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Sharon, to deal with settlement affairs and to elaborate various settlement plans to be submitted to the Ministerial Committee on Settlements. According to this report, this team was to examine the creation of 10 towns in the West Bank, a plan which was reportedly discouraged by the Jewish Agency because of the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of settlers for such a plan.

49. On 21 August 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on a statement by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Dayan, to the effect that "Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria will continue. The question is, where and how."

50. On 4 September 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* and other sectors of the press reported on a 20-year plan of settlement announced by the Agriculture Minister, Mr. Sharon, to establish settlements all over the West Bank and the southern part of the Gaza Strip.

51. On 12 September 1977, the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* issued reports entitled "Settlement at the crossroads" and "A link in the Golan" giving details on the measures taken to date in establishing 76 settlements in the occupied territories, their location and purposes, as well as the installation of Israeli citizens in them and the settlement plans for the future. The first of these two reports made reference to a settlement plan by Mr. R. Weitz, Chairman of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, which extends over the next 15 years and envisages settlement in the southern parts of the Gaza Strip (entitled "The Southern Project"), settlement in the eastern part of the West Bank (entitled "The Eastern Project"), and a "Northern Project" for settlement in areas within the 1949 Truce Agreement lines. According to this report, Mr. Weitz's plan would have Israeli citizens living separately from Palestinians since "history shows that you can live in peace provided you are separate".

52. The article entitled "Settlement at the crossroads" by Abraham Rabinovich appearing in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 12 September 1977 states the following:

For legal reasons, operative responsibility for settlements beyond the green line after 1967 was given to the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) which is nearly identical in its personnel with that of the [Jewish] Agency's Settlement Department. Since 1970, decisions on settlements be-

yond the green line are made by a body commonly known as the Ministerial Committee on Settlement but actually composed of an equal number of government ministers and members of WZO.

The advent of a Likud administration has snapped the organic political ties between the government and WZO. Each has now drawn up its own settlement plan. The head of the Ministerial Settlement Committee, Ariel Sharon, has presented his plan to Prime Minister Begin. Professor Ra'anana Weitz, head of the WZO Settlement Department, will present his plan to the Zionist Congress in February.

53. A statement was made by Cabinet Secretary Mr. Arie Naor, as reported in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 12 September 1977 in an article entitled "Defence wall or barrier to peace" by Mayor Meirmerhav, to the effect that "Israel cannot be deemed to annex that which is rightfully hers and that Jews cannot be barred from settling anywhere within their eternal, pre-ordained domain."

54. On 10 October 1977, Foreign Minister Mr. Moshe Dayan stated in the General Assembly as follows:

The criticism which has been directed against Israel in respect of the establishment of settlements in Judea and Samaria is unfounded. The settlements are legal.

2. *Information relative to the adoption of measures in implementation of the policy of annexation and settlement*

55. The map<sup>98</sup> reproduced as annex I to this report illustrates the settlements established to date by the occupying Power in the occupied territories.

56. On 3 October 1976, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 150 families were living in Yamit, the Israeli settlement located between the Gaza Strip and the north-eastern corner of the Sinai Peninsula.

57. On 21 November 1976, *Ashab* reported that 200 dunams of land of the village of Kfar Qaddum were fenced off and annexed to the new Israeli settlement and that this was the second time that land had been annexed in this manner to the (then) "unauthorized settlement".

58. On 2 December 1976, *Ha'aretz* reported on a protest by the Mayor of Beit Jalla, a village 3 kilometres south of Jerusalem, over the seizure of a large area in Mount Gilo where the construction

of 60 housing units had been started.

59. On 28 and 29 December 1976, *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* reported on the eviction of three Arab families from the Old City of Jerusalem and the newspaper *Ashab*, on 29 December 1976, reported on the demolition of their houses the same evening of their eviction.

60. On 7 January 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on a statement by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Rabin, that 76 settlements had been established in the occupied territories since 1967.

61. On 18 January 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on the conversion of a Nahal settlement to a permanent kibbutz to join four other civilian settlements (Moshavim) already existing and functioning in the Rafah area, between the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

62. On 14 January 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on a petition by the villagers of Murir, north of Ramallah, against the expropriation of over 400 dunams of their land seized by the Israeli Army to set up the Israeli settlement known as Mevo-Shilo.

63. On 19 January 1977 *Ma'ariv* reported on the establishment of a permanent kibbutz, known as Narran, near two other settlements already existing in the area, namely Gilgal and Yitav.

64. On 28 January 1977, *Ashab* reported on seizure of 700 dunams by the military authorities at Abu-Dis, a village approximately 3 kilometres east of Jerusalem.

65. On 31 January 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the activities of the Land of Israel Authority in purchasing land in the occupied territories, including the expropriation of 18,000 dunams of land east of Jerusalem since the hostilities of June 1967.

66. On 1 February 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the allocation of £18 million in the budget of the State of Israel, for the purchase of land in the occupied territories, for the fiscal year 1977/78.

67. On 18 February 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on the construction of a 31-kilometre expressway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, cutting through the occupied territories.

68. On 11 February 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the conversion of Nahal Katif, in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, into a civilian settlement to be called Netzer-Hajani, south of the village of Deir-El-Balah.

69. On 25 February 1977, *Ha'aretz* issued a

<sup>98</sup> Not included in this excerpt [ed. note].

report describing methods used in intimidating the Arab inhabitants into selling their land.

70. On 30 March 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the commencement of a construction on the top of Mount Gilo, the realization of a Housing Ministry project to erect "several hundred villas and a building to house the National Security College".

71. Reports appeared during March and April 1977 on the establishment of a settlement at Mas'ha south-west of Nablus and north-east of Ramallah.

72. On 12 April 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on a complaint by the Mayor of Beit-Jallah about expropriation of land belonging to the inhabitants of his town situated in Mount Gilo, and about the establishment of an Israeli quarter on that land.

73. On 20 April 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on a decision by the Ministerial Committee on Settlements to allocate £I 225 million for the establishment of 25 new settlements, including 17 in the occupied territories.

74. On 8 May 1977, *Ma'ariv* reported that the Ministry of Housing would complete construction of 500 flats by the beginning of 1978 in the Israeli settlement of Sharm-El-Sheikh, known as Ophira.

75. The establishment of an "urban and permanent industrial settlement" at Maaleh-Adumim midway on the main road between Jerusalem and Jericho, described as a "residential satellite of Jerusalem", with 5,000 housing units, was reported in *Ma'ariv*, on 20 June 1977, and in the *Jerusalem Post*, on 24 June 1977.

76. On 27 July 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the "legalization" by the Ministerial Committee on Settlements of the settlements at Qaddum, approximately 8 kilometres west of Nablus, and Ofra, approximately 6 kilometres north-east of Ramallah and Maaleh-Adumim.

77. On 12 July 1977, *Ma'ariv* reported on the establishment of a new settlement known as Houlit, in the Rafah area (north-eastern Sinai), near the Gaza Strip; the same report stated that 13 settlements had so far been established in that area and that 4 more were planned, part of the so-called "Southern Project" which envisages 120 agricultural settlements.

78. On 26 July 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on the establishment of a new settlement in the Rafah area.

79. On 27 July 1977, *Ashab* reported on the completion of 320 new flats in the Old City of

Jerusalem and the construction of another 260.

80. On 18 August 1977, *Ha'aretz* reported on the approval by the Ministerial Committee on Settlements of three new settlements in the West Bank: one to be known as Yatir, located between Hebron and Beersheba; a second to be known as Mevo-Horon, approximately 15 kilometres north-west of Jerusalem in the Ayalon Valley; and a third to be known as Tsur Natan "B", south of Tulkarm.

81. On 2 August 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 6,000 Israeli Jewish families had so far settled in the four developments constructed in the occupied part of Jerusalem and known as Gilo, Ramot, East Talpiot and Neve Yaacov, and that 6,423 more apartments were under construction in that area.

82. On 8 September 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on the moving in by a group of settlers into the new settlement called Yatir, south of Hebron.

83. On 12 September 1977, the *Jerusalem Post* reported on a new settlement in the West Bank, known as Reyhana, located on a hilltop facing three Arab villages, approximately 8 kilometres west of Jenin.

84. On 12 September 1977, the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* reported on the construction of a settlement known as Katzrin, in the Golan Heights, planned as a town for 20,000 persons.

85. On 10 October 1977, *The New York Times* reported on an Israel Radio announcement of the establishment of one settlement and the authorization to build another settlement on the West Bank.

86. On 11 October 1977, *The New York Times* reported on the approval by the Government of Israel of the establishment of six settlements in the West Bank by the end of 1977.

#### B. INFORMATION DESCRIPTIVE OF THE SITUATION OF CIVILIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

87. The following paragraphs reflect the type of reports examined by the Special Committee on the occurrences of incidents and related repercussions; they include reports of strikes, demonstrations, arrests, imposition of curfews and treatment of youths. These samples are listed in chronological order in an effort to reconstruct the day-to-day reality faced by the average civilian in the occupied territories.

88. The arrest of 55 persons was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 3 October 1976.

89. The incidents that occurred in the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron were reported in the *Jerusalem Post*, *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* from 3 to 8 October 1976.

90. The arrest of 40 persons in the Gaza Strip was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 October 1976.

91. The curfew imposed on Hebron, then in its eighth day, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 October 1976. The same reports described the incidents and the violence that occurred during the period.

92. The arrest of 40 persons in the northern West Bank was reported in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 2 November 1976.

93. The student demonstrations in several West Bank towns were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 3 November 1976.

94. The detention of several youths in Nablus was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 5 November 1976.

95. The suspension from classes of 15 secondary school students in Ramallah by the military authorities was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 November 1976.

96. The arrest of "several persons" from the Hebron area and the release on bail later of several of them was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 9 November 1976.

97. The explosion of two charges in Hebron was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 November 1976.

98. The discovery of an explosive device on a bus was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 11 November 1976.

99. The arrest of 21 persons from the Gaza Strip was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 12 November 1976.

100. The dispersal of rioting students in Ramallah was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 14 November 1976.

101. The arrest of 37 West Bank inhabitants was reported in the *Jerusalem Post*, *Ma'ariv* and *Ha'aretz* on 16 November 1976.

102. The demonstration by students in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 23 November 1976.

103. The continuation for the third consecutive day of the student demonstrations in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 25 November 1976.

104. The promulgation of a Military Order by

the Governor of Bethlehem forbidding Beit-Jalla residents from demonstrating against the construction of a Jewish neighbourhood near their village, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 28 November 1976.

105. The arrest of "several youths" in the Golan Heights was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 29 November 1976.

106. The arrest of 43 youths and the release of 39 others from Hebron, following disturbances at the Ibrahimi mosque, was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 1 December 1976.

107. The explosion in Hebron, killing three local inhabitants, reportedly while preparing a charge, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 5 December 1976.

108. The disturbances in several West Bank towns and the total business strike in Hebron were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 7 December 1976.

109. The riots by students against imposition of Value Added Tax and against the expropriation of land near the village of Taluza were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 December 1976.

110. The street riots in Nablus, followed by the detention of a number of youths in Nablus, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 9 December 1976.

111. The arrest of an "undisclosed number of youths" in Nablus was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 9 December 1976.

112. The continuation of a business strike in Hebron for four days and the disturbances in Nablus and Ramallah were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 10 December 1976.

113. The imposition of a curfew on the centre of Nablus, following the outbreak of fresh riots, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 12 December 1976.

114. The arrest of 13 schoolgirls and two of their teachers at Kalandia and their subsequent release was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 13 December 1976.

115. A riot in Nablus and the storming of the Town Hall by Israeli soldiers, reportedly in pursuit of a demonstrator, were reported in *The Times* on 13 December 1976.

116. The demonstrations in the West Bank that continued for six days running were reported in the *International Herald Tribune* on 14 December 1976.

117. The spreading of disturbances to Ramallah and the outskirts of Jerusalem and the continued



use of tear-gas to break up riots were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and in *Le Monde* on 15 December 1976.

118. The general strike in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the imposition of curfew on the centre of Nablus, Ramallah and Kalandia, and the wounding of a 15-year-old boy were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 16 December 1976.

119. The demonstration in Ramallah and the occurrence of incidents in Nablus, followed by the boycott of schools in protest against arrests of Nablus students by the Israeli army, were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 19 December 1976.

120. The sit-in, which was subsequently dispersed by the army, was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 20 December 1976.

121. The arrest of 66 persons from the West Bank was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 27 December 1976.

122. The arrest of "three cells of Golan inhabitants" was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 January 1977.

123. The sit-in at the Nablus Town Hall by the mothers of administrative detainees held at the Nablus prison was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 10 January 1977.

124. The sit-in by students at Bir-Zeit College and the subsequent banning of political activity by the Military Governor were reported in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 14 January 1977.

125. The arrest of 82 persons from the West Bank was reported in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 31 January 1977.

126. The demonstration by secondary school students in Nablus against conditions of the prisoners in Israeli prisons was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 February 1977.

127. The commercial strike in Nablus, Ramallah and Beit-Hanina, in sympathy with the hunger strike by detainees, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 2 February 1977.

128. The closing of the Nablus schools was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 2 February 1977.

129. The attacking of a tourist bus in Nablus by secondary school students was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 2 February 1977.

130. The arrest of 38 persons in Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 3 February 1977.

131. The arrest of nine persons from Nablus and Ramallah was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 and 8 February 1977.

132. The general strike in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 11 February 1977.

133. Rioting in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 13 February 1977.

134. The tossing of a bomb at an East Jerusalem bus was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 20 February 1977.

135. The student demonstration in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 21 February 1977.

136. The disturbances at the Ibrahimi mosque were reported in the *Jerusalem Post*, *Ma'ariv* and *Ha'aretz* on 27 February 1977.

137. The finding of an explosive charge near the centre of Nablus and the subsequent arrest of several suspects were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 27 February 1977.

138. The hunger strike in the campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in sympathy with the prisoners at Ashkelon was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 1 March 1977.

139. The arrest of six youths from Nazareth and one inhabitant of Jenin was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 March 1977.

140. The demonstration by 60 girls in Ramallah secondary school was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 7 March 1977.

141. Renewed unrest in Ramallah was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 March 1977.

142. The arrest of 20 students in Nablus during riots was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 March 1977.

143. The beating up of the Mayor of El-Bireh, Mr. S. Tawil, and a member of the Town Council by Border Police during a demonstration leading to a general strike in Ramallah and El-Bireh was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 8-9 March 1977.

144. The arrest of 16 persons from Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 9 March 1977.

145. A business strike in Ramallah and El-Bireh was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 9 March 1977.

146. A student demonstration in Ramallah and its suppression by Border Police resulting in the injury of 17 students was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 10 March 1977.

147. Brutality by the Border Police in the incident mentioned in the preceding paragraph was reported in the *Sunday Times* on 13 March 1977 and in the *International Herald Tribune* on 23 March 1977. An account of these incidents is contained

in a report by Mr. E. Grosfeld from the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, received by the Special Committee (A/AC.145/RT.87).

148. The tossing of a hand-grenade at an Israeli Army car in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 13 March 1977.

149. The demonstration at the Balata refugee camp was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 13 March 1977.

150. The demonstration by youths from El Amari refugee camp, in sympathy with the opening of the Palestine National Council in Cairo, was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 13 March 1977.

151. The demonstration by students in Nablus was reported in *Ma'ariv* and *Ha'aretz* on 14 March 1977.

152. The arrest of 13 student from Nablus while demonstrating was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 22 March 1977.

153. The explosion of a bomb on an Israeli truck in Ramallah was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 30 March 1977.

154. A riot by students in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 30 March 1977.

155. A general strike in all large West Bank towns and student demonstrations in Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, Bir-Zeit and other towns, in commemoration of the Day of the Land, were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 31 March 1977.

156. Demonstrations in most West Bank towns and refugee camps were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 1 and 4 April 1977.

157. Demonstrations and strikes that took place in Nablus were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 7 and 11 April 1977.

158. Demonstrations in El-Gharbiya and brutality in suppressing them, resulting in injury to 60 persons, were reported in *Le Monde* on 1 April 1977 and in the *Jerusalem Post* between 5 and 18 April 1977.

159. The arrest of a total of 19 persons during April from Jerusalem, Nablus and Tulkarem was reported in *Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 13, 14, 18 and 28 April 1977.

160. The incidents provoked by the arrival of Rabbi Kahane in Nablus, with the avowed intention of establishing himself there, and the resultant riots and curfew were reported in *Ha'aretz*, *Le Monde* and the *Jerusalem Post* between 15 and 27 April 1977.

161. The arrest of six persons from Tulkarem and Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv*

on 18 April 1977.

162. A general strike and riots in Nablus were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 April 1977.

163. Riots, demonstrations and a partial business strike in Nablus were reported in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* on 19 April 1977 and in *Ha'aretz* on 22 April 1977.

164. Riots and business strikes in Ramallah, Kalandiyah refugee camp, Bethlehem and Nablus were reported in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* on 22 April 1977.

165. An explosion in a bus driven by a resident of the Gaza Strip causing injury to 27 Israelis was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 25 April 1977.

166. An explosion at the National Bank in Qalqilya was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 24 April 1977.

167. An explosion in Nablus was reported in *Ashab* on 24 April 1977.

168. An explosion in a bus between Kiryat-Gat and Beersheba, resulting in injury to 26 passengers and the detention of 80 persons from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for interrogation was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 25 April 1977.

169. Demonstrations and strikes in Nablus on two consecutive days against the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories were reported in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* on 27 and 28 April 1977.

170. An attack on Israeli vehicles on the road between Ramallah and Jerusalem was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 3 May 1977.

171. A demonstration against the establishment of a settlement near by and the subsequent curfew in Kabatiya and the killing of a 16-year old boy, Hilal Abu-Rub, and a 55-year old woman, Fatma Youssef Hamady, when Israeli soliders opened fire were reported in *Ha'aretz*, the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ashab* on 4 May 1977.

172. Demonstrations, riots and strikes in Nablus and a subsequent curfew were reported in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 5 May 1977.

173. Strikes and demonstrations in Jenin, Ramallah and Kalandya were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 5 May 1977.

174. The arrest of 66 persons from the West Bank was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 5 May 1977.

175. Incidents in Nablus and Halhul were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 6 May 1977.

176. The incursion by security forces into a school in Jenin and the beating of pupils and teachers was reported in *Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv* and

the *Jerusalem Post* on 9, 15 and 8 May 1977 respectively.

177. A demonstration in East Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 May 1977.

178. Demonstrations in Jenin were reported in *Ma'ariv* on 8 and 15 May 1977.

179. The discovery of an explosive charge in Ramallah was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 11 May 1977.

180. A demonstration by the inhabitants of the village of Deir-Abu-Mash'al in Ramallah was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 11 May 1977, *Ma'ariv* on 12 May 1977 and the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 May 1977. The events that provoked this demonstration were described by Mr. Eytan Grosfeld in his testimony before the Special Committee on 26 May 1977. Mr. Grosfeld was in the village during these events, which consisted largely of a series of nightly incursions into the village by uniformed armed men, alleged to be members of the Israeli armed forces (A/AC.145/RT.86).

181. The sudden summoning of the inhabitants of Kalandiya refugee camp at midnight by the Israeli Army to persuade them not to riot was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 12 and 24 May 1977.

182. Demonstrations, strikes and a subsequent curfew in Nablus were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 16 May 1977.

183. Strikes and demonstrations in Jenin were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 16 May 1977.

184. A strike and demonstrations in Ramallah and El-Bireh were reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 16 May 1977.

185. A demonstration by secondary school girls in Ramallah was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 May 1977.

186. A riot by students in East Jerusalem was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 May 1977.

187. An explosion near Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 17 May 1977.

188. The arrest of 79 persons from Ramallah, Jenin, Hebron and the Jordan Valley was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 22 May 1977.

189. An explosion in Jerusalem was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 29 May 1977.

190. Demonstrations and strikes in Nablus were reported in *Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 6 June 1977.

191. A business strike and demonstrations in Hebron, Ramallah, El-Bireh and Bir-Zeit were

reported in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* on 5 and 6 June 1977.

192. The discovery of an explosive charge in East Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 7 June 1977.

193. The closing down of seven shops in Hebron and 15 shops in Ramallah in reprisal for participating in a strike on 5 June was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 8 June 1977.

194. The arrest of three persons from the Golan Heights was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 8 June 1977.

195. The discovery of an explosive charge in East Jerusalem was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 13 June 1977.

196. The explosion of a charge under an Israeli car in Hebron and the discovery of an explosive charge in Nablus were reported in *Ha'aretz* on 19 June 1977.

197. The arrest of 64 persons from the West Bank was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 29 June 1977.

198. The arrest of seven persons from Gaza was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 6 July 1977.

199. The explosion of a bomb in Petah-Tikva was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 7 July 1977.

200. The firing of a tear-gas shell by Israeli soldiers during prayers at the Ibrahimi mosque was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 13 July 1977.

201. An explosion in Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 July 1977.

202. An explosion at Nahriya was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 21 July 1977.

203. An explosion in Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 21 July 1977.

204. The arrest of eight persons from Nablus and Ramallah was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 31 July 1977.

205. The arrest of several youths from East Jerusalem was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 31 July 1977.

206. The arrest of eight persons from East Jerusalem was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 3 August 1977.

207. The arrest of 14 persons from Awarta village, near Tulkarm, was reported in *Ma'ariv* on 3 August 1977.

208. The discovery of an explosive charge in East Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 August 1977.

209. An explosion in Nablus was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 August 1977.

210. The killing of Ismail Hassan Hammed, 27, a Palestinian, by Israeli forces during a clash near Halhul, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 14 August 1977.

211. The arrest of 11 persons from the West Bank was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 17 August 1977.

212. The tossing of a hand-grenade at a military vehicle in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 August 1977.

213. The arrest of two groups of bedouin from the Sinai was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 18 August 1977.

214. The arrest of the Mayor of Beit-Jalla and three of his councillors and their subsequent release was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 22 August 1977.

215. The arrest of several merchants in Nablus was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ha'aretz* on 25 August 1977.

216. An explosion in Gaza was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 28 August 1977.

217. An explosion in East Jerusalem was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 28 August 1977.

218. The arrest of 11 persons from the West Bank was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 2 September 1977.

219. The arrest of a "terrorist cell" in the Gaza Strip was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 4 September 1977.

220. A demonstration in Nablus was reported in *Ha'aretz* on 4 September 1977.

221. The bricking-up of the home of a suspect, Salman Showky, from Nablus, by the Israeli Army was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 6 September 1977.

222. The arrest of three local policemen from Jericho was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 11 September 1977.

223. The bricking-up of the home of a suspect, Harbi Hassan Mustafa El-Hudur, in the village of Biddu, near Ramallah, resulting in his family of seven, with children aged 1 to 8, rendered homeless, was described in a report received by Mrs. Felicia Langer on 12 October 1977.

224. The arrest of 31 persons from the West Bank and Gaza was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 19 September 1977.

225. The killing of two persons from Gaza by the Israeli Army as a result of an incident where a soldier was attacked by one of the eventual victims was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 20 September

1977.

226. The demolition of the house belonging to the parents of Khader Taweh, a suspect in Beit-Hanina, was reported in the *Jerusalem Post* on 20 September 1977. The incident provoked a protest by the Mayor of Jerusalem to the Military Government who apologized and reportedly asserted that the Army had not realized that the house was within the boundaries of Jerusalem as defined by the occupying Power.

#### C. INFORMATION ON TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS IN DETENTION

227. The Special Committee received numerous reports concerning treatment of civilians who are in detention. The following paragraphs contain a representative cross-section of those reports; for the purposes of easier analysis, they are arranged according to three different phases of detention, namely: during and immediately after arrest and during interrogation; during trial; and during imprisonment.

##### 1. *Information on treatment of civilian detainees during and immediately after arrest and during interrogation*

228. The Special Committee heard the testimony of Mrs. Lea Tsemel during its meetings from 16 to 26 May 1977. At those meetings Mrs. Tsemel communicated her experience as Counsel for a considerable number of civilians accused of security offences (A/AC.145/RT.82-86). Mrs. Tsemel described the provisions of the Security Instructions promulgated by the Israeli Army which provide, *inter alia*, for the detention of persons without trial for specified periods. Under these provisions it is possible for a civilian to be detained for periods up to six months after obtaining appropriate court orders to prolong custody. According to Mrs. Tsemel, detainees are held without trial until they either make a statement admitting their guilt or they communicate such information as the services concerned expect of them. These services are normally the Israeli Security Service or the Military Intelligence Service. In most cases where allegations of torture were made to her the victims referred to their interrogators as agents other than members of the police force. Mrs. Tsemel observed that these interrogators invariably addressed each other in names such as "Abu...", which were Arabic names and obviously meant to disguise their real identity. Thus, the police officials

as such only came into contact with a detainee after the services concerned had completed their interrogation. For all intents and purposes, during the period mentioned, a detainee is under the sole control of his interrogators. Mrs. Tsemel pointed out that during this period, which lasts varying lengths of time, a detainee is inaccessible. Such procedures as may exist to ensure access by a lawyer are only implemented at the discretion of the interrogator, who normally refuses access on the grounds that this would interfere with the conduct of the interrogation. Mrs. Tsemel stated that in her experience virtually all allegations of torture refer to this period; she expressed her opinion that some 30 per cent of those persons who are taken into custody are subject to torture, while another 30 per cent are subjected to beatings. Mrs. Tsemel referred to a number of cases that she had handed in which evidence of torture during interrogation existed.

229. The following are sample cases of those quoted by Mrs. Tsemel:

(a) Ibrahim Asad Muntaleb Hamaisi, 70, was arrested on 3 June 1976 and first seen by Mrs. Tsemel, as Counsel, on 1 July 1976. Mrs. Tsemel gave a description of the treatment that Hamaisi had received during his interrogation and referred to scars that were shown to her allegedly resulting from electric shocks being administered during interrogation. The interrogation presumably took place in Hebron Prison.

(b) Sirhan Salaima, 21, was arrested on 16 March 1976 and was still on trial on 18 May 1977. Mrs. Tsemel communicated to the Special Committee a description of the treatment received by Salaima during his interrogation, including the use of hypnosis, as attested to by Dr. Kleinhaus who testified in military court on 7 February 1977.

(c) Khaled Zawawi was visited by Mrs. Tsemel Ramallah prison when he informed Mrs. Tsemel of his interrogation on 11 January 1976, during which he was beaten on the head by his interrogator. This treatment was repeated on 24 and 25 January 1976, when he was forced to write a request to leave the country, a request that was subsequently suspended after an appeal was made to the Supreme Court on 15 February 1976 to stay the expulsion.

Mrs. Tsemel also stated that conditions of custody during this period were the same as those while serving a sentence. The only difference was that detainees were not obliged to work and, in cases

of prisons located outside the occupied territories, no prison uniform was required. Women detainees awaiting trial, however, were obliged to work.

230. The Special Committee took note of a report appearing in the *Sunday Times* of London on 19 June 1977, entitled "Israel tortures Arab prisoners: special investigation by INSIGHT" (see A/32/132-S/12356, annex). On the invitation of the Special Committee the *Sunday Times* agreed that two of the members of the team who had conducted the inquiry would appear before the Special Committee to establish the authenticity of their report and to furnish the Special Committee with further clarification of the information contained in the article. On 6 and 7 September 1977 Mr. Paul Eddy and Mr. Peter Gillman appeared before the Special Committee (A/AC.145/RT.87-90). Messrs. Eddy and Gillman confirmed the contents of the report and described procedures followed by them in securing evidence relevant to their assignment. They stressed their view that, in allegations of torture, absolute proof cannot exist. They expressed the opinion that it was during interrogation that torture is administered; they referred to the 44 cases upon which they had conducted research. According to them, interrogations are handled by the Israeli Security service and/or the Military Intelligence. They felt that torture followed a certain pattern with differences related to the prison where it took place. A common practice was that of humiliation of the detainee by subjecting him to debasing treatment. The following are sample cases of those quoted by Messrs. Eddy and Gillman:

(a) Omar Abdel Karim, arrested on 3 October 1976 and charged with belonging to a Palestinian resistance organization. He was detained for four months and described his torture during interrogation.

(b) Ghassan El Harb, arrested in April 1974 and charged with belonging to an "illegal organization", also alleged systematic torture during interrogation. He was released in 1977.

(c) Rasmieh Odeh was, according to a description given by her father to Messrs. Eddy and Gillman, savaged in the course of her interrogation.

231. The Special Committee took note of the article entitled "Flawed Insight on torture" by David Krivine, appearing in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 5 August 1977, which reported as follows:

What the Government refrains from saying—and should be saying openly—is that physical force is applied by security services where necessary, and that they do practice rigid secrecy...that to get information from a particularly recalcitrant suspect, rough treatment may be used. He may, according to my information, be pushed about, he may have his face slapped, he may be blindfolded. He may be stripped and have his manliness mocked by a girl soldier to make him feel small. He can be kept in isolation, he can be threatened with a dire fate; he can be subjected to other psychological pressures.

The Special Committee notes that the purpose of Mr. Krivine's article was to show that there was no recourse to a policy of torturing suspects.

232. The Special Committee also took note of the statement contained in the annual report for 1976 of the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to which delegates are not allowed to interview detainees during the period of interrogation following arrest.

## 2. *Information on treatment of detainees during trial*

233. In the course of her testimony before the Special Committee, Mrs. Tsemel described the procedures envisaged in the applicable Security Instructions regulating the conduct of trials. While their respective approaches to the presentation of evidence differed, Mrs. Tsemel's testimony confirmed that given by Mrs. Felicia Langer and summarized in the last report of the Special Committee (A/31/218, sect. IV, B). Mrs. Tsemel informed the Special Committee that article 9 of the Security Instructions allowed considerable flexibility of the military tribunal in selecting procedures to follow in regulating a trial. She quoted as an example the case of Ibrahim Hamaisi, whose daughter, 10–11 years of age, was allowed to testify in court against her father, but whose testimony describing her father's appearance when escorted to the house after interrogation was not admitted, thus depriving the defence from evidence of ill-treatment suffered while under interrogation. Mrs. Tsemel made the point that in spite of the apparent legal precautions built into the Security Instructions, the application of these remedies was virtually non-existent. Thus, virtually all persons arraigned in the military tribunals are found guilty; their conviction is always based on a statement purporting to confess to the offences as charged, no heed being given to the principle that confessions should be supported by corroborative

evidence to constitute acceptable grounds for conviction. In addition, Mrs. Tsemel referred to article 78 of the Security Instructions, which states:

(a) A soldier is entitled to arrest, without a warrant of arrest, any person who has transgressed the instructions in the present Order, or against whom there are grounds for suspecting that he has committed an offence against the present Order.

(c) Regarding a person who has been arrested by virtue of subparagraph (a), a warrant of arrest, concerning him, should be issued with a reasonable lapse of time; were a warrant of arrest not issued within 96 hours from the time of his arrest—he shall be released.

(d) A police officer is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest in writing for a period not exceeding 7 days.

(f) (1) A military court is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest in writing for a period not exceeding 6 months;

(2) Were a warrant of arrest, as aforesaid, issued for a period shorter than 6 months, the military court is entitled to extend it several times, provided that the accumulated periods of detention do not exceed 6 months.

Referring to the legal tests for validity of a statement of confession, Mrs. Tsemel stated that the procedure known as a "trial within a trial" (see A/31/218, paras. 117 and 118) had become useless, if not counter-productive. Several cases in which Mrs. Tsemel appeared resulted in much higher sentences being imposed upon those accused who had ventured to challenge the validity of their confessions, on the ground that those statements were extracted after they were subjected to duress. With regard to the imposition of long sentences, Mrs. Tsemel pointed out that in military courts, in cases where a guilty plea is entered, a confession is included in the *procès verbal* and taken into account in determining the severity of the sentence. Thus the commonly accepted remedy of a "guilty" plea to minimize the length of a sentence is not available to an individual accused in a military court. The criteria applied by the courts in determining guilt in cases of alleged membership of an illegal organization are arbitrary, according to Mrs. Tsemel. The record of the military tribunals indicates that a simple expression of intention is accepted by the tribunals as proof of full membership in an organization: thus statements like "I did not refuse" or "I agreed" are held to be sufficient to establish

full and active membership, even in cases where evidence is provided to show that the accused not only did not, in fact, become a member, but that it was physically impossible for him to have acted as a member. Mrs. Tsemel pointed out the practice, still resorted to, of demolishing or bricking up the house where the family of a suspect lived.

234. The Special Committee took note of the testimony by a member of the delegation of the Swiss League for Human Rights who attended a trial in the military tribunal in Lod on 29 June 1977, giving details of the charges brought against the four accused, aged 16 and 17 years, and their being condemned to between two and six years' imprisonment after being found guilty on all counts, and this on the strength of their own confessions.

### 3. Information on treatment of civilians during imprisonment

235. In her oral testimony before the Special Committee and in written testimony submitted during the same period (16–26 May 1977), Mrs. Tsemel gave a detailed description of conditions in some prisons with which she was familiar through clients of hers serving sentences in those prisons. A detailed description was given of the conditions existing in Ramle Prison, Beersheba Prison, Shatta and Ashkelon. According to these descriptions, these prisons were seriously overcrowded; inmates were severely beaten periodically, sometimes as a collective reprisal against, for example, an attempt to commit an act or the commission of some act by one or a group of inmates and, in other instances, for no apparent reason. This was the situation, for example, in Ramle Prison during the period 1968–1970; after a lull, between 1970 and 1973, treatment became harsher again, but it did not reach the extent prior to 1970. Descriptions of these and other prisons are contained in written evidence submitted by Mrs. Tsemel further to her oral testimony and submitted to the Special Committee (A/AC.145/R.113 and Add. 1). The common use of the *tsinok* as a means of punishment or coercion of detainees was referred to by Mrs. Tsemel. (A *tsinok* has been described as an extremely small cell with minimum light and air; descriptions of dimensions have varied, but a common feature has been the claim that such cells prevented an inmate from lying down.) The conditions in which a detainee is kept while in

*tsinok* were described as extremely severe. The applicable military orders impose a limit of two week's maximum punishment, to be served in two parts of one week each with an interval of one week. In spite of this, Mrs. Tsemel quoted cases where detainees were kept in *tsinok* for much longer periods, as, for example, in the case of Hani Fouad Zorba, 29, from Nablus, who spent 75 days in a *tsinok* between 7 June and 22 August 1976.

236. The Special Committee also took note of a number of reports appearing in the Israeli press purporting to describe prison conditions. Among these reports are the following: "Flawed insight on torture", by David Krivine, appearing in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* of 5 August 1977; the report dated 7 July 1977 by Bernard Edinger of Reuters News Service and partly reproduced in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 and 10 July 1977; and a series of articles by Leif Silbersky of Stockholm, Sweden, received by the Special Committee on 15 September 1977, giving an account of meetings with detainees. The Special Committee notes that these reports appeared after the publication of the *Sunday Times* inquiry on 19 June 1977 and they are all linked to that inquiry either directly or indirectly. The Special Committee noted, however, that Mr. Edinger was allowed to visit Gaza Prison (selected for him by the Israeli authorities) which he described as very clean and well-kept and the inmates as "well-fed". The report of Mr. Edinger covers a visit by him to Gaza Prison lasting approximately six hours.

237. The Special Committee took note of the following information appearing in the annual report of the International Committee of the Red Cross for 1976:

The major problem encountered in 1976 was overcrowding. This had become alarming and was adversely affecting all conditions of detention. The delegates made repeated approaches to the detaining authorities asking them to remedy the situation. However, no tangible result had been obtained by the end of the year.

238. The Special Committee took note of the statement by the Israeli Commissioner for Prisons, Brigadier Haim Levi, appearing in *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* on 4 February 1977 to the effect that prisons were far too congested, quoting statistics of space available as, for example, Hebron Prison, where a detainee was given space of less

than 1 m<sup>2</sup>, Ramle Prison, 2.6 m<sup>2</sup>, and Beersheba Prison, 4.2 m<sup>2</sup>, the average space in other countries being in the order of 8 m<sup>2</sup>.

239. Numerous reports have appeared in the Israeli press of incidents in prisons resulting in the death of detainees, as, for example, the report in *Ma'ariv* and *Ha'aretz* on 28 December 1976 concerning the murder of a detainee in Nablus Prison, the report in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* of 6 February 1977 of the murder of a detainee in Beersheba Prison at the hands of fellow-inmates and the report in *Ashab* on 14 January 1977 of an attempt to escape from Ramle Prison by four detainees.

240. Reports were received of the hunger strike at Ashkelon Prison which began on 10 December 1976 and lasted well into May 1977 with a short break during February/March, in protest against prison conditions and in an effort to secure improvements in these conditions, as a minimum to have equal conditions between detainees from the occupied territories and Israeli Jewish detainees. The Special Committee received extensive detailed reports, including an affidavit, from Mrs. Felicia Langer, who communicated her knowledge of the situation of the detainees obtained in her capacity as Counsel for one of the alleged leaders of the hunger strike. This information included details of the treatment meted out to her client, Mohammed Bseso, in reprisal against the prisoners' action, including severe beatings administered, *inter alia*, by the Director of Shata Prison, Mr. Ben Sabo. The Special Committee received reports of widespread reaction among detainees in other prisons, in sympathy with the Ashkelon strike. These included the reports appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 9 March 1977 of a strike by 200 detainees at Jenin Prison; in the *Jerusalem Post* on 15 March 1977 of a strike at Ramallah Prison and in the *Jerusalem Post* of 16 March 1977 of the 24-hour hunger strike at Ramle Prison.

241. The Special Committee took note of reports of plans to improve conditions in the prisons, the most recent being that appearing in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 August 1977 quoting the Minister for the Interior, Mr. Burg, and the Commissioner of Prisons, Mr. Levi; another report appearing in *Ma'ariv* on 21 September 1977 made reference as follows, to:

...improvements introduced in the jails in the territories several months ago, following a visit held by the Defence Minister Mr. E. Weizmann to those prisons.

On the other hand, allegations of severe prison conditions continue to be made to the Special Committee.

## V. QUNEITRA

242. In its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, the Special Committee reported on the implementation of resolution 3525 C (XXX) by which the Assembly had requested the Special Committee to undertake a survey of the destruction in Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction (A/31/218, sect. V and annex III). To enable it to carry out its mandate, the Special Committee had engaged the services of Mr. Eduard Gruner of Gruner S.A., Basle, Switzerland, to conduct the survey of damage in Quneitra (for qualifications of Mr. Gruner, see A/31/218, annex III).

243. At its thirty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/106 D by which it requested the Special Committee to complete its survey on all the aspects referred to in statements made by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic before the Special Political Committee, including those not covered by the report of the expert or not falling within the scope of his assignment.

244. At its first series of meetings after the adoption of this resolution, the Special Committee discussed its implementation and decided to engage Mr. Gruner to conduct the supplementary survey requested by the General Assembly. In so doing, it requested Mr. Gruner to undertake the survey in accordance with the following mandate:

(a) To examine the evaluation of the damages resulting from the deliberate destruction by Israel of the structures in the town of Quneitra, as it appears in the Supplementary Statement made in the Special Political Committee at its twenty-fifth meeting on 22 November 1976 (A/SPC/31/SR. 25) by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic and, having taken into consideration his own evaluation (see A/31/218, annex III), to establish his definite conclusions on these aspects of the destruction in Quneitra;

(b) To proceed to the evaluation:



(i) Of the damages resulting from the loss of furniture as a result of the deliberate destruction by Israel of the structures in the town of Quneitra, as listed hereunder:

- a. Houses and annexes thereto;
- b. Shops;
- c. Offices;
- d. Clubs;
- e. Cinemas;
- f. Mosques;
- g. Churches;
- h. Public places and buildings (in particular schools and hospitals);
- i. Other structures;

(ii) Of the damages resulting from the deliberate destruction by Israel of the public works in the town of Quneitra, in particular the streets of the town;

(c) To take into account in carrying out the task defined in subparagraph (b) (i) and (ii) above:

(i) The evaluation set out in the Supplementary Statement by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Special Political Committee at its twenty-fifth meeting on 22 November 1976 (A/SPC/31/SR. 25);

(ii) The information furnished by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in response to the request of the Special Committee on 26 February 1977, referring to the categories of furniture described in subparagraph (b) (i);

(iii) His own evaluation; and to formulate his own definite conclusions thereon;

(d) To submit to the Special Committee, if possible by 27 May 1977, a complete report on the points referred to above and on any other points that may be eventually communicated to him by the Special Committee.

At its series of meetings from 16 to 26 May 1977, the Special Committee discussed a progress report by the expert and held consultations with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic on certain aspects of the survey. Mr. Gruner submitted his report to the Special Committee on 30 June 1977. The report was considered by the Special Committee at its meetings from 5 to 7 September 1977 when it decided that the report should be transmitted as part of the Special Committee's main report under General Assembly resolution 31/106 C. The report of Mr. Gruner contains details requested by the Special Committee on each element not covered in the previous survey.

The report is contained in annex II. Mr. Gruner's report gives the following evaluation of damage:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Value</i> ( <i>Syrian pounds</i> )
Furniture .....	154,364,395
Stocks .....	48,740,000
Sacred goods and other items ....	22,940,000
TOTAL, deliberate damage .	226,044,395

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

245. The information received by the Special Committee since the adoption of its last report (A/31/218) and summarized in section IV confirms that the situation in the occupied territories has not altered from preceding years. The Government of Israel, according to this information, continues to implement a policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories; the day-to-day situation of the civilians in these territories remains tense and daily life is marked with a pattern of incidents, demonstrations, riots and other forms of violence directly attributable to the fact of occupation. Chronological narrative of daily occurrences, including violence appearing in section IV, (see paras. 87 to 226), is adequate illustration of this. Moreover, persons under detention do not enjoy the protection that is envisaged for them under applicable international law.

246. A significant development during 1977 has been the emergence of a policy followed by the occupying Power which would assume that the territories in question are not occupied territories. This belief is itself at the root of the thesis held by the Government of Israel that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,<sup>99</sup> does not apply to the occupied territories. The Special Committee has had occasion in previous reports to rebut this thesis and it is universally recognized that the Convention applies to the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East of June 1967, as may be attested to by the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly to that effect, the most recent being resolution 31/106 B, adopted on 16 December 1976, and the traditional stand taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross that the Convention is applicable as repeatedly attested

<sup>99</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.

to in its annual reports. In addition, the Special Committee has endorsed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination which was recognized in several General Assembly resolutions on the subject, including resolution 181 (II). The current policy of the Government of Israel vis-à-vis the occupied territories is more explicit when examined in the light of the statements made by the Prime Minister and other members of the Government and the decisions taken—which continue to be taken—to establish Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and to implant Israeli civilians in them. Thus, the Special Committee has noted the continued preparation of detailed plans to settle the occupied territories as formulated by the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. A. Sharon, according to which a number of settlements are to be established in all parts of the occupied territories over the next 20 years. These settlements are to be linked by a network of highways. Similarly, the plans established by the Jewish Agency and formulated by the head of the Settlement Department of that Agency, Mr. Ra'anana Weitz, would cover three regions and are based on agricultural settlements: the three regions are the Northern, incorporating the Golan Heights, the Eastern, covering the Jordan Valley, and the Southern, which sets out plans for the settlement of the Southern Gaza-Northern Sinai area. In the same context, the Special Committee has noted a significant increase in reports of expropriation and purchase of land in the occupied territories, including reports of Government budgetary appropriations for this purpose. The Special Committee would point out that such purchases are invalid and this regardless as to whether the land involved was owned by the Government or by individuals. This illegality stems from the fact that military conquest and occupation are not recognized as bestowing valid title to property.

247. The Special Committee notes that the policy followed by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories regarding changes in territory continues to have a corresponding trend as regards persons. Thus, although no reports of deportation were noted during 1977, the Government of Israel continues to deny the right to return to the hundreds of thousands of civilians who fled their homes in the occupied territories during and after the 1967 hostilities. There remains, therefore, a serious demographic vacuum in the

occupied territories. The twin policies under which territory and persons are governed in the occupied territories result in changes not only in the physical character but also in the demographic character of these territories. The Special Committee sees no sign whatsoever that this pattern will change in the foreseeable future. It notes with concern that the process has accelerated in recent days with the establishment of eight new settlements in the occupied territories, bringing the total number of settlements to 84, and reports, as recent as 12 September 1977, that nearly 10,000 Israeli citizens were settled in the occupied territories, not including those in occupied East Jerusalem. It is of particular concern to the Special Committee that current international reaction to the establishment of Israeli settlements tends to be limited to those settlements recently established; the Special Committee would emphasize its opinion that each one of the settlements established to date is contrary to articles 47 and 49 of the Geneva Convention,<sup>100</sup> as are all measures taken in occupied Jerusalem.

248. In the second part of section IV above, the Special Committee gave a cross-section of the information received by it illustrating the effect that the occupation was having on the day-to-day life of the civilian population. An examination of this cross-section shows that incidents occur practically every day and a constant cycle has evolved between the occurrence of incidents, the corresponding measures of reprisal, consequent arrests, trials and imprisonment. This cycle involves thousands of civilians from the occupied territories and extends to all areas of these territories, including the Golan Heights, where very few civilians have remained since the June 1967 hostilities. The frequency of occurrence of such incidents also reflects a recurrent harassment of the civilian population. During the period covered by this report, phenomena such as the incident at Deir Abu Mash'al have come to light whereby the entire population of a village is subjected to constant nightly incursions into their villages by groups of uniformed persons. The witnesses who appeared before the Special Committee and referred to this incident were categorical that groups engaged in these incursions were uniformed personnel, ostensibly from the Israeli Army. The

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

reports received by the Special Committee reflect an increasing tendency for Israeli troops to resort to unnecessary force in controlling demonstrations against the occupation. Several reports provided corroboration, for example, of the brutality used in Ramallah in March 1977 against schoolchildren who had demonstrated against the occupation. This tendency is further confirmed by other reports of brutality in controlling demonstrations by youths in other towns. In addition, the Special Committee has taken note of the following information concerning the destruction of houses during 1976 appearing in the annual report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of that year:

No destruction of houses was brought to the notice of ICRC between 7 January and 21 April 1976. Subsequently, however, the occupying Power destroyed further dwellings in breach of articles 33 and 53 of the fourth Convention.<sup>101</sup> As far as ICRC knows, 21 houses were destroyed or bricked up in 1976, depriving 109 people of their homes (61 on the West Bank of the Jordan and 48 in the Gaza Strip). In each case the delegates protested to the Israeli authorities and made sure that the inhabitants had been decently rehoused. When necessary they gave tents and blankets to the affected families.

The Special Committee would add that the practice of bricking up houses of suspects continues up to the time of the adoption of this report.

249. The pattern of arrests that emerges over the period covered by this report will indicate a constantly swelling prison population. The concern voiced by the Special Committee in earlier reports about overcrowded conditions were confirmed this year by the Commissioner General of Prisons for Israel, Mr. H. Levi, in a statement reported on 4 February 1977. According to the report of ICRC for 1976, the number of prisoners detained for security offences was almost 3,000. The report states that overcrowding was the "major problem encountered in 1976". As referred to by the Special Committee in section IV, the ICRC report characterizes the overcrowding as "alarming" and as "adversely affecting all conditions of detention". According to the ICRC report, in spite of the "repeated approaches" to the authorities to remedy the situation, no tangible results had been obtained by the end of 1976. The Special Committee noted

a significant increase in the number of persons released from prison and a noticeable corresponding increase in the turnover of prison population. Thus, the overcrowded situation in these prisons persists. In spite of occasional statements of plans to expand prison accommodation, no action has been reported to date. The situation in prisons has given rise to concern during the period covered by this report mainly because of the series of hunger strikes that occurred in Ashkelon Prison and other prisons in the occupied territories. The duration of the Ashkelon hunger strike itself (from December to May with minor interruptions) reflects the seriousness of the situation of the detainees involved. In that context, the Special Committee had already on 5 March 1977 communicated its concern to the Secretary-General and requested him to undertake specific measures in an effort to bring pressure on the Israeli authorities and to contact ICRC with a view to improving the situation in the prisons (see annex III).<sup>102</sup> The testimony of Mrs. Tsemel adds important details derived from her extensive experience as a lawyer for persons accused and convicted of offences against security, describing the situation in various prisons. Some of these details are contained in descriptions appearing in a written statement to Mrs. Tsemel's testimony and reproduced in document A/AC.145/R.113 and Add. 1.

250. The Special Committee has exercised deliberate caution in the past in expressing its views on one aspect of the treatment of detainees in the occupied territories. In its report of 1976, it stated, as follows:

...the indications that cases of torture have occurred and continue to occur are very strong and the international community cannot afford to connive at a continuation of such an abhorrent practice. The sporadic efforts undertaken by the Israeli authorities—far outnumbered by the serious allegations—have been shown to be insufficient; the same may be said of the ICRC's efforts which, the record shows, have not arrested the increase in the frequency of allegations of torture over the nine years since the occupation (A/31/218, para. 351).<sup>103</sup>

251. Accordingly, the Special Committee's examination of witnesses appearing before it this

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> Not included in this excerpt.

<sup>103</sup> See doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976* [ed. note].

year and speaking on the subject of the treatment of detainees was conducted with the same caution. The record of evidence appearing in section IV gives a cross-section of the evidence given before the Special Committee. The subject of the treatment of detainees, especially with reference to torture, received international attention following a report in the *Sunday Times* of London on 19 June 1977. The contents of the article and the controversy it provoked in the form of correspondence and articles responding critically to that report are well known. The Special Committee examined the report and other articles provoked by it and decided to issue invitations to their authors. Thus, it invited the *Sunday Times* to allow members of the Insight team to appear before it, and invited also the reporter from the *Jerusalem Post*, Mr. David Krivine, and another reporter from Reuters World News Service, Mr. Bernard Edinger. Accordingly, the Special Committee heard the testimony of Mr. Paul Eddy and Mr. Peter Gillman, two of the members of the Insight inquiry team, who had conducted the greater part of the investigation inside the occupied territories. In hearing these two witnesses, the Special Committee in the first instance sought to find out whether the two journalists had had previous interest or special concern about the entire gamut of developments in the Middle East and learnt that they had had little such involvement in the past.

252. The Special Committee, evaluating the over-all position, came to the conclusion that the two journalists had conducted their inquiries over a period of four months with a sense of near clinical detachment. Accordingly, the two journalists had made inquiries from witnesses and discarded evidence which appeared to them unsatisfactory. The work undertaken by the Insight team and the procedure followed by them in securing their information convinces the Special Committee that the Insight report constitutes valid evidence. In all the circumstances, the Special Committee is obliged to go beyond the conclusion it reached in last year's report (A/31/218) and has no option but to state that a strong *prima facie* case has been established that detainees in occupied territories are subject to treatment which cannot be described as other than torture.

253. In order to give itself the most ample range of information on the question of torture, the Special Committee gave equal consideration

to the other reports which were provoked by the Insight report. Of these, the Special Committee examined a report entitled "Flawed insight on torture" by Mr. David Krivine, a correspondent of the *Jerusalem Post*. (The report appeared in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine* on 5 August 1977.) Mr. Krivine did not accept the Special Committee's invitation to appear before it and to communicate to it the material he collected in conducting his own inquiry; his report, however, reflects that physical force is indeed applied by security services "where necessary" and that interrogation procedures are accompanied by violence. The Special Committee has not been able to establish Mr. Krivine's criteria for determining what constitutes torture or what is understood by "physical force" referred to in his report. The Special Committee is of the view that universal standards of human rights concerning the application of cruel and inhuman treatment are one and are to be applied universally; no distinction can be tolerated as to degrees of "acceptable" or "unacceptable" physical abuse, particularly of persons in detention. The Special Committee also examined a report on a visit to Gaza prison by Mr. Bernard Edinger of Reuters World News Service which was published in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 and 10 July 1977. The Special Committee regrets that Reuters News Service did not accept the Special Committee's invitation to Mr. Edinger to appear before it. In the absence of clarification of certain points in Mr. Edinger's report, the Special Committee does not find the report sufficiently descriptive of the situation of detainees during interrogation and during imprisonment. Moreover, the Special Committee notes that Mr. Edinger's report was censored by the Israeli military censor to the extent of 166 words removed because "they disclosed Israeli Army interrogation techniques". In addition, the version of Mr. Edinger's report as published in the *Jerusalem Post* omitted several paragraphs that were in the original version as issued by Reuters World Service. The Special Committee remains profoundly concerned at the absence of any sign of improvement in the treatment of detainees. At the root of this concern is the apparent lack of sensitivity or appreciation by the authorities for the basic rights of the individuals who are in detention. The Special Committee notes with concern the tendency to tolerate forms of ill-treatment of persons. This tendency is based

on an apparent liberal interpretation of the terms "torture" and "ill-treatment". It notes, for example, references of this nature in both the articles mentioned in this paragraph. The Special Committee finds it intolerable that such liberties are taken with such a fundamental principle of human rights intended to safeguard the physical safety and human dignity of the individual. The Special Committee must, therefore, repeat even more emphatically the observation it made in its last report that the international community can no longer afford to ignore the manifest and serious violations of human rights which detainees are subjected to by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories.

254. The Special Committee has examined the information furnished to it by Mrs. Tsemel on the safeguards foreseen in the applicable security instruments intended to protect persons accused in the military tribunals. This and other information obtained from various sources confirm the Special Committee's opinion that these procedures do not find practical application. Among the procedures envisaged to protect the accused, the Special Committee noted Mrs. Tsemel's remarks on judicial remedy available to detainees by applying, in certain instances, to the Supreme Court of Israel. According to her evidence and other evidence received by the Special Committee, these remedies have been invariably thwarted by pre-emptive steps taken by the executive authority through its agents in the military and security services. It is convinced that persons arraigned in military tribunals do not get a fair trial and would urge that non-Israeli observers, possibly representatives of ICRC, attend trials regularly.

255. The Special Committee took note of a report in the *Sunday Times* of London on 18 September 1977 concerning the role of ICRC in inspecting detainees and acting as a safeguard against the physical abuse of detainees. This report, entitled "What the Red Cross secret reports say", is the most recent of the disclosures provided by the original Insight Inquiry. According to this report, ICRC delegates have filed some 550 reports of their visits to prisoners from the occupied territories. The Insight team states that it obtained 336 of these reports and inspected 80 in addition. The report states that at last 200 formal complaints of ill-treatment or torture were passed to the Israeli authorities by Red Cross delegates. The

report gives details on the content of some of these ICRC reports. This information confirms the conclusions reached by the Special Committee at that time that detainees were indeed being subjected to torture. Furthermore, the Special Committee notes with serious concern the information contained in the same report to the effect that some time in 1969 ICRC agreed to modify their reports on complaints and to substitute these with generalizations. The reason attributed by the *Sunday Times* report for these modifications was because some of the ICRC reports "had been leaked at the United Nations". Secondly, and at the same time, ICRC agreed that before any of its delegates would take up any complaint of torture the person concerned must first be willing to repeat his allegations to Israeli army officers, who could cross-question the person. According to the *Sunday Times* report, since this agreement between ICRC and the Israeli authorities, complaints of torture dropped to an average of about six a year.

256. The Special Committee has had occasion to comment in past reports on the efficacy of the existing arrangements for protecting prisoners against ill-treatment and torture. The information referred to in the preceding paragraph would confirm that these arrangements are totally ineffective and in no way provide even the least protection of prisoners. For these reasons the Special Committee would urge a total revision of the existing procedures and renewed efforts at securing new and more effective arrangements. Until such time, members of the General Assembly must appreciate the fact that the prisoners in the occupied territories are at the absolute mercy of the Israeli authorities.

257. The information reproduced in section IV and the assessment made in the preceding paragraphs reflect the continuing deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories. This deterioration is noticeable in the three areas of concern to the Special Committee, namely that concerning the policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories, that of the day-to-day life of the civilians in the occupied territories and that of the treatment of detainees. The occupied territories continue to be the subject of a policy inspired by the "homeland" doctrine; thus the number of settlements continues to grow, as does the number of Israeli civilians living in the oc-

cupied territories. To these phenomena the Special Committee would add new elements that have come to light during 1977, especially the construction of major roads linking the extreme areas of the occupied territories. Thus a picture continues to emerge which reflects definitive policies to change the physical character and the demographic composition of the occupied territories. The situation of the civilians living in the occupied territories continues to deteriorate as the frequency of incidents which affect day-to-day life continue to increase. In some areas the civilian population is directly subjected to interference by the occupying Power, such as those who are expelled from certain areas in occupied Jerusalem; in other areas interference is indirect, such as in the village of Deir Abu Mesh'al. The most serious deterioration recorded by the Special Committee during 1977 has been that of the civilians who are in detention. The numerous reports confirming that ill-treatment of detainees occurs frequently during interrogation, as well as the unsatisfactory manner in which trials are conducted and the situation of detainees in overcrowded prisons are matters of distress to the Special Committee.

258. The Special Committee would once more appeal to the international community, through the General Assembly, to assume its responsibilities to end the occupation, thereby safeguarding the most fundamental of the human rights of the population of the occupied territories. Pending the early termination of the occupation, the Special Committee recommends that a suitable mechanism be established to safeguard the human rights of the civilian population who have been exposed for such a long time to military occupation. In this context the Special Committee would refer to the proposal made by it since its first report.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>104</sup> The Special Committee, in each of its reports, has recommended:

"(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

"(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

"(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement."

In addition, and in view of the serious deterioration in the situation of detainees, the Special Committee would urge the General Assembly to ensure that a mechanism similar to that suggested by ICRC of establishing commissions of inquiry be set up (ICRC Press Release No. 1303 of 19 September 1977).

## VII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

259. The present report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 17 October 1977 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure.

[Signed] O. GOUNDIAM (Senegal)  
I. B. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka)  
B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

## 9

### **Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid concerning recent developments in relations between Israel and South Africa<sup>105</sup>**

November 7, 1977

Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith the special report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* on relations between Israel and South Africa, adopted unanimously by the Special Committee on 28 October 1977.

This special report is submitted to the General Assembly and to the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of General Assembly

Under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

"(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

"(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

"(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work."

<sup>105</sup> UN doc. A/32/22/A. 3.

resolutions 2671 (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 31/6 of 26 October and 9 November 1976.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signed] LESLIE O. HARRIMAN

Chairman of the  
Special Committee against *Apartheid*

## SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee has followed with grave concern the continuing and increasing collaboration by the Government of Israel with the *apartheid* régime in South Africa in the military, nuclear, political, economic and other fields.

2. It may be recalled that this collaboration reached a new and dangerous stage following the visit of the Prime Minister of the *apartheid* régime to Israel in April 1976, the conclusion of a series of agreements during and after that visit, and the subsequent announcement that Israel would supply warships to the South African Navy.

3. On the recommendation of the Special Committee, the General Assembly, in resolution 31/6 E of 9 November 1976, strongly condemned the continuing and increasing collaboration by Israel with the racist régime of South Africa as a flagrant violation of the resolutions of the United Nations and as an encouragement to the racist régime of South Africa to persist in its criminal policies.

4. The Government of Israel has, however, defied this resolution, and the condemnations by numerous Governments and organizations all over the world, as well as the South African liberation movements, and further expanded its collaboration with the *apartheid* régime.

5. Developments in this connexion were reviewed in a report by the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa. The text of the Sub-Committee's report is reproduced in the annex to the present report.

6. Israel's increasing collaboration, especially in the military field, has been one of deliberate choice and a hostile act against the oppressed people of South Africa.

7. In this connexion, the Special Committee wishes to draw the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council to the following statement made by its Chairman on 8 July 1977:

...the Special Committee will soon issue a report on the growing relations between Israel and South Africa and call for world-wide condemnation. In giving special attention to Israel, the Special Committee is in no way selective. Israel has enormously increased its ties with South Africa in defiance of United Nations resolutions. It received the Prime Minister of the *apartheid* régime soon after the defeat of its naked aggression against Angola and signed a series of agreements. It announced the supply of warships to South Africa last August when that country was massacring African school children in Soweto and other centres.

While many other trading partners of South Africa are taking steps to curtail collaboration with South Africa, Israel has increased its collaboration. It has thereby flung a challenge to all freedom-loving people and proclaimed its hostility to Africa. African and other non-aligned States cannot entertain any relations with Israel so long as it does not desist from collaboration with the *apartheid* régime.

The Chairman stated further at the 351st meeting of the Special Committee, on 7 October 1977:

Israel is one of the few countries which is increasing collaboration with South Africa in all fields instead of disengaging itself.

Even France, which has procrastinated for many years on the arms embargo, has announced that it will not sell any more military equipment to South Africa. Israel remains the one and only country which is deliberately flouting the arms embargo.

The Special Committee, I may recall, invited all Member States, including Israel, to participate in the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, held at Lagos, and report on actions taken or contemplated by them against *apartheid*. Israel accepted the invitation and nominated a delegation. But shortly before the Conference convened, it announced withdrawal from the Conference on the spurious ground that the World Jewish Congress had not been invited....

Then, immediately after the Lagos Conference, when the South African régime realized the extent of its isolation, the South African Foreign Minister rushed to Israel and was received by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and others.

As the Havana Seminar warned, the South African régime is trying to establish an alliance of régimes hostile to the United Nations and Israel is co-operating in this disgraceful venture.

The Special Committee will, therefore, need to publicize and denounce this Pretoria-Tel Aviv axis and warn the Israeli Government of the consequences of its alliance with the *apartheid* régime, which is a hostile act against the oppressed people of South Africa and, indeed, all of humanity.

8. The Special Committee wishes to emphasize that the growing alliance between the Government of Israel and the *apartheid* régime, reflecting their common disregard of the United Nations, represents a challenge to the international community in its efforts to secure freedom and peace in southern Africa. It notes with concern the insidious propaganda by the Government of Israel and its supporters against the United Nations organs and against Governments which have advocated firm action against *apartheid*.

9. It considers that the General Assembly should once again condemn the Government of Israel and demand that it forthwith cease collaboration with South Africa. It should promote maximum publicity for all relevant information and encourage Governments and organizations to exert all their influence to oblige the Government of Israel to desist from its disastrous course.

## ANNEX

### REPORT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA

#### I. Introduction

1. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* submitted a special report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session concerning the growing collaboration between Israel and the racist régime in South Africa.<sup>106</sup> Subsequently, the General Assembly, in resolution 31/6 E of 9 November 1976, expressed its deep concern about the military assistance provided by Israel to the *apartheid* régime and strongly condemned the continuing and increasing collaboration by Israel as a flagrant violation of United Nations resolutions and an encouragement to the racist régime to persist in its criminal policies.

2. In November 1976, the Israeli newspaper *Maariv* reported that internal and external pressures in opposition to Israel's links with South Africa had convinced the Israeli Government to undertake an evaluation of its relationship with the *apartheid* régime. The paper reported that the Israeli Government had already undertaken some steps to "lower its profile" in South Africa, notably

by postponing two visits by Cabinet officers to South Africa. A few weeks later, however, the Jerusalem correspondent of the *Johannesburg Star* reported that Israeli sources had denied that recent pressure, from the United Nations and some Western States had influenced the Israeli Government in its stand on South Africa. According to the report, "the United Nations criticism was only to be expected", the sources said, "and anyway, will not go on for much longer".<sup>107</sup> After the recent elections, the new Israeli Minister-designate of Defence, Mr. Ezer Weisman [sic], said his Government would improve its links with South Africa, and in particular continue its defence supplies.<sup>108</sup>

3. A review of the development of relations between the two countries since the last report of the Special Committee shows that Israel has continued to intensify its links with South Africa in all fields despite universal condemnation of such collaboration.

4. The South African Foreign Minister, Mr. R. F. Botha, made a two-day "private visit" to Israel in early September 1977. The South African Embassy in Tel Aviv confirmed that Mr. Botha had paid a "courtesy call" on the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menahem Begin, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Moshe Dayan.<sup>109</sup>

#### II. Military and Nuclear Collaboration

5. Israel has intensified its supplies of arms to South Africa in flagrant violation of the United Nations arms embargo. Increasing reports of nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa have aroused considerable concern in the international community.

6. Press reports have indicated that Israeli military industries have a backing of about R100 million in South African orders. Reportedly, the equipment on order includes missiles, gunboats and fighter jets.<sup>110</sup>

7. In January 1977, officials of the United States Government stated that Israel had sold six gunboats armed with *Gabriel* missiles to South Africa. They reportedly said that since these

<sup>106</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 22A (A/31/22/Add.1-3)*, document A/32/22/Add.2. [This and following notes are part of the original text.]

<sup>107</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 27 November and 11 December 1976.

<sup>108</sup> *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 12 June 1977.

<sup>109</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 5 September 1977.

<sup>110</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, 30 March 1977.



missiles might have been built along the lines of the American *Sidewinder* missile the sale might be in violation of United States official policy prohibiting re-export of arms. A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington, however, denied that Israel had sold any arms with American components "without prior consent from those involved".<sup>111</sup>

8. According to a report in the *Financial Times* (London) of 7 August 1977, Sandhoek-Austral shipyards near Durban are to begin manufacturing *Dubar* coastal patrol boats under licence from Israel.<sup>112</sup>

9. According to information provided by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel appears to be acting as an intermediary for the sale of West German military equipment to South Africa, in particular speed-boats.<sup>113</sup>

10. The Committee has received disturbing reports that Israel's increasingly close co-operation with South Africa in the military sphere may have been extended to the nuclear sphere. These reports have been denied by the Government of Israel.<sup>114</sup>

11. Several observers have expressed concern that the scientific and technological co-operation agreements concluded by the two countries in 1976, and which have established closer ties between the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and the Israeli National Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, may involve the transfer of nuclear know-how. According to a recent report, Israel may be supplying nuclear technology in return for enriched uranium.<sup>115</sup>

12. In its previous report, the Committee had

already indicated that South Africa may be supplying uranium to Israel in return for arms.<sup>116</sup>

13. According to other reports, Israel may be assisting South Africa in developing its delivery capability for nuclear devices.<sup>117</sup>

### III. *Economic Collaboration*

14. Trade figures for 1976 released by the South African Embassy in Israel showed that trade between the two countries had increased by about 13 per cent during the year. South African exports to Israel (mainly iron, steel, food-stuffs and mineral products) rose to \$US 44 million, 14 per cent higher than in 1975. Israel's exports to South Africa (mainly agricultural machinery, electrical goods, chemicals and textiles) rose 12 per cent to \$US 44.2 million.<sup>118</sup>

15. Exchanges of economic missions and other measures to increase economic ties have been intensified since the conclusion of a co-operation agreement between the two countries in April 1976. Mr. Ytzak Unna, Israel's Ambassador to South Africa, announced that Israeli businessmen "have full confidence in the future of South Africa".<sup>119</sup>

16. A top-level South African trade delegation held talks with Israeli manufacturers, industrialists and politicians in September 1976, reportedly with the aim to increase trade between the two countries. The delegation was organized by the South African-Israel Chamber of Economic Relations in conjunction with the Israel-South African Chamber of Commerce, the Israeli Manufacturers' Association and the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry and included the chairman of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the managing director of the Industrial Development Corporation, and several prominent businessmen. The talks reportedly centred around bilateral trade in

<sup>111</sup> *Jerusalem Domestic Service*, 12 January 1977; *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 13 January 1977.

<sup>112</sup> Quoted in P. F. Wilmot, "Zionism and apartheid: structure of imperialism", *New Nigerian*, Lagos, 25 August 1977.

<sup>113</sup> Informationsdienst Südliches Afrika, No. 4, April 1977, *Waffengeschäfte BRD-SA*.

<sup>114</sup> *The New York Times*, 18 April 1976; *Sunday Times*, Johannesburg 12 June 1977.

<sup>115</sup> P. F. Wilmot, *op. cit.*, Elisabeth Mathiot, *La collaboration entre Israël et l'Afrique du Sud*, Paris (Editions France-Pays Arabes, 1977); *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition 14 May 1977. According to the *Morning Star*, London, of 11 May 1976, papers delivered at a joint Israel-South Africa scientific conference in Johannesburg in April 1976 included papers on nuclear physics and isotope chemistry.

<sup>116</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly Thirty-first Session Supplement No. 22A* (A/31/22/Add. 1-3), document A/31/22 Add 2, para. 52.

<sup>117</sup> Ronald W. Walters, "South Africa's nuclear power development: political and strategic implications", testimony before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations of the United States House of Representatives, 21 June 1977; P. F. Wilmot *op. cit.*

<sup>118</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 19 February 1977.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 May 1977.

electronics, chemicals, metal industries and plastics.<sup>120</sup>

17. In November 1976, three senior Israeli officials visited South Africa for discussions on economic relations between the two countries. They were the Controller of Foreign Exchange, the Director of the Investment Authority and the Director of the Investment Centre.<sup>121</sup>

18. It was also reported that an Israeli economic delegation led by a cabinet minister would visit South Africa in 1977. According to Mr. Ytzak Unna, Israeli Ambassador to South Africa, the delegation leader would probably be the Minister of Finance, Mr. Y. Rabinowitz. The purpose of the mission would be to discuss the implementation of the South African economic trade agreement.<sup>122</sup>

19. The Governor of the Israeli Reserve Bank, Mr. Aron Gafny, visited South Africa for a week in September 1977. He called for increased economic co-operation between the two countries, particularly in joint ventures.<sup>123</sup>

20. An Israeli team composed of experts in business, economics and finance is scheduled to hold seminars in South Africa in October 1977. Purpose of the visit is to encourage South African businessmen to take advantage of the free trade agreements between Israel and the European Economic Community by setting up subsidiaries in Israel or entering into joint ventures with Israel-based companies.<sup>124</sup>

21. In September 1977, South Africa and Israel concluded a bilateral agreement to prevent tax duplication. In addition to provisions to avoid double taxation of each other's citizens residing or earning in the other country, the agreement was reported to contain clauses favourable to Israel. These related to South Africa's recognition of tax exemptions granted by Israel to foreign companies in order to promote investment in its economy and taxation of South African pensioners now living in Israel according to Israeli law.<sup>125</sup>

22. The Tel Aviv department-store chain Shalom Stores held a "South African Week" in May 1977, featuring fashions, food-stuffs, hardware and other consumer items, many of them being intro-

duced in Israel for the first time.<sup>126</sup>

23. The Israeli Koor Group is reportedly planning to expand its activities in the South African chemicals industry. According to Mr. F. J. H. le Riche, managing director of the South African company Sentrachem, further co-operation between his group and Koor Chemicals was being negotiated. Mr. le Riche stated that the proposed co-operation would make South Africa more independent of imported chemicals, while at the same time creating possibilities for increased exports. Agbro (Pty), the first joint undertaking by the two groups, has already started production of chemical components for herbicides.<sup>127</sup>

24. According to information disclosed by Mr. Hillel Seidel, an opposition member in the Israeli Parliament, Koor is also planning to represent the South African steel industry in the European Economic Community (EEC), where Israel enjoys preferential trade tariffs because of its status as an associate member. About 40 per cent of South Africa's total exports to Israel are made of steel from the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor), a parastatal company. It was reported that a joint Iscor-Koor steel services centre would be opened in Kiryat Gat, near Tel Aviv, this year. The centre would import South African semi-processed steel and iron for further processing and export. When the deal was announced in May 1976, it was also reported that South Africa was greatly interested in the completion of the project because of Israel's export potential to the EEC. A senior Koor official, however, denied that Koor would be representing South African steel in Europe.<sup>128</sup>

25. According to press reports, a major agreement may have been concluded between the two countries for the supply of coal from South Africa for an electric power plant being built near Hadera in central Israel. Mr. Alan Tew, managing director of the Transvaal Coal Owners Association, confirmed that negotiations were taking place, but denied that any formal agreement had been reached. He stated that Israel was interested in

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 11 September 1976.

<sup>121</sup> *The New York Times*, 29 November 1976.

<sup>122</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 25 November 1976.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 6 September 1977.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 13 September 1977.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> *South Africa Digest*, Pretoria, 20 May 1977.

<sup>127</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 2 October 1976. Koor is owned by the Histadrut trade union of Israel and is one of Israel's largest industrial concerns.

<sup>128</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 19 March 1977.

buying about one million tons of coals a year from South Africa.<sup>129</sup>

26. Consolidated Power (Pty), a joint undertaking of the Tadiran Israel Electronics Industries and the South African company Calan, began operations at Rosslyn near Pretoria in December 1976. Tadiran is a major manufacturer of tactical military communications equipment and is partly owned by Koor Industries (50 per cent), the Israeli Ministry of Defence (15 per cent) and the United States company GTE International (35 per cent). According to details released by the new company's managing director, Mr. Y. Brosh, the company manufactures "emergency lighting systems" for factories, shopping centres and offices, as well as for home use. In addition, the company will handle on an agency basis "other Tradiran products and installations which are too specialized to be made in South Africa".<sup>130</sup>

27. A containerized shipping service for general cargoes between South Africa and Israel was introduced in September 1976. According to Mr. W. B. Davies, a director of Lines, which runs the service, containerization had become necessary because of increased trade between South Africa and Israel.<sup>131</sup>

28. Increasing traffic between the two countries has also reportedly led the Israeli national airline El Al to plan adding a fourth weekly flight to South Africa or to put the Boeing 747 jet on the route instead of the smaller planes presently in use.<sup>132</sup>

29. There have been increasing reports of Israel's interest in the Transkei bantustan. The southern Africa correspondent of the Israeli radio reported on 29 October 1976 that about a month and a half earlier, a delegation from the Transkei agriculture "ministry" had visited Israel seeking agricultural aid. They had met with the Agriculture Ministry and had toured several villages. The report was denied by the Agriculture Ministry. However, the new Transkei agriculture "minister" subsequently confirmed that his predecessor had

indeed visited Israel and conferred with Agriculture Minister Aharon Uzan, although no final agreement had been concluded. The Transkei reportedly intends to send another delegation to Israel in the near future.<sup>133</sup> Early in 1976, a member of the Israeli Parliament, Mr. Mordechai Ben-Porat, had reportedly stated on the occasion of a visit to South Africa that Israel was interested in helping South Africa "develop" the Transkei by supplying technical assistance and training.<sup>134</sup>

30. In February 1977, two representatives of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) visited Israel as part of a tour of Western Europe designed to attract investment to the bantustans. The Jerusalem correspondent of the Johannesburg *Star* reported that many Israeli companies, in particular the plastics industry, were attracted by the idea of investing in the bantustans. A plan under consideration was for Israeli manufacturers "to utilize the low cost semi-skilled labour available in the Republic and then import the goods back to Israel, either completed, or with the necessary finishing being handled here and then exported elsewhere, possibly to the European Economic Community...".<sup>135</sup>

31. Scientific ties also continue to be strengthened within the framework of the co-operation agreement between the two countries. It was reported in March 1977 that the first South African scientist would leave in July for six months' research in electronics at a technological institute in Haifa. Further appointments would be made in April. In June, the first of four Israelis would arrive in South Africa for two months' research at the Institute of Oceanology in Settlenbosch.<sup>136</sup>

32. In June 1977, South Africa and Israel combined to put on the first conference ever held in South Africa by the International Association of Water Pollution Research.<sup>137</sup>

#### IV. Cultural, Sports and Other Relations

33. South African Jewish families are reportedly emigrating to Israel as part of Israel's policy of creating settlements in the occupied territories. It

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 6 November 1976; *New Statesman and Nation*, London, 11 February 1977.

<sup>130</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 8 December 1976; *South Africa Digest* Pretoria, 14 January 1977; *Electronics Directory*, Israel, 1973/74.

<sup>131</sup> *South African Digest*, Pretoria, 22 October 1976.

<sup>132</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 19 February 1977.

<sup>133</sup> *Jerusalem Domestic Service*, 29 October 1976.

<sup>134</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 26 April 1976.

<sup>135</sup> *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 26 February 1977.

<sup>136</sup> *South African Digest*, Pretoria, 25 March 1976.

<sup>137</sup> *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 13 June 1977.

was reported recently that an initial settlement of 15 South African families would grow tomatoes in a *moshav* in an occupied area.<sup>138</sup>

34. The 71-member South African Youth Chamber Orchestra toured Israel for three weeks in December 1976. The tour, which was described as "triumphant" in the South African press, was the result of an invitation from Israel as part of the cultural exchange programme between the two countries.<sup>139</sup>

35. The Association of Round Tables in South

Africa has started three Round Tables in Israel. The Association, a member of the World Council of Young Men's Service Clubs, an international youth organization, reportedly was chosen to form the Round Tables in Israel because of the ties between South Africa and Israel.<sup>140</sup>

36. South African teams participated in the tenth Maccabiah games in Tel Aviv in July 1977.

37. An Israeli volley ball team, Maccabi Tel Aviv, toured South Africa for four weeks from 2 August 1977.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 3 February 1977.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 December 1976; *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly airmail edition, 29 December 1976.

<sup>140</sup> *South African Digest*, Pretoria, 5 November 1976.

## Special Reports Submitted to the Security Council

10

### **Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 31/62 concerning the peace conference on the Middle East<sup>141</sup>**

February 28, 1977

1. The General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of its resolution 31/62 of 9 December 1976, requested the Secretary-General:

(a) To resume contacts with all the parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with his initiative of 1 April 1976,<sup>142</sup> in preparation for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;

(b) To submit a report to the Security Council on the results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle East not later than 1 March 1977.

In the latter part of December and in January, in pursuance of that resolution, I held initial consultations with the representatives of the parties and of the two Co-Chairmen. At the invitation of the Government of Egypt and after consultations with all the parties concerned, I decided to visit the region in early February with a view to making contact in the area with the parties directly concerned before making my report to the Security Council.

2. I departed for the Middle East on 31 January and left the area on 12 February. During that period I visited Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. I held extensive consultations in those countries with the heads of State, heads of Governments, foreign ministers and other leaders involved in the Middle East problem. I also met at Damascus with Chairman Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). At the termination of my

visit to the region, I sent representatives to the respective capitals in order to keep the two Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East informed of my consultations with the parties in the Middle East and to consult them on the question of an early reconvening of the Conference.

3. The main object of my mission was to get clarification of the views of the parties concerned as to the best course to follow in resuming the negotiating process and to consult with them as to the best means of overcoming the various obstacles in the way of that objective. My consultations also provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on the wider aspects of the Middle East problem itself. All the parties expressed their desire for an early resumption of the negotiating process through the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. The problem, therefore, was to find agreement on the conditions under which the Conference could be convened.

#### *Participation in the Peace Conference on the Middle East*

4. The most immediate difficulty is the question of participation. The position of the Arab States is that the PLO should be invited to participate in any future meetings of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.

The position of the Israeli Government is that the Conference should be convened on the original basis, namely, the letter<sup>143</sup> of the two Co-Chairmen which I circulated with my letter of 18 December 1973 convening the Conference [S/11161]. The participation would thus be the same as at the meeting of the Conference which took place in December 1973. The Arab Governments maintain that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Israel, on the other hand, is not prepared to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians but is prepared to negotiate with Jordan concerning the Palestinian question. Israel would not object to the inclusion of Palestinian representatives in the delegation of

<sup>141</sup> UN doc. S/12290. The resolution is printed as doc. 21 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>142</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1976*, document S/12210, para. 8; [orig. note].

<sup>143</sup> Doc. 215 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

Jordan. The position of the PLO is that it must be invited to participate in the Conference from the outset on an equal footing with all other parties as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. I may add that this view was shared by all the Arab Governments, especially as related to the importance of issuing a separate invitation to the PLO.

5. I discussed the question of participation at length with all the parties in an effort to find means of overcoming this primary obstacle to reconvening the Conference. In this context, the possibility of the Conference discussing the question of participation as its first order of business in a resumed session of the Conference in accordance with the above-mentioned letter of 18 December 1973 or in a preparatory stage, the possibility of a unified Arab delegation and other procedural solutions were discussed. It would appear, however, at the present time, that the difference between the parties on this matter is too fundamental to be bridged by procedural devices.

6. During my visit to Beirut, the question of the participation of Lebanon in the Conference was among the subjects discussed. The Government expressed its interest in participating, although it has not yet formalized its position on this matter.

#### *Timing*

7. The question of the timing of the convening of the Conference was also discussed. In principle, all the parties concerned were in favour of convening the Conference at the earliest possible date. The Government of Israel made it clear that it was prepared to attend a meeting of the Conference immediately, provided it was convened on the same basis as the first phase of the Conference in December 1973. The Arab States supported the convening of the Conference within the time-limit set by paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 31/62. The PLO stated that, in the absence of an invitation and as long as the agenda of the Conference was not known, it was not able to express its view on the timing. My own impression is that the parties would be prepared to be flexible as regards timing, provided there was a prospect of the Conference being convened within a reasonable time-limit.

#### *Terms of reference*

8. Another matter which was discussed during

the course of my contacts was the terms of reference of the Conference. In 1973, the Conference was convened on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973). It seems to be generally accepted among the original participants in the Conference that resolution 338 (1973) remains the basis for convening the Conference. In fact, the Government of Israel insists that this is the only basis on which the Conference can legitimately be convened. However, it was noted by the Arab Governments that since the adoption of resolution 338 (1973), the General Assembly had adopted resolutions pertaining to the Geneva Conference and that those should be taken into account.

9. In my conversations with the representatives of the PLO, they made clear its position that resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) could not be considered a legal basis for the Conference, since resolution 242 (1967) had been superseded by General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3376 (XXX). In this regard, the position of the PLO is that, in principle, it is keen on participating in any conference on the Middle East, irrespective of its feelings as regards the basis of the Conference, because it is a party directly involved. However, before taking a final decision to participate, the PLO would wish to know the agenda of the Conference.

#### *Agenda and organization of work*

10. Although the agenda and organization of work of the Conference can be fruitfully discussed only when the problems of participation have been overcome, these matters were to some extent explored in the course of my discussions on the general problem of convening the Conference. It is clear that there is a divergence of views on several aspects of this matter which will have to be resolved before the Conference can get down to its work. On the question of working groups, the Arab side expressed a preference for working groups organized on a functional rather than a geographical basis in which all of the parties would participate, on the grounds that the problem of the Middle East is indivisible. On the other hand, the view was expressed in Israel that negotiations should take place within the Geneva framework on a Government-to-Government basis according to the specific issue involved.

11. Israel regards the Geneva Conference as a continuous ongoing process, within which frame-

work negotiations could take place in different forms and, if necessary, in different places, according to the aspect of the problem involved. Israel prefers a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem. If, however, in the present circumstances, this cannot be achieved, it is prepared to work out limited arrangements within the framework of the Geneva Conference. For their part, the Arab side emphasized that their interest is to work out a comprehensive settlement, within the Geneva framework and under United Nations auspices, involving, in the first place, the solution of the Palestinian question and the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories.

*Possible interim arrangements*

12. Even though there has been no convergence of views as to a number of differences which will have to be resolved before it is possible to convene the Peace Conference on the Middle East, all concerned agree that it is of crucial importance to preserve the momentum towards a resumption of negotiations and to avoid a hiatus in the efforts to achieve this objective. In this context, various possible interim measures which might be considered if no early agreement on reconvening the Conference could be reached were discussed. Among these possibilities was some form of preparatory working group to be set up in the United Nations Secretariat under the Secretary-General's auspices to maintain contact with all the parties and with the Co-Chairmen on the problems of reconvening the Conference, with a view to their early resolution. This would be largely a formalization of existing activities.

13. Another possibility mentioned was the formation of a contact group at Geneva consisting of the representatives of the two Co-Chairmen, of the Secretary-General and of the parties concerned in order to explore further the procedural problems involved in convening the Conference. A further possibility which came up in discussion would be the setting up of an interim conference secretariat to maintain contact with the parties and the Co-Chairmen and to work on the preparations for the Conference, including the agenda, the rules of procedure and the organization of the work. The general feeling about such interim measures seemed to be that, while it would be desirable to maintain the present contacts on an informal basis, it would not seem advisable to formalize them at the present stage.

*Consultations with the Co-Chairmen*

14. By identical letters dated 6 January 1977, I transmitted to the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference the text of General Assembly resolution 31/62. I also informed them of my plans regarding the resumption of my contacts with the parties and the Co-Chairmen along the lines of my initiative of 1 April 1976. On 21 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. Gromyko, in response to my letter, set out the position of the Soviet Union with respect to the convening of the Conference, as well as the general problem of the Middle East.

15. Following consultations with Soviet officials in Moscow, it emerged that the Soviet Union remained committed to the position of principle outlined in its proposal which is contained in document S/12208 of 7 October 1976. The Soviet Union favours an over-all Middle East settlement in the interest of a stable peace in the area and of international security as a whole. Accordingly, it makes an urgent appeal for the resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference without delay on the basis of United Nations resolutions. It suggests that the Conference could be held in two stages and attaches importance to the representation of the PLO at the Conference on an equal footing with the other parties concerned.

16. On 14 February, on the eve of his departure for the Middle East, Mr. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States responded to my letter of January, expressing his Government's support for my own efforts concerning the resumption of the negotiating process. At the conclusion of his visit to the area from 14 to 21 February, I was again in touch with the Secretary of State. The Secretary informed me that he found a clear determination among all the parties to make a serious effort for peace. He found agreement among the parties that, if procedural questions could be resolved, they were prepared to go to Geneva to discuss the substantive issues without preconditions. In Mr. Vance's talks, the principal substantive issues were agreed to be the nature of peace, withdrawal/territorial boundary questions and a settlement of the Palestinian problem. It was apparent to the Secretary of State that the principal procedural problem that had to be resolved arose from the differences among the parties over the question of Palestinian participation in the Conference. On the issue of timing,

the United States has found a consensus that all concerned should work towards reconvening the Conference in the second half of 1977. It is the stated intention of the United States to work with the Governments in the area to make progress this year towards Middle East peace.

#### *Observations*

17. While the immediate purpose of my consultations was to discuss the early convening of the Peace Conference, the wider problems of the Middle East were also discussed. I do not believe that the Council will expect me at this stage to attempt to provide a detailed report on the Middle East question, but it may be of some value to record briefly my own impressions of the attitudes now current among the parties to the Middle East problem.

18. As I have stated before, there can be no doubt that all concerned are earnestly desirous of moving towards a negotiated settlement. In order to achieve this, however, it will be necessary to make a determined effort to overcome the lack of confidence and the mutual distrust and fears of all the parties as to the consequences of making compromises and concessions. In the existing situation, lack of communication and understanding presents a major obstacle in the way of efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the area. I did my best during my conversations to try to bridge this gap by conveying faithfully the views of each side to the other. I know that several concerned Governments are also making efforts in this regard.

19. The main elements of the Middle East problem remain intractable and extremely difficult to deal with. On the other hand, there is, I believe, an increasing consciousness in the area that an opportunity now exists to resume negotiations in a meaningful way and that, if this opportunity is not seized, there are grave dangers that the situation will deteriorate once again, with incalculable consequences not only for the Middle East but for the international community as a whole.

20. As I said earlier, the immediate problem in reconvening the Peace Conference is the participation of the PLO and the representation of the interests and rights of the Palestinian people. Although I have explored with the parties the possibility of surmounting this obstacle by various arrangements I do not believe that it can be surmounted by purely procedural means without

certain changes in attitude on all sides. Such changes would involve mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the claims of the different parties in suitable forms and with adequate guarantees and an effort on all sides to define more clearly the shape of an ultimate peace settlement in the Middle East. Obviously, the attitude of the PLO towards Israel, as reflected in the Palestine National Charter (formerly called the Covenant), the attitude of Israel towards the PLO and the nature and context of the Palestinian entity in a future settlement are among the key issues where adjustments of attitude would have an important bearing on the prospects of success of the Conference.

21. Without such basic changes in attitude, it will be difficult to make progress in resolving the substantive aspects of the Middle East problem. I discussed these questions at some length with my interlocutors in the Middle East. I hope very much that, through further efforts on all sides, it will prove possible to bring about the adjustments which are indispensable to further progress in solving the problem.

22. However great the difficulties may be, I am convinced that we must maintain the movement towards peaceful negotiation for a just and lasting settlement and, specifically, intensify our search for means through which the Peace Conference on the Middle East can be convened at the earliest possible date. We must seize the opportunities that exist, however far apart the positions of the different parties still are. Neither the parties in the Middle East nor the international community as a whole can afford a continuing stalemate. It is vital that we catch the prevailing spirit of moderation and realism before it evaporates and assist the parties to channel that spirit into the arduous process of negotiation.

23. I shall continue my own contacts with the parties and the two Co-Chairmen in order to keep myself informed of their positions in the light of developments since my visit to the Middle East. I shall not fail to inform the Council of further developments.



## 11

**Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 31/61 concerning the situation in the Middle East<sup>144</sup>**

October 3, 1977

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 31/61 of 9 December 1976, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to inform the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East of the resolution and to submit a report on the follow-up of its implementation to the Assembly at its thirty-second session:

2. By identical letters dated 6 January 1977, addressed respectively to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, the Secretary-General brought resolution 31/61 to their attention. The following day, he transmitted to the Security Council the text of the resolution and drew particular attention to paragraph 6 of that resolution, in which the General Assembly requested the Council to take effective measures, within an appropriate time-table, for the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council and the Assembly on the Middle East and Palestine.

3. The implementation of General Assembly resolution 31/61 is closely related to that of resolution 31/62, in which the Assembly called for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, not later than the end of March 1977, and requested the Secretary-General "(a) to resume contacts with all the parties to the conflict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East...; and (b) to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle East not later than 1 March 1977".<sup>145</sup>

4. In February 1977, the Secretary-General

undertook a visit to the Middle East. The main purpose of this mission was to discuss with the parties concerned the best course to follow in resuming the negotiating process and to consult with them as to the best means of overcoming the various obstacles in the way of that objective, but the mission also provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on the wider aspects of the Middle East problem itself. The results of the Secretary-General's mission were set out in the report<sup>146</sup> which he submitted to the Security Council on 28 February 1977 under General Assembly resolution 31/62 (S/12290 and Corr.1). The Secretary-General found that although the parties expressed their desire for an early resumption of the negotiating process through the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East in Geneva, there was no agreement on the question of the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the representation of the interests and rights of the Palestinian people. In this connexion the Secretary-General observed that the obstacles in the way of reconvening the Geneva Conference were of a kind that could not be overcome by purely procedural means. Changes of attitude on all sides were necessary. These would involve mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the claims of the different parties in suitable forms and with adequate guarantees, as well as an effort on all sides to define more clearly the shape of an ultimate peace settlement in the Middle East.

5. Immediately after the Secretary-General's visit to the Middle East, he sent representatives to Moscow and Washington for the purpose of briefing the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on his consultations with the parties concerned and his findings. Since then efforts to resume the negotiating process have continued at various levels in New York and elsewhere. The Secretary-General and his immediate advisers on the Middle East have been in close contact with the two Co-Chairmen in this connexion.

6. Recently a number of developments took place in the Middle East which have a bearing on the search for a peaceful settlement in the area. Those developments have already been brought to the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council in communications submitted by the parties or other Member States and circulated

<sup>144</sup> UN doc. S/12417. The resolution is printed as doc. 20 in International Documents on Palestine 1976.

<sup>145</sup> See doc. 21 in *ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> Doc. 10 above.

as official documents of those two organs. The present report is not the place to deal in detail with those communications, but it may be appropriate and useful to recall briefly here the developments referred to in them.

7. In July the Government of Israel legalized three existing settlements in the West Bank of the Jordan. In the following month it decided to apply Israeli laws in the fields of health, labour and other services to the Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Later in August it authorized the establishment of three new settlements in the West Bank. Arab States and PLO have strongly protested against those decisions, which they considered as deliberate acts to consolidate Israeli occupation and to pave the way for annexation. At the request of Egypt (A/32/241), the General Assembly has decided to include an additional item in the agenda of its thirty-second session entitled "Recent illegal Israeli measures in the occupied Arab territories designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories in contravention of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, of Israel's international obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and of United Nations resolutions, and obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

8. The Government of Israel for its part has brought to the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council a recent decision taken by the Central Council of PLO in which it rejected Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In a letter dated 31 August 1977 (A/32/202-S12392), the Permanent Representative of Israel indicated that the statement issued by the Central Council, together with "the recent indiscriminate outrages against civilians by PLO", demonstrated yet again that PLO could not be a partner to any steps leading to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

9. It is also relevant to make a reference in this report to the situation in southern Lebanon, where fighting between *de facto* forces flared up recently with renewed intensity, since a deterioration of this situation may have considerable implications in the wider context of the Middle East problem.

10. In the Secretary-General's report<sup>147</sup> to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly on

the work of the Organization (A/32/1), he referred to the above developments. In particular, the Secretary-General expressed the view that, in the present critical stage in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it is of vital importance that all the Governments and parties concerned should refrain from any moves likely to heighten tension or to affect the current efforts to resume the negotiating process.

11. As the thirty-second session of the General Assembly gets under way, the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and high-ranking representatives of all the parties concerned have come to New York. On this occasion, the efforts to bring about an early resumption of the negotiating process are entering a new intensified phase. At this crucial stage, it would be inappropriate for the Secretary-General to comment substantively on the efforts under way. He wishes only to express the earnest hope that it will prove possible, with the co-operation and understanding of all concerned, to bring about an early resumption of the negotiating process as a first step towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, as called for by the General Assembly and the Security Council. As the Secretary-General indicated in his report on the work of the Organization: "It is more than ever urgent and vital that the parties preserve the spirit of moderation and realism and channel that spirit into the arduous and lengthy process of negotiation. If that were not to happen, I greatly fear that we shall be facing a major international crisis in the not too distant future."

#### ADDENDUM

The Secretary-General has received a letter dated 17 October 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations concerning paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 October on the situation in the Middle East (A/32/240). The substantive part of the letter is reproduced below:

I have the honour to refer to your report on the situation in the Middle East of 3 October 1977 (A/32/240) and, on instruction from my Government, to draw your attention to a factual error which appeared in it.

In paragraph 7, the report states that the Government of Israel decided in August "to apply Israeli laws in the fields of health, labour and other services to the Arab population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip". This, however, is not the case. On 14 August 1977, the Gov-

<sup>147</sup> See doc. 1 above.

ernment of Israel announced its intention to equalize the services in these spheres given to residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with those given to res-

idents of Israel. The Government did not declare its intention 'to apply Israeli laws', and the former law continues to be administered.

## General Assembly Debate: The Palestine Question

12

### General Assembly, 84th meeting: statement by PLO Executive Committee Member Qadumi<sup>148</sup>

November 28, 1977

MR. KADDOUMI (Palestine Liberation Organization) (interpretation from Arabic): I should like first of all to express my gratitude and appreciation to Mr. Fall, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and Mr. Gauci, the Rapporteur of the Committee, for their very comprehensive and clear statements. They have in fact made it unnecessary for me to deal with many questions, since they have both spoken on them with objectivity in their statements and in their report.

For four years—in other words, since we became Observers at the United Nations—we have been participating in its work, drawing inspiration from its Charter, meeting representatives here each year at the same time in order to discuss with them our chronic problem, which has been appearing on the agenda of this Assembly for the past 30 years, in order to arrive at a just settlement of the question within the framework of existing international instruments and the political efforts made to that end. Each time, after painting a picture of the situation prevailing in respect of that problem and all its ramifications, we find before us draft proposals which could give a political impetus to the solution of this problem and which could well be changed into concrete, practicable realities. This Assembly has at all times given us its support. Israel and its ally, the United States, are the only ones that did not join in the unanimous support for the Palestinians. The decisions taken by this Assembly are but proof of the desire of us all to serve the cause of international peace and to prevent any risk of international war. This Assembly is witness to the fact that the

Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine National Council, which is its highest body, have submitted to this international Organization more than one draft for the purpose of bringing about peace and justice. It is not we but our adversaries who have placed obstacles in the way of the implementation of those projects, which ran counter to their expansionist aims and their intention to establish settlements in the region.

It is we, the leaders of the Palestinian people, who took the initiative of putting forward the historic proposal<sup>149</sup> to settle the Palestinian question through the establishment of a democratic secular single State in Palestine where citizens, regardless of religion or ethnic origin, could co-exist, within a society that would ensure equality of obligations and rights. That was stated in this Assembly by our brother Yassir Arafat in 1974<sup>150</sup> when he outlined his historic vision of an exemplary co-existence of all religious groups in Palestine. Similarly, our National Council in March 1977 adopted a plan accepting the creation of an independent Arab Palestinian State on Palestinian national land to be liberated by an armed struggle and by the pressure of world public opinion.<sup>151</sup> We said that we accepted those terms within the context of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

It is no secret that the Palestine Liberation Organization has supported more than one draft resolution submitted by different members of the Security Council with a view to achieving that noble objective. Unfortunately, those drafts were doomed to failure because of the United States veto. The report of the Committee of 23, recently submitted to the Security Council, is but one of those many attempts that has moved the conscience of the world to seek a just and acceptable solution likely to ensure lasting peace in the area. In that

<sup>148</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.84. pp. 22–41.

<sup>149</sup> See docs. 370 and 429 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

<sup>150</sup> See doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>151</sup> See doc. 229 below.

connexion I must express our gratitude to the Chairman and members of that Committee who have spared no effort to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their national rights.

The Zionists, with the support of the United States Government, have always opposed and continue to oppose elementary human rights for the Palestinian people. They refuse even to recognize these rights; they have never recognized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, to the right to return to their land and to enter their homes from which they were driven by force, their right to exercise sovereignty and independence over their national territory and their right to create an independent State.

Under these conditions it is only natural that our people—and all peoples of the world—maintain a consistent position. No force on earth can make us accept any limitation in those legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Despite the bitterness felt by every Palestinian following the failure of this international Organization to implement its resolutions relating to the Palestinian question, our people continue to have the greatest respect for it and support it as the sole forum empowered to solve international problems and to spare men the evils of war. We know, as all the world knows, what the international situation would be if the plans of the Zionist enemy and its allies were to succeed in diminishing the role of the United Nations, as happened in the past with the League of Nations. We wish the world to guard against such a conspiracy and to remind you that the day that this Organization becomes incapable of preserving peace the spectre of the cold war will again haunt our planet.

Despite all our bitterness, we declare that we do not despair of success in our efforts at this level and in this context to achieve a just solution capable of ensuring lasting peace in the Middle East. We also wish to state that we shall seriously pursue all political efforts likely to solve our problem peacefully, provided that our national aspirations, which this Organization has already supported, are met.

But our position and our unremitting efforts, just like those of the United Nations, have unfortunately not prevented some, acting on their own behalf, from bypassing this Organization, paying little heed to its resolutions and attempting to impose solutions that have been rejected by the

Palestinian people, the peoples of the Arab nation and all our friends because they do not grant us even the minimum rights to which we are entitled.

This Assembly a few days ago adopted an important resolution<sup>152</sup> concerning the Middle East crisis wherein it condemned the Zionist position in respect of the establishment of settlements and Israel's criminal attempt to pillage Arab land again and to Israelize Palestinian territory on the West Bank of the Jordan. The General Assembly in that resolution requested the early convening of the Geneva Conference with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The report of the Committee<sup>153</sup> cites proof of Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories; it cites proof of the brutality of the Zionist occupation, which practices annexation, tortures detainees, establishes settlements, dynamites homes, expels the population and changes the demographic nature of the occupied territories in order better to entrench Israeli domination. Before the adoption of the resolution there had already been talks, contacts and intensive efforts to break the deadlock in order to arrive at a just settlement. The Soviet-American communiqué<sup>154</sup> of 21 October 1977 was an important turning point in those political endeavours; we fully appreciated them and have noted their positive aspects.

Unfortunately, very soon the American side, under Zionist pressure, retracted from the position it had taken in the Committee. They have in fact given in to Zionist pressure thus bringing the situation back to its starting point and creating a climate of pessimism in the international community, something that has had repercussions on the general situation in the area.

Instead of seeing resistance to the Zionist position supported by the United States of America and a consolidation of the positive international position aimed at finding an honourable settlement to ensure peace and security, we were taken unawares, as everyone was, by the dramatic step taken by the President of Egypt on 19 November 1977 when he visited occupied Jerusalem. To say

<sup>152</sup> Doc. 24 below.

<sup>153</sup> Doc. 8 above.

<sup>154</sup> Doc. 160 below.

nothing of the feelings of bitterness and sorrow of the Arab people, the Arab nation and all our friends throughout the world, in connexion with that visit we adopted an objective position which led us to condemn it and to rise against it, and this for a series of reasons which we could list as follows: first of all, the decision of the President of Egypt, as he himself recognized, was taken without consulting the Arab leaders, including the leaders of the front-line forces in the Israeli/Arab conflict as well as his partners in the October War in Syria and the PLO. Everyone knows that the decision was so serious and important for the fate of the Arab nation that it would have required consultation and prior agreement. Moreover, that measure sets him apart from the Arab community and is a challenge to the decisions taken at the Arab summit meetings held at Algiers,<sup>155</sup> Rabat<sup>156</sup> and Cairo.<sup>157</sup>

Secondly, the visit implied recognition of Israel whereas the Arab nation has refused to recognize Israel because it does not recognize Arab sovereignty and violates Arab soil including the land and the rights of the Palestinian people.

Thirdly, this measure is even more serious since the President of Egypt addressed the Israeli Knesset, thus implying that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, something that the United Nations has refused to recognize. Even the United States of America refused to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel although it is the chief ally of the Zionists.

Fourthly, the Arab split we are witnessing today as a result of that visit, something that was to be expected, will hamper rather than assist the early convening of the Geneva Conference because the major parties involved in the existing conflict have refused to take part in the measure advocated by the President of Egypt. They have not supported it and see it as a departure from the course that might lead to the resumption of that Geneva Conference.

Fifthly, the negative aspects of that visit are compounded by the fact that it was carried out in very bad, complex conditions at a time when Israel persists more than ever in refusing to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian

people although those rights were recognized and affirmed by this Assembly. Thus, Israel refuses any participation by the PLO in any political effort that is made in order to arrive at a just solution. That is a violation of one of the most elementary rights of the peoples of the world, namely, the right to choose who should represent them or to speak on their behalf. This is in fact a violation of an Arab resolution adopted unanimously in Rabat whereby it is declared that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In fact, this is an act of defiance of the international community which recognized that truth.

That visit took place at a time when a group of fanatics and extremists have assumed power in the Zionist entity. They are headed by the terrorist Menachem Begin, the hero of the Deir Yassin massacres, who calls the occupied Arab territories "liberated territories", as well as Moshe Dayan who would wish to integrate the Palestinians in those places where they have sought refuge, not to speak of Wiseman [sic], who insolently declares that he can inflict a military defeat on all the Arab armies which would paralyse them for 10 years, and Ariel Sharon who takes measures to establish more settlements in our occupied lands in order to bring in millions of Jews.

Those are the reasons why we have condemned that visit and why we have rejected the arguments adduced to justify it. That visit was accompanied by a wide press campaign orchestrated by the Zionists in order to make it appear as something of great importance for peace. We must, however, examine all its consequences and see whether those consequences are as they have been described or whether it is not the opposite that is true.

First of all, the Arab split has become greater as a result of the visit and that could lead to a polarization of the Arab nation as a whole which would be divided into two camps. We do not believe, no one can believe, that such a serious situation would in any way help to consolidate peace efforts. Quite the opposite, such a situation is fraught with dangers of new explosions, all the more so since, as a result of that visit, extremism is taking over from the moderation, reason and wisdom which prevailed before the visit.

No one can foresee what the consequences of these extreme positions might be. Secondly, the Egyptian President's visit has freed the United

<sup>155</sup> Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>156</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*, and Appendix A below.

<sup>157</sup> Doc. 312 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

States of America from its responsibility as regards the pressure exerted on Israel to renounce its position of obstinacy and defiance, a position that Israel continues to maintain in respect of the two most important aspects of the settlement of the problem, that is, total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the guarantee of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

Thirdly, as a result of this visit we see looming on the horizon possibilities of bilateral solutions. That is the aim pursued at all times by Israel in order to weaken the Arab position and to prevent the attainment of a complete and definitive solution which would put an end to its well-known expansionist strategy and its continued establishment of settlements. It is obvious that such bilateral solutions would only serve to keep tension alive in our region, something that would continue to threaten the cause of peace. Fourthly, the invitation addressed by the Egyptian Government to the parties involved in the conflict to convene a preparatory meeting which might be a prelude to the Geneva Conference—an invitation which has been rejected by the Syrian Arab Republic and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—clearly shows that this is a sterile approach that will in no way offer further impetus to peace efforts, the more so since Israel, through its Government and Foreign Minister, declared that it refused to negotiate with the PLO, whereas it was obvious to Israel that the PLO would refuse to attend that meeting.

Our people in the occupied Arab territories has expressed its will and determination to remain faithful to its leaders, as can be seen from the memorandum and petitions addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations wherein it is stated that our people will never accept anyone but the PLO to represent it and lead it.

Fifthly, the Soviet Union, a Co-Chairman of the Conference, criticized these moves in their entirety and reaffirmed its consistent position, namely, that the Soviet Union will not participate in the Geneva Conference unless the PLO participates as well and unless the Palestinian question is considered in such a manner as to guarantee the rights of our people.

We are today at the threshold of a new and dangerous stage where the possibilities for war in the Middle East region have been multiplied and where the vicious circle of contradictions has

become wider, threatening international peace and security.

The PLO—and with it all the Arab Palestinian people—despite its pessimistic view of the events of these last few days, remains convinced that it is necessary to pursue still the strategy it adopted some years ago, namely, that it should continue its armed political struggle until we achieve our legitimate objectives, as recognized by this Assembly. The PLO firmly rejects any plot designed in any way to distort the will of our people through desperate efforts to produce other leaders to replace the present ones. We shall fight against any attempt to whittle down and even sweep away our rights. We stand by all our rights—to self-determination, to return to our lands and to establish a Palestinian State enjoying full independence with no strings attached.

If the Zionist entity succeeds in making its existence and its policy of expansion and domination the first item on the list of priorities established in the Zionist movement, thanks to the influence it wields through financial pressure and pressure on the information media, there is nothing to prevent us, for our part, from making the question of Palestine, the liberation of our land and the creation of our independent State the first item on the list of priorities for our Arab nation, which also has strategic petroleum and financial resources that could well tilt the balance of power in favour of our cause, the cause of law, justice and peace.

Our people has struggled for almost half a century to be able to exercise the most elementary rights of peoples, and for that it has made enormous sacrifices; hundreds of thousands of martyrs have died, and the peoples of the Arab nation, and especially the great Egyptian people, have always assisted and supported us in our struggle. Hence I must recall here all the sacrifices of our nation, all the martyrs who have died in their thousands on the field of honour to defend our fate, our right to existence and our national objectives. Our people is fully aware also of the sacrifices made by the peoples of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic during the prolonged struggle that has lasted over 30 years.

While at this time we find ourselves at cross purposes with the Government of Egypt, we are fully aware that the Zionist enemy, because of his mental make-up, his obstinacy, his extremism and his rejection of the constituent elements for

attaining a just and vital settlement, bids fair to bring back our unity and to solidify the Arab position. Because peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a just settlement of the Palestinian problem, that solution will come only if it is imposed by force on the Zionist enemy. And the force capable of achieving that aim is to be found only in the unity of the Arab position and the solidarity of the peoples of the world with that position.

Four years ago we came here bringing in one hand a gun and in the other an olive branch.

At each session we have been putting forward through you, Mr. President, political initiatives designed to solve our problem and remove the spectre of war from the Middle East region within the context of the United Nations Charter and the General Assembly resolutions. Each time we have received strong support, until finally Israel has been left in isolation; its true face has been unmasked and in this Organization it meets only condemnation and denunciation.

Here, with all modesty but firmly, we declare yet again that however circumstances may change, and whatever criteria are chosen, no one can impose upon our people a solution that it rejects.

We do not stand alone. It is enough to look at the map of the Arab world or even of the world as a whole, to see how many countries support us, how many support the struggle of our people and our just cause.

We are acting not in the context of our Palestinian responsibilities alone, to defend our existence and our rights, but also in the context of Arab responsibilities, to defend the Arab world and the Arab destiny. We are also moved by our sincere desire to defend the cause of peace which we so deeply revere.

However, there is a great difference between peace and surrender. There is even a fundamental contradiction between the two concepts. We have spared no effort to defend peace. Our tenacious defence of peace will only be exceeded by our refusal, at whatever cost and whatever sacrifice, to surrender.

Our people, which for exactly 30 years have been robbed of their territory, driven from their homeland and shorn of their identity and of their human and national rights, our people, who refuse to live as refugees and displaced persons, who fight for freedom and the creation of an

independent State, express their gratitude to this Assembly and hope that the Assembly will achieve success in its untiring efforts in the service of right, justice and peace.

### 13

#### **General Assembly, 85th meeting; statement by Mr. Chen of China<sup>158</sup>**

**November 29, 1977**

MR. CHEN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): While the question of Palestine is being considered at the plenary meeting of the current session of the General Assembly, I would like, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to extend first of all our high tribute to the Palestinian people who are engaged in heroic struggles.

The Palestinian people are a great and dauntless people with an anti-imperialist revolutionary tradition. Since they fired the first shot in their armed struggle against Israeli-Zionist aggression and expansion on 1 January 1965, the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), persevering in unity and struggle, defying brute force and advancing wave upon wave, have withstood severe tempering and tests and are constantly pressing forward in the midst of struggles. The just struggle of the Palestinian people is closely bound up with the cause of liberation of the entire Arab people and the struggle of the people of the third world against imperialism and hegemonism. The Palestinian liberation movement has become an important revolutionary force in the struggle of the people of the Middle East and the whole third world to combat imperialism and hegemonism and to win or safeguard national independence. The Palestinian people have won ever more extensive international recognition and support for their national rights.

The question of Palestine is an important integral part of the whole Middle East question. We have always held that, intricate and complex as it is, the Middle East question is, in essence, the aggression and expansion by Israeli Zionism and the rivalry between the two super-Powers for

<sup>158</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.85, pp. 26-32



hegemony in the Middle East versus the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab people against aggression and hegemonism. At the same time, the Palestinian people's struggle to regain their national rights is closely linked with the struggle of the people of Arab countries to recover their lost territories, and they support each other. It is their unity and struggle that have promoted the further development of the Middle East situation in a direction favourable to the Palestinian and Arab people and unfavourable to zionism and hegemonism.

However, the present situation in the Middle East remains tense and turbulent and is pregnant with potential new military conflicts. Since the Likud group came to power last May, Israel has become more rampant in its arrogance for aggression and expansion. It has repeatedly clamoured that the occupied Arab territories are "liberated Israeli lands", flagrantly applied Israeli laws and regulations to the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip, established a large number of Jewish "settlements" in the occupied territories, and stepped up its counter-revolutionary atrocities. At this very podium, the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan even declared not long ago that:

The heart of the problem is the Arab refusal to recognize the right of Israel to national sovereignty in the ancient, historical land of the Jewish people. (*A/32/PV. 27. p. 87*)

This is downright gangster's logic and the height of arbitrariness and truculence. To date, the Israeli Zionists are still occupying large tracts of Arab territories and refusing to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people. Their intransigence and criminal acts have aroused strong opposition and indignant condemnation by the Palestinian and other Arab people and the people of the rest of the world.

Pursuing the militaristic policy of aggression over a long period, Israel is facing seething discontent among the people and beset with troubles both at home and abroad. Under these circumstances, the handful of Israeli Zionists dare to run amuck and do all kinds of evil, persistently making themselves the enemy of the one hundred million and more Arab people, primarily because they have the backing of the super-Powers. Motivated by their respective global strategy of seeking world hegemony, both super-Powers want to control

the Middle East. Hence each of them is supporting and abetting the Israeli Zionists from different angles and by various means, while at the same time using different methods to exert pressure on the Arab States and the Palestinian people. Over the years, one super-Power has kept on giving blood transfusions to Israel economically and militarily, supporting, abetting and shielding Israel in various ways. It has repeatedly asserted its "commitment to the security of Israel", subjecting the Palestinian and Arab people to open intimidation and threats. The other super-Power, which styles itself the "natural ally" of the Arab and Palestinian people, ostentatiously "condemning" as it does Israeli Zionist aggression, has been colluding with Israeli zionism in many ways, overtly and covertly. In the name of "friendship" and "support", it is carrying out control and expansion. It uses the supply of military "aid" as a means to ask for military bases and privileges from the Arab States, to interfere crudely in others' internal affairs and to subvert their Governments. Changing tactics frequently, it deliberately creates disputes and even spares no effort to provoke conflicts in order to profit therefrom. Recently, it has been very active in exploiting the temporary differences among the Palestinians and the Arabs and has done its utmost to sow dissension among them and disrupt their unity in an attempt to fish in muddied waters, using the Palestinian people's cause as a bargaining chip in making dirty deals with the other super-Power in its rivalry over the Middle East. At present, each of the two super-Powers is trying to outdo the other in clamouring for "a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East question." This is in fact one of the tactics they employ in their intensified rivalry. In their hearts, neither of them wants a genuine settlement of the Middle East question. They fear the emergence of a strong united Arab world and a stable, prosperous Middle East. What really interests them is the maintenance of a turbulent situation of "no war, no peace" under the smoke-screen of a "comprehensive settlement" in order to facilitate their rivalry, in which each of them hopes to weaken the other, thereby placing the Middle East under its own control. And all this is predicated upon the sacrifice of the fundamental interests of the Palestinian and Arab people.

As the Chinese saying goes, "a wicked person is bound to bring destruction to himself." The

perverse acts of the super-Powers have educated the Arab and Palestinian people by negative example, enabling them to realize ever more clearly that super-Power rivalry is the root cause of the prolonged failure in achieving a settlement of the Middle East and Palestinian questions. Hence they are further combining the struggle against Israeli zionism with that against super-Power hegemonism.

Following the Egyptian Government's decision<sup>159</sup> last year to abrogate its "Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation" with a super-Power and the Sudanese Government's expulsion of the military "experts" of this super-Power last May, the Government of Somalia has recently taken the bold action of abrogating the "Treaty of Friendship" with that super-Power, expelling all its "experts" and ordering the immediate removal of all its military installations in Somalia. These just and determined actions have dealt powerful blows at this super-Power's wild ambition to control the Red Sea area and dominate the Middle East. They also manifest the Arab people's strong determination to further get rid of super-Power control and take their destiny into their own hands.

The United Nations has been discussing the questions of Palestine and the Middle East for three decades. Over a long period, as a result of manipulation and obstruction by the super-Powers, many United Nations resolutions, including the well-known Security Council resolution 242 (1967), described the question of regaining the national rights of the Palestinian people as a so-called "question of refugees". The Chinese delegation has always been firmly opposed to such a position which is biased towards the Israeli aggressors and most unfair to the Palestinian and Arab people. Although the General Assembly adopted resolutions at its twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions, recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian people, these resolutions have thus far remained unimplemented as a result of the wilful resistance of Israeli Zionism and the support and abetment given it by the super-Powers. The Palestinian people's struggle to regain their national rights is inseparable from the Arab countries' struggle to recover all their lost territories. The final solution of these two questions can only rely on the persistent unity and struggle of the Palestinian and Arab

people with the support and assistance of the people of various countries. At present, the super-Powers are deliberately sowing discord and causing contradictions in an attempt to demoralize the just struggle of the Palestinian and Arab people and undermine the unity among the Arab countries. In these circumstances, it is even more important for the Arab and Palestinian people to increase their vigilance, take to heart their over-all interests and eliminate their differences for unity against the enemy. We believe that the Palestinian and other Arab people will further do away with super-Power meddling and interference for the general objective of combating Israeli zionism and super-Power hegemonism and continue to strengthen and consolidate their own unity and carry through to the end the struggle for the recovery of the lost territories and the restoration of national rights. In the final analysis, it is the Palestinian and all other Arab people, and not the one or two super-Powers, that will decide the destiny of the Middle East. All the super-Powers' conspiracies aimed at creating internal differences among the Palestinians and Arabs, undermining the Arab unity, sacrificing the fundamental interests of the Palestinian and Arab people, and nullifying and emasculating the national rights of the Palestinian people are doomed to failure.

The Chinese Government and people have always stood unwaveringly on the side of the Palestinian and Arab people, and we firmly support their just struggle against Israeli zionism and super-Power hegemonism and for the recovery of the lost territories and the restoration of national rights. We strongly condemn Israel's crimes of aggression and the super-Powers' rivalry in the Middle East. We firmly maintain that Israel must withdraw from all its occupied Arab territories and that the Palestinian people must regain their sacred and inalienable national rights. The struggles of the Palestinian and Arab people are just and have won the profound sympathy and powerful support of all the countries and people that uphold justice. Although their struggles remain complex, protracted and tortuous and there will be difficulties of one kind or another on their road of advance, victory finally belongs to the great Palestinian and Arab people who persist in unity, uphold principles, dare to struggle and are good at waging struggles. This is certain and unquestionable.

<sup>159</sup> Doc. 216 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

## 14

**General Assembly, 86th meeting; statement by Mr. George of India<sup>160</sup>****November 30, 1977**

MR. GEORGE (India): India is a member of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the report of that Committee<sup>161</sup> is now before the General Assembly. We should like to make it clear that the report of the Committee is tentative, since it is really for the Security Council and the General Assembly to adopt appropriate measures for resolving the question of Palestine.

I would also draw attention to the fact that the report has been formulated by the Committee with scrupulous regard for the limited mandate given to it by the General Assembly. The Committee has taken into account, as it was bound to do, all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, especially Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The Committee's recommendations are proof of its pragmatic approach to resolving a complex problem, which has been complicated by repeated applications of force.

It is our view that the Committee's report is only a first step in the direction of a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. The Committee could have done no more than indicate the first step, because the second, third and succeeding steps would have to depend upon the action to be taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is in this sense that we expect the Security Council to examine the report of the Committee with reference to the Council's resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), as well as the underlying question of the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and how and when and where those rights should be exercised.

The views expressed so far in the Security Council are not complete, because the Council has deferred the question for further consideration to a later date. However, the actual debate in the Security Council until now has indicated majority support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

But, the rules of procedure of the Security Council are such that majority views have no particular sanctity unless they have the concurrence of the permanent members.

I do not propose to dwell on the tragic history of Palestine. I should, however, explain that historically the struggle for the independence of Palestine from British rule was a part of the worldwide movement, which included the Indian national movement for independence. Palestine had been placed under British administration according to a Mandate of the League of Nations. The final disposal of the Mandated Territory of Palestine was brought before the United Nations by the former colonial Power. The consequences of the partition of Palestine by the United Nations still remain with us and are at the root of the conflict in the Middle East. No peace settlement will therefore be viable unless it includes a just solution of the question of Palestine.

A famous authority on international law, Hans Kelsen, said the following on the question of Palestine:

At the moment when the Government of the United Kingdom withdrew from Palestine, that territory was in a legal situation of statelessness until the new State of Israel was established and recognized by other States. But that part of Palestine, which is not under the control of Israel legally, will remain a stateless territory until a recognized government is established there.

The first step in the solution of the Palestine question is therefore the withdrawal of Israel from areas occupied by it during the conflict of 1967. It is only thereafter that the Palestinian Arab people can freely exercise their national rights. The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and their right to a nation-State of their own, should be recognized by the Security Council. It goes without saying that it is essential that the Palestine Liberation Organization should be invited to participate in any negotiations for a peace settlement in terms of resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

The two draft resolutions before the General Assembly have our support. The Committee on the question of Palestine should clearly continue to function, because the problem is nowhere near solution. A special unit within the Secretariat is evidently necessary because the Committee does

<sup>160</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.86, pp. 2-4

<sup>161</sup> Doc. 4 above.

not at present have a proper staff allocated to it. Having regard to the political nature of the question and the fact that it is also before the Security Council, the Secretary-General will no doubt establish the special unit in the appropriate department of the Secretariat.

## 15

**General Assembly, 87th meeting; statements by Mr. Florin of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Papoulias of Greece and Mr. Poisson of Niger<sup>162</sup>**

November 30, 1977

MR. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from Russian): A few days ago at its thirty-second session the General Assembly of the United Nations, at the end of the debate on the Middle East, adopted by 102 votes—which is to say by the overwhelming majority of the membership—a resolution which says:

... that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region can live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, cannot be achieved without Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights; (*General Assembly resolution 32/20*)<sup>163</sup>

The resolution further calls "for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East... with the participation on an equal footing... of the Palestine Liberation Organization."

The General Assembly has thus once again laid down the basic principles for a resolution of the key issues involved in a just and lasting political settlement of the Middle East conflict. Today, the plenary Assembly is holding a special debate on one of the key issues in the conflict, the question of Palestine. Once again the General Assembly is called upon to concern itself with this question because the ruling circles of Israel continue to this day stubbornly to refuse to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

It must be noted that there is no sign of any readiness on the part of Israel to correct its negative attitude towards the just demands of the Arab people of Palestine the satisfaction of which is, however, pertinent to the establishment of peace in the Middle East. This is indicated, among other things, by Israel's vote against resolution 32/20 which was aimed at ending the continuing Israeli aggression and which clearly outlines the requirements for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Furthermore, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations thought fit to circulate in writing an appeal for Member States to vote against the adoption by the Assembly at its thirty-second session of the resolution on the Middle East. It is asserted that it would be a bad idea to prejudge the results of the Geneva Peace Conference and that, accordingly, everything is negotiable. The question arises whether the intention here is to call in question Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as a whole.

For example, that resolution contains a statement of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, a demand for an end to the aggression against Arab territories that has continued since 1967, and a statement of the right of all States of the region to peaceful coexistence.

In the view of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, these are unquestionably principles that cannot be the subject of negotiations. The flaw in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is the improper statement it makes in regard to the Arab people of Palestine, a matter which needs to be corrected. The whole world now recognizes that the question of Palestine is not merely a question of refugees, which is, however, stated in resolution 242 (1967). Even statements by Israel's allies now reflect an understanding of the fact that in the final analysis there can be no lasting peace settlement in the Middle East without recognition of the lawful rights of the Palestinian people.

Statements by representatives of various States at meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly—though I am referring particularly to the meetings of the Security Council at which the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People<sup>164</sup> was considered—reaffirm this fact.

<sup>162</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.87, pp. 22–32, 37–40, 62–68

<sup>163</sup> Doc. 24 below.

<sup>164</sup> Doc. 4 above.

The right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the creation of its own independent State, is inalienable, and no one can dispute it. There is no logic in Israel's refusal to recognize that the Palestinian people has that right—a right to which Israel itself lays claim. In the final analysis, it is not a question of the creation of any homeland for the Palestinian people but of the creation for that long suffering people of its own independent State.

The Arab people of Palestine has the right to peace and justice. The policies of Israel's ruling circles are obviously still determined by the wish to continue the aggression against their Arab neighbours, to annex the territory of other States and to flout the rights of a whole people, the Palestinian people. When the Deputy from Israel's communist party drew the attention of the Israeli Prime Minister to this fact, he received a characteristic reply: "The Hebrew language knows no Palestinian people, only a people of Israel". Thus in the plenary General Assembly we now have the task of emphasizing the importance of the exercise of the right of the Palestinian people to implementation of the United Nations Charter and the attainment of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, and we therefore welcome and greatly appreciate the statement made by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the permanent representative of Senegal, and I should like to express to him our appreciation and gratitude for his tireless activity in that office.

The German Democratic Republic, a member of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, has always unequivocally come out and will continue to come out in favour of the exercise of the lawful rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to create its own independent State. No one who wants a genuine peace settlement in the Middle East can evade this important question.

The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole lawful representative of the Palestinian people. The United Nations General Assembly too has unconditionally recognized this fact. The Palestine Liberation Organization is today a respected and universally recognized factor in international relations. The number of States that recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization exceeds the

number that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.

The German Democratic Republic pays a tribute to the heroic struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization for the exercise of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people and is giving it active support and solidarity. It is self-evident to my Government that the Palestine Liberation Organization has the right to participate on an equal footing in the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. It is inadmissible that negotiations should be conducted on a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict without the participation of its representatives. The Palestine Liberation Organization rightly rejects manoeuvres aimed at excluding the key questions for genuine peace negotiations. In the final analysis, such attempts can only complicate the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for peace in the region, as was convincingly argued by the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization in his statement on this agenda item to the Assembly.

The Palestine Liberation Organization is waging a difficult and self-sacrificing struggle for the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine and thus for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Acts directed against the Palestinian people which sow discord and are aimed at weakening the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization militate against such a peace.

The experience of the struggle against racism and colonialism has shown that actions aimed at so-called solutions through by-passing or excluding national liberation movements are in the final analysis doomed to failure. If one considers some of the recent events in the Middle East, such as the notorious abuse of the veto right in the Security Council, Israel's rejection of the resolution put before the thirty-second session of the General Assembly and the statement by the Israeli Prime Minister to the effect that he allegedly knows of no Palestinian people, the existence of a serious danger is obvious.

The world Organization is duty bound to support the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization and to help bring about the exercise of the inalienable rights of this long-suffering people. My delegation considers that the United Nations must make a greater effort to

explain the role of the Palestine question in a resolution of the Middle East conflict. We therefore support the proposal to establish an appropriate unit in the United Nations Secretariat. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People must continue its work.

We should like to express our confidence that the results of this debate will represent a contribution to the cause of supporting the Palestinian people and its representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the arduous struggle for the exercise of their inalienable national rights.

In a statement recently handed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has once again reaffirmed that it is striving tirelessly to extend the process of détente to all regions of the world. This also determines the position of the German Democratic Republic regarding a lasting peace settlement of the Middle East conflict.

In this connexion, the Central Committee of the Socialist United Party of Germany, the leading party in the German Democratic Republic, noted at its recent Seventh Plenum:

The conflict remains unresolved and threatens the international situation inasmuch as its principal causes have not been removed. Israeli troops continue to occupy large areas of Arab territory and to flout the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Politburo reaffirms the viewpoint of the German Democratic Republic: namely, that the key to a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict is the full withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967; the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to create a national State; recognition of the right of all States of the region to independent existence and security. The competent organ for considering and resolving these questions is the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. We support the position of the Soviet Union and its initiatives aimed at continuing the path toward the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. The German Democratic Republic supports the demand of the sole lawful representative of the Arab people of Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, to take part on an equal footing in that Conference.

MR. PAPOULIAS (Greece): My delegation has had the opportunity to state its position on the Palestinian problem during the discussion of the

situation in the Middle East. What we said then is valid also in the case of the present agenda item. I am intervening today to repeat that for us the Palestinian problem continues to lie at the heart of the Middle East crisis. It is inextricably linked to a crisis that endangers international peace and security. It would indeed be futile and in fact perilous to try to ignore that basic truth.

It follows that the solution of the question of Palestine can be found only on the basis of the fundamental principles of the Charter and in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Such a solution should entail withdrawal by Israel from all the Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and the recognition and realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and to a national homeland. It entails also the return of the Palestinians to their homes and properties from which they have been uprooted, in accordance with resolution 3236 (XXIX) which my delegation supported.

I need hardly repeat that a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem and of the problem of the Middle East cannot be achieved without the participation of all the parties concerned—which also means the representatives of the Palestinian people. In this respect, I recall that Greece voted in favour of resolutions 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX), as well as resolution 32/20,<sup>165</sup> which was adopted by the Assembly on 25 November 1977 and called for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Relevant to this debate also is the consensus statement<sup>166</sup> made on behalf of the Security Council by its President on 11 November 1976, whereby the Council strongly deplored any measures that alter the demographic composition or the geographical nature of the occupied Arab territories and particularly the establishment of settlements by Israel.

My delegation voted in favour of resolution

<sup>165</sup> Doc. 24 below.

<sup>166</sup> Doc. 14 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*

32/5<sup>167</sup>, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly during the present session.

The Greek delegation, like many other delegations, believes that a just and lasting settlement of the problem of Palestine and of the Middle East is urgently needed and should be sought through negotiations, notably by the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference at the earliest possible date, with a view to achieving a comprehensive solution on the basis of the principles of the Charter and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

MR. POISSON (Niger) (interpretation from French): The question of Palestine, which has been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly since 1947, has never ceased to be an object of concern for the international community. The delegation of Niger wishes to associate itself with those who speak out each year, deploring the tragedy of the Palestinian people.

Who can imagine, without shuddering at the thought, 3 million human beings, shorn of all that they hold most dear, compelled to live in hiding and under threat of death on the very borders of what was and, in spite everything, still is their homeland? Nevertheless that is the situation, however intolerable it may seem in the twentieth century, in which the Palestinian people, whose only fault was to claim its right to peaceful existence on its own territory and homeland, has been living for three decades. That right, recognized by the United Nations in General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, has been reaffirmed almost every year since the adoption of that resolution, as we are told in the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (A/32/35) which has added that that right was also recognized unanimously by the Security Council in its resolution 237 (1967).

Many are the efforts that have been made by the international community in this field: from 1947 to 1975, the report submitted by the same Committee to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly (A/31/35)<sup>168</sup> reveals no fewer than 188 resolutions, each dealing directly or indirectly with various aspects of this question, were adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

In addition, the establishment of that Committee reflected the will of the United Nations to shed light on the question of Palestine to facilitate the implementation of decisions adopted in this field. That laudable initiative has led today to serious and comprehensive consideration of this question, resulting from numerous contacts and investigations carried out by the Committee since its inception. We wish to pay a tribute to its members for agreeing to devote their time and energy to one of the most burning issues of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Given the extent of those efforts, we feel frustrated and, above all, astounded at the meagre progress achieved in the effective implementation of the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes in Palestine. Our astonishment is the greater because the recommendations of the Committee aimed at facilitating the exercise of national Palestinian rights were adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. Those recommendations stressed in particular the leading role taken by the Security Council on the subject and emphasized the need for that body to

...take appropriate action to facilitate the exercise by the Palestinians of their right to return to their homes, lands and property. (A/31/35, para. 64)

That is why we find it incongruous and intolerable that the Security Council, with all its prerogatives, should be unable to meet the hopes placed in it because of the unjustifiable refusal of one or more of its members to go along with its decisions on the subject.

A similar attitude had already been recorded in 1976, according to the report, during the Security Council's consideration of the item entitled "Question of the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People". In fact, two draft resolutions aimed respectively at granting the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) the right to participate in its debates and to affirm

...the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, (Ibid., p. 20)

could not be adopted because of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Council. We find that negative attitude unacceptable from

<sup>167</sup> Doc. 22 below.

<sup>168</sup> Doc. 4 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

every point of view. The disparity between what the Assembly works out and agrees upon and the pettiness of the Security Council should be resolved quickly, to enable the frustrated Palestinian people to return to their homelands.

We are perplexed by recent events in the Middle East. Whether it is a question of optimism or of pessimism, nothing leads us to incline towards one or the other. Nevertheless, the Palestinian cause must be kept alive and support must be given to that people, which will emerge successful and matured by the useless contest between ardent supporters of their cause.

There has been no dearth of initiatives. In the letters<sup>169</sup> addressed on 18 April last to the permanent representatives of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, by the Chairman of the Committee encouraging positions are reflected by leading political figures in those countries. Thus most of the statements recognize the need to implement Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, on the one hand, and to grant the status of equal partner to the Palestinian people in any negotiations, on the other. Let me add that President Jimmy Carter, whose country until now has been the most reticent in the Palestinian cause stated at Clinton on 16 March 1977 that

"... a homeland should be found for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for so many years".<sup>170</sup>

At long last, justice for the Palestinians begins.

Those prospects, however encouraging they may appear to be, should not allow us to lose sight of the fact that the success of the final United Nations action hinges essentially on Israel, whose intransigent attitude in the name of security, which has obviously become a cover, undermines the efforts of the international community while it obstinately refuses to admit to the Middle East anything other than a reign of force and violence. We have always condemned that attitude, because it is not inspired by the noble ideals of peace and justice enshrined in the United Nations Charter whose terms Israel, having been accepted as a Member, if it is consistent, should respect, as it

should respect both the terms and the decisions resulting therefrom. Instead of that, Israel persists in its refusal to recognize the right of the Palestinians as a sovereign and free nation to exercise the attributes of that sovereignty, namely, the right to a territory and to be able to build its own institutions thereon.

We believe that this sterile attitude that is dangerous for the very survival of the Zionist State itself will inevitably evolve one way or another. We are convinced that Israel cannot forever defy the Arab nation and the international community without running the risk of one day being defeated by its own blind obstinacy.

It is high time for it to side with right and reason by agreeing to recognize that the Palestinians have the same rights it arrogated to itself about 30 years ago when it proclaimed a Jewish State in Palestine. It is only by safeguarding the interests of all the parties involved in the conflict, without exception, that a just and lasting peace will be established in the Middle East.

That need, which has been recognized by the international community, should guide Israel which, more than any other State, is indebted to the United Nations, one of whose resolutions consecrated the existence of Israel in 1947. Is it not paradoxical today that this creature of the United Nations denies this worthy Organization any decision-making power, flouting its principles and violating its Charter? By trampling under foot the relevant resolutions of the United Nations is not the Hebrew State itself sowing doubt in the minds of all as to the irreversible nature of its creation and its existence as an independent State?

It is not in the interest of Israel to undermine the United Nations. That is why more than ever it is necessary for it to review its position and to go along with world opinion, because whatever its strength may be, it cannot guarantee what cannot be defended—in other words, the occupation by force of Arab lands, the spoliation of national Palestinian rights, and the annexation for its own benefit of Jerusalem, that meeting-place of the three greatest monotheistic religions of the world today.

The Zionist State appears not to have understood this truth. In fact, while proclaiming its desire to conclude peace agreements with the Arabs, it pursues its odious practices in the occupied territories, thus flouting, as is its habit, all the inter-

<sup>169</sup> See doc 4 above.

<sup>170</sup> See doc. 73 below.



national community's appeals to reason and moderation.

The Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People reported on the question of Palestine and on the profound concern of that body at the decision of the Israeli Government to approve the establishment of three settlements in Kaddum, Afra and Maala.

That disapprobation did not move Israel too much, since a dispatch from the *Agence France Presse* of 28 November 1977 tells us that two groups of Jews called the Gush Emunim groups, composed of 25 families, will shortly be installed in the military camps on the West Bank in accordance with the programme adopted several weeks ago by Prime Minister Begin. The same news dispatch, quoting a responsible Israeli figure, states that no change will affect the programme of Jewish settlements on the West Bank and that negotiations for new settlements will be arranged.

This deliberate change in the demographic structure of the occupied territories by the Judaization of Palestinian areas is incompatible with the desire proclaimed by Israel to arrive at an overall peace in the region. It is flagrant proof that the Zionist State continues to ignore Palestinian interests the respect for which, as it knows, is the key to any solution of the Middle East conflict.

Niger, faithful to its policy of bringing peoples together, sincerely hopes that the Arab countries will overcome the factors of internal division and will recover the unity of their blood brotherhood and of their legitimate pride in their three decades of heroic struggle side by side with the martyred Palestinian people.

This determination to fight for freedom and independence has won for the Arab peoples the respect of the world and in particular of Africa whose States and peoples have given their unreserved support to the Palestinian cause.

The attitude of the African countries reflects a sincere and true solidarity the product of the destiny we share and of which Africans, Arabs and Asians became fully aware after Bandung. This will to co-operate, which was born 22 years ago, has since been affirmed at the political and at the economic level.

Niger, for its part, is gratified at this Arab-African co-operation which has engendered a climate of mutual confidence and esteem and has

helped promote mutual assistance between African and Arab States.

The results of that co-operation, however negligible they may appear to be to the sceptic and the unfeeling, today more than ever militate in favour of tolerance and joint action. The miles that still lie ahead along the path leading to the total liberation of our peoples from all forms of domination demand that we close our ranks notwithstanding temporary misunderstandings.

We trust that the rays of hope we see on the horizon are not signs of a useless conflagration but, rather, the prelude to a just and lasting peace in the region.

## 16

### **General Assembly, 88th meeting; statement by Mr. Herzog of Israel<sup>171</sup>**

**December 1, 1977**

MR. HERZOG (Israel): The Middle East stands today at one of the most crucial turning-points in its modern history. After four wars and incalculable suffering, we stand, for the first time, on the eve of serious negotiations aimed at resolving the issues that divide us and replacing the decades of bloodshed and destruction with a new era of peace. The bold and imaginative moves of the last two weeks have rendered obsolete the rhetoric and warmongering of the past and have borne witness to the profound desire of common people in the region for an end to war.

But while the momentum for peace is being maintained in the Middle East itself, this Assembly continues in a world of its own. While preparations proceed apace for a constructive dialogue in Cairo in the near future, this body continues to rehash old formulas that do not mention negotiations but advocate instead an imposed solution in total disregard of the legitimate interests of one of the parties to the conflict. And while serious efforts are being made in Cairo, Jerusalem and elsewhere to remove the obstacles to a Geneva Peace Conference, this Assembly will vote, for the second time in two weeks, on a draft resolution which deliberately avoids reference to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), on the

<sup>171</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.88, pp. 7-15.

basis of which the Geneva Conference was convened.

Indeed, while hard decisions are being taken in the capitals of the Middle East, this body is once again considering a draft resolution which ignores the events of the past fortnight as though they never were. A challenge has been offered in Jerusalem and Cairo. The time has come for the United Nations to rise to that challenge, to respond to the initiatives taken and to affirm its commitment to peace and co-operation. If it fails to do so, and chooses instead to cling to the worn-out clichés of the past, this Organization will condemn itself to the fate of its predecessor which, 40 years ago, at another turning-point in history, failed to respond to an impassioned African plea against war and fascism.

That fateful day, on 30 June 1936, when the League of Nations condemned itself to obsolescence, should recall the words of the philosopher Santayana: "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it". Those grim days should give us the wisdom to pause and reflect on the verdict of historians years hence who will look back on the response of the United Nations to the momentous events we are now witnessing.

History will record that this Assembly, ostensibly dedicated to international peace and co-operation, turned a deaf ear to the first major break-through in 30 years of conflict in the Middle East. History will record that, when the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt visited Jerusalem and opened the first direct dialogue with Israel after a generation of bloodshed, this Assembly chose not to endorse that initiative but to continue in its perennial obsession of amassing anti-Israel resolutions.

History will record that, when two of the principal parties to the conflict pledged in this forum to leave behind the wars of the past and embark on a fifth struggle, the struggle for peace, this Assembly in its resolutions allied itself with the forces of war and rejection.

History will record that, when practical moves were being taken to bring the parties to the negotiating tables of Cairo and Geneva, the Assembly this week chose to avert its eyes and to consider resolutions which ignored the very concept of negotiations.

If this body does not rise to the challenge and

seize this precious opportunity to break out of one of the most vicious circles of international conflict in the world today, history will recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations condemned itself to irrelevance.

When I follow the activities of the so-called Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, whose report we are here asked to consider, I am reminded of the ancient Arabic proverb which proclaims that: "He who has nothing to do acts as a judge". Here is a Committee, 19 of whose 23 members have no diplomatic relations with Israel and none of which is a party to the conflict in the Middle East, sitting on the sidelines prescribing one-sided resolutions while two of the principal parties to the conflict are seriously engaged in opening a constructive dialogue on all issues separating them. The absurdity of that Committee's composition and mandate notwithstanding, we have been presented with a resolution authorizing that body to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations. I will not here embark on an analysis of the ominous implications of those recommendations. I have done so many times before and know well that this chamber is not disposed to evaluate the arguments and to judge the issues on their merits. Nor will I reply to the vicious attacks on Israel made in the course of this debate other than to note again that they merely confirm Israel's legitimate concern for its own security. Indeed, those representatives assembled here who have difficulty in understanding Israel's determination to ensure the security of its citizens need only analyse the intentions underlying both the Committee's recommendations and the attacks made against us in this debate. I will not go into the report of the Palestine Committee, for its blatant disregard of Israel's own sovereign rights bears no relation to the new era that has dawned in the Middle East. That era, as typified in the spirit of Jerusalem two weeks ago, will be one of direct dialogue based on mutual respect in which the substantive issues separating us from our neighbours will be resolved, not by sterile speeches, but by face-to-face negotiations.

Indeed, it appears that even the sponsors of the customary anti-Israel resolutions here have become aware of the irrelevance of their own hollow condemnations, for they have now resorted to setting up permanent institutions in place of their

paper resolutions.

Not content with the existence of two anti-Israel committees which already cost the world Organization more than half a million dollars annually, they now propose to set up within the Secretariat a special unit whose sole purpose will be to churn out hatred and vilification of Israel. Ironically, the financing of this hostile unit, at a time when the world Organization is already experiencing financial difficulties, will be borne primarily by the taxpayers of those nations that have officially welcomed the current moves towards peace, and which contribute well over 60 per cent of the budget of the United Nations.

What is more serious is the fact that the establishment of such a unit will seriously prejudice the impartiality of the Secretariat itself. That body, which has a role to play both in relation to the peace-keeping forces of the Middle East and in reconvening the Geneva Conference, will lose its standing as an honest broker, and forfeit any positive role it might have played in bringing the parties together.

In addition, we are experiencing a further serious erosion in the respect which this body has for itself. When it begins blithely to pass resolutions without considering either the ethical or financial implications contained in them, then it is well on the road both to moral and fiscal bankruptcy. As the Talmud says:

"When one transgresses a commandment and repeats the offence, he feels no further restraint". Many representatives here had become so accustomed to the extremist resolutions passed here, that they were totally unaware of what those particular resolutions contained. They should not be surprised if the precedent being created here today were soon to be followed by special units in the Secretariat for each of the problems currently before the General Assembly. If a special unit on Palestine is set up, why not a unit on Cyprus, on Timor, or on the Comoros Island of Mayotte, to mention but a few?

The proposed special unit will reflect, as does the Palestine Committee, the policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a terrorist organization which compensates for its discredited acts in the Middle East by attempting to build a false image of respectability here. That Organization, committed by its covenant to the destruction of the State of Israel, showed its true colours last week when one of its constituent groups threatened

to assassinate West Bank Palestinian Arab leaders who accepted an Egyptian invitation to Cairo. Those leaders, it should be recalled, include those who were democratically elected by secret ballot in free elections by the Palestinian Arabs living in the region itself, a distinction which the emigré terrorists of Beirut and Damascus can hardly claim for themselves. Only a few days earlier, the leader of al-Saiqa, another constituent member of the PLO, threatened openly to kill the President of Egypt. That, in addition to its avowed aim to destroy both Jordan and Israel, is the character of the organization which will direct the activities of the special unit on Palestine to be established within the United Nations Secretariat.

Despite the obstacles which this Assembly continues to place in the path of peace, and despite the bitter condemnations heard in this hall, Israel remains ready to enter into immediate negotiations with all its neighbours with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace. We have always maintained that a direct and open dialogue is the only way to attain that goal, and we urge that the constructive dialogue begun between Egypt and Israel be extended to all parties involved in the conflict. I am convinced that, given the chance, the population of every other country in the Middle East would give expression to the same spontaneous feelings of joy and hope that were manifested in the streets of Cairo and Jerusalem in recent days. For all peoples in the region have suffered the ravages of war for far too long. Let us respect the voice of the people, for "*Salus populi suprema lex*"—"The well-being of the people must be the supreme law".

I repeat here what I said last week and what our Prime Minister has reaffirmed in the Knesset: in the negotiations that will take place, everything must be negotiable; there are no preconditions.

In that context, Israel is committed and has always been committed to a just solution of the Palestine Arab issue. Such a solution must be sought within the framework of a comprehensive solution of the conflict as a whole. Our position is that the Palestinian Arabs should be represented in negotiations and in that spirit the Government of Israel agreed, by unanimous decision of the Cabinet on 11 October 1977, to endorse the working paper<sup>172</sup> prepared with the United States of

<sup>172</sup> Doc. 164 below.

America, a paper designed to overcome procedural difficulties in regard to the question of Palestinian Arab representation. Clause (3) of that paper stated:

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Arabs.

It is more urgent than ever that serious and substantive discussions on all issues begin as soon as possible. Israel has therefore welcomed President Sadat's call for talks in Cairo to pave the way to Geneva, and has accepted an invitation to participate in those talks. The historic changes set in motion by President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem demand a new and courageous approach in regard to all issues if peace is to be achieved in the Middle East. We in Israel accept that challenge, and we appeal to all our neighbours to do likewise. Let the negative tones of "refusal", "rejection" and "war" become dim echoes of the past.

Let us rather embrace together the spirit of Jerusalem, and face a new future of peace and co-operation, so that the words of the prophet Isaiah may be realized:

In that day there shall be a highway from Egypt to Assyria. The Assyrians will come to Egypt, and the Egyptians will worship with the Assyrians. In that day, Israel shall be a third with Egypt and Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth which the Lord of hosts has blessed, saying "Blessed be my people Egypt and Assyria, the work of my hands, and Israel, my inheritance". (*Isaiah 19:23-25*).

## 17

### **General Assembly, 89th meeting; statements by Mr. Alarcon of Cuba, Mr. Marpaung of Indonesia and Mr. Marasli of Turkey<sup>173</sup>**

**December 1, 1977**

MR. ALARCON (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): With each year that passes, the need to resolve the question of Palestine in a just and lasting manner attracts increasing attention from the States Members of the United Nations. The gradual growth of support by the international community for the heroic people of Palestine in

their struggle to achieve their noble national objectives is noticeable. My delegation has worked strenuously in the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and supports its recommendations, which are the best means of solving the question now under consideration. We trust that the General Assembly will adopt decisions that will enable the Committee further to expand its work and thus contribute to an early realization of justice for the Palestinian people.

The full exercise of its inalienable rights by the Palestinian people has become a perpetual demand by the concert of nations gathered here. That aspiration goes beyond the national desires of the Palestinian people and has become a universal clamour.

However, there is a discordant note in the universal concert of voices. That has been referred to in recent days very appropriately by the head of the political department of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Comrade Farouk Kadoumi, who highlighted the unanimous support of the United Nations for the just cause of its of its people. As he pointed out,

"Israel and its ally, the United States, are the only ones that did not join in the unanimous support for the Palestinians." (*A/32/PV. 84, p. 23-25*)<sup>174</sup>

During three decades Israel and its main imperialist ally have denied the Arab people of Palestine their most elemental human rights, and have attempted to ignore their existence and to disregard their inalienable right to self-determination. However, in confronting powerful enemies, the Palestinian people has known how to resist them and to struggle against those who have systematically attempted to exterminate it.

We must state that the Arab people of Palestine, while confronting with courage and determination the sinister designs of Zionism and imperialism, has been able to give proof of its constructive and peaceful will, proposing in various forums and on various occasions plans leading to a just, acceptable and lasting solution to the problems of the region. In so doing, the Palestinian movement and its leaders have shown their maturity and their readiness to contribute to international peace and security.

<sup>173</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.89, pp. 53-57, 96-98, 111-113.

<sup>174</sup> See doc. 12 above.

It should be added that each time it has been the Zionists and American imperialism which has sabotaged any reasonable initiatives proposed by the sole legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. I shall not go into the wealth of initiatives culminating with the proposal for the creation of an independent and democratic Palestinian State on Palestinian national soil, to which Comrade Kaddoumi referred from this rostrum. But it should be reiterated at this time that it has been the Palestinian people and their legitimate representative who, throughout these 30 years, have made the most major, the most consistent, the most patient efforts to achieve a peaceful and democratic solution to the conflict. They are the ones who have given countless proof of generosity and flexibility, despite being the target of relentless attacks, despite being denied all their rights, despite the fact that failure to solve the problem has meant for the Palestinians a vast, unjust and brutal toll of sacrifice and suffering.

This is why it is especially inadmissible that today Israel and its imperialist allies, and those who court them, attempt to carry out manoeuvres allegedly designed to solve the Middle East conflict at the expense of the Arab people of Palestine. Such manoeuvres should be rejected most resolutely. The problem of Palestine is the very backbone of the Middle East conflict and consequently, there will be no real or effective solution to that conflict if it does not include the problem of Palestine, if the Palestinian people are not guaranteed the exercise of their national rights in conformity with resolution 3236 (XXIX) and the other resolutions subsequently adopted by the General Assembly.

Any attempt to seek separate solutions taking into account only partial aspects will not lead to peace in the region but, on the contrary, will increase the danger of war and confrontation. Faced with approaches favouring alleged bilateral solutions disregarding central and unavoidable aspects, approaches promoted outside the United Nations, we must assert the need to insist on global solutions which should not exclude any of the factors defined by the international community, solutions brought about within the Organization, using its machinery and respecting its decisions. In this connexion we should condemn the stratagems of Israel and its imperialist allies and those who echo them, those who wish to frustrate the

holding of the Geneva Conference and to replace it with confabulations of dubious inspiration and uncertain prospects. Equally worthy of condemnation are the plans to exclude the PLO from negotiations or to isolate Syria and to place it in a disadvantageous position. In recent days, moreover, the demonstrations and public protests on the West Bank of the Jordan have shown that nothing and no one will be able to weaken the will to struggle of the Palestinian people and their decision to continue to fight until they achieve the full exercise of all their rights.

The strategy of imperialism in the Middle East has consisted in trying to divide the Arab peoples and to separate them from the socialist community and the other revolutionary and progressive forces of the world who are their only firm and loyal allies. The Arab peoples and their leading Governments have attempted to co-ordinate a common strategy, enabling them to confront present difficulties and to achieve victory. We are convinced that the Arab peoples will be able to strengthen their cohesion and solidarity, defeating the intrigues of imperialism and its agents and will continue moving forward until they conquer true peace, peace with dignity, based on independence and justice.

MR. MARPAUNG (Indonesia): At the outset, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to Mr. Fall, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, for his lucid introduction of the report of the Committee.<sup>175</sup> My delegation also notes with appreciation the statement made by the Rapporteur of that Committee.

The Committee has demonstrated objectivity in its work and diligence in seeking to secure the implementation of its recommendations, embodied in its report of last year. The Indonesian delegation is of the view that those recommendations continue to be valid and constitute an equitable basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. The Committee has been successful in focusing world attention on the rights of the Palestinians, including the right to return to their homeland and the national right to self-determination and independence. The international community has in the past exhibited a degree of indifference to their

<sup>175</sup> Doc. 4 above.

plight; however, there is now a general recognition of their rights and of the urgent need to restore them as part of any over-all settlement in the Middle East.

It is significant that there is virtual unanimity of opinion among the Members of the General Assembly that the Palestinian issue is the fundamental element in the search for a settlement of the conflict. It is consequently recognized that any agreement that excludes the national rights of the Palestinians and does not involve the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) cannot be viable. The PLO represents the Palestinians and was designated as the sole representative of the Palestinians by the 1974 Rabat Arab summit conference.<sup>176</sup> That recognition has also been confirmed by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, which called for the participation of the PLO as indispensable to all negotiations on the question of the Middle East. It is therefore only logical that the PLO be represented on an equal footing with the other participants at a Geneva conference.

Unfortunately, Israel's current policies with regard to the Palestinians suggest that it is not yet prepared to accord those Palestinian rights full recognition. The actions taken by the Israeli Government clearly imply a continuation of a policy of annexation of the occupied territories. Those actions are not only incompatible with the recommendations of the Committee, but also constitute a serious obstacle to the realization of the rights of the Palestinians. Claims of historical sovereignty advanced by the Government of Israel and the assertion that the territories in question were not occupied territories simply cannot be sustained. The argument put forward by Israel is a historical fallacy; it is incompatible with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and also contravenes the right to self-determination. Furthermore, such assertions represent a flagrant defiance of the will of the international community as expressed in numerous resolutions both of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Despite consideration of the recommendations of the Committee by the Security Council for a second time, the Council has failed once again to adopt a decision to implement them. In my

delegation's view, it is most essential that action be taken by the Security Council with regard to this pressing issue. The recommendations of the Committee are designed to facilitate an equitable solution to this question, which has been before the Council for a long time. It is therefore incumbent upon the Security Council to endeavour urgently to promote a positive approach which will lead to a solution of the Palestinian problem. Continued failure would be fraught with dangerous consequences not only for the region, but also for the international community as a whole.

My delegation fully endorses the proposal contained in draft resolution A/32/L.40 for the establishment of a special unit on Palestinian rights within the Secretariat of the United Nations in order to prepare studies and publications relating to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and to promote the attainment of those rights. My delegation, as a member of the Committee, would extend all support within its means to the Committee's efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations as called for in the draft resolution contained in document A/32/39. Furthermore, we hope that the Security Council will take a decision as soon as possible on the recommendations, so as to facilitate a solution of the Middle East problem.

It has taken our Organization nearly three decades to give the Palestinians and their national rights the urgent attention they deserve. However, we have reached a critical phase when their recognition and implementation can no longer be postponed. It is imperative to consolidate the support that this cause has already received and to unite all efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the region. In that light, all the competent organs of the United Nations should be prepared to initiate action and provide assistance for the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

MR. MARASLI (Turkey): Turkey is a member of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. In joining the Committee, we have taken into account our country's basic position regarding the question of Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people, our long association with the discussion of this problem in the United Nations, and also our concern, as a country situated in the area, for the peace and tranquillity of the Middle East.

<sup>176</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*, and Appendix A below.

The report of the Committee, so ably presented by its Chairman, Mr. Fall, and by its Rapporteur, Mr. Gauci, describes the activities carried out by the Committee during 1977 and contains its recommendations. Whatever the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee, already endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/20, a constructive conclusion of the debate in the General Assembly on the question of Palestine, which is the central issue of the Middle East conflict, should constitute an important contribution to the search for a comprehensive solution, especially at a time when intensive diplomatic activities are taking place with a view to the convening of the Geneva Conference.

Any discussion on the question of Palestine is bound to focus attention on the tragic fate that the valiant people of Palestine have endured for more than 30 years and their resolute efforts to achieve self-determination. The Palestinian issue is still an incessant source of sufferings and wrongs. There can be no durable peace in the Middle East without justice, and justice requires the recognition and fulfilment of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

After many years, during which the issue of Palestine was considered exclusively within the context of a refugee problem, this basic dimension has been finally admitted and defined in various resolutions of the General Assembly. An overwhelming majority of the international community supports the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish an independent State.

General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) is of historic importance in this regard. This resolution, while confirming the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and their right to return to their homes, emphasizes at the same time that the Palestinian people is one of the main parties directly concerned with the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Later on the General Assembly further elaborated on this question, and in its resolution 3375 (XXX) decided to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in all international efforts relating to the Middle East on an equal footing with the other concerned parties.

Turkey supported those resolutions. Our support

has been based on the universal recognition of the right to self-determination and on our respect for the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. I wish to reiterate at the same time that, while we recognize the central role of the rights of the Palestinian people in the search for an over-all solution of the Middle East problem, it is the view of my Government that a just and lasting peace in the region can be achieved only through a comprehensive settlement. It is our firm belief that such a solution cannot be attained unless Israel withdraws from all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967. It should also be stressed that necessary arrangements should be made to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all the States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

It is in the light of the considerations I have just outlined that my delegation will support the two draft resolutions before the General Assembly.

## 18

### **General Assembly, 90th meeting; statement by Mr. Thunborg of Sweden<sup>177</sup>**

**December 2, 1977**

MR. THUNBORG (Sweden): This year's debate on the question of Palestine has taken place against the background of dramatic development, with sometimes surprising turns. President Sadat's visit to Israel was a historic event which may have an important influence on the developments in the Middle East. It is the hope of the Swedish Government that it will increase the possibilities of an early convening of the Geneva Conference and strengthen the efforts to reach a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem.

In order to achieve a just and lasting peace, the legitimate right of all the States in the area, including Israel, to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries must be safeguarded; but that is not enough. As the Palestinian problem is central in the whole Middle East complex of questions, any settlement must include also a solution of the Palestinian problem. It can hardly be denied that the interests and rights of the Pal-

<sup>177</sup> Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/32/PV.90, pp. 28-31.

estinian Arabs have not been sufficiently taken into consideration in the previous attempts at attaining a settlement of the Middle East question. It must be recognized that the Palestinian people has its legitimate national rights, which include the right to form a State that will live in peace side by side with Israel. It is only through the realization of those rights that the Palestinian problem will be settled.

The Swedish Government holds the view that the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East still offers the best opportunity for peace, and also for a settlement of the Palestinian problem. The task of that Conference is to reach a settlement based upon two Security Council resolutions, resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Furthermore, provision has to be made for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arabs. It should be possible to find a lasting and just settlement within this framework. In the present situation it is of the utmost importance that all efforts should be concentrated on facilitating the convening of an early and constructive conference at Geneva.

The Swedish Government therefore supports the efforts of the Secretary-General to bridge the differences between the parties. His efforts must be highly commended.

In that context, I would like to repeat the view of the Swedish Government that the Palestinians should be assured participation in those negotiations. The role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the most representative spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs must be considered as fundamental in that context. The situation now requires the utmost wisdom and careful action on all sides. It is in the interest of all parties that they now do their utmost to create a really viable peace process and that they try to avoid unnecessary discord which can only be harmful and can only confuse this already very difficult problem.

My Government therefore supports all efforts to achieve such a process and appeals to the parties to act forcefully in favour of reaching agreements, arrangements and an understanding that will lead to the ultimate goal: a just and durable peace in the Middle East.



## Statements by UN Officials

19

### **Press conference statements by UN Secretary-General Waldheim outlining some of the problems which are delaying the Geneva conference (excerpts)<sup>178</sup>**

New York, May 23, 1977

MR. CHAKRAPANI (President, UNCA): Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, for meeting with us today. Before I ask my first question, I would like to inform my colleagues that this will be a general press conference, as indicated by the Secretary-General himself. The duration could be half an hour or even slightly more, and we shall have the usual embargo of 15 minutes.

My first question to you, Mr. Secretary-General, is this. As admitted by you at Geneva, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated, especially since the recent elections in Israel. Are you contemplating activating the diplomatic processes or are you considering any new initiatives to prevent a possible confrontation and to persuade the parties to agree to negotiate at Geneva?

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do not think there will be an immediate confrontation. If I stressed the gravity of the situation, I did not say anything new. I think there can be no doubt that the situation in the Middle East is serious and that a resumption of the negotiating process is of the greatest importance. I stressed that point in Geneva. Of course, we have now to see how the new coalition Government will be formed in Israel. It is evident that the talks in regard to a resumption of the Geneva Conference were held with the previous Government, and therefore it is logical that we have to see how the new Government in Israel will act in regard to the problems of foreign policy in general and specifically in regard to the Middle East. I therefore feel it premature to make a concrete comment in this regard. Much

will depend on what kind of approach the new Israeli Government will adopt towards the Middle East problem.

Having said this, I wish to stress again my great preoccupation with the situation in the area, and I hope that, after the Government of Israel has been formed, contacts will be resumed so that we may get a better picture of the situation.

Since there were some misunderstandings apparently—or perhaps it is better to say “misinterpretations”—of what I said in Geneva last week, I wish to quote what I said at my press conference there. I said:

that it is essential to continue the negotiation process and that the convening of the Geneva Conference is extremely important. It is vital that something constructive and positive in the negotiating process should happen this year, because without progress I think the danger will increase, the danger of another military confrontation.

I think that from that quotation it is abundantly clear that I fully support all efforts to convene the Geneva Conference as early as possible.

However, in the light of the recent developments, it is also evident that there is a new situation. We have to take this new situation into account; it could, perhaps, delay the negotiating process, but I still hope that the Geneva peace conference can take place before the end of the year.

QUESTION: You have emphasized the need for convening the Geneva Conference as soon as possible. Is there any point, really, in convening that body unless the negotiating positions have been pretty well worked out in advance and the parties involved named? In view of the fact that some of those positions have hardened so much in the last few days, how can there be any prospect for a Geneva Conference very soon?

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: I fully share your views; I could not agree more. And this was the meaning of my statement in Geneva.

Much as I would welcome an early convening

<sup>178</sup> *United Nations Press Release*, UN doc. SG/SM/2447, pp. 1–4, 7.

of the Geneva Conference—it is to be hoped before the end of the year—I have to stress the point that we are confronted with a new situation and, as you rightly said, we must prepare the Conference; we must clarify the positions before we go to the Conference, as far as the procedural aspects are concerned as well as the substance. We must, for instance, know who will participate in such a Conference; the question of PLO participation, is still open; no agreement has yet been reached in this regard.

There is the question of substance; what will the future solution be? Of course, we cannot expect that that problem will be solved before the Conference, because then we would not need the Conference. Just to rubberstamp something which has been worked out is not the purpose of the Conference. But we have to get a certain rapprochement of the different opinions which still exist—for instance, about the creation of a Palestinian homeland, as President Carter has said, and about the question of reciprocal recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestinian entity. I am just mentioning some of the problems which are still open and on which the opinions of the parties involved in the negotiating process are still far apart.

So let there be no doubt about this: I think we have to be realistic; we have to see things as they are. Why create the impression that things are going fine, if, in fact, we are still far away from agreement on basic issues?

Therefore, I feel that it is extremely important to use the months ahead to clarify the situation and to bring the positions closer to each other. We will then be in a better position to say when the Geneva Conference can be convened.

20

**Statement by Rapporteur Gauci of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People presenting the report of his Committee to the General Assembly (excerpt)<sup>179</sup>**

November 28, 1977

The details of the recommendations should by now be familiar. No doubt they can be varied and improved upon. But they had been firmly geared to securing two fundamental objectives—justice and peace—within a reasonable time-table, gradually utilizing the untapped potential of the United Nations to help us secure this elusive goal. The recommendations remain unchanged in our present report, their validity undiminished. But the first steps in the envisaged time-table have not yet been taken. We should rectify this omission.

The pace of progress in international conference diplomacy is undoubtedly slow. It took our Organization nearly 30 years before it gave the Palestinian question the objective and urgent attention it merited. But we have now reached an important phase: either we keep moving forward objectively along our selected path for progress, or else we may have to suffer the consequences of our irresolution. The Committee prefers the first option.

Accordingly, and in brief, in my modest role as Rapporteur of the Committee I feel our main task now requires us mainly to keep open the forum for discussion; to consolidate the base of the support already received; to convince the remaining doubters; to make better known the realities of the question; to encourage all positive efforts towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the region; to strengthen the awakening hopes; to maintain the emphasis on a peaceful negotiated solution which would satisfy legitimate aspirations while allaying genuine preoccupations; and to encourage all competent bodies of the United Nations to be ready to contribute their efforts as and when required.

To the extent that these combined objectives depend on the Committee, I feel I can honestly say that we have not overlooked any single one of them. Our forum has at all times remained

<sup>179</sup> UN doc. A/32/PV.84, pp. 16–22.

open; indeed, we have more than once gone out of our way to seek the views of any party directly involved or having a contribution to make. We took great pains in an attempt accurately to analyse any observations made on the first report of the Committee, and in this respect, while maintaining our original recommendations unchanged, we explained in writing, instead of verbally, as had been the case at the previous session, why we felt that we should give adequate stress to only one side of the complex equation—that part which is unfulfilled and which represents the sole mandate within the Committee's competence. We sought to maintain close contact with our Secretary-General and with the members of the Security Council, since we held, and still hold, that all sectors of the United Nations system should act in concert if we are to make progress on this delicate, dangerous and intolerable situation. Although the Security Council has not yet taken decisive action, its potential contribution remains a valuable asset at hand.

The details of our endeavours are all provided in this our second report, which is before the Assembly. The Chairman of the Committee has already outlined the most important. I need not repeat them. Nor do I need to remind this Assembly that the recommendations of the Committee are morally and legally founded on the innumerable resolutions of the United Nations concerning the question now before us. Perhaps I could add that on more than one occasion, both before the Security Council and the General Assembly, we also asked for any additional constructive suggestions for broadening and strengthening the recommendations the Committee had devised. No suggestions were forthcoming, and therefore none have been incorporated in the report. To the verbal observations that were made we have submitted written replies which are reproduced as annexes to this report. Finally, the Committee severely censured additional illegal acts in the occupied territories which instead of facilitating a solution do the opposite.

And so once again we come before the Assembly as it takes upon itself the responsibility for reviewing the question of Palestine and the plight of its people. As I said last year, their past is on our conscience, their future is our concern. From the theoretical point of view, the question of Palestine has now come full circle, and there is undoubtedly reason

for some encouragement. Influential voices from many important countries are now laying great stress on the central role of the Palestinian issue within the grave Middle East situation. That recognition, sad in itself, must nevertheless be noted with relief, even though it is long overdue, because it is a factor of fundamental importance, for it now represents a universal consensus.

Important as recent statements on the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to a homeland undoubtedly are, so much emphasis is being placed on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) that, by way of an example, I prefer to quote an opinion which goes back to January 1977, because in my view it represents a well-considered and knowledgeable contribution on this question.

One of the main architects of resolution 242 (1967), a diplomat who needs no introduction here and who served in the area when it was under the British mandate, Lord Caradon, after consultations with leaders of most of the countries in the region, wrote an article in *The Times* of London under the heading "Why the Palestinians see the Holy City as a Gateway to Peace". He said:

One main conclusion is the clearest of all. The Palestinians want a State of their own on the West Bank of Jordan. They long for a homeland in which they take their own decisions and shape their own destiny and regain their self-respect by practical, constructive endeavour.

Later he added: "Moreover, international backing for the objective of a Palestinian State is overwhelming." Later still he wrote:

It is no longer looked upon as a wildly idealistic conception that the security of Israel and the peace of the whole Middle East must depend not on arms or on territory or on the domination of one side over the other, but on agreement and on peaceful coexistence, with Palestinians too having a right to self-determination and security in their own homeland.

I need hardly add that, with few exceptions, all nations recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. It is clear that none but the Palestinians themselves can determine who are their representatives, and it is known that efforts have been made to make the Palestine National Council as widely representative of all Palestinians as possible. Certainly no lasting solution in the

area can be envisaged if one of the principal parties does not consider itself to have been adequately represented when its future is being determined.

However, now we have to go beyond theoretical progress. The critical moment of decision is before us. There are those who have the clear responsibility to transform theory into reality, in their own long-term interests and for the common good. We too—all of us—have a responsibility. Let us first save ourselves the embarrassment of the bitter and useless recrimination that characterized previous debates: justified though it may be, it serves no practical purpose. Let us consider simple, gradual, effective steps for progress. Let us not turn our backs on this historic opportunity, which may never recur. Let us not run the risk of a new generation of violence and bloodshed, devastation and human suffering too vast to imagine, much worse certainly than that which we have already witnessed in the past. Let us, therefore, for our part, without equivocation but with clarity, conviction and commitment, unanimously show in no unmistakable way wherein lies the path to peace in that region. In the best traditions of the great religions to which the region gave birth, let the message from this hall ring out loud and clear: dignity and nationhood for the Palestinian people, security in brotherhood for all States and people in the area, peace with justice in the Middle East. As for the parties most directly involved, surely the generous first step should come from the temporary trespasser, not from the oppressed victims. This would be a combined contribution of tremendous significance, a real turning point in the history of the region.

## 21

**Press conference statement by UN Secretary-General Waldheim calling for a preparatory meeting for a Geneva conference under UN auspices<sup>180</sup>**

**New York, November 29, 1977**

I wish to make a statement in regard to the Middle East situation. In response to the invitation of the Egyptian Government I intend to designate General Ensio Siilasvuo Chief Co-ordinator of the

United Nations Peace-keeping Operations in the Middle East, to be present at the meeting in Cairo. As it turns out, the meeting in Cairo will probably have limited participation. In the light of this consideration and having in mind the urgent need for an early convening of the Geneva Conference, I suggest that consideration be given to the holding of a preparatory meeting at United Nations Headquarters, or any other generally agreed venue, of all those invited to the Cairo meeting. I believe that such a broadly based meeting, following on the Cairo meeting, could facilitate the convening of an early and constructive conference at Geneva.

That is the statement I wanted to make in regard to this very important question. Permit me to say a few words in order to explain my suggestion. First of all, let me say that, as we are all fully aware, it appears that there will be a limited number of participants in the Cairo meeting. In addition, other Arab Governments are convening separate meetings. Under these circumstances I believe the United Nations has a useful role to play to bring all the parties together on neutral ground. That is the reason why I suggested that, as a sort of follow-up meeting, a meeting of all the parties concerned should take place here in New York at United Nations Headquarters. The purpose of that meeting would be to continue the preparatory work for a Geneva Conference which, as we know, everybody is interested in having. We must maintain the momentum and it is my suggestion, therefore, to hold a meeting of all the parties concerned and, of course, the two Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference, here in New York.

I thought that it would be useful to give those few comments in regard to the statement which I have just made.

<sup>180</sup> *United Nations Press Release, UN doc. SG/SM/2513.*

## Resolutions and Decisions

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

22

### **General Assembly Resolution 32/5 deploring illegal Israeli measures in the occupied Arab territories<sup>181</sup>**

**October 28, 1977**

*The General Assembly,*

*Stressing* the urgent need to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

*Expressing* grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and the measures and actions taken by the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, and designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories,

*Considering* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,<sup>182</sup> is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967,

1. *Determines* that all such measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. *Strongly deplores* the persistence of Israel in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions

of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;

4. *Calls once more upon* the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, to desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

5. *Urges* all States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General;

(a) To undertake urgent contacts with the Government of Israel to ensure the prompt implementation of the present resolution;

(b) To submit a report to the General Assembly and the Security Council, not later than 31 December 1977, on the results of his contacts;

7. *Requests* the Security Council to review the situation in the light of the present resolution and of the report of the Secretary-General.

23

### **General Assembly Resolution 32/14 reaffirming the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination<sup>183</sup>**

**November 7, 1977**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970, 2955 (XXVII) of 12 December 1972, 3070 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973, 3246 (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3382 (XXX)

<sup>181</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, p. 2. Adopted at the Assembly's 52nd plenary meeting by 131 votes to 1 with 7 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>182</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig. note].

<sup>183</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, pp. 284–285. Adopted at the Assembly's 60th plenary meeting by 113 votes to 3 with 18 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

of 10 November 1975 and 31/34 of 30 November 1976,

*Recalling* also its resolutions 2465 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2548 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969, 2708 (XXV) of 14 December 1970, 3103 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973 and 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 on the use and recruitment of mercenaries against national liberation movements and sovereign States,

*Recalling* the Declaration and the Programme of Action adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held at Maputo from 16 to 21 May 1977,<sup>184</sup> and the declaration adopted by the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, held at Lagos from 22 to 26 August 1977,<sup>185</sup>

*Taking note* of the declaration of the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference, held at Cairo from 7 to 9 March 1977,<sup>186</sup>

*Reaffirming* its faith in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the importance of its implementation,

*Reaffirming* the importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples as imperatives for the enjoyment of human rights,

*Affirming* that "bantustanization" is incompatible with genuine independence, unity and national sovereignty and would have the effect of perpetuating the power of the white minority and the racist system of *apartheid* in South Africa,

*Reaffirming* the obligation of all Member States to comply with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the exercise of the right to self-determination by peoples under colonial and alien domination,

*Welcoming* the independence of Djibouti,

*Reaffirming* the national unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros,

*Indignant* at the continued violations of the human rights of the peoples still under colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, the continuation of the illegal occupation of Namibia and South

Africa's attempts to dismember its territory, the perpetuation of the racist minority régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa and the denial to the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights,

1. *Calls upon* all States to implement fully and faithfully the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the exercise of the right to self-determination by peoples under colonial and alien domination;

2. *Reaffirms* the legitimacy of the people's struggle for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed struggle;

3. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe, of the Palestinian people and of all peoples under alien and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without external interference;

4. *Demands* the immediate evacuation of the French administration and forces from the Comorian territory of Mayotte;

5. *Condemns* the policy of "bantustanization" and reiterates its support for the oppressed people of South Africa in their just and legitimate struggle against the racist minority régime in Pretoria;

6. *Reaffirms* that the practice of using mercenaries against national liberation movements and sovereign States constitutes a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are criminals, and calls upon the Governments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment, financing and training of mercenaries in their territory and the transit of mercenaries through their territory to be punishable offenses and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries, and to report on such legislation to the Secretary-General;

7. *Condemns* the policies of those members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of other countries whose political, economic, military or sporting relations with the racist régimes in southern Africa and elsewhere encourage these régimes to persist in their suppression of the aspirations of peoples for self-determination and independence;

8. *Strongly condemns* all Governments which do not recognize the right to self-determination and independence of all peoples still under colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation,

<sup>184</sup> A/32/109/Rev.1-S/12344/Rev.1, annex V. [orig. note.]

<sup>185</sup> A/CONF.91/9 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.77.XIV.2), chap. X. [orig. note.]

<sup>186</sup> Doc. 68 below.

notably the peoples of Africa and the Palestinian people;

9. *Strongly condemns* the ever increasing massacres of innocent and defenceless people, including women and children, by the racist minority régimes of southern Africa in their desperate attempt to thwart the legitimate demands of the people;

10. *Demands* the immediate release of all persons detained or imprisoned as a result of their struggle for self-determination and independence, full respect for their fundamental personal rights and the observance of article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under which no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;<sup>187</sup>

11. *Notes with appreciation* the material and other forms of assistance that peoples under colonial and foreign rule continue to receive from Governments, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and calls for a maximization of this assistance;

12. *Keenly awaits* the publication of the following studies by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:

(a) Historical and current development of the right to self-determination on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments adopted by United Nations organs, with particular reference to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(b) Implementation of United Nations resolutions relating to the right of peoples under colonial and foreign domination to self-determination;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give maximum publicity to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to give the widest possible publicity to the struggle being waged by oppressed peoples for the realization of their self-determination and national independence;

14. *Decides* to consider this item again at its thirty-third session on the basis of the reports that Governments, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have been requested to submit concerning the strengthening of assistance to colonial Territories and peoples under foreign domination and control.

24

**General Assembly Resolution 32/20 reaffirming its condemnation of Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and calling for the convening of the peace conference on the Middle East<sup>188</sup>**

November 25, 1977

*The General Assembly,*

*Having discussed* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 and 31/61 of 9 December 1976,

*Taking into account* the decisions of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, concerning the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine,<sup>189</sup>

*Deeply concerned* that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than ten years, to be under illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades, are still deprived of the exercise of their inalienable national rights,

*Reaffirming* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that all territories thus occupied must be returned,

*Reaffirming also* the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

*Taking note with satisfaction* of the joint statement on the Middle East<sup>190</sup> issued on 1 October 1977 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America in their capacities as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East,

*Reaffirming* that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem must be based on a comprehensive

<sup>188</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September—21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, pp. 32–33. Adopted at the Assembly's 82nd plenary meeting by 102 votes to 4 with 29 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>189</sup> Docs. 141 and 142 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>190</sup> Doc. 160 below.

<sup>187</sup> General Assembly resolution 217 A (III). [orig. note]

solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into account all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all their inalienable national rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories,

*Convinced* that the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

1. *Condemns* Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated resolutions of the United Nations;

2. *Reaffirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region can live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, cannot be achieved without Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights;

3. *Calls anew* for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization;

4. *Urges* the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations,

5. *Requests* the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the develop-

ment of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session a comprehensive report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.

25

**General Assembly Resolution 32/35 condemning Israel for collaborating politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily with South Africa<sup>191</sup>**

**November 28, 1977**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the item entitled "Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa",

*Having examined* the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to this question,<sup>192</sup>

*Taking into consideration* the parts of the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia<sup>193</sup> relating to this question,

*Recalling* its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and its resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, containing the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration, as well as all other resolutions of the United Nations relating to the item,

*Taking into account* the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the Programme of Action for the Liberation

<sup>191</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, pp. 364–367. Adopted at the Assembly's 83rd plenary meeting by 101 votes to 12 with 28 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>192</sup> A/32/23 (Part I11) and Corr.2, chap. IV. [orig. note.]

<sup>193</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session Supplement No. 24 (A/32/24)*, part two, chap. VI; and annex XII. [orig. note.]



of Zimbabwe and Namibia, adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held at Maputo from 16 to 21 May 1977,<sup>194</sup> as well as the Lagos Declaration for Action against *Apartheid*, adopted by the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, held at Lagos from 22 to 26 August 1977,<sup>195</sup>

*Taking note* of the decision concerning the export of oil to the illegal racist régimes in southern Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its fourteenth ordinary session, held at Libreville from 2 to 5 July 1977,<sup>196</sup>

*Reaffirming* the solemn obligation of the administering Powers under the Charter of the United Nations to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Territories under their administration and to protect the human and natural resources of those Territories against abuses,

*Affirming* that any economic or other activity which impedes the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and obstructs efforts aimed at the elimination of colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa and other colonial Territories violates the political, economic and social rights and interests of the peoples of the Territories and is therefore incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

*Affirming* that the natural resources of all colonial Territories, particularly Zimbabwe and Namibia, are the heritage of the peoples of those Territories and that the exploitation of those resources by foreign economic interests in conjunction with the illegal racist minority régimes constitutes a direct violation of the rights of the inhabitants and of the principles stated in the Charter and all relevant resolutions of the United Nations,

*Noting with profound concern* that the colonial Powers and certain States, through their activities in the colonial Territories, have continued to disregard United Nations decisions relating to the item and that they have failed to implement in particular General Assembly resolutions 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970 and 31/7 of 5 November 1976, by which the Assembly called upon the

colonial Powers and those Governments which had not yet done so to take legislative, administrative or other measures in order to put an end to enterprises in colonial Territories, particularly in Africa, which are owned by their nationals or bodies corporate under their jurisdiction, whenever such enterprises are detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants of those Territories, and to prevent new investments which run counter to such interests,

*Condemning* the intensified activities of those foreign economic, financial and other interests which continue to exploit the natural and human resources of the colonial Territories and to accumulate and repatriate huge profits to the detriment of the interests of the inhabitants, particularly in southern Africa, thereby impeding the realization by the peoples of the Territories of their legitimate aspirations for self-determination and independence,

*Strongly condemning* the support which the racist minority régime of South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia continue to receive from those foreign economic, financial and other interests which are collaborating with them in their exploitation of the natural and human resources of, and in the further entrenchment of their illegal and racialist domination over, the international Territory of Namibia and the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), respectively,

*Strongly condemning* the investment of foreign capital in the illegal production of uranium and the collaboration by certain Western countries and other States with the racist minority régime of South Africa in the nuclear field which, by providing that régime with nuclear equipment and technology, enables the latter to develop nuclear and military capabilities, thereby promoting South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia as well as its growth as a nuclear Power,

*Deeply concerned* at the fact that foreign economic, financial and other interests continue to deprive the indigenous populations of other colonial Territories, including those in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean regions, of their rights over the wealth of their countries, and at the continued loss of ownership of land by the inhabitants of those Territories as a result of the failure of the administering Powers to take effective steps to safeguard such ownership,

<sup>194</sup> A/32/109/Rev.1-S/12344/Rev.1, annex V. [orig. note.]

<sup>195</sup> A/CONF.91/9 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.77.XIV.2), vol. 1, sect. X. [orig. note.]

<sup>196</sup> See docs. 124 and 125 below.

*Conscious* of the continuing need to mobilize world public opinion against the involvement of foreign economic, financial and other interests in the exploitation of natural and human resources, which impedes the independence of colonial Territories, particularly in Africa,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the peoples of dependent Territories to self-determination and independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of their Territories, as well as their right to dispose of those resources in their best interests;

2. *Reaffirms* the relevant provisions of the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the Programme of Action for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia, adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, as well as the Lagos Declaration for Action against *Apartheid*, adopted by the World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*;

3. *Reiterates* that any administering or occupying Power which deprives the colonial peoples of the exercise of their legitimate rights over their natural resources or subordinates the rights and interests of those peoples to foreign economic and financial interests violates the solemn obligations it has assumed under the Charter of the United Nations;

4. *Reaffirms* that, by their depletive exploitation of natural resources, the continued accumulation and repatriation of huge profits and the use of those profits for the enrichment of foreign settlers and the entrenchment of colonial domination over the Territories, the activities of foreign economic, financial and other interests operating at present in the colonial Territories of southern Africa constitute a major obstacle to political independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources of those Territories by the indigenous inhabitants;

5. *Condemns* the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the colonial Territories that impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination;

6. *Strongly condemns* all States which collaborate politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily with South Africa in flagrant violation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the United States of America, France,

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Belgium, Italy;

7. *Strongly condemns* the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel for collaborating with South Africa in nuclear matters and requests all Governments to refrain from supplying the racist minority régime of South Africa, directly or indirectly, with installations that might enable it to produce uranium, plutonium and other nuclear materials, reactors or military equipment;

8. *Calls once again upon* all Governments which have not done so to take legislative, administrative or other measures in respect of their nationals and the bodies corporate under their jurisdiction who own and operate enterprises in colonial Territories, particularly in Africa, which are detrimental to the interests of the inhabitants of those Territories, in order to put an end to such enterprises and to prevent new investments that run counter to the interests of the inhabitants of those Territories;

9. *Requests* all States to refrain from any investments in, or loans to, the minority racist régimes in southern Africa and to refrain from any agreements or measures to promote trade or other economic relations with them;

10. *Expresses* its conviction that the scope of the sanctions adopted against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia should be expanded to cover all the measures contemplated in Article 41 of the Charter and expresses the hope that the Security Council will envisage adopting appropriate measures to this end;

11. *Condemns* all violations of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, as well as the continued failure of certain Member States to enforce those sanctions, as being contrary to the obligations assumed by them under Article 25 of the Charter;

12. *Requests* all States to take effective measures to end the supply of funds and other forms of assistance, including military supplies and equipment, to those régimes which use such assistance to repress the peoples of the colonial Territories and their national liberation movements;

13. *Calls once again upon* all States to discontinue all economic, financial or trade relations with South Africa concerning Namibia and to refrain from entering into economic, financial or other

relations with South Africa, acting on behalf of or concerning Namibia, which may lend support to its continued illegal occupation of that Territory;

14. *Requests* all oil-producing or oil-exporting countries which supply crude oil and petroleum products to the racist régime of South Africa to cease forthwith all exports of crude oil and petroleum products to the racist régimes in southern Africa and to take the necessary measures against oil companies which, in violation of the United Nations resolutions on sanctions, continue to deliver oil to those régimes;

15. *Strongly condemns* the racist minority régime of South Africa which, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and in open contravention of its specific obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, continues to collaborate with the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, and calls upon that Government to cease immediately all forms of collaboration with the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

16. *Invites* all Governments and organizations within the United Nations system, having regard to the relevant provisions of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, contained in General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, and of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, to ensure in particular that the permanent sovereignty of the colonial Territories over their natural resources is fully respected and safeguarded;

17. *Calls upon* the administering Powers to abolish every discriminatory and unjust wage system which prevails in the Territories under their administration and to apply in each Territory a uniform system of wages to all the inhabitants without any discrimination;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake, through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat, a sustained and wide campaign with a view to informing world public opinion of the facts concerning the pillaging of natural resources and the exploitation of the indigenous populations by foreign monopolies and the support they render to the colonialist and racist régimes;

19. *Requests* the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to

Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to examine this question and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

## 26

### **General Assembly Resolution 32/40 urging the Security Council to take a decision on the recommendations of General Assembly Resolution 31/20 as a basis for the solution of the Palestine question<sup>197</sup>**

December 2, 1977

## A

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 and 31/20 of 24 November 1976,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,<sup>198</sup>

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,<sup>199</sup>

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Taking note* of the resolution on the question of Palestine adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its twenty-ninth ordinary session, held at Libreville from 23 June to 3 July 1977,<sup>200</sup>

<sup>197</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, pp. 36–38. Adopted at the Assembly's 91st plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 100 votes to 12 with 29 abstentions

Part B: 95 votes to 20 with 26 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>198</sup> Doc. 4 above.

<sup>199</sup> Doc. 12 above.

<sup>200</sup> Docs. 124 and 125 below.

*Taking note* of the Declaration on the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries at their extraordinary meeting in New York on 30 September 1977,<sup>201</sup>

*Taking note also* of the final communiqué of the extraordinary meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Conference, held in New York on 3 October 1977,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Takes note* of the report of the Committee and endorses the recommendations contained in paragraphs 43 and 44 of that report;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that, during the consideration of the report of the Committee by the Security Council at its 2041st meeting, on 27 October 1977, all members of the Council who participated in the discussion reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East could not be established without the achievement, in particular, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;

4. *Urges* the Security Council to take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/20<sup>202</sup> as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine;

5. *Decides* to circulate the report to all the competent bodies of the United Nations and urges them to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's programme of implementation;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the reports of the Committee to all conferences on the Middle East held under the auspices of the United Nations, including the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East;

7. *Authorizes* the Committee to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations, to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where such representation would be considered by it to be appropriate, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

8. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks, including summary records of its meetings;

9. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session.

## B

### *The General Assembly*

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,<sup>203</sup>

*Noting*, in particular, the observations contained in paragraphs 38 to 42 of that report.

*Recognizing* the need for the greatest possible dissemination of information on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and on the efforts of the United Nations to promote the attainment of those rights,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat of the United Nations a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights which would:

(a) Prepare, under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, studies and publications relating to:

(i) The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;

(ii) Relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations;

(iii) The activities of the Committee and other United Nations organs, in order to promote the attainment of those rights;

(b) Promote maximum publicity for such studies and publications through all appropriate means;

(c) Organize, in consultation with the Committee, commencing in 1978, annual observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People;

2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;

3. *Invites* all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the implementation of the present resolution.

<sup>201</sup> Doc. 157 below.

<sup>202</sup> Doc. 19 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>203</sup> Doc. 4 above.

27

**General Assembly Resolution 32/91 on the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories<sup>204</sup>**

December 13, 1977

A

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3525 B (XXX) of 15 December 1975 and 31/106 B of 16 December 1976,

Considering that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,<sup>205</sup>

Noting that Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

Taking into account that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Strongly deplores* the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967;

3. *Calls again upon* Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since

1967, including Jerusalem;

4. *Urges once more* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

B

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolutions 3240 C (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3525 C (XXX) of 15 December 1975 and 31/106 D of 16 December 1976,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,<sup>206</sup> in particular annex II thereof, entitled "Report on damage at Quneitra", a report on the nature, extent and value of damage, submitted by a Swiss expert engaged by the Special Committee,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* of the thoroughness and impartiality with which the expert engaged by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories discharged the tasks entrusted to him;

2. *Condemns* the massive, deliberate destruction of Quneitra perpetrated during the Israeli occupation and prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that city in 1974;

3. *Reaffirms* that the Syrian Arab Republic is entitled to full and adequate compensation, under international law and in equity, for the massive damage and deliberate destruction perpetrated in Quneitra while it was under Israeli occupation, and to all other legal remedies in accordance with applicable international law and practice;

4. *Takes note* of the statements made by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic before the Special Political Committee at the thirty-first<sup>207</sup> and thirty-second<sup>208</sup> sessions of the General Assembly to the effect that his Government reserves all rights to full compensation in regards to all damages resulting from Israel's deliberate destruction of Quneitra, including those not covered by the expert's above-mentioned report or not falling within the scope of his assignment;

<sup>204</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723. pp. 153–156. Adopted at the Assembly's 101st plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 132 votes to 1 with 1 abstention

Part B: 96 votes to 1 with 37 abstentions

Part C: 98 votes to 2 with 32 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>205</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig. note].

<sup>206</sup> Doc. 8 above.

<sup>207</sup> A/SPC/31/SR.30, para. 12. [orig. note.]

<sup>208</sup> A/SPC/32/SR.34, paras. 7–10 [orig. note.]

5. *Requests* the Special Committee to complete its survey on all the aspects referred to in paragraph 4 above and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the facilities required for the completion of the tasks referred to in the previous paragraphs.

### C

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Bearing in mind* the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949;<sup>209</sup> as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

*Recalling* its resolutions on the subject, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations bodies concerned and by specialized agencies,

*Having considered* the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, which contains, *inter alia*, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel,

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Deplores* the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

3. *Calls again upon* Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

4. *Deplores* the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments, and condemns in particular those violations which that Convention designates as "grave breaches" thereof;

5. *Condemns* the following Israeli policies and practices;

(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;

(c) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return;

(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;

(e) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses;

(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

(g) The ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;

(h) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;

(i) The interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;

(j) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;

6. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

7. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

8. *Reiterates* its call upon all States, in particular those States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, and upon international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied

<sup>209</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287. [orig. note.]

territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

10. *Requests* the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and to submit to the Secretary-General a special report on that subject as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

(b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;

(c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available;

(d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

28

## **General Assembly Resolution 32/105 D condemning Israel for continuing relations with South Africa<sup>210</sup>**

**December 14, 1977**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its repeated condemnations of the intensification of relations and collaboration by Israel with the racist régime of South Africa in the political, military, economic and other fields, in particular resolution 31/6 E of 9 November 1976,

*Taking note* of the special report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* concerning recent developments in relations between Israel and South Africa,<sup>211</sup>

*Recalling* Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977,

*Noting with grave anxiety* that Israel has continued further to strengthen its relations with the racist régime of South Africa in defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly,

*Considering* that the collaboration by Israel has constituted an encouragement to the racist régime of South Africa to persist in its criminal policy of *apartheid* and is a hostile act against the oppressed people of South Africa and the entire African continent,

1. *Again strongly condemns* Israel for its continuing and increasing collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa;

2. *Demands once again* that Israel desist forthwith from such collaboration and, in particular, terminate all collaboration in the military and nuclear fields;

3. *Requests* the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to keep the matter under constant review and report to the General Assembly and the Security Council as appropriate.

<sup>210</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, pp. 50–51. Adopted at the Assembly's 102nd plenary meeting by 88 votes to 19 with 30 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>211</sup> A/32/22Add.3–S/12363/Add.3. [orig. note.]

## 29

**General Assembly Resolution 32/161 reaffirming the right of the Arab states and peoples to permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of the territories occupied by Israel**<sup>212</sup>

December 19, 1977

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* the relevant principles of international law and the provisions of the international conventions and regulations, in particular, the Hague Convention IV of 1907<sup>213</sup> and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949,<sup>214</sup> concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the occupying Power,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, particularly their provisions supporting resolutely the efforts of the developing countries and the peoples of the territories under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation in their struggle to regain effective control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities,

*Bearing in mind* the pertinent provisions of its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, and 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

*Recalling further* its resolutions 3175 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3516 (XXX) of 15 December 1975 and 31/186 of 21 December 1976 on permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of

their territories;<sup>215</sup>

2. *Also notes* that, owing to the time constraint, incomplete coverage and technical and other limitations, the report did not cover all pertinent losses, such as:

(a) The adverse economic effects extending beyond the year 1975;

(b) Losses in the Arab territories still under Israeli occupation;

(c) Human and military losses;

(d) The loss of and damage to items of national, religious and cultural heritage;

(e) Losses in the traditional sectors, including the retail trading, small industries and farming sectors;

(f) The full impact on the development process of the Arab States, territories and peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation;

3. *Emphasizes* the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty and control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities;

4. *Reaffirms* that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities in the occupied Arab territories are illegal, and calls upon Israel immediately to desist forthwith from all such measures;

5. *Further reaffirms* the right of the Arab States and peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion, loss and damages to their natural, human and all other resources, wealth and economic activities, and calls upon Israel to meet their just claims;

6. *Calls upon* all States to support and assist the Arab States and peoples in the exercise of their above-mentioned rights;

7. *Calls upon* all States, international organizations, specialized agencies, investment corporations and all institutions not to recognize, or co-operate with or assist in any manner in, any measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character or institutional structure of those territories.

<sup>212</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, pp. 210–211. Adopted at the Assembly's 107th plenary meeting by 109 votes to 3 with 26 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>213</sup> Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Hague Conventions and Declarations 1899–1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915). [orig. note.]

<sup>214</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No 973, p. 287. [orig. note.]

<sup>215</sup> A/32/204. [orig. note.]



**General Assembly Resolution 32/171 calling on the Secretary-General to report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories**<sup>216</sup>

December 19, 1977

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, 1976,<sup>217</sup> and the relevant recommendations for national action<sup>218</sup> adopted by Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held at Vancouver from 31 May to 11 June 1976,

Recalling also resolution 3 of the recommendations of the Conference for international co-operation on living conditions of the Palestinians in occupied territories,<sup>219</sup> and Economic and Social Council resolution 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 31/110 of 16 December 1976,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories<sup>220</sup> and expresses the view that there is need for further analysis in order to meet fully the objectives of General Assembly resolution 31/110;

2. *Requests* therefore the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session a comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in preparing the above-mentioned report, to consult and co-

operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people;

4. *Urges* all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of the report.

SECURITY COUNCIL<sup>221</sup>

**Security Council Resolution 408 (1977) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months**<sup>222</sup>

May 26, 1977

*The Security Council,*

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,<sup>223</sup>

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the urgent need to continue and intensify such efforts,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 30 November 1977;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

<sup>216</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Thirty-second Session, 20 September–21 December 1977*, UN press release GA/5723, p. 227. Adopted at the Assembly's 107th plenary meeting by 107 votes to 4 with 28 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix G.

<sup>217</sup> *Report of Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.76.IV.7 and corrigendum), chap. I. [orig. note.]

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. II. [orig. note.]

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. III. [orig. note.]

<sup>220</sup> Doc. 6 above.

<sup>221</sup> In 1977 the membership of the Security Council was as follows: Benin, Canada, China, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Libya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, USSR, UK, USA and Venezuela.

<sup>222</sup> UN doc. S/RES/408 (1977). Adopted at the Council's 2010th meeting by 12 votes to none; Benin, China and Libya did not participate in the voting.

<sup>223</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1977*, document S/12333. [orig. note.]

**Security Council Resolution 416 (1977) extending the mandate of UNEF for one year<sup>224</sup>****October 21, 1977***The Security Council,*

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October, 340 (1973) of 25 October and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April and 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, 368 (1975) of 17 April, 371 (1975) of 24 July and 378 (1975) of 23 October 1975, and 396 (1976) of 22 October 1976,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force,<sup>225</sup>

Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East,<sup>226</sup>

Recalling the Secretary-General's view that any relaxation of the search for a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be dangerous and his hope that urgent efforts would be undertaken by all concerned to tackle the Middle East problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at the comprehensive settlement called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973),

Noting that the Secretary-General recommends the extension of the mandate of the Force for one year,

1. *Decides:*

(a) To call upon all the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of one year, that is, until 24 October 1978;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and on the steps taken to implement resolution 338 (1973);

2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy.

<sup>224</sup> UN doc. S/RES/416 (1977). Adopted at the Council's 2035th meeting by 13 votes to none; China and Libya did not participate in the voting.

<sup>225</sup> S/12416.

<sup>226</sup> S/12417.

**Security Council Resolution 420 (1977) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months<sup>227</sup>****November 30, 1977***The Security Council,*

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,<sup>228</sup>

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the urgent need to continue and intensify such efforts,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 1978;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

## ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA

**Economic Commission for Western Asia Resolution 36 (IV) accepting the application by the PLO for full membership<sup>229</sup>****April 26, 1977***The Economic Commission for Western Asia,*

Affirming the growing importance of the economic and social role of the Palestinian people in the region of Western Asia,

<sup>227</sup> UN doc. S/RES/420 (1977). Adopted at the Council's 2051st meeting by 12 votes to none; Benin, China, and Libya did not participate in the voting.

<sup>228</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1977*, document S/12453. [orig. note.]

<sup>229</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10* (UN doc. E/5969), p. 22. Adopted unanimously at the Commission's 6th meeting.

Recalling its resolution 12 (II) which accorded the Palestine Liberation Organization permanent observer status on the Economic Commission for Western Asia,

Having considered the note by the Executive Secretary (E/ECWA/46) regarding the request submitted by the State of Bahrain and the Government of Democratic Yemen to accord full member status to the Palestine Liberation Organization on the Economic Commission for Western Asia, after it had been accorded full membership of the League of Arab States,

Having considered article 2 of the terms of reference of the Economic Commission for Western Asia, as contained in Economic and Social Council resolution 1818 (LV) of 9 August 1973,

Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to amend article 2 of its resolution 1818 (LV) to read as follows:

2. The members of the Commission shall consist of the States Members of the United Nations situated in Western Asia, which used to call on the services of the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut, and of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Future applications for membership by member States shall be decided on by the Council upon the recommendation of the Commission.

#### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

35

### **Economic and Social Council Resolution 2089 (LXIII) accepting the PLO as a full member of the Economic Commission for Western Asia<sup>230</sup>**

July 22, 1977

*The Economic and Social Council,*

Recalling its resolution 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976, on assistance to the Palestinian people,

Considering that the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Economic Commission for Western Asia would contribute

to the purposes and aims of the Commission,

Taking into consideration resolution 36 (IV) of the Economic Commission for Western Asia,<sup>231</sup>

1. Decides to amend paragraph 2 of the terms of reference of the Economic Commission for Western Asia as contained in Council resolution 1818 (LV) of 9 August 1973 to read:

2. The members of the Commission shall consist of the States Members of the United Nations situated in Western Asia which used to call on the services of the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut and of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Future applications for membership by Member States shall be decided on by the Council upon the recommendation of the Commission.

2. Requests the Executive Secretary of the Commission to take the necessary measures for the early implementation of the present resolution.

36

### **Economic and Social Council Resolution 2100 (LXIII) urging UN agencies to cooperate with the PLO on projects to improve the social and economic position of the Palestinian people<sup>232</sup>**

August 3, 1977

*The Economic and Social Council,*

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 3210 (XXIX) of 14 October 1974, 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and Council resolutions 1978 (LIX) of 31 July 1975 and 2026 (LXI) of 4 August 1976,

Taking into consideration the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to the Palestinian people,<sup>233</sup>

Bearing in mind the views expressed during the sixty-third session of the Council,

1. Calls once more upon the United Nations Development Programme, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations

<sup>230</sup> Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Geneva 6 July–4 August 1977, Resolutions and Decisions Supplement No. 1 (UN doc. E/6020), p. 1. Adopted at the Council's 2078th plenary meeting by 27 votes to 11, with 12 abstentions.

<sup>231</sup> Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (E/5969), chap. III. [orig. note.]

<sup>232</sup> Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-third Session, Geneva 6 July–4 August 1977, Resolutions and Decisions, Supplement No. 1 (UN doc. E/6020), pp. 25–26. Adopted at the Council's 2084th plenary meeting by 31 votes to 1, with 11 abstentions.

<sup>233</sup> E/6005 and Add.1. [orig. note.]

system to continue and to intensify, as a matter of urgency and in co-ordination with the Economic Commission for Western Asia, their efforts in identifying the social and economic needs of the Palestinian people;

2. *Urges* these agencies and organizations to consult and co-operate closely with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, with a view to establishing and fully implementing concrete projects to ensure the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian people;

3. *Calls* upon agencies and organizations within the United Nations system that have not taken the necessary action in conformity with Council resolution 2026 (LXI) to do so as a matter of priority;

4. *Urges* the executive heads of the organizations and agencies concerned to formulate and submit to their respective governing and/or legislative bodies concrete proposals for ensuring, in co-operation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the effective implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit [an] annual report to the Council on the action taken by the agencies and organizations concerned and the results achieved.

#### COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

### 37

#### **Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1 (XXXIII) A and B deploring Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied territories<sup>234</sup>**

February 15, 1977

#### A

##### *The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Guided* by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of the

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

*Recalling* the pertinent United Nations resolutions on the situation in the occupied territories and the protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories,

*Taking into account* that the General Assembly has, in resolution 31/20, recalled its resolution 3376 (XXX), in which it expressed grave concern that no progress has been achieved towards;

(a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty,

(b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted,

*Taking into consideration* that the General Assembly has adopted resolution 3314 (XXIX) which defines as an act of aggression the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof,

*Welcoming* the statement adopted by the Security Council at its 1969th meeting, on 11 November 1976, by which the Council, *inter alia*, expressed its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation,

*Taking note* of the reports of United Nations organs, specialized agencies and international humanitarian organizations on the situation of the occupied Arab territories and their inhabitants, in particular the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/31/218),

*Greatly alarmed* by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, particularly the measures aiming at annexation, as as well as the continuing establishment of settlers' colonies, mass destruction of homes, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, expropriation of properties and imposition of discriminatory economic legislation,

<sup>234</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 6* (UN doc. E/5927 and E/CN. 411257), pp. 68–71. Adopted at the Commission's 1390th meeting.

A. 23 votes to 3 with 6 abstentions.

B. Adopted without a vote.

1. *Expresses its grave anxiety and concern* over the deteriorating serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and aggression;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the Palestinians and the other displaced inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories to their homes;

3. *Deplores* once again Israel's continued violations, in the occupied Arab territories, of the basic norms of international law and of the relevant international conventions, in particular, Israel's grave breaches of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which are considered as war and an affront to humanity, as well as Israel's persistent defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its continued policy of violating the basic human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

4. *Condemns* in particular the following Israeli policies and practices;

(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlers' colonies therein and the transfer of alien population thereto;

(c) Mass destruction and demolition of Arab houses;

(d) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return;

(e) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

(f) The torture and ill-treatment of persons under detention and the violation of the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions;

(g) The confiscation, expropriation and all transactions for the acquisition of Arab property and land by Israeli authorities and individuals;

(h) The exploitation of human, natural and all other resources of the occupied territories and the promulgation of discriminatory economic legislations;

(i) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;

(j) The denial to the population of the occupied Arab territories of their right to national education and cultural life;

(k) The interference with religious freedoms and practices;

5. *Condemns once more* the massive deliberate destruction of Quneitra perpetrated during Israeli occupation and prior to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that city in 1974, and considers this act as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;

6. *Reaffirms* that all such measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition or status of the occupied Arab territories or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are all null and void, and calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem;

7. *Declares* all measures taken by Israel with a view to changing the structure, status, and established religious practices in the sanctuary of Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in the city of Al-Khalil null and void and calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken;

8. *Calls upon* Israel to release all Arabs detained or imprisoned as a result of their struggle for self-determination and the liberation of their territories, and to accord to them, pending their release, the protection envisaged in the relevant provisions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and, in this context, requests the Secretary-General to collect all relevant information concerning detainees, such as their number, identity, place and duration of detention, and to make this information available to the Commission at its next session;

9. *Further calls upon* Israel once more to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to acknowledge and abide by its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;

10. *Reiterates its call* upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies, the regional intergov-

ernmental organizations and the international humanitarian organizations and to give it the widest possible publicity, and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its next session;

12. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of the thirty-fourth session as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine", and requests the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Commission all United Nations reports appearing between sessions of the Commission that deal with the situation of the civilians of these territories.

## B

### *The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 31/106/B, which reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Urgently calls once more* upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

3. *Urges once more* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, the specialized agencies, the regional intergovernmental organizations and the international humanitarian organizations.

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### **Commission on Human Rights Decision 1 (XXXIII) expressing concern over the death of Arab detainees in Israeli prisons<sup>235</sup>**

**February 10, 1977**

The Commission decided to send the following telegram to the Government of Israel:

The Commission on Human Rights, convened at its thirty-third session, mindful of its duty to promote and to encourage respect for human rights throughout the world, is deeply concerned at reports of the deaths of Arab detainees in Israeli prisons which are attributed to the conditions of their imprisonment and calls upon the Government of Israel to take urgent measures to ensure in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions an improvement in prison conditions and refrain from ill-treatment of detainees.

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### **World Health Assembly resolution WHA 30.37 denouncing Israel for obstructing the committee of experts' investigation on Israeli practices in the occupied territories<sup>236</sup>**

**May 18, 1977**

#### *The Thirtieth World Health Assembly,*

*Recalling* resolution WHA 29.69 and the previous resolutions of the World Health Assembly concerning the health conditions of refugees and displaced persons on the one hand, and on the other hand the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Commission on Human Rights;

*Taking note* of the report of the Director-General on "Health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East", concerning the assistance provided to the Palestinian population;

*Having examined* the report of the Special Committee of Experts set up to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East, and noted that the Special Committee of Experts has not, up till now, been

<sup>235</sup> *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Sixty-second Session, Supplement No. 6* (UN doc. E/5927 and E/CN.4/1257), p. 88. Adopted at the Commission's 138th meeting.

<sup>236</sup> *World Health Assembly Document A 30/VR/13.*

able to carry out its mandate owing to the refusal of the occupying authorities to grant it permission to visit the occupied Arab territories;

*Convinced* that the occupation of territories by force gravely affects the physical, mental and social health conditions of the population under occupation, and that this can be rectified only by the cessation of such occupation;

*Bearing in mind* that the liberation of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of a just peace;

*Deeply concerned* at the forms of pressure practised by the occupying authorities, such as the eviction and deportation of medical and auxiliary staff from the occupied territories, with resulting deterioration of health conditions and services within the occupied territories;

*Deeply concerned* at the continuation in the occupied Arab territories of Israeli practices such as:

(a) the eviction and deportation of Arab populations and the resettlement in their homes of non-Arab inhabitants;

(b) the destruction and demolition of Arab houses and the confiscation and expropriation of Arab lands and properties;

(c) detention and ill-treatment of persons, resulting in numerous deaths;

*Considering* that proper adherence to the mandate conferred on the Special Committee of Experts by the World Health Assembly is essential for the implementation of the Committee's mission;

*Denounces* the procrastination and obstinacy of the Israeli occupying authorities and their obstruction of the mission of the Special Committee of Experts, and considers unacceptable all the excuses to which the authorities have resorted for refusing to grant the Committee permission to visit the occupied Arab territories;

*Considers* that the data which the Israeli occupying authorities have submitted to the Committee concerning the health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories, without permitting the Committee to visit those territories, are inconsistent with resolution WHA 26.56 and hence irrelevant;

*Condemns* Israel for ignoring the previous resolu-

tions adopted by the World Health Assembly;

4. *Demands* that the Israeli occupying authorities permit the Special Committee of Experts as such to visit all the occupied Arab territories and guarantee the Special Committee freedom of movement so that it can directly contact the Arab population under Israeli occupation, Arab institutions and specific target groups within the population, and in the event of failure on the part of Israel to comply with the Assembly's request, that consideration be given by Member States to appropriate action to be taken under the Constitution of the World Health Organization, after a report has been presented by the Director-General;

*Requests* the Special Committee of Experts to carry out its mandate as set forth in section B of resolution WHA 26.56, and to take into consideration the deteriorating health conditions of the detainees which are resulting in many deaths, bearing also in mind the resolution of the thirty-third session of the Commission on Human Rights;

6. *Notes* with appreciation the role played by the Director-General in implementing resolution WHA 29.69, and requests him to continue collaborating with the Palestine Liberation Organization in providing technical and material assistance to raise the level of health of the Palestinian population;

7. *Requests* the Director-General to continue to allocate the necessary funds for the improvement of the health conditions of the population in the occupied Arab territories and to ensure that such funds are used under the direct supervision of WHO through its representative in the occupied Arab territories;

8. *Requests* the Director-General to report to the Thirty-first World Health Assembly on the execution of the mandate of the Special Committee of Experts;

9. *Decides* that the title of the relevant item be amended to read "Health conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories including Palestine" in the provisional agenda for the Thirty-first World Health Assembly.





International



**Press interview statements by Mayor Zayyad of Nazareth discussing the situation of Arabs in Israel<sup>1</sup>**

**Early January, 1977**

*Q. Do you as an Arab Israeli feel that you have just as many rights as a Jewish Israeli has?*

*A.* According to Israeli law, all citizens of the country are equal, but there are unwritten laws according to which the whole Arab population in Israel suffers from the policy of national aggression and discrimination. So, in a sense, we are, under the law, full citizens, but in practice it is not this way and we are considered second-class citizens.

*Q. For example?*

*A.* First of all, all Arab towns and villages in Israel have been under military rule since 1948. After the extension of the state, this rule was established in all Arab towns and villages. Until 1966, no Arab could move from his military zone to another military zone in the country without a military pass. This practice was abolished in 1966, but the military rule is still going on. After abolishing the military pass requirement, the government blacklisted 1,000 to 2,000 people who were mainly opponents of the official policy of the state. These are blacklisted on a political basis; any political activist who doesn't agree with the official line is blacklisted and he cannot move freely. I, until I was elected a member of the Knesset at the end of 1973, could not move about ever since 1948. After being elected a member of the parliament, I obtained parliamentary immunity.

*Q. You are undertaking a major restructuring of your town but claim you have run into considerable difficulties in obtaining funds from the government. Do you see this as a personal thing?*

*A.* First of all, the Arab municipalities and local councils are discriminated against on a national basis not because there is a Communist mayor. Even before I was elected mayor, the town council of Nazareth suffered from a lack of national financial help and funds. This policy was sharpened after I was elected. Most of the mayors and councils of these Arab municipalities are not Communists and they are government-affiliated, but it is just the same as at Nazareth. They just don't receive help and funds—only nominally, which in reality amounts to nothing. For any Arab council in any Arab village, its budget is any where from one-tenth to one-eighth that of a comparable Jewish village. This is a general picture.

*Q. How big is Nazareth?*

*A.* Nazareth has a population of 45,000. The budget for the 1975-76 financial year which ended last March was 31 million Israeli liras. Afula is a town six or seven kilometers from Nazareth and the budget is the same despite the fact that Afula has only 16,000 or 17,000 people. We are three times the population of Afula. Upper Nazareth has 16,000 or 17,000 population and its budget is about 40 million liras. Acre, which is about 35,000 people, during the same year had a budget of 50 million Israeli liras; this year their budget is 60 million liras. In Israel, the budgets of the local councils and municipalities are built on two things mainly—taxes and governmental financial help.

*Q. So, in other words, much of your budget comes out of Jerusalem?*

*A.* From the Ministry of Interior. This is the Israeli type of budget. Without government help, you cannot pay the salaries of the employees. This difference between the budget of Nazareth and Acre, which has 10,000 less population, is a difference of 19 million Israeli liras. With 19 million additional liras we could turn Nazareth into a literal paradise in two or three years. We

<sup>1</sup> Interview conducted by William Willoughby, the *Washington Star*, January 8, 1977, pp. A1, C8.

can't carry out many major projects of development for the town.

*Q. What other problems do you face?*

*A.* First of all, we suffer from lack of land. The smashing majority of the Arab lands in Israel has been confiscated during the last 28 years. This confiscation of Arab land has been a daily process since the establishment of the state. Nazareth, for instance, lost a vast majority of its land. Jewish Upper Nazareth was built on these lands. There is also the problem of education. A government committee five years ago estimated the shortage at 3,000 classrooms. Now, after five years, the estimated shortage is about 6,000 rooms. The school in an Arab village is something that is distributed all over the village. It is not all in one building—two or three rooms here; two or three rooms elsewhere. Sometimes they are even without a toilet. They are like stables, not fit for a human being. Of course, there is a big lack of equipment. In some villages the children have been using the same chairs for 15 years—things like that. There are no playgrounds—not even trees in most of the schools.

*Q. How about at higher levels?*

*A.* In the universities about 1.8 percent of the enrollment is Arab. In education, there is a lack of secondary education and vocational schools. In public services, the great majority of villages are without a network of asphalt roads inside the village itself and are without other public services. Even in Nazareth, which has a drainage system, there is by no means a complete system. There is not a single Arab village except Nazareth which has a drainage system. In Nazareth, there are parts of the town without drainage, without electricity, without asphalt roads. There are parts of Nazareth which still are in the same condition they were 2,000 years ago when Christ was there. Nothing has changed except in parts of the town.

*Q. And how do you compare this with the Jewish villages and towns?*

*A.* In 1952 or 1953 there was question about Judaizing Galilee—whether or not there was a right to do that. Then they began expropriating Arab lands and building Jewish towns. The Jewish towns are given much more opportunity to develop themselves. It is impossible to compare, for instance, the difference between Nazareth and

Upper Nazareth. In Nazareth, we don't even have one factory—for that matter, none of the Arab communities has. This is literally speaking. The majority of our Arabic workers are working outside our own towns and villages—in Jewish enterprises in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Eilat, places like that. Of the 80,000 Arab workers, 60,000 of them are working outside their own communities. The physical situation of any Arab village simply cannot be compared with any Jewish village.

*Q. Do you see the government of Israel looking at its Arab citizens as being suspect, as a threat to state interests? If so, do you see any practical way they can allay these fears and suspicions?*

*A.* After the 1948 war, the majority of the Arab population who used to live in the villages where we were supposed to be according to the partition plan were kicked out and more than 480 villages were destroyed. The Arabs who remained in Israel after it was established decided that this is their homeland and they did not want to leave by any means. It was all the time true that they wanted to live in Israel, but as equals. We considered ourselves to be part of the state and we only wanted to live in peace with national equality. The government doesn't appreciate it and does not accept in a positive way this fact and plans all it can to sharpen its policy against the Arab people so as to convince them indirectly that they have to leave the country. But, of course, we are not going to leave the country. We are part of the soil. We want a homeland like any other people. We proved that we are not against the state; we are only against the policy of our government. And every identification between the state and the policy of the government is harmful to the state itself. We want to change the policy.

*Q. How?*

*A.* We are trying to mobilize public opinion in Israel and we appreciate that there are wide circles of democratically minded Jews with whom we are working hand in hand against this policy which we are against and for peace and justice in the Middle East.

*Q. How much chance do you feel that you have of changing the policy?*

*A.* We have a chance. There is a chance to change this policy. This maybe isn't for the near

future, but we have to continue to struggle. We have no alternative but to continue it. I believe that if a just peace could be established in the Middle East this would help us much in the state of Israel.

*Q. What would be your position toward the Palestine Liberation Organization and other Arabs who are not willing to recognize Israel as a state?*

*A.* The PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people, recognized internationally by the Arab nations, and more than that, recognized by the Palestinians themselves. Of course, there are differences between our program for solution in the Middle East and the PLO program, but this is not meant to ignore the PLO as the sole representative. Our differences with the PLO is centered on one point, mainly, about the right of the state of Israel to exist. The PLO is not recognizing Israel and I think it is understandable. Israel is not recognizing the Palestinian people. Israel must recognize the Arab people and their right for self-determination. I think this would lead automatically to the recognition of Israel by the PLO. Historical developments would bring such recognition by the Palestinians and the PLO of the right of Israel to exist. But to ask the Palestinians and the PLO to recognize Israel before Israel recognizes the Palestinian people is like putting the carriage before the horse. It must be vice-versa, I think.

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### **Statement by the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestine Peace expressing satisfaction with the relations formed between the Council and the PLO and their desire to work for peace on the basis of a mutual agreement<sup>2</sup>**

Paris, January 1, 1977

The PLO believes that the principles for peace laid down in the statement by the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestine Peace constitute an acceptable basis for the solution of the Palestine-Israel conflict...

The Palestinian leader reaffirmed that the PLO was not opposed to the Geneva peace conference and that it would participate in it if invited. Until that was possible, the PLO would deploy all its efforts in favour of peace on the basis of a mutual agreement. As a first step towards the realisation of this objective, the PLO is maintaining close relations with the Israeli Council for an Israel-Palestine Peace and with the other forces of peace inside Israel, whose activities are warmly appreciated.

Mr. Peled, president of the executive committee of the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestine Peace has explained in detail the development of Israeli public opinion on the subject of the Palestinian people and the PLO. Mr. Peled stressed the significance of the Knesset debate on the Israeli Council's contacts with the PLO and recent votes demonstrating the growing desire in Israel to deal directly with the PLO. He also stressed that M.K. Ariele Eliav had recently had occasion to inform President Katzir of the details of these meetings.

The PLO leader as well as Mr. Peled are of the opinion that the relations made between the PLO and the Israeli Council for an Israel-Palestine Peace mark a ray of hope in the relations between their peoples. They expect that their cooperation in the struggle for peace will contribute to the establishment of cordial, friendly and respectful relations between the PLO and the Israeli people.

Regular meetings between the PLO leader and members of the Israeli Council for an Israel-Palestine Peace are planned for the future.

<sup>2</sup> Statement made after talks between the two sides on December 31, 1976 and January 1, 1977; French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 6, 1977, p. 2.

**Speech by Likud Party leader Begin of Israel explaining the party's foreign policy (excerpt)<sup>3</sup>**

Jerusalem, January 6, 1977

The Likud is seeking the confidence of the voters, so that it may become the leading parliamentary party and form the next government. Until the government crisis we were saying that the Labour Alignment must be moved to the opposition seats. Since that time the country has been living in the nightmare of a minority government, which lacks the confidence of the Knesset. The Alignment is, in fact, ruling against the opposition of the Knesset majority in which the Likud is the primary factor. So from now on we say that the Alignment must remain in the opposition seats with limited representation. Thus after the elections in May it will be possible to form a government, in which the Likud is the dominant element, and which will enjoy the confidence of the Knesset.

If the Likud is called to form the government, its primary concern will be to prevent war. Fully aware of the gravity and authenticity of our words—this has been experienced by other nations—I am expressing now my full confidence that we shall deter aggression, prevent war, preserve the security of the nation and move it towards peace. We shall always be concerned to increase the strength of the Israeli army. We shall work for a permanent transition to a state where we ourselves produce the basic means of defence and deterrence. Israel has outstanding scientists and an excellent labour force, so it is always possible, thanks to them, to achieve this goal.

The Likud government will take initiatives towards peace. We shall do this not through UN General Assembly, where the majority is hostile to us, but rather we shall look for a friendly country which has normal diplomatic relations with Israel and its neighbours; we shall transmit our suggestions to them to start negotiations towards signing a peace treaty. These negotiations

must be direct, with no previous conditions, and free from any foreign formulas for a solution. "With no previous conditions" means that just as we do not ask the Arabs to accept our suggestions before starting negotiations, they also will not ask us to accept their suggestions before attending a peace conference. This will meet alternately in the capitals of our states, or in a neutral place such as Geneva. "Free from any foreign formulas for a solution" is an item in the platform of the US Democratic Party on the Middle East, which was approved by the president-elect, Carter (except for the transferral of the US Embassy to Jerusalem). This is a sound political stand which we adopt with no reservations. The negotiating table must be clean. The partners must be committed to refrain from any hostile acts—by means of regular armies or non-regular forces.

Special attention must be given to the relations between Israel and the United States. These relations should be established on a mutual basis, in the conscience of the two peoples too. Till now, there has been an impression prevailing in America that there is one-sidedness in providing aid to Israel. From my experience I can say that only few people in America know what we did for her during the seven years of war in Vietnam, when we were standing on the east bank of the closed Suez Canal. The truth is that by forcing the Soviet arms shipment to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, we delayed the supply of weapons to the enemies of the US and saved thousands of American soldiers from being killed or wounded. Leftist snobism has prevented, till now, certain circles from revealing these and other facts to American public opinion. We shall reveal these facts, and our relations will be established on mutual recognition—which is the real basis for foreign relations. We will encourage the initiative of Israeli citizens and friends of the US, and the initiative of American citizens and friends of Israel, to establish public committees in both countries to serve US-Israeli common interests.

These common interests stand on the background of a claim to establish a so-called Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. Such a state would be a continued threat to the Jewish state and also a serious threat to the free world as a whole, because it will inevitably turn into a central Soviet base in the Middle East: We shall dedicate our full attention to explaining this common interest.

<sup>3</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), January 7, 1977, p. 21.

We shall express our readiness to normalize the relations between Israel and the Soviet Union, should the USSR which severed its diplomatic relations with Israel nine years ago, suggest their renewal. We shall inform her of our readiness for that, but we clearly demand that the Soviet government stop the persecution of Jews and Zionists, set Russian Jewry free, and make it possible for any of them to emigrate to Eretz Israel, if he so wishes.

We shall act to repair relations between Israel and France and renew our friendship with her. I am convinced that our numerous friends in France will work towards this good objective, also on a mutual basis. The coming period will be suitable for this joint action in both countries.

We shall also contribute, as far as possible, to the establishment of peace and mutual understanding among nations.

Our national policy will be based, in accordance with right, justice and law, on the following principles:

1. Judaea and Samaria are integral parts of the Israeli sovereignty. It should be known that anyone ready to surrender Judaea and Samaria to foreign rule will inevitably be founding the basis for a Palestinian state.
2. The borders between Egypt and Israel shall be fixed in Sinai. The whole of Sinai is no more in our hands, and there is no party in Israel, except for the communists, who is ready to abandon all of Sinai. There is nothing more to add to our basic provision concerning a peace treaty. It has been established that no line drawn by the government leads to an agreement, but rather to pressures for further shifting to Israel's disadvantage.
3. The borders between Syria and Israel shall be fixed on the Golan Heights based on the political evaluation already made.
4. Relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Eretz Israel shall be founded on propriety, mutual respect, equal rights of citizens and inhabitants, and socio-economic progress.
5. Members of the Arab nation, which we recognize, shall be given a free choice to acquire Israeli citizenship or to keep their previous one. If they choose to become Israeli citizens, they will enjoy all rights, including voting for the Knesset, on equal footing with Jewish citizens. If they do not choose our citizenship, they will enjoy all rights,

except voting for the Knesset, on equal footing with Jewish citizens. The Arabs in Eretz Israel shall be assured of autonomous education. The refugee problem shall be solved on humane basis, through human understanding, by providing them with work and housing.

This programme is called, misleadingly, "chauvinism". I want to ask every intellectual what kind of chauvinism is there, if we are proposing a life in common with members of another nation, in peace, propriety, equal rights and mutual respect? We are facing a complete distortion of concepts and facts. We are not "chauvinists", we are nationalists.

. . . . .

#### 43

#### **Press statement issued by the Ministry of Justice of France summarizing the arguments of the court commanding the release of Fatah official Awda (Abu Daud)<sup>4</sup>**

Paris, January 11, 1977

Informed by the German police force, within the framework of international agreements, of the existence of an international warrant for the arrest of the perpetrators of the Munich attack, and of the circumstantial evidence of the German police according to which Mr. Abu Daud, who entered France under the name Ragi Yussuf, was one of the perpetrators, the French police authorities summoned the person concerned to an identity check on Friday afternoon. Subsequently, at the telephoned request of the interior minister of Federal Germany announcing the issuing of a warrant for the arrest of the party concerned and confirmed by telegraph late in the evening, the French authorities retained the said party in custody.

On Saturday morning the German judicial authorities informed the French authorities in writing and through Interpol of the contents of the warrant for the arrest of Mr. Abu Daud, called for his arrest and made a request for extradition.

<sup>4</sup> Translated from the French Text, *Le Monde* (Paris), January 13, 1977, p. 2.

Under these conditions, in application of article 9, paragraph 1 of the extradition agreement between France and Germany, Mr. Abu Daud was brought before the court which proceeded to make a provisional arrest.

However, in application of article 9, paragraph 3, of the Franco-German agreement, this request by the German judicial authorities should, at the same time, be confirmed through diplomatic channels.

Now the summing up also indicates that the Grand Jury of the Court of Appeal, which met Tuesday morning to pass judgement on upholding the provisional arrest of Mr. Abu Daud, established that this diplomatic confirmation had not arrived and that, therefore, the German authorities had not completed the necessary measures for the continuation of this arrest.

Moreover, the Israeli authorities on Monday evening let it be known through Interpol that an arrest warrant existed, issued by the Israeli police against Mr. Abu Daud for the same reasons, and asked in application of article 10 of the French-Israeli extradition agreement for his provisional arrest in view of his possible extradition.

The Grand Jury has established that the acts in question were committed outside Israel by persons not having Israeli nationality at a time when French law did not authorize the prosecution in France of analogous actions committed in a foreign country by a foreigner. It therefore considered that, in application of article 3, last paragraph of the law of March 10, 1927, it could not carry out the request of the Israeli authorities concerning these actions.

Under these circumstances the Grand Jury has decided to release Mr. Abu Daud, against whom no charge has been made concerning his activities in France.

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**Statement by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev calling for cooperation with the US in a resumption of the Geneva conference (excerpt)<sup>5</sup>**

**Tula, January 18, 1977**

We stand for most vigorous measures to eliminate the hotbed of war in the Middle East. The bloodshed in Lebanon, which was stopped with such difficulty, has demonstrated once again the dangers with which further procrastination with regard to the Middle East conflict is fraught.

The Middle East needs a lasting and just settlement which will not encroach on the vital rights of any state and any people. Israel, of course, has the right to state independence and a secure existence. But the Arab people of Palestine have a similar right.

The road to a settlement of the Middle East problem—and we have said this many times—lies through the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. It now appears that all the interested sides are inclined to have the work of the conference resumed. And this implies a still greater increase in the importance of cooperation between the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference—the Soviet Union and the United States. Given a mutual desire, they could do much to help the sides in the search for mutually-acceptable solutions.

<sup>5</sup> Made in a speech at celebrations marking the role of Tula (south of Moscow) in the Second World War; excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5867 (January 25, 1977), p. 29.



45

**Press interview statements by US President Carter calling for Palestinian participation within the Arab delegation in Middle East peace talks<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1977

*Ms. Thomas: What are the prospects of a Geneva conference on the Middle East soon, and will we formulate final Arab-Israeli settlement proposals that were put on the table?*

A. I think the conference on the Middle East is very likely this year. I would hate to go into more detail about where or when until after at least the Secretary of State has had a chance to consult in depth with the heads of state, Israel and Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

*Ms. Thomas: Will he be going to the Middle East?*

A. Yes, he will be going to the Middle East, I think within the next month. Many of these leaders will be invited to come and visit me here. I would prefer to meet with the leaders of those nations after the Secretary of State has had a chance to consult with them.

*Ms. Thomas: Would you approve of the Palestinians having representation at such a peace conference, and would you think in terms of their eventually having statehood?*

A. I think it would not be appropriate now for me to spell out specifics. If the Palestinians should be invited to the meeting as agreed by the other participating nations, along with us, it would probably be as part of one of the Arab delegations. But that is something still to be decided.

46

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of President Giscard d'Estaing of France (excerpt)<sup>7</sup>**

Riyad, January 25, 1977

The two sides held talks in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding... Regarding the situation in the Middle East, HM King Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz and HE the French President declared that there were dangerous implications involving the current situation in the Middle East area vis-a-vis the stability of the area and world peace. The two sides believed that if the current circumstances were more propitious than before for a comprehensive, just and durable solution, an urgent initiative must be taken to search for this solution. Otherwise, the situation would deteriorate dangerously.

The French President asserted that a settlement should be based on Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied in June 1967, the right of the Palestinian people to have a homeland like other peoples, and the right of the area's states to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders.

His Majesty King Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz pointed out that the Palestine issue was the essence of the Middle East dispute, and that the desired just peace in the area would only be achieved by Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and by the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to determine their future on their soil and homeland. His Majesty King Khalid Bin Abd al-Aziz also pointed out that a comprehensive solution to our cause must be achieved through the participation of all the parties concerned including the PLO, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Concerning Lebanon, the two sides expressed their pleasure at the return of calm to Lebanon as a result of the Riyad<sup>8</sup> and Cairo<sup>9</sup> summit conference

<sup>6</sup> Interview granted to AP and UPI; excerpted from the partial transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVI, 1964 (February 14, 1977), p. 125.

<sup>7</sup> Broadcast on Riyad radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5423/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

<sup>8</sup> See doc. 267 in *International Documents 1976*.

<sup>9</sup> See doc. 314 in *ibid*.

resolutions. The two sides made clear their agreement on the need to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and the unity of its people and territory. They also expressed their appreciation of the efforts exerted for national reconciliation, rebuilding the state, and the reconstruction of Lebanon under the leadership of President Ilyas Sarkis.

#### 47

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Finland by a PLO delegation<sup>10</sup>**

**Helsinki, January 29, 1977**

In response to an invitation extended by the Arab-Finnish Friendship Society, a Palestinian delegation made up of comrades Ghanim Zurayqat, Mahmud Qadri and Adil Wasfi, paid an official visit to Finland in the period between January 19 and 29, 1977.

On January 22, the delegation took part in a public discussion on Palestine and the Middle East problem. Comrade Ghanim Zurayqat delivered the PLO address.

The delegation also took part in several meetings of solidarity with the people of Palestine which took place in several Finnish cities. Contributing to the success of these meetings was a Palestinian musical group which met with a splendid response. The Palestinian delegation met with the executive committee of the Arab-Finnish Friendship Society and with the National Council of the Finnish Peace Committee.

The delegation also met with representatives of several political parties and popular organizations, including Mr. Uiva Leto, member of the Politbureau of the Finnish Communist Party, Mr. Yiavi Poikolin, secretary for foreign affairs of the Finnish Communist Party, Mr. Perko Tuola Parvi, deputy leader of the Finnish Democratic Socialist Party, Mr. Miko Imoten, secretary-general of the Centre Party, Mr. Ilka Irik, secretary for foreign affairs and Mr. Juan von Ponsdorf, secretary of the Finnish Trade Union.

At the Foreign Ministry the delegation was received by Mr. Jako Blomberg, in charge of bilateral relations with foreign states at the Political

department. The delegation was also received by Mr. Leo Kotala, a former deputy representing the Democratic Socialist Party and the Finnish member of the international committee investigating Israeli crimes against human rights in the occupied Arab territories. All these meetings and discussions took place in a fraternal atmosphere and with mutual understanding.

During these meetings, the question of opening a PLO information office in Helsinki was discussed and agreement was reached between the Friendship Society and the PLO delegation regarding the importance of opening a PLO office since this would constitute a positive step in view of the strong interest in the Palestine problem expressed by Finnish public opinion, political parties and official circles. This would enhance the status of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Palestine.

The Friendship Society saluted Comrade Abu Ammar and underlined the importance of strong relations between itself and the Palestine Committee for Peace and Solidarity.

The PLO delegation, in turn, expressed their thanks and appreciation to the Arab-Finnish Friendship Society and the Finnish Peace Committee for the role they are playing in enhancing solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian and Arab people.

The communiqué affirmed the following:

1. The necessity for the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories in accordance with UN resolutions and of securing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, primarily:
  - (a) Their right to return to their homeland, to establish their independent state and to self-determination.
  - (b) Condemnation of all acts of racial discrimination aimed at transforming the cultural, civilizational and social character of Jerusalem and of all occupied Arab territories; condemnation of the crimes committed by the Zionist ruling circles against human rights in the occupied Arab territories.
  - (c) Recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, whose sovereignty and right to fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people must be recognized.

<sup>10</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 12, 1977, p. 6.

**Draft resolution of the EEC affirming the need for a Middle East peace settlement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338<sup>11</sup>**

January 31, 1977

1. Recent developments in the Middle East have created serious possibilities for negotiations. The states of the EEC express their direct interest in the rapid progress towards reaching a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. They are aware that the situation of "no war, no peace" seriously harms security in the region and in the world.

2. From this vantage, the Nine affirm the need for a peace agreement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and on the principles outlined in their joint communiqué of November 6, 1973,<sup>12</sup> as follows:

(a) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

(b) The need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict;

(c) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

(d) Recognition that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into account in the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

3. We wish to reaffirm that all these principles must form a whole, and that Israel, within the framework of a settlement, must be ready to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. Similarly we believe that the Arab side must be willing to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

4. With regards to the rights of the Palestinians, the Nine consider that there can be no possible solution to the Middle East conflict unless the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to express their national entity is concretised. In this respect, it reaffirms the statement of its representative in New York on February 2, 1976, that "the exercise

of the right of the Palestinian people in the effective expression of its national identity can be encompassed on a regional basis within the framework of a negotiated settlement."

5. The Nine consider that peace negotiations aiming at a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement to the conflict must be renewed immediately. They appreciate the efforts made in this respect by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conformity with UN General Assembly resolution 31/62 of December 12, 1976. They consider that the parties involved, including the Palestinian people, must begin consultations in an appropriate manner. On this basis they insist that all the parties take appropriate measures to encourage the start of realistic and constructive negotiations.

6. The EEC states are prepared to help as much as they can and within the limits defined by its members in the realization of a settlement. They are willing to participate in its application as soon as an agreement is reached by all parties. In this respect, the Nine, as they have previously announced, will most probably be ready to consider participating in the organization of international guarantees for the application of a peaceful settlement.

49

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Deputy Chairman Hussein of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq (excerpts)<sup>13</sup>**

Moscow, February 3, 1977

Sadam Hussain, Vice-Regional General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and Vice-President of the Iraqi Republic Revolutionary Command Council, was in the Soviet Union Jan. 31 through Feb. 3, 1977, on an official goodwill visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government.

<sup>11</sup> The resolution was later withdrawn by the EEC. Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 21, 1977, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>13</sup> Partial English text, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIX, 5 (March 2, 1977), pp. 19-20. Translation copyright 1977 by THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

Hussain was received by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Special attention was given during the negotiations to the situation in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic express deep concern over the continuing tension in that region caused by Israel's aggressive expansionist actions and the policy of imperialism, which is inimical to the fundamental interests of that region's peoples. In order to maintain and strengthen their position in the Middle East, these forces try to undermine antiimperialist gains in this region and incite internecine conflicts among Arabs.

The sides consider that the events that transpired in Lebanon were part of a conspiracy by the forces of imperialism and reaction aimed at dealing a blow to the Palestinian resistance movement and the national-patriotic forces of Lebanon and diverting the Arab peoples' attention away from the struggle to solve the cardinal problems of the Middle East. They welcome the cessation of military actions in Lebanon and are unanimous in their conviction that the Lebanese crisis must be settled by the Lebanese themselves, without foreign intervention, in a way that preserves Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The sides declare their solidarity with the Palestinian resistance movement's just struggle against Israeli aggression and for the Palestinian Arab people's independence. They reaffirm their resolve to continue rendering comprehensive aid and support to the Palestinian movement, viewing it as an integral part of the Arab and world national-liberation movement.

The Soviet Union and Iraq expressed deep conviction that a just and enduring peace can be achieved in the Middle East only on condition that all occupied Arab territory be liberated and the legitimate and inalienable national rights of Palestine's Arab peoples completely satisfied.

The Soviet Union and Iraq proceed on the premise that unity among the Arab states on an antiimperialist, progressive basis and strengthening of their friendship and cooperation with the world's progressive countries, and above all with the USSR and other countries of the socialist commonwealth, are becoming of the greatest

importance to success in the struggle for attainment of these goals.

The Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic declare their resolve to further strengthen the bonds of Soviet-Arab friendship, which they view as a historic achievement of the Soviet Union and the Arab countries. They will firmly rebuff any attempts to damage this friendship and will make every effort to cement close union between the socialist states and the Arab national-liberation movement.

## 50

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi<sup>14</sup>**

**Belgrade, February 4, 1977**

Upon the invitation of the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Milos Minic, the head of the PLO Political Department, Faruq Qaddumi, paid a brief working visit to Yugoslavia. He was received by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Union of Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia, to whom Qaddumi communicated the views of the Palestine Liberation Organization regarding the progress of events in Lebanon and the Middle East. Qaddumi also exchanged views in detail with the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Milos Minic, concerning certain important issues in international relations, especially those that have a bearing on the development of the situation in the Middle East, and the initiatives being made for a Middle East settlement, in light of the preparations being made to prepare for a reconvening of the Geneva Middle East peace conference.

Also discussed in depth were the activities of the non-aligned states and the ministerial meeting of the non-aligned states scheduled to be held in early April of this year in New Delhi.<sup>15</sup> Faruq Qaddumi also held especially important talks with the Deputy Chairman of the Federal Council of the Socialist Alliance of the Yugoslav Working

<sup>14</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 5, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> See doc. 81 below.

people, Marin Chetenic, and with Dobrivoje Fedic, member of the Executive Committee of the Presidential Council of the Yugoslav Communist League. In addition to an exchange of views concerning the current situation in the Middle East, these talks included a discussion of development in the relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Yugoslav Communist League, the Socialist Alliance of the Yugoslav Working People and other political and social organizations. The talks dealt with the type of aid and support that Yugoslav political and social organizations can furnish to the Palestine Liberation Organization in the future.

During the discussions, which took place in an atmosphere of total frankness and understanding on both sides, a complete agreement of views emerged regarding the basic issues in the Middle East crisis, especially as regards the Palestine problem and safeguarding the Palestinian presence, as well as other issues related to the international scene.

The Yugoslavian side reaffirmed its total support for the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, for without a just settlement of the Palestinian question along these lines, there can be no settlement of the Middle East crisis.

## 51

### **Joint communiqué issued following talks between President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel<sup>16</sup>**

**Geneva, February 4, 1977**

Today, Friday, H.E. President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast met with Yitzhaq Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, in Geneva and held talks which lasted three hours.

The President and the Premier exchanged views in depth about the Middle East situation and discussed diplomatic efforts that aim to achieve peace in the region.

They agreed that the best way is dialogue, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and

338.

They also discussed the role of African states in international relations.

Discussions took place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and total frankness.

## 52

### **Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Genscher of West Germany outlining the position of the European Community towards a Middle East settlement<sup>17</sup>**

**February 9, 1977**

*Q. Can your Excellency clarify the aims of your forthcoming Middle East visit and tell us the kind of talks you are going to have in this part of the world?*

*A. My visits to Jordan, Syria and Egypt will centre for the moment on two issues:*

Concern for the close and friendly relations happily existing between us for a long time, and an exchange of ideas on international questions. I will direct my talks towards evaluation on the expectations and possibilities of a peace settlement in the Middle East. We are of the view that the expectation of progress towards a solution to the conflict in 1977 is better than ever before. However the difficulties ahead, as in the past, are very great.

I look forward with particularly eager anticipation to the visit to Jordan, that in this connection plays an extremely important role.

*Q. In past weeks a Franco-German meeting has taken place in which you clarified your forthcoming Middle East trip. Does this mean that you are trying to synchronize the FRG's attitude towards the Middle East with that of France?*

*A. Of course, the Middle East question is one of the most important topics to be exhaustively discussed in all bilateral consultations. This is also the case at the regular Franco-German meetings.*

I should, however, point out that the nine states of the European Community have displayed a

<sup>16</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), February 6, 1977.

<sup>17</sup> Interview conducted for the Jordanian national news agency; translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 12 (February 11, 1977), pp. 111-112.

joint position on Middle East policy since 1973, adjusting it according to developments. At the last meeting of the nine foreign ministers at the European Political Cooperation session on February 1 in London, we were once more able to affirm that we in Europe found ourselves united over the Middle East question.

*Q. In your view, what role could the Western European states play? Should they participate in the solution to the Middle East problem?*

A. The states of the European Community have an immediate interest in a peace settlement in this area, which is a neighbour of Europe. The heads of government and countries of the Nine, as far back as December 15, 1973, made known their readiness to help in the search for peace and in guaranteeing a settlement. This readiness remains steadfastly strong.

As you know, the European states have not participated in the Geneva conference. This does not, however, prevent them from exerting their own influence, in order to promote the willingness of all parties to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. My trip, and that of my French colleague which follows soon after, are an expression of this attitude. I will also pay a visit to Israel in mid-March and hope that experience I gain on this trip can serve to reduce somewhat the mistrust that still exists.

*Q. How do you evaluate German-Jordanian relations in particular and Arab-German relations in general and in your view what is the best way to promote these relations?*

A. The relations between both our countries are traditionally warm and close. The visits of His Majesty King Hussein and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan to the Federal Republic of Germany are just as much evidence of this, as the visit to Jordan of the present Federal President Walter Scheel, when he was still foreign minister.

Like my countrymen I have not forgotten that Jordan has in the past shown us much goodwill, when German-Arab relations were facing difficulties.

Fortunately these difficulties belong to the past. Germany and the southern Mediterranean region, especially Jordan, have maintained traditionally good and close relations. This holds true for politics as it does for economics and especially for culture. Today interdependence is greater than it ever was.

With the cooperation agreement between the European Community and almost all Arab states of the Mediterranean we have developed close economic relations. Only a few days ago we signed such an agreement with Jordan, Syria and Egypt. Just as with the Euro-Arab dialogue we want to promote growth and stability in both areas and show the world that a balanced collaboration is possible between countries of different levels of industrialisation.

*Q. What significance can be given to Euro-Arab dialogue and what is its criteria? How do you evaluate the dialogue until now and what should be done to guarantee the best possible results?*

A. The main significance of Euro-Arab dialogue lies in the fact that it has succeeded in finding a new kind of comprehensive cooperation between two neighbouring regions. The Arab world and Europe, whose relations with one another go far back in history, are predestined for this cooperation.

The dialogue has made good progress during the two years of its existence and I see it as the right way towards close cooperation that is profitable for both sides.

The results reached during the working sessions on the technical level since 1975 are impressive. Certainly—and I must stress this—we should not look at the dialogue in a short term perspective. Euro-Arab dialogue is a long-term undertaking that is aimed at the development of a lasting partnership.

I think that a reciprocal sense of duty and a joint desire to firmly strengthen and build up our cooperation are decisive criteria for our dialogue.

53

**Press conference statements by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany reviewing his position on the Middle East conflict<sup>18</sup>**

**Damascus, February 9, 1977**

*Q. I should like to ask Mr. Genscher his view on what the President said about West German participation in the Geneva conference being useful?*

A. In this connection, we should recall the agreements concluded between the European [Economic] Community and a number of Middle East countries, including Syria. We believe that these economic agreements are an expression of a balanced policy on the Middle East, that will promote stability in the area and create the conditions favourable for the solution of the Middle East conflict.

Yesterday, I mentioned our view of a settlement to the Middle East conflict. We are paying close attention to the efforts that are being made by the US to solve the Middle East conflict. We do not want to compete with the US; we want to cooperate with it as a European community, in creating the atmosphere favourable to this solution.

As regards the proposed Geneva conference, we believe that increasing the number of individuals and groups participating in it might not contribute to its success. We, for our part, want to share in bringing viewpoints closer together in the light of our balanced policy.

At the same time, we understand the President's statement about welcoming West German participation.

We thank the President for the constructive role his government is playing with a view to reaching a solution of the Middle East conflict.

We believe that the objective circumstances for reaching a solution of the Middle East conflict are better today than ever before.

I have brought President Hafiz Asad not only the greetings of the President and Chancellor of

West Germany, but also an official invitation from the President of the Republic for him to visit West Germany, and the President and the Chancellor will both be very happy if he accepts this invitation.

54

**Joint communiqué issued following talks between a delegation of the Working People's Progressive Party of Cyprus and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>19</sup>**

**Beirut, February 9, 1977**

At the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, a delegation representing the Working People's Progressive Party of Cyprus, led by its secretary-general Comrade Papaioannou, and made up of Comrades Ioannis Katsouridis, member of the party's secretariat and of its Political Bureau, and George Safidis, chairman of the Party Central Supervision Committee and of its Committee for Solidarity with the Arab People against Imperialism, responded to the invitation, and the delegation was received by Brother Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee and commander-in-chief of the forces of the Palestine revolution.

Brother Yasir Arafat exchanged views with the secretary-general of the party and the head of the visiting delegation concerning the current situation in Cyprus and in the Palestine revolution. Also reviewed were all matters relating to the struggle of the two friendly peoples, the Cypriot and Palestinian, against imperialism, racist Zionism and colonialism and for the realization of their national objectives.

In this regard, Comrade Papaioannou, head of the delegation, expressed the support of the Working People's Progressive Party of Cyprus and of the people of Cyprus in general for the Palestinian people and its armed revolution in its heroic struggle against the racist Zionist entity in Palestine and for the creation of a secular democratic state in Palestine. Comrade Papaioannou explained the nature of the battle being waged by the Cypriot people for the sake of the independence and the unity of Cyprus. He referred to the necessity of

<sup>18</sup> Made at a joint press conference with President Asad of Syria; interview conducted by the German press corps accompanying Mr. Genscher; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 10, 1977. For President Asad's statements see doc. 212 below.

<sup>19</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 9, 1977, p. 3.

implementing UN resolutions regarding Cyprus, for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and for the return of the refugees to their homes, in order to safeguard respect for the independence of Cyprus, its sovereignty and its non-aligned position. He further explained the party's advocacy of a constructive dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots without foreign interference to settle their problems, including the problem of missing persons. The party affirmed the necessity of liquidating all foreign military installations in Cyprus which might be used against Arab and friendly countries. The party further affirmed its demand for a demilitarized Cyprus once the problem of Cyprus is settled.

Brother Yasir Arafat expressed his deep appreciation for the position adopted by the Working People's Progressive Party and the people of Cyprus in general regarding the problem of Palestine and the Palestine revolution as well as their support for the Palestinian struggle against world imperialism and racist Zionism. Brother Arafat explained the facts behind the conspiracies against the Palestinian people being planned by the forces of imperialism, racist Zionism and colonialism, and expressed his faith in and support for the battle being waged by the friendly people of Cyprus for the sake of the independence, unity and sovereignty of Cyprus.

There was a complete agreement of views regarding all matters discussed.

## 55

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat to Pakistan<sup>20</sup>**

**Karachi, February 11, 1977**

1. In order to exchange views regarding the Middle East situation and to strengthen existing cooperation between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr. Yasir Arafat, paid a visit to Pakistan in the period of February 9 to 11, 1977, at the invitation of H.E. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of the Republic of Pakistan.

2. The PLO leader was invited to visit the Prime Minister's official residence at Larkana. During this visit, the two leaders held extensive discussions regarding all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and the possibilities for a just peace. The PLO leader relayed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Palestine Liberation Organization's position as regards various aspects of the Middle East problem, including the problem of Palestine, which is the core issue.

3. Mr. Arafat was accompanied in these talks by Mr. Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, member of the PLO Executive Committee and its official spokesman. The Pakistani Prime Minister was accompanied by Mr. Aziz Ahmad, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mustafa Gatwi, Prime Minister of Sind, and Mr. Agha Shahi, Director-General of the Foreign Ministry.

4. H.E. Mr. Arafat expressed his thanks to H.E. the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the initiatives taken to support the Arab Palestinian question, including the convening of the second Islamic summit in Lahore, which made a vital contribution to the mobilization of international support for the Palestine problem. H.E. the Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed his appreciation for the efforts being made by H.E. Mr. Arafat, as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may live, in support of Arab Muslim solidarity.

5. The two leaders called upon the international community to take careful note of the explosive situation in the Arab territories occupied by the Israelis, a situation created by mass violation of basic human rights and by persistent Israeli attempts to alter the cultural and human character of the city of Jerusalem.

The two leaders insisted upon an immediate cessation of all operations being carried out to expel the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, where arbitrary and racist measures are being enacted by the occupation authorities.

6. The two leaders affirmed that peace in the Middle East can come about only after total Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem and the other occupied territories, as well as the establishment of the full rights of the Palestinian people in its homeland, Palestine, in accordance with the UN Charter, the resolutions of the second Islamic summit in

<sup>20</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 11, 1977, p. 1.



Lahore, the Rabat summit of 1974 and UN General Assembly resolution 3236.

The Pakistani Prime Minister reaffirmed the solidarity of the government and people of Pakistan who stand shoulder to shoulder with their Palestinian and Arab brothers, supporting their struggle and their just cause.

7. The two leaders expressed their indignation at the desecration of holy sites in the occupied territories. They affirmed that the desecration of holy sites belonging to world religions in Jerusalem and Hebron underlines the urgent necessity of putting an end to the forcible annexation by Israel of Jerusalem and the other occupied Arab territories.

8. The two leaders affirmed their resolve to exchange views immediately and at a high level. They further stressed the need for the Arab and Muslim worlds and for all peace-loving forces to mobilize all their moral, political and material resources to support the just Arab cause and the fixed and inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people. They reaffirmed their support for the resolutions of the conference of Islamic foreign ministers held in Istanbul in 1976, regarding the question of Palestine.

9. H.E. Mr. Arafat expressed his appreciation for the wide-ranging measures being taken by Prime Minister Bhutto for the sake of the social and economic progress of the people of Pakistan. He also expressed his warm appreciation for the effective aid furnished by the government of Pakistan to the Palestine Liberation Organization as regards facilities granted for higher education, technical training and humanitarian aid.

10. H.E. Mr. Arafat expressed his heartfelt thanks to the Prime Minister and the people of Pakistan for the warmth of their reception and the kind hospitality extended to him and his delegation during their stay in Pakistan.

56

**Press conference statements by Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany discussing the European countries' role in an eventual reconvening of the Geneva conference<sup>21</sup>**

**Cairo, February 12, 1977**

*Q. The Foreign Ministers of the European Common Market countries held a meeting in London on January 20, and agreed to issue a political statement on behalf of the EEC recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people and referring to the Common Market countries' relations with the PLO. Was pressure exerted on these countries so that they refused to issue the statement, or postponed its publication?*

*A. The situation is not quite like that. The Common Market countries met in London and adopted a position on the essential points of the Middle East problem. The statement we agreed on did not refer to the PLO, but we—the French Foreign Minister and I—agreed to continue discussion of this subject, after I and the French Foreign Minister had visited the area, and the UN Secretary-General had submitted his report to the United Nations, and after the US Secretary of State's visit to the area. In the light of these discussions, we should be able to reconsider the text of the political statement, as a result of these meetings.*

*Q. Do you think that West Germany is prepared to attend the Geneva conference?*

*A. I think that President Sadat was right when he spoke of the opportunities offered to West Germany and the Common Market countries as regards what we can do vis-à-vis the Middle East problem. We can participate in creating an atmosphere of stability in the area. We can share in solving the economic problems and, thanks to our unaligned policy, we can talk as frankly to the Arabs as we can to the Israelis. We are trying to help improve the chances of achieving peace in this area. We are doing this because we realize*

<sup>21</sup> Made on Dr. Genscher's arrival in Cairo for talks with President Sadat; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 13, 1977. For President Sadat's statements at the press conference see doc. 213 below.

that Middle East peace is our peace, and that our interests are identical with those of the area. Europe and the Middle East are closer together than we used to imagine, and if you examine the situation, West Germany's participation in the Geneva conference will not have very much effect; in spite of all the efforts made by the countries participating in the conference, its chances of success do not depend on the number of countries attending it.

*Q. After your visit to three Arab countries and your talks in Cairo, can you tell us what impression you will take back with you to Germany of the extent of the Arab leaders' desire for peace?*

*A.* I agree with President Sadat's appraisal of the situation to the effect that 1977 is favourable to the achievement of peace in the Middle East. My impression, my personal view after my talks here, in Damascus and in Amman, is that the countries I visited are prepared to make very serious efforts to exploit the present circumstances which are favourable to the achievement of peace. President Sadat has played a very important role in creating these favourable circumstances. The West German government feels that these elements and factors that have emerged should be exploited with a view to achieving a just and permanent peace. The countries of the area want peace so that once they are rid of the burden of arming themselves, they may devote their efforts to construction and development.

As regards West Germany's position, we stress that the question of the Palestinians is the key to the situation, and that their legitimate rights must be realized and become a fact, that Israel has the right to live within recognized frontiers, and also that the occupation of the territories must be ended.

### **Final communiqué of the second session of the General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (excerpts)<sup>22</sup>**

**Tunis, February 12, 1977**

1. The General Committee of the Euro-Arab Dialogue held its second session in Tunis from 10–12 February, 1977. The meeting was opened by H.E. Mr. Habib El Chatty, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia and President-in-Office of the League of Arab States. He addressed the Committee.

6. Both sides emphasised their great concern about security in the Middle East and its implications for European and world security. They expressed full awareness of the dangers inherent in the persistence of the current stalemate and of their mutual interest in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

7. Both sides explained their views on the Middle East problem, including the question of Palestine. They noted with great interest the statements made by each other in this respect. They reaffirmed that a solution to the question of Palestine based on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is a crucial factor in achieving a just and lasting peace.

8. The European side expressed its conviction that the principles included in the Declaration of 6 November 1973,<sup>23</sup> as elaborated since then in statements made by the Nine, notably on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, constitute the basic elements of a Middle East peace settlement and that these principles must be taken as a whole. The European side restated its view that a solution of the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact.

9. The European side reiterated the concern of the Nine over the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 1967. They maintained that the Fourth Geneva Convention was applicable to the occupied territories and opposed the policy

<sup>22</sup> Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the EEC.

<sup>23</sup> Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

of establishing settlements there, which could only prejudice the prospects for peace. They were also opposed to any moves to alter unilaterally the status of Jerusalem. The Arab side expressed its appreciation of this attitude.

10. The European side welcomed the improved situation in Lebanon and expressed support for its independence, unity and territorial integrity. The Arab side expressed its appreciation for this position, which is in accord with the joint Arab will to reconstruct an independent unified Lebanon.

11. The European side took note of the proposal put forward by the Arab side to establish a committee for political consultation between the two sides. The European side undertook to consider this proposal with due attention.

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### **Statement by Pope Paul VI expressing the Vatican's support for Palestinian rights and its view on the status of Jerusalem<sup>24</sup>**

**Vatican City, February 13, 1977**

It is necessary to reconstitute a perspective of justice and security for all the peoples of the Middle East, and we are thinking also of Lebanon which has already paid a very high price because of an unsolved situation. The just claims of the Palestinian people must be satisfied and an effective juridical framework for Jerusalem be found such that the city will no longer be a reason for discord but will become, as is its vocation, a religious centre of peace in which the local communities of the three great monotheistic religions can live together in peaceful equality of rights.

## 59

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Guinea of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>25</sup>**

**Conakry, February 13, 1977**

At the invitation of the leader of the Guinean Revolution, President Ahmad Sekou Touré, a

PLO delegation headed by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee paid a visit to the Republic of Guinea on February 12th and 13th. The PLO delegation was composed of Abdel Muhsein Abu Maizar, member of the PLO Executive Committee and its official spokesman, Lt. Col. Ziad al-Saghir, member of the Military Bureau, Mr. Mahmoud al-Labadi, head of the PLO Foreign Information, and the director of the PLO office in Guinea. Present at the meeting, which was held at the Presidency, were: comrade al-Hajj Musa, member of the Politburo and of the Central Committee and Minister of Interior, Security and Justice; comrade al-Hajj Idu Batouri, member of the Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs; comrade Tili Tisito, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and comrade Tishli Tamara, Minister of Higher Education. The two delegations extensively studied the current international situation, particularly in the Middle East and the latest developments of the Palestinian cause, affirming the militant relations and bonds of friendship between the Palestinian Revolution and the Guinean Revolution. They also stressed that the Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people and the Arab states seriously threatens Middle East security as well as world peace, pointing out that there can be no peace in the Middle East without terminating the Zionist offensive and recuperating the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people to establish their own independent state on its national soil.

Both sides reaffirmed that Israel's racist expansionist policy in the occupied territories and the Arab region backed by imperialism highly aggravates the situation and threatens peace and security in the Middle East.

Yasser Arafat praised the great efforts exerted by the Guinean Democratic Party under the leadership of President Sekou Toure, especially in the political, economic and social domains for the sake of democratic progress and the development of the friendly Guinean people.

In accord on all issues, both sides expressed their interest in continuously reinforcing the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the Palestinian and the Guinean peoples. In this context they declared that Security Council resolution no. 242 is not the appropriate platform for any just settlement of the Middle East conflict, 'because it deliberately represses the Palestinian people's in-

<sup>24</sup> Made on the occasion of Sadat's visit to Rome; translated from the partial French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), February 15, 1977.

<sup>25</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 14, 1977, pp. 1-2.

alienable national rights and deprives them from freely living in their homeland in accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution no. 3236. The two Presidents noted that the desecration of holy sites in occupied Palestine by the Zionist authorities particularly in Hebron and Jerusalem, arouses the anger and denunciation of all believers in the world.

In the name of the PLO delegation Yasser Arafat expressed his appreciation for the solidarity and unconditional support shown by the friendly Guinean people, their Government and President for the Palestinian people in the various phases of their heroic struggle. Arafat also expressed his warmest thanks to President Sekou Toure for the brotherly welcome they met during their visit to the Guinean Republic.

## 60

**Radio interview statements by Foreign Minister de Guiringaud of France stating that recent developments in the Middle East are favourable to peace (excerpts)<sup>26</sup>**

February 15, 1977

*Q. As regards Geneva, your visit in the area coincides with international diplomatic activity. Your German colleague, Mr. Genscher, seems to present his mission as a complement to American action and in harmony with it. Is that a position that expresses European feeling in general?*

*A. Herr Genscher is free to present his mission as he wishes. I note that he is accompanied by a large number of people including at least eighty industrialists. This indicates that his mission also has an economic aspect. Mine does not have this aspect at all. We have economic relations with the countries I am going to visit, but our technical ministers have visited them to deal with these aspects. I am thinking of concentrating on a political aspect, and in particular I propose to gather the opinions, the feelings of the leaders of the countries I am going to visit, on the possibilities for a peace settlement.*

<sup>26</sup> Interview conducted by Majid Nawfal and broadcast on Radio Monte Carlo; translated from the partial French text as published in *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Beirut), February 16, 1977, pp. 1, 6.

*Q. There has been mention of a European text on the Middle East,<sup>27</sup> a text which apparently was drawn up in London at the end of January between the European foreign ministers. It was said that this text would not be published because the Americans thought that it was not the time to publish it. Is it true that there have been American pressures? Has there been a general development of the European position on the Middle East?*

*A. It is quite true that the political experts of the nine countries of the European Community had prepared a draft declaration by the Community on the prospects for a peace settlement in the Middle East. This text was submitted to the ministers in London during their meeting of January 31. The ministers decided not to publish this text. So, many things were said about the reasons why they had not done so. The real reason is that at a time when several of them were about to leave for the Middle East, for a trip, for an enquiry on the chances for settlement, the means by which a settlement could be reached, it did not seem to us appropriate to publish a statement. We may perhaps be led to publish one, but a little later, at the conclusion of the enquiries that we shall all be making.*

*Q. Has the European position evolved as a whole?*

*A. What we can say is that the situation in the Middle East today is not exactly what it was a year ago, or even some months ago. This is a good reason for the Europeans waiting for the results of the enquiries and trips that several of us are going to make—and that some have already made—before redefining our position.*

*Q. France is being urged to go to Geneva. Would she, at the right moment, act as guarantor for future agreements under her double responsibility as a European country and as a permanent member of the Security Council? Furthermore, do you see a solution outside the United Nations?*

*A. First of all, it should be stated that France did not participate in the first phase of the Geneva conference. If she is invited to another phase of the conference, as certain governments already proposed last year, she will consider the question. The problem of France's participation in guarantees is a different problem. The Middle East problem has been before the Security Council for 25 years and in the framework of the Security*

<sup>27</sup> Doc. 48 above.

Council, of which—I remind you—France is a member, guarantees could be envisaged after the parties have arrived at an agreement on a settlement.

*Q. Certain statements, mainly from the Israeli side, leave the impression that there is a wish for a tête-à-tête between the superpowers. Do you consider that relations between France and Israel have returned to normal?*

*A. Relations between France and Israel went through a crisis at the time of the Abu Daoud affair. The meeting I had with Mr. Yigal Allon in Brussels on February 8, has allowed us to turn over a new leaf, and we both expressed the hope, which I think justified, that relations between France and Israel would return to normal, that is, cordiality.*

*Q. Conversations between certain Palestinian and Israeli circles have taken place in France. To what extent can France encourage this kind of dialogue on its soil?*

*A. It is not up to France to intervene officially in this kind of dialogue. It is true that an eminent French politician, who occupied an important position in the institutions of the 4th Republic, did to a certain extent personally favour this dialogue. He informed us of this, and we think that anything that might contribute to a better understanding of the respective positions of the parties works in favour of a settlement and in favour of peace.*

*Q. Do you think that you might happen to meet Mr. Yasir Arafat on your tour?*

*A. I do not at the present time have the intention of meeting Mr. Arafat. Other contacts with Palestinian leaders are possible.*

*Q. Do you think that '77 will be the year of peace in the Middle East?*

*A. It is difficult to say if '77 will be the year of peace. What one can say is that '77 presents more favourable circumstances than there have ever been until now in the search for peace. And it is in this sense that one should interpret the visits that several western foreign ministers have made or are about to make to the Middle East in order to better understand the positions of the opposing parties.*

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## **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel reviewing their talks<sup>28</sup>**

**Jerusalem, February 16, 1977**

*Secretary Vance:* We have just had a thorough discussion with the Prime Minister and other leaders. We have discussed the military situation and a number of related problems, as well as economic problems and other subjects of common interest between our two countries. It has been a very helpful and useful set of talks for which I am most appreciative. I think that I now have a much clearer understanding of the position of Israel with respect to a number of issues relating to the search for peace, and I look forward now to moving on to other countries to try and obtain a similar thorough and searching review of the issues as seen in those capitals.

*Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin:* Mr. Secretary, as I said on two occasions before, we welcome you to your visit to Israel. We are glad that on your first trip as the Secretary of State of the new Administration, your first trip is to the Middle East and your first stop is in Israel. We, at least, see in it a sign that the close, intimate relations between our two countries are going to be continued and are going to be improved. I believe that in our talks, we have put to you all our positions, the reasons for what we aspire to, and we hope that your trip will be another step in the common effort of the United States and Israel to move forward toward a more peaceful situation in the area and hopefully toward peace. We wish you a good stay and a nice trip.

*Q. On the matter of military supplies such as the concussion bombs [inaudible].?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, we discussed a number of issues including the question of concussion bombs. I indicated that this is a decision which will be made by the President, and I do not want to comment on it until such time as the President makes his decision.

<sup>28</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington) LXXVI, 1968 (March 14, 1977), p. 210.

*Q. How about the Kfir fighters to Ecuador, was that also discussed?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, that also was discussed, and we heard the views of Israel with respect to that decision. As I indicated in the United States, that decision was taken because of our policy with respect to the introduction of advanced weapons into Latin America, and the decision was consistent with our longstanding policy with respect to not selling advanced weapons to Latin American countries.

*Q. Are you inviting Mr. Rabin to Washington?*

*Secretary Vance:* We are inviting all of the leaders, including Mr. Rabin, to come to Washington in the future to meet with the President. As to the dates when those visits may occur, they will be worked out in the near future in accordance with the calendars of the various chiefs of state.

*Q. Will there be more than one Israeli leader invited to Washington?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I said, we are extending the invitation to the heads of state of each of the countries involved.

*Q. Mr. Rabin, did Secretary Vance's answer about the Kfir and about the concussion bombs satisfy you? Do you see these American decisions as final?*

*Prime Minister Rabin:* Well, it is not up to me to pass judgment about the American decisions or what might be the American decisions. In our relations with the United States, we put what we want and the reasons for that and, whenever, they have to be taken by common understanding. I don't believe it will be advisable at the present to say more than that.

*Q. Is there any change in Israel's stand regarding the PLO as a negotiating party?*

*Prime Minister Rabin:* The answer is simple: no.

*Q. Has there been any change in the U.S. stand, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Vance:* The answer is no.

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# **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance reviewing his talks with President Sadat of Egypt<sup>29</sup>**

**Cairo, February 17, 1977**

*Q. Do you expect another step-by-step to be taken or do you expect a full Geneva conference to meet? Because reports from Israel were saying that you have proposed a type of Geneva conference where there would be the Israelis and the Egyptians, the Israelis and the Syrians, and the Israelis and the Jordanians—what is called a Geneva-type conference. Is this a correct report, sir?*

*A.* It is correct that I have suggested that there be a Geneva-type conference in the last half of this year, 1977. I have not proposed that there be a step-by-step process, but that will be up to the parties to decide.

*Q. What is meant by a Geneva-type conference?*

*A.* I mean a Geneva conference, a conference to be held at Geneva. Last night, I was asked the same question—did I draw a distinction between it?—and I said I did not.

*Q. Does it mean that all the partners—all the parties will be at the conference?*

*A.* It would mean that there would have been a determination prior to the conference as to who should attend—that is a procedural question—and that invitations would then be extended and the parties would all attend.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before you left on this trip that you hoped to explore in depth the talk that the PLO was moderating its position. Based on your conversations with President Sadat today, do you have any more specific feeling about the problem?*

*A.* I have received additional information today. I wish to complete my visits with the other capitals before I have any final answer to the question.

*Q. If the PLO amends its charter and becomes more moderate on the question of Israel, would the United States then change its attitude toward the PLO?*

<sup>29</sup> Department of State Bulletin, LXXVI, 1968 (March 14, 1977), pp. 211–214. For President Sadat's statements at the press conference see doc. 215 below.

A. I have said that the problem up to this date that has concerned the United States is that the PLO has had in its covenant a provision to the effect that they would not recognize Israel as a state, the existence of Israel, and that they did not recognize that [U. N. Security Council Resolutions] 242 and 338 are a basis for convening a conference.

## 63

**Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance reviewing his current Middle East trip and discussing ways of incorporating Palestinian representation in the Geneva conference<sup>30</sup>**

February 18, 1977

*Q. Could you address yourself to the proposal of President Sadat on some sort of a confederation to exist between the PLO or the Palestinian West Bank State and Jordan, and whether you regard this as a constructive thing, and if so, how will it move the situation forward?*

A. It seems to me it's a constructive suggestion. It begins to move forward suggestions which have been made by the Israelis as to how the Palestinian question might be resolved. And therefore there appears to be some narrowing of the differing positions, and to that extent it seems to me it's a constructive suggestion.

*Q. Did you discuss that proposal with President Sadat during your conversations yesterday?*

A. Yes, I did.

*Q. Was it discussed at length? Did you propose—did you, for example, suggest that the link between Hussein and the PLO be a matter for Geneva rather than afterward?*

A. Let me say that the purpose of my trip has been to find out as much as I could and to learn as deeply as I could what the positions of the various states are with respect to the whole range of substantive and procedural issues which are bound up in the Middle East problem. I have

found the discussions in the two capitals which I have been to, or in the two countries which I have been to, to be very helpful in this regard. People have been frank. They have answered all the questions that I put to them. I have been able to probe in depth questions which I might have with respect to various suggestions or proposals. As a result of that, I think that I have gained information which is going to be very helpful to me and the President as we move along in attacking the Middle East problem.

I do not intend to go into all the details of the conversations I have had with the various heads of government and their cabinets. Our role is to try and act as a facilitator who could bring the parties together. I think it would not be useful to me to go into all the details of suggestions which are made to me as possible bridging steps.

*Q. Could you comment, could you make a judgement solidly that the Egyptians are ready to try to move the PLO specifically—I am asking whether he thinks he senses that the Egyptians are ready to try to move the PLO on this question of the covenant specifically. Would this have to be resolved?*

A. Yes, I do, I do have that feeling.

*Q. Is it your impression that this proposal had the support of at least of some of the PLO? Obviously, Fahmy had seen Arafat yesterday. There seemed to be some connection. Was there in fact a connection?*

A. The only thing I want to say on this is it appeared that it did have the support of the—

*Q. The support of the PLO?*

A. Yes, but I don't want to say anything more than that.

*Q. Are you referring to the link with the Jordanians? You're not referring to the covenant business?*

A. I was referring to the linkage.

*Q. But you have no indication of how the PLO might go?*

A. I don't know how the PLO will go.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse me? Do you see King Hussein supporting the idea?*

A. I don't know. I haven't had my talks with him yet. I'll find out when I talk to him.

*Q. You do think the Egyptians are ready to move the PLO on the covenant, that means on the specific issue of the recognition of the State of Israel?*

<sup>30</sup> The press conference took place on Vance's aircraft between Cairo and Beirut; transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVI, 1968 (March 14, 1977), pp. 214–217.

A. Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you bring up, or did they bring up with you, future arms sales to Egypt—specifically, the F-5s?*

A. Let me say that we discussed the policy of the United States as enunciated by President Carter—make it the concern rather than the policy—the concern of President Carter with respect to the question of arms sales throughout the world and his desire to try and find ways to cut down on the sale of arms and our responsibilities in this regard because of our position as the principal arms seller.

I also discussed with them the problem of arms sales in the Middle East and our desire to try and find a way to reduce the sale of arms to the countries in the Middle East. In this connection the Egyptians raised the question of their military requirements and needs and indicated that they had read my testimony at the confirmation hearings in which I had said that if requests were received from them, we would consider them applying the three principles which I enunciated at the confirmation hearings and again in the press conference which I had with all of you.

*Q. How does that translate, Sir? Does that mean that there could be a possibility of the U.S.—*

A. No. All it means is that they may make requests of us, and if so, we will treat them in accordance with the principles that I have previously enunciated.

*Q. Did yesterday's announcement by Mr. Sadat—did Mr. Sadat's proposal catch you by surprise?*

A. Which?

*Q. To have the confederation with Jordan and the West Bank, and secondly, what is now the gap?*

A. Let's take it question by question. I had not heard that proposal from him until he made it.

*Q. In your private talks?*

A. Yes.

*Q. Secondly, what is now the gap between Israel and Egypt?*

A. What?

*Q. What is now the gap in the understanding Israel has and Mr. Sadat's proposal in seating the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation? Is there now a major*

*difference?*

A. Let me say this, there is still a major difference.

*Q. I'm a little lost by that, sir. A major difference in what sir?*

A. He said is there a gap and what is the nature of the gap between the positions enunciated by Sadat yesterday with respect to the Palestinian question and the view of the Israelis, and I said, yes, there is a gap, and I'm not going to go into the details.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were going to look for the "give" in positions. Did you find a lot of flexibility on the Israeli side and the Egyptian side? Did you really find much give, or did you get a pretty hard line?*

A. No, there are big differences between them, but both of them indicated that if the procedural questions could be resolved, that they are prepared to go to a Geneva conference without preconditions.

*Q. You say you found give in there?*

A. I think that's give.

*Q. Is there any practicality in this notion of trying to move toward some kind of entity linking Jordan and a West Bank Palestinian state to go before Geneva this year? It all seems you have to compress so much.*

A. Let me say, if we are going to play the kind of role I think we can, moving between the parties and trying to bring them together, that for me to go into too much detail on what I think of this proposal and that proposal is not constructive. I think our role is one here of trying to bring the parties together, and I don't want to make comments about what I may think about the validity or strength of one proposal as opposed to another.

*Q. Is it your understanding that this proposal is also supported in a general way by Syria and Saudi Arabia?*

A. I don't know. I will find out when I go there. I think it's been discussed with them before, but I'm not going to speak for them. I'll hear it from them.

*Q. Can you address a general question of practicality though, Mr. Secretary? That's what's bothering me. Whether it's still possible to think in terms of getting to Geneva this year?*

A. Yes, I still think it's possible.



**Press conference statement by US Secretary of State Vance outlining the results of his trip to the Middle East (excerpt)<sup>31</sup>**

**Damascus, February 21, 1977**

When I started out, I indicated that I had several objectives in mind. The first objective was to indicate the importance that the President and I attached to the question of peace in the Middle East. The second was to get a chance to meet the leaders of the various countries involved and their principal advisers. And the third was to get a chance to learn firsthand their views and have an opportunity to discuss those views with them in an effort to obtain a clearer understanding and to find where there might be areas of common ground with the positions of others.

With respect to each of these objectives, I feel satisfied that they have been accomplished.

Every one of the leaders to whom I talked indicated an appreciation of the fact that this mission was taken at this time and the reassurance that it gave to them of the importance which the United States attached to the question of a resolution of the Middle East question.

Secondly, I found it was indeed important to meet these men face to face. As President Asad said to me yesterday afternoon, there is no substitute for seeing a man face to face and having a chance to look him in the eye.

With respect to the final objective, I do feel that I have a much clearer understanding of the views of the parties and an idea with respect to those areas where there may be common understanding on agreement. Let me briefly summarize those areas for you.

First, all the parties are agreed on the need for peace. Every one of the leaders pointed out to me the importance of cutting back on military expenditures and putting those resources into meeting the economic and social needs of their countries. There wasn't one that did not underscore the importance of this to me.

Secondly, all of the parties stated that they are prepared to go to a Geneva conference in the last half of 1977 to discuss an overall peace settlement.

Thirdly, all of the parties agreed that if procedural questions can be resolved, they are prepared to discuss all substantive questions at Geneva without preconditions.

And finally, all the parties are agreed as to the general nature of the three core elements of a final settlement—namely, peace, withdrawal, and resolution of the Palestinian question.

The two sides are deeply divided, however, on the definition and methods of resolving these three core issues.

First, on the definition of what peace means. On the one hand you have the view that peace is an end of war, and that is generally the Arab view. And one must expect time to pass before there can be normal relations across the board between countries that have been at war, in a state of belligerency for years and years. On the other hand, the Israelis would define peace as basically the establishment of full normal relations. And as you can see, there is a very broad gap between these two views.

Secondly, there is a clear difference between the two sides on the meaning of shape of withdrawal.

And finally, there is a difference of views between the two sides on how to resolve the Palestinian question. As a matter of fact, there appear to be even differences among the Arabs themselves as to how that question should be resolved. And finally, the parties are sharply divided on the key procedural question of how to deal with the issue of the PLO.

So as you can see, although there are common areas of understanding and agreement, there are also very sharp differences. And the conclusion that I draw from that is that one must be very careful not to be overoptimistic, as King Hussein cautioned when we were in Amman.

On the other hand, there are areas of common ground which provide a basis for some encouragement in the fact that all of them really do, sincerely, in my judgement, believe that there is a desperate need for peace. That is a positive factor. Those are very preliminary conclusions I have come to as I start the last day of this visit.

<sup>31</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVI, 1968 (March 14, 1977), pp. 219–222.

## 65

**Statement by US Senator Sparkman (Dem.) outlining principles for a Middle East settlement including self-determination for the Palestinian people<sup>32</sup>**

Washington, February 24, 1977

In my general foreign policy speech early in the last session of Congress, I suggested that we have two vital interests in the Middle East—the survival and security of Israel and the oil and friendship of the Arabs. These interests I suggested at that time and I now reiterate, “cannot be separated, but they can, I feel sure, be reconciled—through a general settlement based on guarantees for Israel, withdrawal from occupied territories, and self-determination for the Palestinian people.”

There have been profound changes in the Middle East in the last year, and the overall effect of these changes is favorable for peace. A year ago the Lebanese civil war was raging, and the Arab nations were quarrelling bitterly with each other over Lebanon. This situation gave Israel a transient tactical advantage, but it also incapacitated the Arab nations for entering realistic peace negotiations. Since then the Lebanese civil war has been brought to an enforced end; Syria and Egypt have ended—or at least suspended—their quarrel; the PLO has been reduced militarily and brought to a new degree of realism about Israel and its own aspirations; and Saudi Arabia, under moderate but newly assertive leadership, has emerged as the effective arbiter of the Arab world.

Under these new circumstances the Arabs seem genuinely ready to negotiate a peace settlement assuring Israel's survival in return for restoration of the territories occupied in 1967. The time for peace negotiations is as propitious as it has ever been—or is likely to be. If there is no progress in the fairly near future, it is a safe prediction that the current unity of the Arabs will crack, positions will harden, and the Arabs will fall once again into competitive animosity against Israel.

On the Israeli side the picture is less certain.

Until a new government is chosen in the election scheduled for May, the Israelis cannot be expected to enter serious, difficult peace negotiations in a renewed Geneva conference. The United States cannot of course intervene in the processes of Israeli democracy, but we can—and in my judgment should—make known our strong hope that the new Israeli Government, whatever its composition, will take a positive, conciliatory and innovative attitude toward peace negotiations with the Arabs. One hopes that Secretary of State Vance has pressed this point during his trip to the Middle East.<sup>33</sup>

It would probably be unwise for the President of the United States to set forth a detailed American blueprint for a Middle East settlement. I would think it highly appropriate, however, for the President to make a public statement on an early occasion expressing our basic interests with respect to the Middle East, and perhaps also suggesting some basic principles of an equitable settlement. These basic principles—which now seem to represent a consensus among informed, moderate observers of the Middle East problem—might be summarized as follows:

First, the Arab States and also the PLO must recognize without qualification the legitimacy and permanence of Israel as a sovereign state with the right to live in peace and security within recognized borders.

Second, Israel must withdraw, within a specified period of time, to her borders of 1967, with only such modifications as may be agreed upon.

Third, the Palestinian people must be accorded the right of self-determination, either in the form of confederation with Jordan or a separate West Bank-Gaza State, according to their own free choice.

Fourth, the Arab States—including the new Palestinian State or entity—must agree to end all hostile actions or propaganda against Israel and also agree to a fixed timetable for the establishment of normal political and economic relations with Israel.

Finally, the entire settlement should be supported by solid international guarantees—including arrangements for demilitarized zones, limitations on armaments, commitments by the United Nations Security Council to uphold and if necessary defend

<sup>32</sup> Made in a foreign policy speech to the US Senate, *Congressional Record* (daily), February 24, 1977, pp. S 3040–3041. Senator Sparkman is chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

<sup>33</sup> See docs. 61 to 64 above.

the terms of the settlement, and if desired, an explicit American guarantee of Israel's survival and security.

Although war does not now seem imminent in the Middle East, it could very well become so if the present opportunity is allowed to pass. It would be worse than futile for the United States or other outsiders to try to impose a settlement, but as the Brookings Study-Group on the Middle East advised last year,<sup>34</sup> the international community can usefully offer "initiative, impetus and inducement" for peace.

## 66

### **Appeal issued by Le Collectif d'information sur les détenus et prisonniers palestiniens calling for support for the demands of Palestinian prisoners in Israel<sup>35</sup>**

Paris, late February, 1977

The hunger strike by the Palestinian detainees in Israel and in the territories occupied since June 1967 once again draws the attention of international public opinion to the gravity of the attacks on the freedoms and rights of man of which many hundreds of Palestinian democrats and patriots incarcerated in Israeli prisons are victim. According to the general administration of Israeli prisons itself, 5,852 Palestinian patriots are crowded into an average space of 2 square metres per person.

This 45-day strike begun in December 1976 in Ashkelon has, one way or another, affected most of the prisons of Gaza and the West Bank.

In all cases it has run up against the intransigence of the prison administration and the military occupation authorities, who have tried in vain to stifle the echo of this struggle. Despite this, 200 detainees at least have again gone on strike this week. The delicate state of health of a good number of them, however, continues to deteriorate and, according to their lawyers, some are in an alarming condition as a result of this particularly exacting hunger strike.

The legitimacy of the claims made by the detainees on strike cannot leave us indifferent.

The solidarity movements engendered by this strike in Gaza and the West Bank, the firmness of the positions taken by the principal Arab mayors of these territories in favour of Palestinian detainees and the courageous mediations in Israel by Mrs. Felicia Langer and Ms. Lea Tsemel, as well as other lawyers, appeal to the conscience of us all.

The report of the UN Special Committee of September 1976,<sup>36</sup> the recent approaches of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Israeli government, confirm, if this was necessary, the disturbing and serious conditions of the Palestinian detainees.

The humanitarian, democratic demands, and their patriotic demands to be considered prisoners of war, must be widely known and supported. The ridicule and cruelty to which they are daily subjected are intolerable and must be firmly denounced. The repressive and discriminatory, juridical arsenal, over which the Zionist information media exhibits great discretion, must be clearly exposed.

We call on all those who are carrying on the just struggle of peoples for freedom to join our appeal and increase the initiatives enabling this important aspect of the hardship of the struggling Palestinian people to be better known and to break the intransigence of the Israeli government. Let us also give our support to the Collectif d'Information sur les détenus palestiniens.

<sup>34</sup> Doc. 194 in *International Documents 1975*.

<sup>35</sup> Translated from the French text published as an advertisement in *Le Monde* (Paris), March 3 and March 6-7, 1977, p. 4. The signatories were: Gérard Althabe - Lawyer Michèle Beauvillard - Lawyer Maurice Buttin - Doctor Abraham Behar - Yves Boisset - Claude Bourdet - Jacques Chatagner - Jean Chesneaux - Jean Cardonel - Geneviève Clancy - Lawyer Jean-Jacques de Félice - Suzanne De Brunoff - Jean Dresch - Robert Davezies - François Della Suda - Jean Genet - Daniel Guérin - Pierre Halbwachs - Guy Hennebelle - Pierre Jalée - Alain Joxe - Professor Marcel Francis Kahn - Lawyer Louis Labadie - Lawyer Henri Leclerc - Professor Michel Larivière - Albert-Paul Lentin - Lawyer Léo Matarosso - Doctor Bernard Morin - Professor Paul Milliez - Michèle and Armand Mattelart - Georges Montaron - Pasteur Mathiot - Elisabeth Mathiot - Lawyer Joë Nordman - Professor Jean Roujeau - Pierre Rossi - Michèle Ray.

<sup>36</sup> Doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

**Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing the concept of "defensible" borders between Israel and the surrounding Arab states<sup>37</sup>**

Washington, March 9, 1977

*Q. Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk about defensible borders lately and what that means in regard to the Middle East. Could I ask you, sir, do you feel that it would be appropriate in a Middle East peace settlement for the Israelis to keep some of the occupied land they took during the 1967 war in order to have secure borders?*

A. The "defensible border" phrase, the "secure borders" phrase, obviously are just semantics. I think it's a relatively significant development in the description of possible settlement in the Middle East to talk about these things as a distinction.

The recognized borders have to be mutual. The Arab nations, the Israeli nation, have to agree on permanent and recognized borders, where sovereignty is legal as mutually agreed. Defense lines may or may not conform in the foreseeable future to those legal borders. There may be extensions of Israeli defense capability beyond the permanent and recognized borders.

I think this distinction is one that is now recognized by Israeli leaders. The definition of borders on a geographical basis is one that remains to be determined. But I think that it is important for the world to begin to see, and for the interested parties to begin to see, that there can be a distinction between the two: the ability of Israel to defend herself by international agreement or by the sometime placement of Israeli forces themselves or by monitoring stations, as has been the case in the Sinai, beyond the actual sovereignty borders as mutually agreed by Israel and her neighbors.

*Q. Well, does that mean international zones between the countries?*

A. International zones could very well be part of an agreement. And I think that I can see in a growing way, a step-by-step process where there might be a mutual agreement that the ultimate settlement, even including the border delineations,

would be at a certain described point. In an interim state, maybe two years, four years, eight years or more, there would be a mutual demonstration of friendship and an end to the declaration or state of war.

I think that what Israel would like to have is what we would like to have: a termination of belligerence toward Israel by her neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right to exist, the right to exist in peace, the opening up of borders with free trade, tourist travel, cultural exchange between Israel and her neighbors; in other words, a stabilization of the situation in the Middle East without a constant threat to Israel's existence by her neighbors.

This would involve substantial withdrawal of Israel's present control over territories. Now, where that withdrawal might end, I don't know. I would guess it would be some minor adjustments in the 1967 borders. But that still remains to be negotiated.

But I think this is going to be a long, tedious process. We're going to mount a major effort in our own government in 1977 to bring the parties to Geneva. Obviously any agreement has to be between the parties concerned. We will act as an intermediary when our good offices will serve well.

But I'm not trying to predispose our own nation's attitudes toward what might be the ultimate details of the agreement that can mean so much to world peace.

*Q. Mr. President, I'd like to try to clarify the Israeli situation, if I might. A moment ago in answering the question, you spoke of the possibility of substantial withdrawal of Israeli control over territory and then, just a few seconds later, spoke of the possibility of minor territorial concessions by the Israelis. What is it exactly that you have in mind here? Are you really talking about some big withdrawals, or are you talking only about minor withdrawals?*

A. I don't think I would use the word minor withdrawals. I think there might be minor adjustments to the 1967—pre-1967 borders. But that's a matter for Israel and her neighbors to decide between themselves.

I believe that we will know by, I'd say, the middle of May, much more clearly the positions of the interested parties. I've not yet met nor

<sup>37</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVI, 1971 (April 4, 1977), pp. 306, 307, 309.

talked to the leaders in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt—Saudi Arabia, to a lesser direct-participation degree.

I will meet with all these leaders between now and the middle of May. And I don't want to try to define in any specific terms the exact delineation of borders, but I think this is obviously one of the most serious problems.

There are three basic elements: One is an ultimate commitment to complete peace in the Middle East; second, border determinations which are highly controversial and have not yet been defined by either side; and third, dealing with the Palestinian question.

And I'm not trying to act as the one to lay down an ultimate settlement. I don't know what an ultimate settlement will be. But these matters will be freely and openly debated within our own country and within the countries involved. And I think I've described as best I can my own position.

*Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go just a little bit further in your discussion of the defensible borders issue. If I understood you correctly, you're talking about the possibility of something like an Israeli defense line along the Jordan River and perhaps at some point on the Sinai Desert and perhaps at some point on the Golan Heights that would be defense forces but not legal borders. Have I understood that correctly, that your feeling is that the Israelis are going to have to have some kind of defense forces along the Jordan River and in those other places?*

A. Well, you added a great deal to what I said. In the first place, I didn't mention any particular parts of the geography around Israel. And I didn't confine the defense capability to Israeli forces. These might very well be international forces. It might very well be a line that's fairly broad, say 20 kilometers or more, where demilitarization is guaranteed on both sides. It might very well consist of outposts, electronics or, perhaps, personnel outposts as were established in the Sinai region as a result of the Egypt and Israeli agreement.

I'm not going to try to get more specific in saying what will or will not be the case. But that is a possibility that might lead to the alleviation of tension there, and it's one about which I will be discussing this matter with the representatives from the Arab countries when they come.

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### **Political declaration of the first Afro-Arab summit conference meeting<sup>38</sup>**

**Cairo, March 9, 1977**

1. The First Conference of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and the League of Arab States met at Cairo from 7 to 9 March 1977.

2. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government guided by the faith of their peoples in the promotion of Afro-Arab Cooperation based on the principles and objectives of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States and on the application of their common political will as expressed in their relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the Summit Conferences of their respective Organizations, examined and adopted the Draft Declaration and Programme of Action prepared by the meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council at Dakar from 19 to 22 April 1976 dealing with cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic, financial, commercial, educational, cultural, scientific, social and technical fields.

3. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference reaffirms its commitment to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence and to the establishment of a just international economic order.

4. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference affirms its commitment to the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, non-aggression, self-determination, and the inadmissibility of the occupation or annexation of territories by force and the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts.

5. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government reaffirm the need to strengthen their peoples' united front in their struggle for national liberation and condemn imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, apartheid and all other forms of discrimination and racial and religious segregation, especially under the forms in which they appear in Southern Africa, Palestine and the other occupied Arab and African territories. In this connection they express their full support for the struggle of the peoples of Palestine, Zimbabwe,

<sup>38</sup> UN doc. A/32/61, Annex I, March 17, 1977, pp. 2-6.

Namibia, South Africa and the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) for the recovery of their legitimate national rights and the exercise of their right to self-determination and affirm their support for the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros.

6. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference invites the OAU and the League of Arab States to exchange information regularly on the development of the common struggle for the liberation of their respective peoples in Africa and the Middle East to enable member States to play an effective and positive role in this respect.

7. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government condemn the constant military aggressions as well as other political and economic manoeuvres carried out by imperialism through the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and their allies, against the sovereign States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia, with the aim of politically destabilizing the governments of these countries and of sabotaging their efforts for economic development. The Summit regards such aggressions as directed against the Afro-Arab world and a threat against world peace. The Conference also condemns similar activities carried out by Israel against Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the people of Palestine. Further, the African and Arab Heads of State and Government decided that their respective countries should provide and increase their material support and any other type of assistance required to enable these countries to consolidate and defend their independence.

The Conference condemns the Israeli authorities for their persistence in changing the demographic and geographic features of the occupied Arab territories in violation of the international law and U. N. resolutions. The Conference demands that Israel should desist from taking such measures with a view to creating better conditions to facilitate the establishment of a settlement in the region.

8. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference decides that increased efforts be made within the OAU, the Arab League and the United Nations and all other international Forums to find the most effective ways and means of accentuating at the international level the political and economic isolation of Israel, South Africa and Rhodesia so long as the regimes of these countries persist in their racist, expansionist and aggressive policies. To

this effect, the Summit Conference affirms the necessity to continue to impose total boycott, political, diplomatic, cultural, sporting and economic and in particular the oil embargo against these regimes.

9. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference expresses its strong conviction that the implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation will constitute a significant turning point in history for the strengthening of all forms of ties between them, the consolidation of their political independence and sovereignty particularly their permanent control over their natural resources, in the struggle of the peoples of the Third World and the maintenance of world peace and security.

10. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference, after a thorough examination of the situation, expressed great concern about the problems of Palestine, the Middle East, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Fully convinced that these causes are Afro-Arab causes, the Summit decides to extend its total support to the peoples struggling against the racist and Zionist regimes and to the Frontline States bordering confrontation zones for their assistance to the National Liberation Struggle.

11. The Conference strongly condemns the practice of mercenaries and undertakes to eliminate this phenomenon in Africa and the Arab World.

12. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference further decides to take all necessary measures to promote direct economic and financial relations and exchanges of every kind especially commercial, cultural, educational, scientific and technological between African and Arab States.

13. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government express their unshakeable faith in Afro-Arab Co-operation and declare their determination to undertake to mobilize all their energies and exert all their efforts to attain the objectives laid down in the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation<sup>39</sup> with a view to strengthening further the understanding among all their peoples and creating indissoluble ties of Afro-Arab fraternity based on strong and lasting foundations.

<sup>39</sup> Doc. 69 below.

**Declaration and programme of action on Afro-Arab cooperation issued at the first Afro-Arab summit conference meeting (excerpt)<sup>40</sup>**

Cairo, March 9, 1977

I. PREAMBLE

1. We, the Kings and Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and of the League of Arab States, meeting in Cairo from 7th to 9th March 1977;

2. *Considering* the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States;

3. *Recalling* the decisions taken and the resolutions adopted, at various levels, particularly at the 8th Extraordinary Session, the 23rd and 24th Ordinary Sessions of the OAU Council of Ministers as well as at the 6th<sup>41</sup> and 7th<sup>42</sup> Arab Summit Meetings and at the 62nd and 63rd Ordinary Sessions of the Council of Ministers of the League of Arab States with a view to strengthening co-operation between the States;

4. *Conscious* of our multiple ties and interests and by reason of geography, history and culture and our desire to promote co-operation in the political, economic and social fields, and by reason of our joint struggle against domination and exploitation in all their forms;

5. *Appreciating* the ties of friendship, brotherhood and good neighbourliness existing between African and Arab States;

6. *Guided* by a common will to strengthen understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our states so as to fulfil the aspirations of our peoples for the consolidation of Afro-Arab brotherhood;

7. *Determined* to strengthen the ties between our States and peoples by establishing common institutions;

8. *Considering* the common interests and aspirations of the African and the Arab peoples;

9. *Convinced* that Afro-Arab co-operation falls within the framework of common action by all developing countries in order to increase co-operation among themselves, on the one hand,

and on the other, to intensify efforts to establish a new, fairer and more equitable international economic order;

10. *Determined* to harness our natural and human resources for the general progress of our people in all spheres of human endeavour;

11. *Bearing* in mind the principles and provisions of the Algiers Charter,<sup>43</sup> the Lima Declaration, the African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence, the Declarations, Resolutions and Programme of Action for Economic Co-operation of the Fourth Summit of Non-aligned Countries,<sup>44</sup> the economic and decolonization provisions of the Declaration of the Lahore Islamic Summit and of the Solemn Declaration of the Summit of the Kings and Heads of State of the Member States of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, the Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the Declaration and Programme of Action of the Dakar Conference on Raw Materials and Development;

12. *Hereby decide* to adopt this Declaration and Programme of Action defining the principles and framework of collective and individual action by African and Arab countries for Afro-Arab Co-operation.

II. PRINCIPLES

13. Political and economic co-operation between African and Arab States shall be founded in particular on the following principles:

(a) Respect for the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and political independence of all our States;

(b) Equality of all States;

(c) Permanent sovereignty of States and peoples over their natural resources;

(d) Non-aggression and inadmissibility of occupying or annexing territories by force;

(e) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other States;

(f) The safeguarding of mutual interests on the basis of reciprocity and equality;

<sup>40</sup> UN doc. A/32/61, Annex III, March 17, 1977, pp. 2-7.

<sup>41</sup> Docs. 331, 332, 333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>42</sup> Docs. 307, 308, 309 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>43</sup> Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>44</sup> Docs. 118, 119 and 120 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

(g) Peaceful settlement of differences and disputes in a spirit of tolerance;

(h) Joint struggle against domination, racism and exploitation in all their forms to safeguard world peace and security;

### III. FIELDS OF CO-OPERATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION

#### A. *Fields of Co-operation:*

14. African and Arab countries undertake to develop their relations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels on a comprehensive and long-term basis of cooperation in the following fields:

- (a) Political and diplomatic;
- (b) Economic and financial;
- (c) Commercial;
- (d) Educational, cultural, scientific, technical and information.

#### B. *Political and Diplomatic Co-operation:*

15. African and Arab countries *reaffirm* their adherence to the policy of non-alignment, an important factor in the struggle for:

- (a) The freedom and independence of nations;
- (b) The establishment of world peace and security for all States;
- (c) The universal application of the principles of peaceful co-existence;
- (d) The democratisation of international relations;
- (e) Equal rights in co-operation;
- (f) Economic development and social advancement.

16. *Condemn* imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, apartheid and all other forms of racial and religious discrimination and segregation particularly in Africa, Palestine and the occupied Arab territories;

17. *Reaffirm* their support for African and Arab causes and *undertake* to co-ordinate their action at the international level, in particular, at the United Nations, on questions of common interest. To this end, African and Arab Groups in international bodies shall establish close co-operation;

18. *The two parties* shall continue to give their political, diplomatic, material and moral support to African and Arab national liberation movements recognized by both the OAU and the League of Arab States.

19. The Member States of the two parties shall endeavour to establish and strengthen their dip-

lomatic and economic representations in each other's countries and shall promote contacts between their similar national, political and social institutions.

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### **Message from Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng of China to the Palestine National Council in Cairo wishing the conference complete success and reaffirming China's support for the PLO<sup>45</sup>**

**Peking, March 11, 1977**

On the occasion of the convocation of the 13th Conference of the Palestine National Council, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people, our warm congratulations and high militant salute to the conference and the heroic people and armed forces of Palestine.

The Palestinian people are a great and dauntless people with an anti-imperialist revolutionary tradition. Since they fired the first shot in their armed struggle on January 1, 1965, the Palestinian people have, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, upheld unity, persisted in struggle, defied brute force and advanced wave upon wave, and have withstood severe tempering and tests. Summing up experience in the course of struggle, they are constantly pressing forward.

Your struggle is a just one; it is not only bound up with the cause of liberation of the entire Arab people, but also closely linked with the struggle of the people of the third world against imperialism and hegemonism. The Palestinian liberation movement has become an important revolutionary force in the struggle of the people of the Middle East and the whole third world to combat imperialism and hegemonism and to win or safeguard national independence. The Palestinian people have won ever more extensive international recognition and support for their national rights. All Arab people, all people of the third world and all those who uphold justice stand on your side.

Determined to carry out the behests of their great leader and teacher Chairman Mao and

<sup>45</sup> English text, *Peking Review*, no. 12 (March 18, 1977), p. 3.



unswervingly implementing his revolutionary line in foreign affairs, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the just struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab people for the restoration of their national rights and recovery of their lost territories. I am fully confident that the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and with the support of the people of the whole world, will overcome all hardships and obstacles along their road of advance and win final victory.

I wish the conference complete success.

## 71

### **Statement by Foreign Minister Peacock of Australia outlining his country's policy towards the Middle East<sup>46</sup>**

**Canberra, March 15, 1977**

In the Middle East the last year witnessed another tragic episode in an already tragic history: the terrible internecine conflict in Lebanon. Australia has played its part in international efforts to alleviate the human suffering, both through gifts of food and through special immigration arrangements. We hope President Sarkis will make rapid progress in rebuilding the country. I am very pleased that we will be able to reopen our office in Beirut in May. In the meantime the resident Embassy now being established in Damascus will deal with Lebanese migration applications. As well as the Embassy in Syria, we have recently established one in Iraq, where an Ambassador takes charge this month. These moves to strengthen our representation testify to our recognition of the growing economic and political importance of the region.

On the central Arab-Israeli dispute, the coming year will see a renewed effort towards settlement, and together with most other states we welcome this and trust that it will be pressed with the utmost determination. In the meantime, we have been glad to contribute to the United Nations Peace-keeping effort for the Middle East. At the request of the United Nations Secretary-General, Australia

deployed four RAAF helicopters with their crews and maintenance staff to the U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai in July last year.<sup>47</sup>

Australia has lent its support to United Nations resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973, seeing them as giving absolute recognition to the right of Israel to survive as a nation, and as also recognising the need for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories. One change in the situation since 1967 is that the Palestine problem has come to be seen generally as not merely an issue of refugees, but of the need for any settlement to take account of the legitimate rights of the Palestine people.

Proposals are now being advanced from the Arab side relating to the setting up of a Palestinian state on territory to be vacated by Israel on the West Bank of the Jordan and in Gaza. It is an entirely legitimate concern in Israel that whatever entity is in control of these territories should live in peace with its neighbours, and abjure threats or acts of force, as required by resolution 242. This can not be said of the long-established platform of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), and so long as the PLO can not be seen to have abandoned its earlier written rejection of Israel's right to exist, the road to peace will be blocked. A reciprocal proposition is that recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people will also require action by Israel in one form or another.

If, as a result of negotiations, there is agreement on the establishment of a Palestinian homeland alongside Israel, this will have Australian support. All this is a matter for negotiation among the parties directly concerned.

## 72

### **Statement by UK Prime Minister Callaghan expressing reservations over a direct UK role in a Middle East settlement<sup>48</sup>**

**London, March 15, 1977**

*Mr Crouch: Did the question of this being a year of opportunity for a settlement in the Middle East come up in the Prime Minister's discussions with President Carter? Did the hon. Gentleman advance the idea that*

<sup>46</sup> Made in a foreign policy speech to the House of Representatives; excerpted from the text, *Australian Foreign Affairs Record* (Canberra), XLVIII, 3 (March 1977), pp. 141-142.

<sup>47</sup> See doc. 2 above.

<sup>48</sup> Text supplied, on request, by the British embassy, Beirut.

*Britain, in conjunction with other EEC members, could offer much greater strength and initiative in helping to solve that problem?*

A. This possibility was raised. The President indicated clearly that he was opening a debate in his reference to the possibility of legal frontiers that were different from defensible frontiers. He did not touch upon the future of the Palestinians on the West Bank. That is a different question to be considered later. The American Administration desire that, if possible, there should be an overall settlement, though I said that I did not think that much could happen before the Israeli elections and that any efforts would have to be concentrated in the second half of the year.

As far as our rôle and that of the EEC is concerned, there are different attitudes in the Middle East. President Sadat has always said to me that he would welcome a British presence, but I am not sure that it would be so welcome in other areas. We shall have to leave that matter until we are nearer a settlement—if we get to that stage this year. We would, of course, discharge our responsibility as a member of the UN Security Council if called upon to do so.

It is clear that the major influence in the Middle East, because of armaments supplies, finance and other matters, must rest with the United States, and Europe should not therefore attempt to preempt the United States but rather work in support of it.

## 73

**Statement by US President Carter pointing to security for Israel, permanent borders and a homeland for the Palestinians as the prerequisites for a Middle East peace<sup>49</sup>**

Clinton, Mass., March 16, 1977

*Q. My name is Reverend Richard Harding, and, President Carter, it's a pleasure to welcome you to the number-one everytown, USA—Clinton, Massachusetts.*

*I would like to ask you, Mr. President—it seems that peace hinges greatly on the Middle East.*

A. Yes.

*Q. What do you personally feel must be done to*

*establish a meaningful and a lasting peace in that area of the world? Thank you.*

A. I think all of you know that there has been either war or potential war in the Middle East for the last 29 years, ever since Israel became a nation. I think one of the finest acts of the world nations that's ever occurred was to establish the State of Israel.

So the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of peace.

The second one is very important and very, very difficult; and that is the establishment of permanent borders for Israel. The Arab countries say that Israel must withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines. Israel says that they must adjust those lines to some degree to insure their own security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab countries on the one side and Israel on the other. But borders are still a matter of great trouble and a matter of great difficulty, and there are strong differences of opinion now.

And the third ultimate requirement for peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claim up till this moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be overcome.

There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years. And the exact way to solve the Palestinian problem is one that first of all addresses itself right now to the Arab countries and then, secondly, to the Arab countries negotiating with Israel.

Those three major elements have got to be solved before a Middle Eastern solution can be prescribed.

<sup>49</sup> Excerpted from the partial transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVI, 1972 (April 11, 1977), pp. 334–335.

I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that's most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.

We hope that later on this year, in the latter part of this year, that we might get all of these parties to agree to come together at Geneva, to start talking to one another. They haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can get them to sit down and start talking and negotiating that we have an excellent chance to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a hope.

I hope that we will all pray that that will come to pass, because what happens in the Middle East in the future might very well cause a major war there which would quickly spread to all the other nations of the world; very possibly it could do that.

Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle East for their life. We don't. If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle East, we could survive; but Japan imports more than 98 percent of all its energy, and other countries, like in Europe—Germany, Italy, France—are also heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.

So, this is such a crucial area of the world that I will be devoting a major part of my own time on foreign policy between now and next fall trying to provide for a forum within which they can discuss their problems and, hopefully, let them seek out among themselves some permanent solution.

Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the best answer I can give you to that question.

. . . . .

74

**Radio interview statement by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel regretting US President Carter's statement on a homeland for the Palestinians<sup>50</sup>**

March 17, 1977

I would have been happy had he used another expression in place of the term "homeland". I do not know what it is, this homeland. There are certain phrases in Carter's remarks which we must mention. He said that, up until now the Palestinians declared that Israel has no right to exist where she is now and that the land must revert to them, and that they have not, in any of their public statements, abandoned their intention to destroy Israel. Carter emphasized this in his remarks, where he said that these matters must be overcome. Now he says: "There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered so many, many years."

I accept this formulation if we agree that their homeland is in Jordan. If we do not define this homeland, then our position, Israel's position, is that the Palestinian question must be solved in the framework of negotiations between Israel and Jordan, and that special expression must be given to Palestinian identity in the Jordanian-Palestinian state east of Israel. I do not think Carter means this. But if I were able to give my own interpretation of that formula, I think I can live with it.

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**Statement by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev outlining proposals for a Middle East settlement (excerpt)<sup>51</sup>**

Moscow, March 21, 1977

The Middle East is another area that is continuing to attract attention. A noticeable increase in diplomatic activity is observed there in recent weeks. Judging by everything, the resumption of the Geneva Conference is gradually becoming an

<sup>50</sup> Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; translated from the Arabic translation, *Rasid Idhaat Israel* (Beirut), no. 1160, (March 18, 1977), p. 151.

<sup>51</sup> Made in a speech at the 16th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions; excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5876 (March 29, 1977), p. 106.

ever more realistic question. Such a course of events, naturally, can only be welcomed.

The conference in Geneva, however, is not an end in itself. Fruitful and just results of its work are the main thing. It goes without saying that the drawing up of peace terms in all their details is primarily a matter for the conflicting sides themselves. But the Soviet Union, as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference and a state situated in the direct proximity of the area in question, has its own views about the main principles and directions of the future peace settlement.

We hold, in particular, that the final document (or documents) on peace in the Middle East should be based on the principle of the impermissibility of the acquisition of territory by way of war and on the right of all states of the area to independent existence and security. It goes without saying that the inalienable rights of the Palestine Arab people should be ensured, including their right to self-determination and to the creation of their own state.

We regard as unquestionable that the documents on peace should provide for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. Such a withdrawal could be carried out not at once, but in stages, in the course, say, of several months, within strictly defined datelines. The appropriate border lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours, participants in the conflict, should be clearly defined. These borders should be declared to be finally established and inviolable.

We proceed from the premise that from the moment of the completion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops the state of war between the Arab states involved in the conflict and Israel will be ended and relations of peace established. In this, all sides will undertake mutual obligations to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence and to resolve their international disputes by peaceful means.

Demilitarised zones, without unilateral advantages for any party, could be created on both sides of the established borders, of course with the consent of the respective states. Either a United Nations emergency force or United Nations observers could be stationed within these zones for some clearly stipulated period of time.

Obviously, the final documents of the conference should also contain a provision about free passage

for ships of all countries, including Israel (after the ending of the state of war), through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as a statement by Egypt about the passage of ships through the Suez Canal which is entirely under Egyptian sovereignty.

In our opinion, the fulfilment of the terms of the peace settlement could be guaranteed, should the contracting parties so desire, by the United Nations Security Council or, perhaps, by individual powers, for instance, the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain. The guarantor states could have their observers in the United Nations contingents in the respective zones.

Such, comrades, are our preliminary ideas, in very brief form, on the possible basis of a just peace in the Middle East. We are not imposing them on anyone, but find it useful to let them be known, just as we, naturally, will be prepared to hear the views of others.

We already said that in connection with a peace settlement in the Middle East the relevant states could study the question of facilitating an ending of the arms race in that area. In general, the problem of the international arms trade seems to merit an exchange of views.

## 76

### **Statement by President Ceausescu of Rumania calling for a rapid solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>52</sup>**

**Bucharest, March 28, 1977**

We are seriously concerned by the fact that, although nearly ten years have passed since the unleashing of the war in the Middle East, still no solution has been found to the conflict, which poses a serious and permanent threat to peace and international security. This is why Rumania calls for a swift solution of this conflict by political means in order to reach a just and lasting peace in this area, taking as point of departure the

<sup>52</sup> Made in a speech to a joint session of the Rumanian Communist Party and the National Assembly; translated from the partial French text, *Revue Roumaine d'Etudes Internationales* (Bucharest), XI, 2, pp. 166-167.

necessity for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, for a solution to the problem of the Palestinian people in accordance with its interests and legitimate aspirations—including the establishment of its own national state—and for the guarantee of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the region. To this end the resumption of the Geneva conference, with the participation of all the interested states, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, would be of great importance.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that it will not be possible to resolve these problems unless the more active participation of the United Nations at all stages is ensured—in the adoption of decisions and in guaranteeing them.

## 77

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of US Secretary of State Vance (excerpts)<sup>53</sup>**

**Moscow, March 30, 1977**

On March 28–30, 1977, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A.A. Gromyko, held talks with the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Cyrus R. Vance, who was in Moscow on an official visit.

The discussion of international issues included the Belgrade preparatory conference, and the situation in Cyprus and southern Africa. They reaffirmed the importance of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 1971. Special attention was given to the situation in the Middle East. The sides have agreed that cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference is essential in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the area. An understanding was reached to hold, in the first half of

May, 1977 in Geneva, a meeting between the Secretary of State of the U.S. and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.<sup>54</sup> for a thorough exchange of views on the Middle East problem, including the question of resuming the work of the Geneva conference. Some of the other issues discussed in the talks in Moscow will be reviewed at that time.

The consideration of practical questions of bilateral relations produced several specific understandings.

## 78

**Joint communiqué issued after a meeting between CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>55</sup>**

**Moscow, April 4, 1977**

The Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, on April 4th, received Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. The main issue in the meeting was the development of the situation in the Middle East, and the role of the Palestinian Resistance in the general Arab struggle to eliminate the traces of the Israeli aggression, and reach a just peace in the area.

It was pointed out that certain imperialist circles, in cooperation with Israel, are trying to exploit the current situation of no settlement in the Middle East to weaken the front opposing imperialism, and strengthen the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

Comrade Brezhnev pointed out that the Palestinian Resistance in the past few years has achieved huge victories in defending the legitimate rights of the Arabs and Palestinians.

Brezhnev then confirmed his Party's and Government's principled stand in realizing an overall settlement to the Middle East problem which should take into consideration the rights of the Palestinian people, especially their rights of self-determination and establishing their own independent state. He added that the Soviet Union

<sup>53</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington) LXXVI, 1974 (April 25, 1977), pp. 404–405.

<sup>54</sup> See doc. 103 below.

<sup>55</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), April 9, 1977, pp. 1–2.

always supports the PLO participation in the Geneva Conference for peace in the Middle East.

Arafat spoke about the struggle of the Palestinian people to realize their national aspirations regarding the results of the 13th session of the Palestinian National Congress,<sup>56</sup> he confirmed the efforts of the Palestinian Revolution to continue the struggle against imperialist-reactionary conspiracies and strengthen its relationship with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist bloc.

In the name of the Palestinian people, Arafat expressed his deep appreciation for the Soviet Union's support for the Palestinian people and their national aims.

Brezhnev also pointed out that the Soviet Union has always supported the Palestinian people and the peoples of the Arab world in their struggle for their national independence, and for social progress and freedom. He then wished victory and the realization of their aims to Palestinian militants.

## 79

### **Press interview statements by US President Carter discussing Palestinian representation at a Geneva peace conference<sup>57</sup>**

**Dobbins Air Force Base, Georgia, April 8, 1977**

*Q. Mr. President, do you think that the resignation of Prime Minister Rabin may throw off your timetable for the Geneva talks and a settlement in the Middle East?*

A. No, I don't. Obviously, the Israeli Labor Party will now be searching for a replacement candidate for Prime Minister Rabin in May. And I believe that the outcome of the election might very well be affected; nobody can anticipate how.

But there is a great realization among the Israeli leaders that 1977 is an important year. There is almost a unanimous commitment, I think, among all the Mideastern countries that if we don't succeed this year in some major step toward peace that it will be a long time before we can mount such a mammoth multinational effort again.

<sup>56</sup> Docs. 228-231 below.

<sup>57</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI, 1976, (May 9, 1977), pp. 461-462.

So it may be affected—the chances for peace—but no one can predict how. And I believe the Israelis will push forward with their own strong desire to have a permanent and lasting peace with the Arab neighbors, to have borders that they can defend, and that the Palestinian question be resolved. I don't think the identity of one particular political figure, even the Prime Minister, will affect that adversely.

*Q. Mr. President, when you were meeting with President Sadat and you were talking about this Palestinian question, did you get any impression that there is a way to get the Palestinians to Geneva as part of some delegation? And if so, can you give us some of your thinking on that?*

A. Well, as you know, President Sadat earlier had been the Arab leader that was courageous enough to espouse the idea that the Palestinians might be part of the Jordanian delegation. Whether or not that will evolve, I don't have any way to anticipate.

But I have good hope that we can resolve the question of Palestinian participation in some fashion or another. At this point, which is quite early in the year's efforts, I believe that it's primarily a responsibility of the Arab countries and the Palestinians. And for me to spell out what I think is a most likely prospect, I think would be counterproductive at this point.

*Q. Mr. President, do you think they should be represented?*

A. Well, obviously, one of the three crucial decisions to be made in the Middle East concerns the Palestinian people. And there will have to be a spokesman for their viewpoint during the conference itself. Whether that would be done by a surrogate or by them directly is something that hasn't been evolved.

The other two questions, obviously, are the definition of permanent peace and the assurance of it, and the border delineations.

But I certainly think that in some fashion that the Palestinian people must be represented.

*Q. Mr. President, President Sadat used the word "entity" when he came to Washington, instead of Palestinian nation or Palestinian state.*

A. Yes.

*Q. Did you get any impression from him that he is moving toward, or more willing now to accept a Jordanian-Palestinian nation; that is, a homeland that would be under the control of Jordan?*

*A. That's a question I wouldn't want to answer for President Sadat. I'll let him make his own statements publicly, and I don't intend to repeat what he tells me privately.*

But I think that it's obvious that that's one avenue of success. It's one that I have espoused even during the campaign months—that perhaps some confederation or some relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan might be advisable.

As you know, there are approximately a million Palestinians who are part of the Jordanian society now, in very high positions in the government, and I think this is a natural possibility. Whether or not it will be the ultimate decision, I can't say.

## 80

### **Communiqué issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries (excerpts)<sup>58</sup>**

New Delhi, April 11, 1977

1. The Coordinating Bureau of Non-aligned countries met in New Delhi at Foreign Ministers' level from April 7 to 11, 1977.

34. Having reviewed the situation in the Middle East, the Bureau is of the view that all the factors conducive to an explosion actually exist. The aggravation of the situation poses so serious a threat to international peace and security that a new armed conflict could flare up. The Bureau stresses its conviction that the gravity of the situation is due to Israel's obstinacy and its continued policy of occupation and expansion and its refusal to comply with the principles laid down in the U.N. Charter and Resolutions.

35. The Bureau believes that, having been in occupation of Arab land for about ten years, Israel continues to pursue its policies of expansion and annexation of the occupied Arab territories,

of expulsion and mass arrests. It continues to maltreat Arab populations, to demolish their houses and ransack Arab property of historical and cultural significance. Israel continues to suppress basic freedoms; to restrict the freedom of religious practice; to exploit unlawfully the natural manpower and other resources of the occupied territories; to change the physical, political, cultural, religious and demographic status of those territories. In addition, Israel continues to entrench its occupation by establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories on an increasingly large scale, thus constituting a major obstacle in the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East. Israel also continues to violate the human rights of the Arab inhabitants, to torture Arab prisoners to death, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Human Rights Declaration and the Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian populations during a state of war. The latter document was signed on 12 August 1949 but Israel refuses to abide by it in defiance of the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations in this regard.

36. The Bureau noted the efforts being undertaken towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East and the attempts on the part of Israel to perpetuate a deadlock, particularly as Israel endeavours to gain time and prolong its occupation in a bid to create a fait accompli, relying on United States political, economic and military support. The Bureau, therefore, stresses that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only be established within a comprehensive settlement based on a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, and the recovery and practice by the Palestinian people of their inalienable right.

37. The Bureau notes with satisfaction the resolution adopted by the 31st Session of United Nations General Assembly on the Middle East problem.<sup>60</sup> The Bureau calls on the Security Council to meet at the earliest possible date to take effective measures according to an appropriate time-table, and secure the total withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories. The Security Council is called upon to shoulder its responsibilities, as defined by the United Nations Charter, in removing any possible threats to the

<sup>58</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVIII, 652 (June 20, 1977), pp. 13, 16–17.

<sup>59</sup> Docs. 141 and 142 in *International Documents on Palestine, 1976*.

<sup>60</sup> Docs. 18 to 25 in *ibid*.

maintenance of world peace and security. The Bureau stresses the important role which the Security Council must play in establishing a just and lasting peace in the region, with a view to defusing the explosive situation and removing the dangers threatening world peace and security.

38. The Bureau noted with grave concern that Israel's continued usurpation of Palestine, its flagrant denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people as recognised by the United Nations, its persistence in its hostile, expansionist and racist policy and its repressive practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories constitute a defiance of the International Community and a violation of the Principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

39. The Bureau recalled that the V Summit Conference urged the need to take the most adequate measures to strengthen the pressure of the Non-Aligned countries on Israel in the United Nations and Specialised Agencies particularly in the Security Council with a view to securing Israel's compliance with United Nations resolutions and ensuring the non-use of veto.

40. The Bureau noted with satisfaction that the United Nations General Assembly, in its 31st Session, had adopted the Report of the "United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people".<sup>61</sup>

41. It called on the Security Council to meet at the earliest possible date to adopt the Report and take effective measures for the immediate implementation of its recommendations, which enable the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable national rights—a prerequisite to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

42. The Bureau, furthermore, noted with satisfaction the decision adopted by the Palestinian National Council in its meeting—March 1977, in which it considered the recommendations of the Reports as a positive and advanced step towards the attainment of the aspirations and rights of the Palestinian people.

43. The Bureau noted with satisfaction the adoption, *inter alia*, by the Palestine National Council of the following decisions in conformity with United Nations General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXX) and 3375 (XXX):

(a) to pursue the struggle of the Palestinian people to regain its national rights including the Right to Return, the Right to Self-determination and the Right to establish its own national state over its national soil

and

(b) to affirm the right of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to participate in all international conferences, forums, and efforts dealing with problem of Palestine and the Arab Zionist Conflict for the fulfilment of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people which have been recognised by the United Nations General Assembly, particularly in Resolution 3236.<sup>62</sup>

44. The Bureau recalled the decision, *inter alia*, of the Colombo Summit Conference calling upon all Non-aligned countries to pledge support for the Palestinian people by all possible means in their continued struggle until they fully attain their inalienable national rights.

## 81

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Prime Minister Nouri of Tunisia (excerpts)<sup>63</sup>**

**Moscow, April 12, 1977**

Hedi Nouri, Prime Minister of the Republic of Tunisia, Secretary-General of the Parti Socialiste Destourien, was on an official friendly visit in the USSR on April 4–12, 1977 at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Particular attention was given to the Middle East. The two Sides noted that the situation in that area is still complicated and explosive because of Israel's persistent continuation of its policy of aggression and occupation of Arab territories, the denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the ignoring of the resolutions of the United Nations Organization. They consider Israeli measures to change the physical character, demographic composition and status of the occupied territories or any part of these territories illegal and invalid.

Both Sides are convinced that a just and lasting

<sup>62</sup> See doc. 229 below.

<sup>63</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, no. 17 (April 23, 1977), supplement, pp. 4–5.

<sup>61</sup> Doc. 4 in *ibid*.



peace can be ensured in the Middle East only provided Israel completely withdraws from all Arab lands it occupied in 1967 and the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine are restored in conformity with the UN Charter, including their right to self-determination and establishment of their own national, independent state.

Both Sides favour an early re-opening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East and that all the parties directly concerned participate on an equal basis, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Tunisian Side said it appreciated the help and support which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are giving to the just cause of the Arabs in their conflict with Israel.

Both Sides are convinced that a just settlement of the Middle East problem will be of great importance for spreading the favourable influence of detente to the Mediterranean and for transforming the area into a zone of peace and international cooperation.

## 82

### **Speech by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Asad of Syria<sup>64</sup>**

**Moscow, April 18, 1977**

Esteemed Comrade Hafis al-Asad,  
Esteemed Syrian friends,  
Comrades,

We are happy to welcome to Moscow once again our friend Hafis al-Asad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the statesmen and political leaders from friendly Syria who came with him.

The people of Syria have just celebrated their national holiday—foreign troops Evacuation Day. This date is close to the hearts of Soviet people also.

Our country was among the first to staunchly defend the freedom, independence and independent

development of the young Syrian Republic. We firmly adhered to that stand during the years of military trial which the Syrian people had to endure in their struggle against imperialist aggression. We continue adhering to it now.

The countries of victorious socialism and the forces of the national liberation movement are natural allies.

This alliance is for the abolition of exploitation and imperialist piracy around the world, for giving the peoples the chance to decide their own destiny and build a new life without outside interference, in short, it is for a better and fairer life, so that the people can be confident of their peaceful future.

Appraising political developments in their broad context, evaluating their main directions, one can't help noticing the tremendous changes that are taking place in different parts of the world, changes in favour of peace, freedom and independence of the peoples, and of social progress.

The Middle East is no exception. Events have been moving ahead in a stormy way here, often becoming dramatic. The policy of some Arab states has at times made abrupt turns. But one thing is clear; whereas before the colonialists reigned supreme in the Middle East, the Arab countries are now politically independent, and their peoples are firmly determined to advance along the road of social progress. And these changes are historically irreversible.

Why is it that of late things seem to be moving towards a Middle East settlement and the convocation of the Geneva Conference? Why is this being talked about in the capitals of even those countries where—and this is no secret for anybody—other techniques and methods were preferred and applied?

The decisive reason is because the forces—in the Middle East itself and beyond—that favour a comprehensive settlement are so substantial that they must be taken into account.

All peace-loving peoples strongly demand an end to the Middle East seat of tension.

I can speak definitively for the Soviet Union: our desire for a just and lasting Middle East peace is invariable and consistent.

This obviously follows from the foreign policy decisions of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from its Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and for Freedom and Independence of the Peoples.

<sup>64</sup>*Pravda* (Moscow), April 10, 1977; English text, *Moscow News*, no. 17 (April 23, 1977), supplement, pp. 2–3. See doc.239 below for President Asad's speech on the same occasion.

Our country is persistently working towards peace and tranquillity in the Middle East, to do away with the consequences of the Israeli aggression. We stand for a radical settlement. Our suggestions on the issue are balanced and, the main thing, they are honest.

There is good reason why the ideas we recently made public on the possible principles for a fair Middle East peace brought forth broad positive comments from around the world, including the Arab peoples.

Clearly a peace built on aggression, on the seizure of foreign lands, cannot be fair. And so, neither can it be lasting. We stand for the historical areas captured by Israel being unconditionally returned to Syria and the other victims of aggression.

Neither can a peace be durable if it tramples on the vital interests of a state or a people in the Middle East. This refers above all to the Arab people of Palestine who are fighting courageously to establish their own state. This also refers, naturally, to all the other peoples in the area, including the people of the state of Israel. All of them have the right to state sovereignty and security.

Concrete consideration of all the questions involved in a settlement should have begun long ago at the Geneva Conference, of which the Soviet Union is a co-chairman. We favour its convocation without delay.

It stands to reason that the Palestine Liberation Organization—the legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people—should take part in its work on a fully equal basis. Our firm position is that no decision concerning the Arab people of Palestine should be taken without the Palestinians or against their will.

Naturally, the struggle to further improve the international climate, to consolidate international security and move detente ahead is not confined to ending the existing armed conflicts and eliminating seats of tension. It is equally important not to create new such seats.

Today one has to speak about this specifically in connection with the attempts of imperialist forces and their henchmen to interfere in the internal military conflict in Zaire.

We have already spoken about this, and I want to emphasize again: if a dangerous new source of tension emerges in the centre of Africa,

all the responsibility will rest with those who violate a fundamental principle of inter-state relations—the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. We strongly oppose such actions wherever they may take place. Those who meddle in other people's affairs, who work for the growth of a conflict situation in Zaire and around it should think seriously about the possible consequences.

Comrade President the history of Soviet-Syrian relations has many bright pages telling about the consolidation of friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Syria, about the broadening of their equal cooperation both in international affairs and in bilateral relations.

Our peoples' friendship rests on their common fundamental interests in the historical battle for peace and social progress, and the rich experience of many years of struggle against all forms of imperialist aggression, colonialism and racism.

This, one may say, is the main content of Soviet-Syrian friendship. It is exactly this that determines the character of our relations and their development in all other areas. Equality, mutual respect, consistency and frankness, straightforwardness and fairness are the principles of our friendship. And based on these principles, it will continue to develop and grow stronger.

For our part, we have been doing and are doing all we can to cement cooperation with Syria along all lines. And here it is important that we give concerted and constant thought to the prospects to the deepening of both bilateral Soviet-Syrian relations in all fields and to coordinating actions on urgent international problems, above all the Middle East problem. The opportunities do exist.

I would like to toast the good health of Comrade Hafis al-Asad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, Chairman of the Progressive National Front of Syria, President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

To the progress and prosperity of friendly Syria!  
To friendship between the Soviet and Syrian peoples!

## 83

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh of Vietnam to Iraq (excerpts)<sup>65</sup>**

Baghdad, April 19, 1977

At the invitation of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the government of Iraq, Mr. Nguyen Duy Trinh, member of the Politbureau of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, paid a visit to the Iraqi Republic in the period April 16 to 19, 1977.

The two sides expressed their determined support for the heroic struggle waged by the Arab people in general and the Arab Palestinian people in particular against the persistent Zionist aggression aided by US imperialism, in order to liberate all occupied Arab territories and to realize their inalienable national rights on their soil and in their homeland Palestine.

They further affirmed their support for the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine and the armed Palestinian resistance inside and outside occupied Palestine, for the sake of expelling Zionism and liberating the whole of Palestinian soil. They call upon all peoples of the world and their national and revolutionary movements to furnish all support and aid to the struggle of the Palestine resistance movement.

## 84

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Asad of Syria (excerpts)<sup>66</sup>**

Moscow, April 22, 1977

Hafiz al-Assad, secretary-general of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, heading a Syrian Party and government delegation, stayed in the Soviet Union from April 18 to 22, 1977, on an official

friendly visit as guest of the central committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

During the talks, a constructive exchange of views was held on bilateral Soviet-Syrian relations, the situation in the Middle East and ways of achieving a just and lasting peace in that region, and also on highly important international problems.

The sides reaffirmed their resolve to develop the relations of friendship and mutual confidence between the Soviet Union and Syria.

They noted with satisfaction that the co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic rested on the foundation of equality, mutual respect and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs. The sides are fully resolved to continue to adhere to this course on the basis of the principles and theses contained in the joint Soviet-Syrian statement<sup>67</sup> signed in Moscow on April 13, 1974, by Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU central committee, and Hafiz al-Assad, secretary-general of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic. Both sides regard this statement as a firm political foundation for the development of bilateral relations and also of the struggle for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The USSR and the SAR attach paramount importance to the development of mutual political relations and believe that firm relations in this field favourably affect Soviet-Syrian economic, commercial and other cooperation. As experience has shown, personal contacts between the leaders of both countries play a special part in the strengthening of Soviet-Syrian friendship and they will be maintained in the future, too. Both sides expressed their intention to continue the practice of holding regular consultations with each other at various levels.

The sides expressed the desire for the further development of the friendly contacts between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party. An understanding was reached on specific steps in the field of interparty relations for the next period.

<sup>65</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), April 20, 1977.

<sup>66</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5879 (April 26, 1977), p. 144.

<sup>67</sup> Doc. 96 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

It was noted during the discussion of commercial and economic co-operation that it was developing successfully and becoming increasingly stable and long-term in nature. This co-operation embraces the leading branches of the Syrian economy, including power, oil production, transport and irrigation development, which are of great importance for the making and development of the national economy and the rise in the living standards of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Soviet Union and Syria noted that there were favourable possibilities for the further deepening of economic and technical co-operation on a mutually-advantageous basis and reaffirmed their desire to give a further impetus to its development.

The two sides also discussed and outlined steps for further raising the level of the defences of the Syrian Arab Republic.

An exchange of views took place on major international problems. Emphasis was on developments in the Middle East where an explosive situation is maintained as a result of the continuing occupation of Arab territory by Israel and its refusal to recognise the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The sides condemned the reprisals, racial discrimination and oppression carried out by Israel on the occupied Arab territories, its attempts to change the face of these territories and also the expulsion of the Arab population from their land and the building of Israeli settlements on it.

The Soviet Union and Syria believe that a just and stable peace in the Middle East can be achieved only on condition of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and satisfaction of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their inalienable right to self-determination and the setting up of their own independent state.

The sides expressed their determination to continue co-operation for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They reaffirmed the great importance of the identity of the positions of the Arabs and the strengthening of Arab solidarity in the cause of rebuffing attempts by Israel and the imperialist forces backing it to split the ranks of the Arab countries in order to set them at loggerheads and weaken their struggle against Israeli aggression.

The mutual determination of the USSR and

Syria was expressed to work for an early holding of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, in its proceedings from the very beginning and on an equal footing with the other participants in the conference. In doing so, the Syrian side noted the importance of the role in preparing and holding the Geneva Conference which falls on the Soviet Union in its capacity as co-chairman.

The Soviet Union and Syria noted with satisfaction that a process of normalisation of the situation was taking place in Lebanon and that peace and security were being restored in that country with the safeguarding of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. They condemned Israeli intervention in the domestic affairs of Lebanon, which is expressed in Israel's unceasing provocations in the south of the country.

The sides are convinced that the strengthening of Arab unity in the struggle against Israeli aggression and imperialism is of great importance for achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They advocate the strengthening and deepening of contacts between the national liberation movement of the Arabs and the states of the socialist community, the non-aligned countries and all progressive forces.

85

**Press conference statements by UK Foreign Secretary Owen reviewing his talks in Egypt and discussing aspects of current moves towards a Middle East settlement<sup>68</sup>**

**Cairo, April 26, 1977**

*Q. What do you think has come out from your talks with President Sadat?*

*A. We discussed Africa and its wider ramifications but we went into perhaps more detail of the possible future timetable and the way negotiations might go through this year, with the objective of reaching Geneva so that we did spend quite a*

<sup>68</sup> Excerpted from the transcript supplied, on request, by the British embassy in Beirut.

lot of time on the Middle East. It was very interesting for me to discuss with the President his meeting in Washington. I have been to Washington earlier with Prime Minister Callaghan and will be seeing Cyrus Vance myself on the 6th in London and we will be jointly attending a number of meetings, both the Economic Summit and the NATO meeting, and later the CENTO meeting in Tehran. And so it was very interesting to get the President's own impression of those discussions and the way he sees the shape of any future negotiations. I think that was the main area which was for me interesting.

*Q. Many politicians have said that 1977 would be the year of peace in the Middle East. Do you think now after your talks with the President and Mr. Fahmi that this will be possible?*

A. Yes. I think that is certainly possible. And I think it is no bad idea to have some timescale in which you are trying to make progress. I don't think you should get too rigidly attached to it though. This is a problem that has eluded negotiators over many decades and it will take time. There are still quite appreciable differences of view on quite a number of important elements. But I would hope that we would make progress in 1977 and I think looking back, that 1977 has been the year in which the process really did come together. Certainly I think that is a reasonable objective to take and it is one which the US administration has been working towards.

*Q. Do you think that Britain will participate in any talks on the Middle East in the near future?*

A. Well the Geneva format is pretty settled, it is always open to widen the range of the meeting. People can decide that. I think the British role is one at the moment both in terms of its relationships with Egypt and various Arab countries and also with Israel. So it is a sort of bilateral relationship. It is also within the community and it has got a special relationship with the US. It is closely involved through that. The way and the format in which we may be involved I think is up to the participants. If we are asked to come and we can help, we have never made any secret of the fact that we attach a very high importance to getting a peaceful resolution to the problem in the Middle East, we would be prepared to consider any role that we might be asked to play. We have never hidden the fact that under some

circumstances, as part of a negotiated settlement, there may be place for some form of international guarantees. Well obviously you have to look at it. You can't make commitments without seeing what is being asked of you. But the concept of guarantee is one which Britain has always supported.

*Q. Are you making any specific proposals about a peace settlement?*

A. No. I David Owen, nor I Britain have got any specific proposals. I don't think it is the right thing. I have my ideas like I suppose everyone in this room has.

*Q. Do you agree with the Arabs that Resolution 242 is not now useful?*

A. Not useful. I think 242 is a very good background resolution. Time has moved on. Situations change but I still think it is a valid basis for any form of negotiations. But I have never been one to be terribly attached to resolutions and the fixed nature of words. The most important thing is attitudes. That's the fundamental thing that brings peace. It is the resolution of minds not the resolution on paper that's needed and what is now needed is a strong sense of commitment to a peaceful solution both within Israel and within the Arab countries. Now if you can bring that together and any outside international mediation, and the US has naturally found itself taking the lead role in this, then you can get a peaceful transition. The problem is a solvable one. It's a very difficult problem. There are very complex arguments on either side and there is a whole background of history. But the fundamental thing is a wish for peace and that has to exist to all the parties to a negotiated settlement.

*[Question on whether Britain should play a major role in helping to solve the Middle East problem.]*

A. Well, we're bedevilled by our history. I mean you can't escape it if you are British Foreign Secretary. You may wish to. Although I don't think necessarily we should escape it. I don't claim that every item of British history I would wish to defend, particularly where I am speaking today. But on balance, broadly speaking, I think our historical record is certainly defensible and there is a tendency I think for people to think that we have responsibilities, which we probably do have, but also the capability of delivering and

that I think we don't always have. We don't shirk our responsibilities. We certainly have an historic role which has given us a great deal of expertise. I think our expertise in the Arab world is almost unrivalled of any western industrialised nation. And that expertise we have always made available to anyone and have always put it at the disposal of a peaceful settlement and will continue to do so. And sometimes we can use that expertise because we do have relations with all sides in the argument and I think that is reasonable. We will certainly do that. We won't run away from it. On the other hand I don't want to come here pretending to you that Britain acting as an individual nation has a key role in this. I don't think we do. I think we have a supportive role and an important supportive role.

*Q. Dr. Owen have you at any time during your visit to Egypt or beforehand been asked to meet the PLO and if so was it in any way to act as a mediator between the PLO and perhaps the US. Have you in any way been involved in talking to any Palestinian representatives of any kind during the course of your Middle East visit so far?*

A. No.

*Q. Is there any suggestion that you will when you go to Damascus or not?*

A. Well I read something in the papers about that a few weeks back. But I have no intention of seeing anybody from the PLO.

*Q. Is there any restriction on you?*

A. Restriction? Well I'm a free agent.

*Q. Is there any rule that prevents the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to meet a representative of the PLO?*

A. No, I have made clear in the context I think I was talking of a peaceful settlement in southern Africa, but it is a basic philosophy of mine that I would be prepared to go anywhere and see anyone if it helped towards peace. I think that's what a Foreign Secretary's job is about. The question is you have to make a judgement as to whether you think it would help. And that judgement is best taken at a particular moment in time. I certainly think of myself as a free agent, to pursue a policy of peace either in this case in the Middle East or anywhere else and I think one would take a judgement on whether that would be helpful at the time and take into account all

the varying considerations that there always are associated with who you see, who you recognize, what you do.

*Q. Some political observers have got the feeling that Britain is lagging behind Western Europe. What's your view on this?*

A. What's yours? Do you believe that?

Well, you take these stories, they run you round you know. I made no secret of it. I am not in the business of spending my time wondering whether the "the" is there or the "A" is there or whether you should put this sentence in parenthesis or something like that. I really believe that there are bigger issues behind all this which are attitudes. That's the fundamental issues of peace. Now as far as Britain is concerned I have no doubt whatever that we are deeply involved in having good relations with the Arab world. We also have good relations with Israel. And there is no harm in that. I think that if you believe in a peaceful resolution of this problem which I do, you will have to have, and I believe it is perfectly attainable, good relations between Israel and the Arab world. So some of the people who are trying to achieve peace from outside shouldn't have to be ashamed at having good relations with both of you and that's my objective. As far as Britain's relationship with the Arab world, we have I think shown this in every way that I think it is possible to say that we wish to have a good relationship. I have spoken to a number of ministers, not just the foreign minister, here and I have asked have you any problems? Any problems to the Minister of War, any problems to the Minister of Health, any problems to the Minister of Education and every time I have received "no there aren't any problems". I think that's how you judge relations and if I go round to the rest of the Arab world—I was in Abu Dhabi a few months back just before I was Secretary of State—again I think we have got good relations. I have seen most of the major Arab leaders ever since I have been Secretary of State. I saw King Hussein just before I left London. I have seen Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia. I have seen a lot of the Saudi Arabians, I saw King Khalid when he was ill, having an operation in London, and I think that the present Prime Minister in Britain has shown, he has demonstrated admirably, his wish to have good relations with the Arab world. We have conducted the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in I think a way which

has demonstrated a commitment to the importance of Euro-Arab dialogue in Tunis,<sup>69</sup> to the need to get the agreement through, the Mashraq Agreements. I think we have made progress. I don't claim that it is very rapid and I think you will find it is a good thing that we have close relations with the United States.

*Q. [Arms sales to Egypt].*

*A.* I gather there are no problems. I talked to the Minister of War in particular about this, and there are no outstanding difficulties at all. I mean there isn't any weapon system or any item of equipment which they want that we have not been able to provide and the only main obstacle they face is the whole question of financing them.

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### **Press interview statements by US President Carter discussing the visit of King Hussein of Jordan to the US and the Geneva peace conference<sup>70</sup>**

Washington, April 26, 1977

. . . . .

*Q. How did it go, Mr. President?*

*A.* Just fine. It was one of the most productive and enjoyable visits we have had.

*Q. Mr. President, could you clarify a point? On the participation of the Palestinians and the possible participation in a Jordanian delegation, do you mean PLO representatives or Palestinians who are not part of the PLO?*

*A.* Well, it's too early to start spelling out specifics about that. The one thing I might add, on which all the leaders seem to agree, is that the more agreement that we can reach before going to Geneva, the less argument there is going to be about the form of the Palestinian representation.

And I think unless we see some strong possibility for substantial achievements before a Geneva conference can be convened, unless we see that prospect, then I think it would be better not to

have the Geneva conference at all.

So far, though, I have been encouraged. I think it would be a mistake to expect too much. The differences are very wide and longstanding and deep. But I found a strong desire among all the leaders with whom I met so far to marshal extraordinary efforts during this year because of the moderate leadership that exists in the Middle East and because of the experiences that have been so devastating in the past. So we are all determined to do the best we can in '77.

I think that the exact composition of the delegations, involving the Palestinians, of course, and the interrelationships that exist among the Arab nations—whether part of the discussions would be done as a group and part of them on a bilateral basis, those kinds of things have to be worked out.

After I've finished meeting all the leaders in May, a strong likelihood is that we would consolidate our own analysis of the remaining problems and possible answers to questions,<sup>71</sup> and then Secretary Vance would go back to the Middle East for another complete round of talks with the leaders involved.

Those are our present plans, and so far the leaders in the Middle East have agreed with that.

*Q. May I follow that up, Mr. President?*

*A.* I think that is probably about all I need to say.

*Q. But you do seem more pessimistic than before Hussein came.*

*A.* No, I am not more pessimistic. I think it would just be a mistake for us to be overly optimistic. To raise expectations too high would be—I think would be potentially very damaging. I think after May, though, we'll have a much clearer concept of what can be done.

*Q. Did you learn anything new from Hussein?*

*A.* Yes, I did. He is a very good instructor, and I am a very eager student.

<sup>69</sup> See doc. 57 above.

<sup>70</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI, 1978 (May 23, 1977), pp. 522–523.

<sup>71</sup> See doc. 96 below.

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia by President Perez of Venezuela (excerpt)<sup>72</sup>**

Riyadh, April 28, 1977

At the invitation of HM, King Khalid Abd al-Aziz Al Sa'ud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, HE the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez, paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from Monday, seventh Jumada al-Awwal 1397 AH, corresponding to 25th April 1977, to Wednesday, ninth Jumada al-Awwal 1397 AH, corresponding to 27th April 1977.

With the participation of the official Saudi and Venezuelan delegations, and in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, HRH Prince Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz and HE President Carlos Andres Perez reviewed international political and economic problems, regional questions and bilateral relations.

The two sides reaffirmed that the situation in the Middle East contained dangers that affected the region's security and stability as well as world peace. The two sides were of the opinion that if circumstances today were better than they had been in the past with regard to the search for a comprehensive, just and permanent solution, it was inevitable that a search for this settlement should begin before the situation deteriorated in a dangerous way. They also reaffirmed that the Palestine question was the essence of the conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, the comprehensive solution of that question should be realized by all sides concerned being present.

. . . . .

**Press interview statement by Prime Minister Castro of Cuba describing his talks with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat in Moscow (excerpt)<sup>73</sup>**

Havana, late April 1977

. . . . .

My visit to Moscow coincided with that of Arafat.<sup>74</sup> We have magnificent relations with the PLO, and we had some talks with him. He told me how the Palestinian Council meeting<sup>75</sup> that was held in Cairo developed. The idea I got from the Palestinian media and from Arafat was that it was a tremendous success that consolidated the unity of the PLO and set forth the line of struggle for the coming years. The Palestinian movement came out of the meeting strengthened. Arafat gave me a general outline of the events in Lebanon, of the struggle waged by the Palestinians there to survive and to defend the revolution. He told me that thousands of Palestinian fighters were killed. These are very sad things, but, in spite of them, the Palestinian movement had demonstrated its capacity to stand up against the attacks resulting from the maneuvers by imperialism and Zionism. I think that the Palestinians are one of the most heroic peoples in the world today. In spite of the enormous difficulties they've had to confront—their betrayal by the Arab reaction, imperialism's maneuvers and Israel's attack—I'm absolutely sure that, sooner or later, their cause will triumph. We will always stand firmly by the Palestinian people in their struggle.

. . . . .

<sup>72</sup> Broadcast in Arabic on Riyadh radio, partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5499/A/1-2. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>73</sup> English text, *Granma* (Havana), XII, 21, May 22, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>74</sup> See doc. 237 below.

<sup>75</sup> See docs. 228-231 below.



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**Press interview statements by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria declaring that UN resolution 242 and recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people are the basis for Middle East peace (excerpt)<sup>76</sup>**

Vienna, early May, 1977

*Q. Mr. Chancellor, you have always demonstrated objectivity in the position you have adopted as regards the Middle East conflict. The Arab side has appreciated your attitudes, especially since it is aware that you are of Jewish origin. Before dealing with your own contribution to the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, let me ask you how you assess the present chances for a just and permanent settlement of the Middle East conflict?*

*A. I believe that the chances for arriving at a just and permanent settlement of the Middle East conflict are far better today than they have been in the past. The reason, in my view, is that the Israelis have also begun to realize that there can be no settlement of this conflict without solving the Palestine problem itself. Furthermore, I believe that there is an improvement in the overall scene. Inside the PLO, a most important stage has been reached, winning for the PLO comprehensive international recognition. Therefore, I think we are approaching a solution, especially since President Sadat did not simply make wise and realistic proposals while he was in the United States; he also found there a great deal of understanding and appreciation for these views. For all these reasons, I believe that this year and the next will be two decisive years in this regard.*

*In addition to all this, I would like to state that every reasonable person in the Middle East today realizes that a continued state of war would mean enormous expenditure for the parties concerned, which, if used for peaceful purposes, could transform the entire Near and Middle East region into not only a zone of peace but also one of great prosperity. I am under the impression that Egypt in particular understands this issue clearly.*

*Q. In your recent speech before the Israeli Labour Party Congress, in which you took part as a guest, you called for the participation of representatives of the*

*Palestinian people in the Geneva Middle East conference, and, as a comment on Israel's refusal to talk to the PLO, you said, and I quote, "None of us can decide by himself the representatives of this people"—that is the people of Palestine. Furthermore, former West German Chancellor and head of the Social Democratic Party and of the Socialist International Willy Brandt stated in a recent interview with al-Ahram that your views were not opposed by the Israelis. Are you under the impression that the Israelis will ultimately follow this path, which alone can bring success?*

*A. I do not want to cause a lot of difficulties for my friends in Israel, and I say this in order to affirm that I have friends in Israel also. But I cannot believe that in fact the Israelis have not begun to recognize and appreciate what I stated before the party congress. I said then that one cannot by himself specify and determine the side with whom one is to negotiate. If one realizes that there is a Palestinian problem and that it must be solved, one cannot arrive at this without the participation in negotiations of representatives of the Palestinian people as well. I have always expressed this view. In the past, the French refused to negotiate with the [Algerian] National Liberation Front, but later changed their mind and negotiated with it. Accordingly, I have held and still hold the view that the Israeli side will one day be willing to talk to representatives of the Palestinian people.*

*Q. As is known, you have held talks on behalf of the Socialist International with Arab officials directly involved in the Middle East conflict and with Israel. In that interview, Willy Brandt said that you will soon prepare a written report about this to be submitted to the Socialist International and to public opinion. Can you tell us something about that report and its date of publication?*

*A. As a matter of fact, I did finish that report a long time ago. However, there are recent events and developments which I must take into account in that report, and this has delayed its publication. As regards your question concerning its date of publication, this will take place shortly after the Israeli elections, because I do not want to cause any problems to anyone. The first part of the report will be issued in the name of the entire delegation. I shall append my own personal conclusions to the second part of the report.*

<sup>76</sup> Translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Hasan Suliak, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 5, 1977, p. 4.

*Q. Mr. Chancellor, can you tell us in general about*

*your proposals or about the general tenor of this report, without going into details?*

A. The report will not be one that "reveals" any "secrets." It will set down with utmost clarity those principles that the delegation believes are worthy of consideration in the context of a peace settlement. One such principle that I can allude to is to encourage the Palestinian people to participate in the negotiations relating to a settlement of the Middle East conflict. In this regard, I would like to affirm that I do not agree to any proposed solution except in the context of the establishment of a Palestinian state. I will clarify this question in my report. One must also take into account the consequences of establishing such a state, especially as regards the relations of this state with both Jordan and Israel.

*Q. Mr. Chancellor, does your report also deal with the question of the return of occupied Arab territories?*

A. My assessment of the problem is as follows: UN resolutions must be respected, especially resolution 242. And while the PLO has a certain position on this resolution, the Palestine National Council that met recently in Cairo has clarified this issue.<sup>77</sup> As I see the course of events, the Palestinians reject this resolution only because it does not mention the Palestinian people, referring only to "refugees". This point needs to be elaborated because, in the meantime, a stage of development has taken place whereby everyone has come to regard the Palestinians as a people and this is happening increasingly in Israel itself. I consider this a great improvement. Therefore, the report will be based upon that UN resolution and will draw up some political conclusions as a complement to it.

Finally, I would like to say that I hope that it will be possible to bring viewpoints closer in the next few months. This will become even clearer than at present due to the enormous contributions of President Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt. President Sadat, despite all enmity and suspicion, was the first man of courage who stood up and gave a new and clear indication, I mean an indication of understanding. If all these were to succeed, President Sadat would become, and I have been stating this for a long time, one of the greatest men of our time.

**Statement issued by the delegations of the PLO Central Council and the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) following their discussions<sup>78</sup>**

**Prague, May 4, 1977**

On May 3 and 4, 1977 in Prague, the first official meeting between a delegation of the PLO and a delegation of the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) was held. Views were exchanged in a friendly atmosphere on problems of their common struggle. The delegations also expressed their gratitude to the Czech Communist Party for offering its hospitality.

The members of the Palestinian delegation were Messrs. Majid Abu Sharar, secretary of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, Issam Abd al-Latif, member of the Political Bureau of the DFLP, Abdullah Hurani, director of the PLO Information and Guidance Department, and Arabi Awwad, member of the Central Committee of the Jordanian Communist Party.

The members of the Israeli Communist delegation were Messrs. Wolf Erlich, chairman of the Central Controlling Committee of the Party, Emile Tuma, member of the Party's Political Bureau, Uzi Bernstein, member of the Political Bureau, and Ali Ashur, member of the Central Committee.

The two parties stressed that this meeting will mark the beginning of growing relations between the two sides and all other progressive and democratic forces.

<sup>77</sup> See docs. 228- 231 below.

<sup>78</sup> Translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 5, 1977.

**Statement by US President Carter praising President Asad of Syria for supporting peace efforts in the Middle East<sup>79</sup>**

Geneva, May 9, 1977

It's with a great deal of pleasure and hope that I come to Geneva to meet with the great President of Syria, President Asad. As a leader of one of the great countries in the Middle East, I look to him for guidance and advice and for support as all of us search for progress in achieving peace in that important and troubled part of the world.

President Asad has a great role to play because of his experience, the greatness of his country, his interest in and sensitivity about world affairs outside his region, and because of his ability to bring together different peoples who in the past have been unfriendly toward one another and at odds.

This is a year when we are blessed with strong and moderate leaders in the Middle Eastern region. I believe that it is a year of hope for substantial progress, but it can only be achieved with close consultation, open minds, and a determination to succeed in spite of very difficult obstacles. I have already met with the leaders of Israel and Egypt and Jordan, and this meeting with President Asad will help me to understand the common agreements that exist and the potentials for the resolution of differences that still remain.

The good will of President Asad has already been demonstrated. For many years he has been a strong supporter in the search for peace, working closely with my predecessors in the White House and with Secretary Kissinger and others, as efforts have been made.

We have no regional role to play in this year's deliberations, but we hope to act as an intermediary who can have influence only to the extent that the other nations trust us to be fair, to be objective, to be truthful, to be determined.

Following my own meetings with these great

leaders, we will ask our own Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, to visit the Middle Eastern region again to consult more closely with the nations involved in future deliberations. And I believe that if I can learn from President Asad today, that that will be another major step toward the progress that we all hope to see.

There must be fairness; there must be some flexibility; there must be a forgetting about past differences and misunderstandings; there must be determination; there must be a resolution of the Palestine problem and a homeland for the Palestinians; there must be some resolution of border disputes; and there also must be an assurance of permanent and real peace with guarantees for the future security of these countries which all can trust. We will add our good offices as requested, but I am very much aware that the agreement can only be permanent and can only be initiated if the parties who live there reach an understanding with one another.

I want to express my deep thanks to President Asad for being willing to come to Geneva to meet with me, and I will try to capitalize on the close friendship which he and I have already established. And I believe that the discussions will be fruitful because of his good will, his experience, his knowledge, his sensitivity, and his graciousness in meeting me here.

So, thank you again, President Asad. I hope that this day's deliberations will be a contribution to peace in the Middle East which can help to guarantee peace and prosperity throughout the whole world.

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**Press conference statements by US President Carter reviewing his talks with President Asad of Syria<sup>80</sup>**

London, May 9, 1977

*Q. Mr. President, how did your day go in the meetings with President Assad?*

*A. We have a very good personal relationship now, I think, with the leaders of Israel and Egypt, I think with King Hussein of Jordan and now*

<sup>79</sup> Statement made by President Carter prior to his meeting with President Asad in Geneva. *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXXVI, 1980 (June 6, 1977), pp. 593–595. President Asad's statement on the same occasion is published as doc. 243 below.

<sup>80</sup> Made after meeting President Asad in Geneva; transcript published by the US embassy in Beirut on May 11, 1977.

with President Assad of Syria, and this is a very crucial element prior to any major progress on settling the difficult Middle Eastern question. Nobody could guarantee any progress this year, of course. But unless all those leaders and their people trust us as an honorable intermediary, being willing to tell the truth and willing to be objectively fair, I don't think any progress is possible.

I was very pleased at the relationship that I had formed with President Assad today, and I think everyone who was there would agree and, of course, after the elections in Israel, I want to meet with the new leader of that country.

Prince Fahd will be coming to see me in Washington—these are necessary prerequisites I think to progress—as I have said many times, there is no way we can impose settlement on the countries involved...

My judgment is that they want to make progress this year. These preliminary deep consultations for hours and hours of time to explore the complicated facts of the Middle Eastern question which has been disruptive for almost thirty years is necessary...

*Q. Mr. President, did President Assad seem prepared to go to Geneva Conference this year, and did he give you any idea of how he saw Palestinians being represented there?*

A. Well, the answer to both of those questions is yes. He is willing to go to a Geneva Conference provided the arrangements can be made, and he did express his opinion to me about how the Palestinians should be represented there.

*Q. Is it your opinion that Mr. Assad will settle for anything less than every inch of the Golan Heights?*

A. Well, I'd rather let him speak for himself.<sup>81</sup> I'm not in a position of trying to lay down a settlement, and I am also not in a position to reveal what different leaders say to me privately. He's always free to comment for himself.

*Q. Mr. President, now that you've spoken with all these leaders, do you still think there's a possibility of having defense outposts beyond legal boundaries as you have mentioned once before?*

A. Well, I think that's certainly a possibility.

Obviously, the terrain is different in different parts in that region. On the Sinai, it's crucial that you have long-range radar because of the distances involved and the topography of the land.

In the Golan Heights, which I have visited, there are areas involved which are much less. The distances are closer. The vantage points can be used perhaps adequately just by visual observations.

So I wouldn't want to set out now with a complicated border or what type of observation posts might be required to insure peace. Nor would I want to spell out at this time the composition of peacekeeping forces that might be stationed in the zones on each side of the future borders.

But those things are discussed in some depth with every one of the leaders, and that general concept has been accepted, yes. Good night. I'll see y'all tomorrow.

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### **Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance and Foreign Minister Allon of Israel after talks in London<sup>82</sup>**

**London, May 11, 1977**

*Secretary Vance:* I have just finished a discussion with my old friend Foreign Minister Allon, who is one of the distinguished leaders not only of his own country but in the Middle East. This is part of our continuing conversations relating to our search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We reviewed our discussions with other parties which we have had since the Foreign Minister and I met last time, and I shall be going back in the future to the area after we have completed all of our discussions with the Arab foreign leaders.

I would like to note that I have seen some speculation in some of the papers to the effect that the United States might impose a settlement on the parties. We have made it very clear from the outset that no such thing is intended in any way. We have said, both the President and I, on many occasions that if there is to be a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, then it must be determined by the parties in negotiations

<sup>81</sup> For television interview statements by President Asad on the talks see doc. 244 below.

<sup>82</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI, 1980, (June 6, 1977), pp. 607–709.

among themselves. We will help to facilitate that process and will work with the parties to that end.

I have also noticed some speculation in the newspapers to the effect that the possibility exists that in our arms transfer policy, which we have been working on and which will be announced in the future, that this may in some way harm Israel. That is not the case. We have made it very clear that we have a special relationship with Israel. We are committed to the security of Israel; and as we have in the past, we will in the future make sure that Israel has the defense articles necessary to preserve that security, including the advanced technology which will be required. I want to make this very, very clear.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports have not spoken of any attempt by the United States to impose a solution but, rather, to set the process of negotiation going in such a way that some concessions will be likely made by Israel or the other parties before the actual face-to-face negotiations begin. Is there any actual process of give-and-take going forward? For example, is there a proposal for Israel to recognize—for the PLO to recognize the State of Israel in exchange for Israel recognizing a Palestinian state?*

*Secretary Vance:* There have been no specific proposals made by either side at this time. As I have indicated earlier, we are in the process of getting the general views of the parties. I would hope that at a later date there will be specific proposals from all of the parties which we will then discuss initially among them and at that time we may have some suggestions of our own.

*Q. What did you mean by that term "homeland for Palestinians"—or the President when defining that term?*

*Secretary Vance:* The President indicated at that time it meant just what it said and that the actual definition of that would have to be made by the parties in their negotiations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you mean by "special relationship"?*

*Secretary Vance:* We were at the very outset of Israel's birth one of those that helped to bring it into being. We have been very close to Israel. We share the same values, we share the same hopes and aspirations, and we have been the closest of friends through all of these years and will in in the future as well.

*Q. Could we ask Mr. Allon—do you feel there is any danger of Israel becoming diplomatically isolated by this process that is now going forward?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Well, I see no reason for being isolated, because for the time being Israel is the only party to the Middle Eastern conflict which made it public that she is ready to offer territorial compromises in return for a lasting peace agreement. Our position is being explained to our friends all over the world, and as far as we are concerned, the Geneva peace conference could have been reconvened long ago. So we are in a good position vis-à-vis our friends.

*Q. Mr. Allon, do you feel that the new American Administration has a new attitude toward the Middle East, and if so, how do you like it compared to the Ford-Kissinger attitude?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* If you listen carefully to what Secretary Cyrus Vance has said just now about a "special relationship," about the role that America is playing the [inaudible] of peacemaking in the Middle East, I think it is a very positive definition of America's role and we are very [inaudible].

*Q. Mr. Allon, what is your view about the American plan as Secretary Vance has enunciated? Do you think it is a good idea?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Well, I have been given to understand that the United States is not intending to come out with a plan of its own, that the agreement should be reached by the parties concerned and the United States will facilitate with its good offices the parties to the conflict in such a way that the hope for peace will be implemented and realized.

*Q. Does that mean that the Administration is not going to put out any ideas, at least publicly, how the situation [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I have indicated previously, we have suggestions to make. We will make the suggestions to the parties.

*Q. Would you agree with the definition of Mr. Carter, President Carter, that moderate leaders are ruling now, are in power now, over the Arab countries?*

*Foreign Minister Allon.* Well, there is only one way to express moderation—that is by proposing moderate policies and solutions—and I do hope that Arab leaders in the Middle East become more realistic as a result of the developments in the

Middle East of the last years. Since President Carter had the chance to meet with each and every one of the Arab leaders and I didn't yet, he is in a better position to judge. Nevertheless, I am very anxious to give them a chance to demonstrate their moderation around the conference table as soon as possible.

*Q. Mr. Vance, could I ask you to clarify your earlier statement about the arms sales question?*

*Secretary Vance:* I thought it was clear.

*Q. Are you meaning to say, then, that Israel will be given the same priority in our arms transfers as the NATO countries are now?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Do you think it is enough? [Laughter.]

*Secretary Vance:* I think I made it very clear that they will receive and have from us whatever is required for their security, I said, including advanced technology.

*Q. Could you repeat that?*

*Secretary Vance:* I said that I thought I had made it very clear that we will make available to Israel whatever is needed for their security, including advanced technology.

#### 94

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR by Foreign Minister Muti of South Yemen (excerpts)<sup>83</sup>**

Moscow, May 12, 1977

At the invitation of the Soviet government, Muhammad Salih Muti, member of the Central Committee Politburo of the united political organizations of the National Front and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, visited the Soviet Union May 10–12, 1977.

M.S. Muti was received by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A.A. Gromyko, member of the

<sup>83</sup> Pravda (Moscow), May 14, 1977; partial English text, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIX, 19 (June 8, 1977), p. 16. Translation copyright 1977 by THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . .

In the exchange of opinions on international problems of moment, particular attention was devoted to the situation in the Middle East. The sides noted that the continuing dangerous situation in that area is a direct consequence of the aggressive policy of Israel and those powers that stand behind her.

The Soviet Union and Democratic Yemen share the view that a just and stable peace in the Middle East can be achieved only on condition of complete liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and that the inalienable, legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine be ensured, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own independent state.

Democratic Yemen supports the efforts of the Soviet Union aimed at a just settlement in the Middle East and at ensuring the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

#### 95

### **Press conference statements by US President Carter reviewing the prospects for a Middle East settlement and expressing hope that the PLO will recognize Israel<sup>84</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1977

*President Carter:* I took a quick trip to Geneva to meet President Assad of Syria—a continuing process in my own life as President—to study the special attitudes towards a possible alleviation of the Middle Eastern dispute this year. And hopefully, after the Israeli elections this month, we can have the new leader of the Israeli Government come back to meet with me as Prime Minister Rabin did earlier this year.

*Q. Mr. President, do you think that Israel should accept the Palestinian homeland if the Palestinians or PLO accept the state of Israel? And also, as a result of your talks today, are you persuaded that we should share arms technology and co-production with Israel?*

<sup>84</sup> Partial text published by the US embassy in Beirut on May 13, 1977.

A. Yes. The answer to both those questions is yes. I don't think that there can be any reasonable hope for a settlement of the Middle East question which has been extant now on a continuing basis for more than 29 years without a homeland for the Palestinians. The exact definition of what that homeland might be, the degree of independence of the Palestinian entity, its relationship with Jordan, perhaps Syria and others, the geographical boundaries of it, all have to be worked out by the parties involved. But for the Palestinians to have a homeland and for the refugee question to be resolved, it is obviously of crucial importance.

We have a special relationship with Israel. It is absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It is a special relationship.

Although I have met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and had long hours of discussion, I never found any of those Arab leaders objected to that special commitment of ours to the protection of the integrity of Israel.

And, obviously, part of that is to make sure that Israel has adequate means to protect itself without military involvement with the United States. I have no objection about this arrangement. I am proud of it. And it will be permanent as long as I am in office.

*Q. It seemed to us, traveling with you, that you and the people in your party were a bit more upbeat on the question of the Middle East this week than perhaps a couple weeks ago after the Hussein visit. I just wonder, do you have indications now that the Palestinians are ready to recognize the right of Israel to exist? And also, do you have some indication that Israel is ready to recognize the need for a Palestinian homeland?*

A. We have had no contact with the Palestinians, with the PLO. But I have concluded meetings with the Prime Minister of Israel, the President of Egypt, the President of Syria, and the King of Jordan. At the conclusion of this series of meetings, I feel better than I did before. At the end of the Hussein meeting, my own hopes were improved.

I don't want to mislead anyone. The chances for Middle East peace are still very much in doubt. We have a long way to go. But I do believe that there is a chance that the Palestinians might make moves to recognize the right of Israel to

exist. And if so, this would remove one of the major obstacles toward further progress.

Our Government, before I became President, promised the Israeli Government that we would not recognize the PLO by direct conversations or negotiations, as long as the PLO continued to espouse the commitment that Israel had to be destroyed.

I would like to see this resolved. There is a chance that it will be done. We are trying to add our efforts to bring this about. But I have no assurance that it will be accomplished.

## 96

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of President Ceausescu of Rumania (excerpts)<sup>85</sup>**

**Cairo, May 13, 1977**

In response to an invitation by President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat, the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and his wife Elena Ceausescu, paid an official friendly visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt from 11th to 13th May 1977.

After reviewing the situation in the Middle East, the two Presidents affirmed that Israel's continued occupation of the Arab territories and its other actions and measures aimed at changing the demographic, cultural and historical character of those territories create grave tension and constitute a threat to the area and an obstacle in the way of a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem. The two Presidents have firmly called for an immediate end to all these actions and measures and for the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories.

The two Presidents believe that present conditions are suitable for carrying out political and diplomatic activity to achieve a just and lasting peace in the area. They stressed that any delay in taking specific steps in this regard could lead

<sup>85</sup> Broadcast on Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5514/A/1, 2-3; reprinted by permission.

to bad consequences for peace and security in the Middle East and the entire world.

The two Presidents reaffirmed their country's position that the realization of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be based on Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories which have been occupied since June 1967 and the restoration of the Palestinian people's national rights including their established right to set up an independent state in the land of Palestine—a matter which would lead to a settlement guaranteeing the right of existence for all states in the area.

The two Presidents support the continuation of the active role the United Nations is carrying out in settling the Middle East issue so that it may contribute to the solution of the complicated problems in the area in accordance with the provisions of the resolutions issued by the UN organs. In this framework they demand the resumption of the Geneva conference on peace in the Middle East as soon as possible with the participation of all sides concerned, including the PLO on the basis that it is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and that its participation be on an equal footing with all the other sides. They believe that the settlement of the Middle East dispute must enjoy wide support from all peace-loving states and forces to help the realization of a just and permanent peace in the area.

President Nicolae Ceausescu expressed his deep appreciation of the efforts which President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat is exerting to realize a peaceful settlement for the Middle East situation and to establish a lasting and just peace in the area. He stressed that these efforts do not conform only with the interests of the Egyptian people and the other Arab peoples but also with the interests of all peoples in peace and security in all parts of the world.

For his part, President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat expressed his great appreciation of the continuous activity which President Nicolae Ceausescu is carrying out to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and the constructive and firm principled position he is adopting and the method he is following in dealing with the vital issues of the present-day world to strengthen international peace and co-operation.

The two Presidents expressed their resolve to continue to exert their efforts to achieve a just

solution leading to the establishment of a permanent peace in the Middle East serving the interests of the Middle Eastern countries and peoples and the interests of all the countries and peoples in the world. They decided to continue the contacts in this regard and to hold bilateral consultations whenever necessary.

97

**Speech by US Secretary of State Vance emphasizing the urgent need for a Middle East settlement (excerpt)<sup>86</sup>**

**Tehran, May 14, 1977**

The search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is one of the highest priority items on the foreign policy agenda of our country. We believe it is critically important that a meaningful beginning be made this year toward a permanent settlement of the Middle East conflict. To that end, we are working with the governments concerned to reconvene the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East in the latter part of 1977. We are also convinced, however, that the Geneva conference has to be well prepared, since failure at Geneva would bring with it serious risks of future hostilities.

Our intensive consultations with the key Middle East leaders have given us some hope for progress. In these consultations, we are seeking to clarify the positions of the parties and to identify the areas of possible agreement with respect to the basic issues that must be resolved in the final settlement; namely, the nature of peaceful relations among the parties; the question of withdrawal from occupied territories, security arrangements that will help make recognized borders secure borders; and a settlement of the problem of a homeland for the Palestinian people.

These are complex and difficult issues. Given the legacy of almost three decades of hostility, suspicion, and frustration, we do not underestimate the obstacles which must be overcome. We

<sup>86</sup> Made to the CENTO Council of Ministers; excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI, 1980, (June 6, 1977), p. 616.



believe, however, that there is today in the Middle East a will for peace and a growing awareness of the grim alternatives. If all concerned keep the image of these alternatives before them, we believe that reason may prevail and that necessary compromises on all sides can be found. It should not be beyond the imagination of statesmen to devise solutions that will meet the concerns of all states and peoples in the Middle East for their security and territorial integrity, for peace and justice, and for the future prosperity and well-being of their people.

## 98

**Communiqué issued after a meeting of the Council of Ministers of CENTO (excerpt)<sup>87</sup>**

Tehran, May 14, 1977

The ministers reviewed developments in the Middle East since their last meeting. They noted with satisfaction the improvement of the situation in Lebanon and paid tribute to all those who are contributing towards the solution of this problem. They agreed that the failure to achieve peace in the Middle East continues to constitute a grave threat to world peace. They reaffirmed the importance they attached to the continuation of efforts designed to achieve a settlement resulting in a just, honourable and durable peace in the Middle Eastern area as a whole.

## 99

**Television interview statements by Likud Party leader Begin of Israel outlining his attitudes to the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>88</sup>**

Jerusalem, mid-May, 1977

*Mr. Clark: Mr. Begin, welcome to Issues and Answers. Your stunning victory in this week's elections has aroused concern in the United States that it will be difficult for*

<sup>87</sup> Excerpted from the English text as published in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), July 15, 1977, p. 28455.

<sup>88</sup> Interview conducted by Bob Clark and Bill Seamans and broadcast on ABC's "Issues and Answers" on May 22, 1977; transcript supplied, on request, by ABC.

*President Carter to pursue his campaign for Middle East peace because of your hard-line against giving up any of these so-called occupied territories.*

*Is there any compromise in your position that could provide a middle ground between you and President Carter?*

A. Well, I hope to form the new government of Israel in the next few weeks, after the publication officially of the results of the elections, and present planning. If after that, as I heard the statement made by President Carter, I am invited to the White House, it will be a pleasure and an honor to go and meet President Carter, and we shall have a frank discussion about the issues concerning the future of our land.

I will put it very simply. I believe that Judea and Samaria are an integral part of our sovereignty. It's our land. It was occupied by Abdullah against international law, against our inherent right. It was liberated during the 6-day war when we used our right of national self-defense, and so it should be. We want to live together with the Arabs in equality of rights, in peace, in human dignity, in human progress. Nothing wrong with that. A Jewish majority, an Arab minority. Free people believe that in one country men of various origins can live together in peace and in understanding.

We in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights I believe in the accomplishment of a peace treaty we can find a line which will assure the interests of all the sides concerned.

*Mr. Clark: Permit me, if I may, to state President Carter's position. He has said in recent months there would have to be substantial withdrawal by Israel from the occupied territory, the captured territory, with only minor adjustments in the borders that existed before your victory in the 1967 war.*

A. I read that.

*Mr. Clark: Of course, he is talking about the entire west bank isn't that position in almost total conflict with your own pledge to the Israeli voters—and you have said in effect that you would annex the occupied or captured territory.*

A. No, I didn't use the word annex because it is a complete misrepresentation.

*Mr. Clark: But you would not give an inch—*

A. You annex foreign land. You don't annex your own country. It is our land. You don't annex it. I would like to point out that I read a statement by President Carter, and indeed he

said almost complete withdrawal to the lines of Fourth of June, 1967, with minor modifications. To us it means the revival of the Rogers plan.

May I remind you that when the Rogers plan was presented to us in December, 1969, I was then a member of the government of national unity under Mrs. Meir. Mrs. Meir, the Premier, called in the New York Times correspondent and said: "If any government of Israel ever accepted that plan, the Rogers plan, it would commit treason." Mrs. Meir said so. I would like to point out we have on this a national consensus. It is not only the point of view of the..... [sic] but of all the parties except the Communists to reject unconditionally and under any circumstances that proposal of the minor modifications in the lines of the Fourth of June. And when Secretary Rogers visited our country, he participated at his initiative in a session of our foreign affairs committee.

I took the floor and I pointed out to him the paradox. The only party in Israel which supports his plan is the Communist Party completely subservient to Moscow. Whereas all the parties represent the 150 members out of 120 of the Knesset reject it. [sic] So this is not a problem of our party but the national consensus,

*Mr. Clark: But there has been a strong feeling in the United States that there was a prospect for movement as long as the labor government was in power where you appear to be totally unyielding on this.*

A. I explain to you what is the matter with that statement made by President Carter. He would encounter complete the position by the previous government as well, by Mr. Peres or Mr. Rabin. They ought to reject that withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967 and the creation of a so-called Palestinian State, much the same. But I hope there won't be any conflict. Why should there be a conflict between us and the United States? I will try to explain to President Carter. He knows perfectly well the Bible. I understand he knows the Bible almost by heart. So he knows to whom this country by right belongs. Then there is a question of our national security. If we should withdraw from Judea and Samaria, please understand, everybody should have a look, a glimpse at the map. All our cities and towns would be in the range of the conventional artillery provided by the Soviet Union to the Palestinian State and the range of that artillery now is 43

kilometers, 800 meters. Not only Jerusalem would be in crossfire, even Tel Aviv, Rehovot, Beersheba. All our civilian towns, all the civilian population. It is just inconceivable that we should agree to such a mortal danger to our mothers and sisters and women and children.

On the other hand I would like to bring out as I am going to do when I am in Washington, to everybody to whom I will have privilege to talk, it is also very detrimental to the vital interest of the United States and the free world. Such a Palestinian State would in no time turn into the central base of the Soviet Union. It is not coincidence that during that strategic conference in Moscow, Mr. Castro was present and Mr. Arafat, at the very same time, and both were received by Mr. Brezhnev and Podgorny and Gromyko, the greatest rulers of the Soviet Union. But Castro is at least the prime minister of a country. We regret it became a Communist country. But Mr. Arafat and his henchmen lead a group of, I may say openly, with the Nazi attitude toward the Jewish people, they want to destroy our people and yet he talked to the highest leaders of the Soviet Union at the very same time. No coincidence because Moscow wants to take now the free world, let me say by two moves, one in Africa with the help of the Cubans and one in the Middle East with the help of those who call them Palestinians.

Now please note that Moscow already rules Ethiopia, South Yemen, Somalia, has a base in Libya, in Syria and Iraq. Should the free world allow another base here in the heart of the Middle East? I think it would be folly. And therefore I contend—

*Mr. Clark: We want to talk more about the Communist threat but we have a number of other questions we want to get into.*

*Mr. Seamans: Mr. Begin, you have invited the Arab leaders to meet with you when you become prime minister.*

A. I did.

*Mr. Seamans: But there is a widespread reaction that we have all heard in the Arab countries that your election victory has been a very difficult problem for them, they think you are extremist and they can't negotiate with you.*

*What would you have to negotiate with the Arab countries who continue to demand a total withdrawal from the occupied territory?*

A. I don't call those territories occupied. They are liberated territories. Judea and Samaria are occupied by Abdullah and Hussein with no basis whatsoever in international law. Through the invasion and aggression, and they corrected it. So they are now occupied territories. But let us leave out semantics. If the Arab leaders whom I invited to meet me in a peace conference—we want peace, we don't want another war—refuse, do refuse to talk to me, the practical result will be that I won't talk to them and it won't be unique.

Five prime ministers of Israel suggested to the Arab rulers the same: "Meet me, anyplace, any time. We are ready to talk peace," and they refuse. So it will be only a repetition of Arab intransigence not to talk about peace. All of us, starting from Mr. Ben Gurion through Mr. Sharret, Eshkol, Golda Meir, Rabin, and if I become prime minister it will apply to me, all of us wanted to talk to them peace. "Let us sit down around the table."

Actually you don't conduct negotiations for peace treaties on television. You do it in a room at a peace conference and everybody has got his proposals and their proposals may be completely different from ours or vice versa. But you talk peace. If they refuse, so they will have refused for the sixth time so then we shall know that they are very intransigent as they are. Because if they demand of us totally to withdraw to the lines of the 4th of June 1967, they should know that no one in this country except the Communists, and they have only six members in the new Knesset, out of 120, nobody in this country will accept it.

*Mr. Seamans: On the basis of what you said, do you really think a reconvening of the Geneva Peace Conference is possible?*

A. It is absolutely possible and I would like to tell you that if, as I heard yesterday Mr. Vance and Mr. Gromyko agreed that the Geneva conference should be convened in the autumn, in the fall. If it is convened by the two great powers, and all the delegations will come, I will be ready to lead the Israeli delegation and speak on behalf of Israel and Zionism which is the liberation movement of the Jewish people.

*Mr. Clark: But, Mr. Begin, though there is a new Geneva conference, isn't your uncompromising position against giving up any of the captured territories likely to put you on a collision course with the Arab world,*

*and there is a strong feeling already being reflected in comments around the world that your election has increased the danger of a new Middle East war.*

A. Well, I don't think there is any substance in this story.

My friend, please understand, Mr. Clark, the Arabs don't accept any Israeli plan. They rejected the Allon plan<sup>89</sup> totally and unconditionally. And the Allon plan means give up parts of Judea and Samaria. That plan was presented to King Hussein three times and he said three times "Totally unacceptable." If you meet him, ask him. He will repeat that statement.

*Mr. Seamans: Mr. Begin, President Carter has assured the Arab leaders of his support for a homeland for the Palestinians. Presumably including part of the West Bank, which you say you will not give up.*

*How could he back down on that promise without destroying his effectiveness and credibility in working for a Middle East peace.*

A. I wish all the best to President Carter, and I surely wouldn't like to do anything which would be detrimental to his authority. He is the leader not only of the United States but also of the free world, and we respect him very highly. However, I would like to point out that we don't know what he meant by that expression "homeland for the Palestinians." He said one day he will explain what it means. Let me hope that he will explain it to me when I meet him, when I have the honor to see him.

I think the Palestinians have a homeland. They live now in their places, in the cities. Who are the Palestinians? They are Arabs.

You know I call myself a Palestinian. Palestine is a foreign translation of the famous indelible word "the land of Israel," and therefore we are all Palestinians. We want to give the Arabs in our country a free option of citizenship, cultural autonomy, so they can educate their children in their language and their heritage, in their religion. They have a homeland. They will live together with us, in peace.

As far as this so-called Palestinian state is concerned, separate us, take away from those 70 kilometers between the Mediterranean and the Jordan, 54 kilometers, Mr. Seamans, and leave us 14 kilometers from the sea on the line of Congaelia Kalkilya, 15 kilometers on the line of Netanya,

<sup>89</sup> Doc. 163 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1976.

or 22 kilometers on the line of Tel Aviv, or 25 kilometers on the line of Ashkelon, is putting in the gravest danger of the State of Israel. We cannot allow, we cannot afford, such a danger. Six million Jews in one generation were killed. We don't want to see our children and women massacred again in our time. It is a matter of our life. Please understand it as a matter of our life.

*Mr. Seamans: Now you said Mr. Carter did not make his reference to the homeland for the Palestinians clear. Do you feel that his statement contributed to your election victory?*

A. Oh, no, I wouldn't say President Carter interfered in the elections of Israel. I didn't want Israel to interfere in the American elections. I wouldn't like to see the American President helping my side. I don't think he helped anybody. I can only regret, as an Israeli citizen, before the victory, before the election, the decisions by the new Administration about the concussion bombs and selling of the 24 KFIR planes to Ecuador were negative. I think we should have taken it up long ago, and we may take it up again. Of course, the United States takes its own decisions, but from time to time we have to point out that they may be corrected and revised, and if I meet him, I surely will speak about this problem with President Carter, but I don't think that the steps undertaken by the President influence the voters of Israel.

*Mr. Clark: Mr. Begin, please correct me if I am wrong, but there is a presumption in the United States that Israel is totally dependent for survival on American economic and military aid. Now if you defy the official policy of the American Government—and again, this uncompromising stand on returning any of the captured territory. Aren't you jeopardizing our continuing support, or do you feel you can get along without it?*

A. You ask me to correct you if you are wrong, so I am going to correct you. It is not true that the assistance given to us originally by the United States is unilateral. It is very important. We appreciate it very highly, and we are grateful. It is not unilateral.

May I tell you, Mr. Clark, that for six years, when this little country stood on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, we helped your country very much, indeed, in the most delicate sphere, avoiding casualties in your army. You then were involved in a horrible, cruel war in Viet Nam, and we, this

little country, forced the Soviet Union to send their ships with the munitions and weapons to the Tonkin Bay via the Cape of Good Hope, the longest sea lane on the globe, with the delay of every sail of 16 days and for six years—the public opinion in your country should know these facts—for six years you can make the count, how many weapons and the munitions we prevented from coming into the hands of your enemies and how many thousands of American soldiers we saved from being wounded or killed.

Or, I will give you another example—

*Mr. Clark: I believe the American people understand, this very special relationship between your country and ours, but you cannot get away from the hard fact that we are currently providing you in recent years something about \$2 billion a year in economic and military aid. My question to you is, are you so committed to going your own way that you could get along without that aid? Are you dependent on us?*

A. Please let me continue.

*Mr. Clark: I would appreciate an answer to that question.*

A. You will get it, but if you let me continue my answer. I would like American public opinion to know that in August, 1970—there were hundreds of Syrian Soviet tanks poised on the border of the Jordan to invade. The Sixth Fleet was moved to the eastern part of the Mediterranean, but the Sixth Fleet with atomic bombs not to be used, they are produced not to be used, they don't have artillery, they don't have tanks, they asked us to make the move. We made a move and the Syrians had to withdraw and confrontation avoided. Another service to America and to the free world.

What I would like to point out is, their assistance in the economic field and supply of weaponry is of great importance, given to us by America, and we are very grateful.

Why should it discontinue? You know that President Carter—

*Mr. Clark: Wouldn't you?*

A. Excuse me. You know what President Carter said to President Ford, that during the so-called reassessment: you, President Ford, and Dr. Kissinger, almost brought Israel to her knees. It is inconceivable that the man who said so condemning such a policy should repeat it.

*Mr. Clark: But—*

*A. And I don't think—and Professor Brzezinski told me personally that he doesn't think in order to use pressure against Israel, that help would be withdrawn, it won't. I don't believe President Carter will withdraw help from Israel, the ally of the United States, a faithful ally of the free world, because of possible differences of opinion.*

*Mr. Clark: But those differences are critical. If you feel to reach an accommodation with the Carter Administration on this—*

*A. I believe we shall reach an accommodation—*

*Mr. Clark: —on this vital issue of territorial concessions, won't you be jeopardizing losing American aid? You do not think you would?*

*A. My friend, no. It is vital to our life and to our future, and I will try to explain it to President Carter. For President Carter and the United States Government it is a matter of policy. To us, it is a problem of survival, Mr. Clark, and this I am going to explain, and there won't be any conflict. Why should there be a conflict?*

*Mr. Seamans: You spoke about American public opinion, the deep concern in Washington over your election. How do you plan to try to change that? Will you work through Israel's friends in Congress or some public opinion campaign in America?*

*A. We shall undertake great public opinion; we shall, of course, talk to the Members of Congress. We have great friends in Congress, great friends. I know them personally as well. I met Senators and Congressmen for many years. They perhaps listen to me, and they know that we are going to talk to the American people. You know those two facts that I told you about the help rendered by Israel to the United States are absolutely unknown in the United States. Whenever I told them to the American intelligentsia, I was asked the question: why do we hear it for the first time? And there were people of great intelligence, also people who worked in the government, for the first time. Why is it a secret? It shouldn't be a secret.*

*We have a community of interest. We should be allies. We should help each other. Communism is spreading, taking over country after country. We want to prevent it in the Middle East. We do prevent it. We are the central factor preventing Communism from taking over, so let*

*us stand together for the interests of our countries and also for human liberty.*

*Mr. Clark: We would like to talk a bit, Mr. Begin, about the PLO.*

*A. Why don't you say the so-called PLO?*

*Mr. Clark: The so-called PLO I will accept.*

*Would you consider territorial concession if the so-called PLO recognized Israel's right to exist, something that our government and the Carter Administration has been working to achieve?*

*A. Perhaps I will say something which may be a surprise to you. We don't ask the so-called PLO to recognize our right to exist. We got our right to exist 3,700 years ago, from the God of Abraham. Yitzhak Ya'acov, and those killers who come to kill our children; we don't ask them to recognize our right to exist. We want to negotiate peace treaties with the Arab governments and countries. We exist, and we have a right to exist exactly as any other people. We don't want to destroy the Arab people. They want to destroy the Israeli people. That is the difference. And as far as the so-called Palestinian state is concerned, to be ruled by the so-called PLO, again there is a national concession. It is not the policy of the Likud; it is the policy of the Israeli people.*

*Mr. Clark: One more quick question, if I may. Are there any conditions under which you would consider participation by the so-called PLO in a Geneva conference such as a joint delegation with Jordan?*

*A. Not at all. They cannot participate in the negotiations. They have a so-called Palestinian charter in which they say in Article 19 that the formation of the State of Israel is null and void from its inception. What are we going to negotiate with them? The destruction of the State of Israel? That is absolutely absurd. So they are not partners to our problems.*

*Mr. Clark: We are now out of time. I am sorry to interrupt you. Thank you for being with us on ISSUES AND ANSWERS.*

*A. Thank you.*

## 100

**Press interview statements by Likud Party leader Begin of Israel discussing US aid to Israel and reiterating that Israel will not give up the West Bank<sup>90</sup>**

Tel-Aviv, mid-May, 1977

*Q. How do you react when people call you a terrorist?*

A. Was I a terrorist because I fought for the liberation of the Jewish people who had been massacred in Europe? We fought for our national rights, for our country, and had I not done it, I would now be deeply ashamed. They're calling me a terrorist and they call [Palestinian leader Yasir] Arafat a freedom fighter—he who knowingly attacks women and children. When accidents like this happened to us—and they did—we were deeply sorry and we apologized.

*Q. Do you regard the election as a victory for the Likud, or merely a repudiation of the Labor Party?*

A. No, it was really a victory for the Likud. In the previous election, we won 39 seats and the Labor won twelve more than us. In this election, we won—as of now—43 seats, eleven more than Labor. This is a reversal almost without precedent. I admit that I was taken by surprise. We thought we'd have one, two, at the most three seats more than Labor.

*Q. Which part of your program do you think most appealed to the voters?*

A. Our security policy, which has the support of the majority of our people. We said we cannot give up Judea and Samaria. If we gave it up, it would destroy our security, and all the cities of Israel would be within the range of enemy artillery.

*Q. Will you encourage settlements on the West Bank?*

A. Of course. We'll tell the young people, come and settle the land. Why can Jews settle only in Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv or in London and New York, and not in the land of their forefathers? We will not expel the Arabs from their land. We want to live side by side with them as good and decent neighbors.

*Q. Would you continue to keep the bridges to Jordan open? Do you plan to continue the good-fence policy with the Lebanese?*

A. Yes, of course. And you can assure your readers in southern Lebanon that much as the previous Israeli Government has done for them, the Likud government will do even more. We don't want to see a Christian minority destroyed by a Muslim and leftist majority.

*Q. Your party refuses to accept U.N. Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Won't this attitude lead to conflict with President Carter?*

A. Why should there be a conflict? I will explain to President Carter that if we should surrender to the demand and withdraw to the lines of June 1967, this would be a mortal danger to Israel. The enemy will be just 14 kilometers from the seashore at Qalqilyah, and almost as close in other places. This is mortal. No nation in the world would accept it. We cannot accept it.

*Q. Would you give up American aid, if that proved to be the price for your policies?*

A. The Americans give us aid because we fulfill a very serious role in the vital interests of the U.S. For example... in 1970, Syrian tanks were poised to invade Jordan, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet was in no position to do much. So they asked us to move. We concentrated a certain number of troops and three days later the Syrians withdrew. We prevented a conflagration in the Middle East.

And then there is the very large issue of Communism. If we should give up Judea and Samaria, there would be a Palestinian state there which would become a Soviet base. We prevent Communism from taking over this part of the world, which links three continents.

*Q. Your critics charge that your policies will damage U.S.-Israeli relations.*

A. I don't believe that if we say, "Our friends, you asked us to withdraw from Judea and Samaria but we cannot do it," that an Under Secretary of State would get up and say, "If so, you don't get a penny from the U.S." It's inconceivable. During the campaign, Carter was very sharply critical of what President Ford had called the

<sup>90</sup> Interview conducted by Milan J. Kubic; *Newsweek* (New York—International edition), May 30, 1977, pp. 14–15.

“reassessment” [of U.S. policy], meaning the denying of vital arms to Israel. Carter charged that “they almost brought Israel to her knees.” A man who uses such sharp words, a man who said there must be morality in international relations, that’s not the man who would use this sort of pressure.

*Q. So you feel confident that you will get along well with President Carter?*

A. I never met Mr. Carter. It will be an honor and pleasure if I am invited to the White House to meet him. I hope we shall have a very good relationship. But if there are differences of opinion, may I say that we are all free men, and sometimes we may agree to disagree. This has happened . . . before and it may happen again, but I’ll do my best to have a good understanding with the U.S. Government.

*Q. Doesn’t your policy undermine the U.S. position with the Arabs, who were counting on U.S. help to win Israeli concessions?*

A. Experience proves the contrary. What did America lose when it provided us with Phantoms? Nothing. U.S. influence in the Arab countries became even stronger. There is the problem of oil. I don’t underestimate it, but we shouldn’t exaggerate it. Did you notice that the oil exporters had decided to raise the price in July by 5 per cent, and that a few days ago they rescinded the decision? They can’t drink the oil. They have to sell it.

*Q. Will you be more successful than your predecessors in dealing with the Arabs?*

A. I don’t like to boast, but I can say that we will deal with them on a realistic basis. Since the elections, I suppose all the Arab rulers and the great part of mankind have learned that they had some misconceptions. They talked about the occupied West Bank. We call it liberated Judea and Samaria. I think that this is a sounder policy than that of the previous government which promised withdrawals. They did not produce peace. . . . So when we say that Judea and Samaria belong by right to our people, it’s a sounder policy. It gives us security and a chance for peace, while a policy of partial withdrawals only invites pressure for more withdrawal, but it does not produce agreement with the Arabs. I

therefore assume that ours is a sounder policy. Anyhow, let’s give it a chance.

## 101

### **Statement by Americans for Justice in the Middle East urging US citizens to express support for a just peace in the Middle East<sup>91</sup>**

**New York, May 19, 1977**

Today Menachem Begin, leader of the Likud Coalition and Prime Minister of Israel, arrives in the United States. He and his supporters have been characterized by a desire for territorial expansion, insensitivity to the Palestinians and to Israel’s non-Jewish neighbors, and a view of Jewishness that exalts the warrior and silences the prophet. Everyone living in this region—foreigners, Arabs and Israelis—feels that the success of Begin’s program would mean another war.

We are an American organization based in the Middle East. Our members have witnessed at first hand the effects of wars and conflicts in the area. We are convinced that only a truly just peace for all peoples can serve American interests in this region.

Justice for the Israelis has been guaranteed, but justice for the Palestinians may continue to be neglected.

Israel’s violations of Palestinian human rights have been cited repeatedly by the United Nations, notably in Resolution 6A (XXXI) of the Economic and Social Council’s Human Rights Commission, which “. . . declares that Israel’s policy of annexation, establishment of settlements and transfer of an alien population to the occupied territories is in contravention of the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles and provisions of international law, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the basic human rights and freedoms of the people.”

Because of the leading position of the United States in world politics, justice for the Palestinians can only be obtained after the United States has officially recognized the human rights of the Palestinians. We firmly endorse President Carter’s human rights campaign. We believe that if his

<sup>91</sup> Text as inserted in an advertisement in the *New York Times*, May 24, 1977, p. 28; reprinted by permission of AJME.

campaign for human rights is applied to the Palestinians their agony under occupation and statelessness can be transformed into a national revival and a return to the community of nations.

We urge you, our fellow Americans, to write to our President and express your support for a just peace for all peoples in the Middle East.

102

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the meeting between US Secretary of State Vance, CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpts)<sup>92</sup>**

Geneva, May 20, 1977

In the course of the discussions between Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State of the USA, and L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and A.A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, held in Moscow at the end of March, 1977<sup>93</sup> Cyrus R. Vance and A.A. Gromyko met in Geneva on May 18–20.

Cyrus R. Vance and A.A. Gromyko also had a thorough exchange of views on the problem of the settlement in the Middle East.

Both sides proceed on the premise that elimination of the continuing source of tension in the Middle East constitutes one of the primary tasks in ensuring peace and international security. They are convinced that in achieving this goal an important role belongs to the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, an international forum specifically set up to negotiate a settlement of the Middle East problem in the interests of all the parties concerned.

Having confirmed that mutual efforts of the US and the USSR, who are co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, are of substantial importance for achieving a just, durable and stable peace in the Middle East, the sides agreed to direct their joint efforts toward resuming the work of the Conference during the fall of 1977, while recognizing the

importance of careful preparation before the Conference meets. For these purposes, the US and the USSR will be conducting monthly consultations at the level of ambassadors in Washington or Moscow.

They agreed, too, that they will be working in this direction also in their contacts with the parties immediately involved in the Middle East conflict.

103

**Resolution by the Eighth Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic countries affirming the duty of Islamic states to liberate Jerusalem (excerpt)<sup>94</sup>**

Tripoli, May 21, 1977

In those concerning Palestine, it expressed regret at the fact that the Zionist movement was “maintaining its policy of occupation, expansion, annexation, destruction of buildings and expropriation of assets” as well as its policy of “massive expulsion of Arabs living in the occupied territories”; appealed to all states to render all forms of help to the Palestinian and Arab peoples in their “legitimate struggle”; recalled “the close ties which link the Moslems of the holy city of Jerusalem with the duty of Islamic states to liberate it and restore it to Arab control”; and reaffirmed the resolution adopted by delegates to the sixth Islamic Foreign Ministers’ conference in Jeddah in July 1975<sup>95</sup> on the “expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and all international organizations”.

<sup>92</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI, 1981 (June 13, 1977), p. 633.  
<sup>93</sup> See doc. 77 above.

<sup>94</sup> Partial English text, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), XXII, 37 (September 16, 1977), p. 28556.  
<sup>95</sup> Doc. 126 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.



**Speech by US President Carter outlining the principles for a Middle East peace settlement (excerpt)<sup>96</sup>**

South Bend, Indiana, May 22, 1977

Fourth, we are taking deliberate steps to improve the chances of lasting peace in the Middle East. Through wide-ranging consultation with leaders of the countries involved—Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—we have found some areas of agreement and some movement toward consensus. The negotiations must continue.

Through my own public comments, I have also tried to suggest a more flexible framework for the discussion of three key issues which have so far been so intractable:

The nature of a comprehensive peace—what is peace; what does it mean to the Israelis; what does it mean to their Arab neighbors?

Secondly, the relationship between security and borders—how can the dispute over border delineations be established and settled with a feeling of security on both sides?

And the issue of the Palestinian homeland.

The historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it is derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search for permanent peace. We will continue to promote a settlement which all of us need.

Our own policy will not be affected by changes in leadership in any of the countries in the Middle East. Therefore, we expect Israel and her neighbors to continue to be bound by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which they have previously accepted.

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean disaster, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well.

**Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing his ideas about a Middle East peace and considering the effects of the Likud election victory in Israel<sup>97</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1977

*Q. Mr. President, on March 9, you talked about the idea of Israel withdrawing to her '67 borders, with only minor adjustments. Is that still your position, and is there any way that Israel could retain the West Bank of the Jordan and make that fit in the definition of "minor adjustments"?*

A. That is still my position, although I might add again that the United States, including myself as President—we do not have a Middle Eastern settlement plan, but the basic premises have been spelled out very clearly.

In the U.N. resolutions that have been passed, coming from the Security Council, voted on and supported by our government—and these have been binding policies of the government—they do include the right of the Palestinians to have a homeland, to be compensated for losses that they have suffered. They do include the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories from the 1967 war, and they do include an end of belligerency and a reestablishment of permanent and secure borders.

All these things have been spelled out in writing in those U.N. positions which we have endorsed—every Administration since they were passed.

I would certainly assume that withdrawal from West Bank territories, either partially or in their entirety, would be a part of an ultimate settlement, but that is something that has to be worked out still between the Israelis and their neighbors.

We do not intend to put forward a description of what the exact borders should be. It is not our role to play. We will explore possibilities for common agreement and reserve the right to make our opinions known. But we have no control over anyone in the Middle East and do not want any control over anyone in the Middle East. But those three basic principles—permanent peace, secure borders, and resolution of the Palestinian

<sup>96</sup> Made at a commencement ceremony at Notre Dame University; excerpted from the *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI (June 13, 1977), pp. 621–625.

<sup>97</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVI, 1982, (June 20, 1977), pp. 654–655, 656–657.

question—all have been and still are integral parts of any peace settlement.

. . . . .

*Q. Mr. President, to follow up on the Middle East, Mr. President, could you give us more of your thinking on the disposition of places like the Golan Heights, which you talked about during the campaign, the question of Jerusalem, and other areas like that? And can you say how your proposal for minor alterations differs from the 1969 American plan<sup>98</sup> calling for substantial alterations?*

*A. No, I can't respond to those specific things. I think it would be inappropriate for me to try to draw a line on a map in the Golan Heights, the West Bank of Jerusalem, or the Sinai Peninsula. That is something that would have to be negotiated between the parties involved.*

*But I think also that it was obvious that the United States didn't advance the cause of the settlement when the so-called Rogers plan was put forward without adequate prior consultation with the different nations who were concerned with the Middle Eastern question.*

*I think it is better just to talk in terms of what our country has had as its long-time policy. But as far as an exact definition of the borders, I don't have the capability nor the inclination to go into that.*

. . . . .

*Q. And your public statements with respect to a Palestinian homeland are being credited as being a factor in the election of a conservative, hardline political group in Israel.*

*Do you think that you are going to be able to continue your policy of open discussions of foreign policy issues and, at the same time, achieve agreements? In other words, do you think you are going to be able to have your cake and eat it, too?*

*A. I don't agree with the premise of your question. I don't believe that my open espousal of a desire on the part of the American people to reduce the number of missile launchers or atomic weapons prior to the time we negotiated in Moscow was a reason for a breakdown in that discussion.*

*It has led to continuing discussions, and I believe it's a viable policy that I will pursue, and I see no reason why the American people should not know it, and I believe that overwhelmingly*

*the American people support it. I think it's good for the American people to know what our positions are at the time that the Soviets know what our positions are, and vice versa.*

*This is a matter that must be addressed openly. It involves not only the Soviet and American people but it also involves our allies and friends who depend upon us around the world. In the campaign itself and in my Inaugural Address, I expressed a hope which I still have that ultimately myself or my successor, Mr. Brezhnev or his successor, can arrive at a point where nuclear weapons are eliminated completely from the Soviet and the American arsenals.*

*The other point of your question was concerning the results of the election in Israel. I think that the international questions in Israel were very slightly discussed or debated during their campaign. My opinion is that the result of the elections were not affected appreciably if at all by any statements that I made concerning an ultimate Middle Eastern settlement.*

*Our positions are compatible with the positions taken by my own predecessors and, in fact, historically the United States has espoused these basic principles. And I think that this is something that must be addressed frankly by the prospective government in Israel, by the people of Israel, their Arab neighbors, and by the people in the United States.*

*So, I don't intend to refrain from expressing very clearly my position on foreign issues to the public. On occasion when negotiations are going on or when we have an agreement with our negotiating partners to refrain from public statements, of course I will do so. But that will be an individual judgment to be made.*

. . . . .

*Q. Realizing that the Israeli Government is not in place yet, but assuming that Mr. Begin will have a dominant role in it, and based on his initial remarks about withdrawal of the sector, do you see him as a potential obstacle to the peace process?*

*A. No, I don't. I don't yet have any way to know who will put the government together. Obviously Mr. Begin leads the Likud government which came in first. And we are waiting now for the Israeli election results to be confirmed and for the President of Israel to designate the leader of that party to put the government together.*

<sup>98</sup> See docs. 54 and 205 in *International Documents on Palestine, 1969*.

Following that time and before the government is completely evolved, I intend to congratulate Mr. Begin, if it is he, and to invite him or whoever is designated to come over here for discussions with me.

There obviously are difficulties caused by a change in the Israeli Government. But in the long run, as is the case in our own country and in a democracy like Israel, the government leaders fairly accurately reflect the hopes and desires and fears and purposes of the people whom they are chosen to lead.

Mr. Begin will have to put together a government. He'll have to deal with conflicting interests as he forms his cabinet and brings in other groups to make sure that he has a majority in the Knesset.

So, I don't look at this as an insuperable obstacle. It does create a question. I think a large part of that question can be resolved when I meet with him personally and when he meets with the congressional leaders and with the Jewish Americans who are very deeply interested in this and sees the purpose of our own country.

I think this may have an effect on him. I have already seen some moderation in his views as he's dealt with Mr. Yadin and others, and I hope that this moderation will continue.

Obviously, the Arab leaders also have to be moderate. Some of the adamant stands that they have taken in the historical past will have to be abandoned. If they didn't, there would be no hope for peace.

So, both sides of this—or rather all sides of this discussion have to yield to some degree to accomplish the purposes of their own people.

## 106

### **Press interview statements by Foreign Minister de Guiringaud of France giving his views on the Middle East after the Likud election victory (excerpt)<sup>99</sup>**

Paris, June 1977

*Q. At the end of your tour of Middle Eastern countries in February and March you felt optimistic about the convening of a Geneva conference.<sup>100</sup> Do you still feel the*

*same way?*

A. The situation in the Middle East seemed, at the beginning of the year, to be such that chances for peace were better than at any other time in recent years. There was a general attitude of moderation and realism among Arab leaders. They recognised the fact that Israel was there to stay and they were prepared, in my opinion, to make significant concessions during the negotiations in comparison with what had been their attitude in previous years.

Now I would be very cautious about the chances of a settlement this year, or even about the chances of convening the Geneva conference at the end of this year. There is a new element which has surfaced as a result of the unexpected outcome of the Israeli elections. The Labour Party, which had been in power in Israel for so many years, was prepared to enter into negotiations and had proclaimed its desire to negotiate a settlement.

I had seen Mr. Rabin and also Mr. Allon when I went to Israel in March. They seemed to me to be sincerely willing to enter into negotiations provided that some of their interests, as they saw them, were safeguarded.

Now we still don't know who will be the leader of the new government, but the main party in the Knesset is the Likud. Some of the declarations that its leader, Mr. Begin, has made after the elections show that there is such a wide difference between what he considers the rights of Israel and what the Arab states consider as a basis for a settlement that the chances of a negotiation this year seem to me less favourable than they were, say, three weeks ago (before the elections) .

*Q. The UN Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, commenting on the outcome of the Israeli elections, said: "The new situation in Israel will certainly not facilitate the negotiating process." So, in other words, you share his view?*

A. I think I could subscribe to this declaration word for word.

*Q. Many Middle Eastern countries feel that Resolution 242 is no longer valid in 1977 as a basis for a final settlement. Does France share this view?*

A. We still consider Resolution 242 to be the basis for a settlement but perhaps 242 has to be completed, not as a resolution but by the consideration of a fact: the necessity to recognise the right

<sup>99</sup> Interview conducted by Raphael Calis, *Middle East* (London), July 1977, pp. 33–35.

<sup>100</sup> See doc. 60 above.

of the Palestinian people to a homeland, which does not appear in the ten-year-old Resolution 242.

The Palestinian question did not appear at that time as it does today. This new element, the Palestinian question and the right of the Palestinians to a homeland, should be taken into consideration also.

*Q. Do you think that President Carter's views on how a settlement should be achieved have speeded up the movement towards a final settlement or have they actually complicated the issues?*

A. The move of President Carter is, in fact, a move towards a position which was defined by France more than three years ago and which was based on Resolution 242 with the addition of the Palestinian factor. The position of France has been adopted more recently by the European countries, especially the members of the European Community, and has been defined, as a European position, on several occasions at the United Nations.

In the past, there used to be a difference between the American position and that of the European countries, the difference being mainly the way the Palestinian problem was apprehended and the way the status of the various states of the region was to be considered.

Now I see President Carter is taking the stand which was ours first and then that of the Europeans when he recognised the Palestinians must have a homeland and when he also recognised that the Palestinians must participate in the Geneva conference.

I would not say this complicates the issue: on the contrary, I think it is a sign that the position we defined nearly three years ago and on which we have rallied the European countries is now adopted by the American Government.

*Q. Does France see eye to eye with the US on such controversial issues as "Palestinian homeland", "defensible borders" and "demilitarised zones"?*

A. I would say that, according to our impressions, there is no significant difference between our position and the American position regarding the Palestinian problem.

On "defensible borders" it is a different question. We have never adopted either the concept or the terminology of "defensible borders". We have said that all the states of the region should enjoy "secure, recognised and guaranteed" borders and

we have always insisted on the first part of Resolution 242 which calls for withdrawal from the occupied territories.

The concept of "demilitarised zones" was introduced by our delegation early in the United Nations debates and we stick to it. Now, it seems that the American Administration no longer mentions "defensible borders" but resorts to the expression of "demilitarised zones". But we have not discussed this with the Americans and I am not in a position to say if, on this issue precisely, our positions really coincide.

*Q. Did the recent Western summit in London reach any conclusions on the steps that should be taken to bring peace to the Middle East?*

A. The London summit had purely economic objectives and we did not discuss the Middle East crisis.

*Q. Does France envisage a more active role in bringing about a Middle East settlement as requested by more than one Arab country?*

A. We have, traditionally, always played a role in the Middle East and we think that we still have to play a role in the eventual solution of the Middle East conflict. We do that on three levels:

We have defined principles: withdrawal from the occupied territories held since 1967, a homeland for the Palestinian people, the right of all the states of the region, including Israel, to secure recognised and guaranteed borders. And we are glad to see that nearly everybody agrees on these principles, including the Soviet Union, which has spelled these out in joint communiques with us. I am glad to see that the new American Administration seems to join in those principles.

The second level of our action is persuasion; we try to use our influence with all the parties in the conflict, including Israel, to preach moderation and realism. We think that our principles are realistic and can be a good basis for a settlement.

The third level at which we may play a role is, if a settlement is reached and if some guarantees are decided, as has been suggested several times at the UN that we are prepared to participate in those guarantees.

*Q. What sort of specific guarantees do you envisage?*

A. First, there may be guarantees along the borders: demilitarised zones or electronic devices

such as those being used in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Second, the stationing of UN observers and even the participation of contingents of forces from Security Council member countries.

Third, there may eventually be an agreement on guarantees subscribed by the five permanent members of the Security Council through either political or diplomatic means.

But none of these guarantees can be envisaged unless there is a settlement and, of course, these would all be subject to the agreement of the parties concerned.

### 107

#### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Senegal of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>101</sup>**

**Dakar, June 8, 1977**

In response to an invitation by Senegalese President Leopold Senghor, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, paid an official visit to Senegal from June 6th to 8th. On June 7th, talks between the Senegalese and Palestinian delegations followed a meeting between Arafat and President Senghor.

The two parties declared the dangerous situation in the Middle East a threat to world security, and called for the implementation of a just and durable peace in the region, which could only be achieved through solving the Palestine question—the essence of any settlement of the crisis. The two parties confirmed that any just solution should be realized on the basis of implementing the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent state, and the right of the refugees to return to their homeland. The two parties also condemned Israel's expansionist policy.

Yasser Arafat thanked the government and people of Senegal for their efforts to support the Palestine cause. He praised the role of President Senghor in the peace-efforts currently underway in the Middle East. President Senghor in turn praised Arafat for his courageous leadership of the PLO.

The two parties condemned the racist policy practiced by the Rhodesian and South African regimes, and called for the transfer of authority to the black majority in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. They also declared their readiness to participate by all means in the liberation movements, taking into consideration the attempts by the UN and by the Organization of African Unity to achieve a peaceful solution.

### 108

#### **Joint communiqué issued following talks between a delegation of the Communist Party of Lebanon and officials of the Communist Party of the USSR (excerpt)<sup>102</sup>**

**Moscow, June 10, 1977**

The participants in the meeting firmly condemned the policy of imperialism, of the Israeli ruling circles and of reaction, which impede progress towards a just and secure peace in the Middle East built upon ensuring the legitimate rights and interests of all the states and peoples in that region, including the Palestinian Arab people, who are struggling to attain their right to create a national state.

The Lebanese Communist Party delegation declared its full support for the programme for a settlement of the Middle East crisis<sup>103</sup> announced by the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, at the sixteenth congress of Soviet Trade Unions.

The Lebanese comrades discussed the struggle of the Communists and of all other Lebanese national forces for a democratic settlement of the conflict in that country. In this regard, they affirmed the importance of the solidarity between the nationalist Lebanese and the Palestine resistance movement as well as cooperation with other anti-imperialist forces.

The representatives of the Soviet and Lebanese Communist Parties expressed their support for the efforts being made by the legitimate authorities

<sup>102</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nida'* (Beirut), June 11, 1977.

<sup>103</sup> Doc. 75 above.

<sup>101</sup> English text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 9, 1977, pp. 1–2.

in Lebanon, which seek to secure national independence, sovereignty and the country's territorial integrity. They condemned Israel's aggressive acts in South Lebanon which are to be considered as an encroachment on Lebanese sovereignty and a danger to Lebanon's territorial integrity.

The participants in the meeting affirmed the necessity of solidarity among all progressive and national forces in the Arab world and of effectively confronting the attempts of imperialism and reaction to weaken the links between the Arab peoples and their natural allies, namely, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community.

### 109

#### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Fahmi of Egypt (excerpt)<sup>104</sup>**

Moscow, June 11 1977

Ismail Fahmy was received by Leonid Brezhnev and had a talk with him on questions of Soviet-Egyptian relations, the situation in the Middle East and some international problems of mutual interest. Ismail Fahmy conveyed to Leonid Brezhnev greetings from President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.

In the course of talks held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, Andrei Gromyko and Ismail Fahmy held a comprehensive discussion on the state and prospects of Soviet-Egyptian relations and considered concrete measures aimed at overcoming the existing difficulties in the relations between the two states.

Particular attention was paid to discussion of possible ways of strengthening the appropriate political basis of relations between the two countries and the development of Soviet-Egyptian co-operation in different spheres, in the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt. The present-day situation in the Middle East and questions concerning the establishment of a lasting and just peace in that area and resumption of the work of the Geneva

Peace Conference were also considered.

The two sides once again declared that peace in the Middle East could be ensured only through the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967 to the lines existing on June 4, 1967, the guarantee of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine and, above all, their right to establish an independent state of their own, and also the Palestinians' right to return to their homes and compensation in accordance with United Nations decisions.

The two sides noted that there was still a danger of a new military clash in the Middle East as a result of the continued occupation of Arab lands, the obstructionist policy of Israel and its illegal actions on these lands. They declared their determined support for the earliest possible, and not later than the autumn of 1977, reconvening of the work of the Geneva Conference with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, on an equal footing with all other participants, with a view to attaining a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

In the course of the negotiations, mutual agreement was reaffirmed to continue meetings and consultations between officials of both countries, in Moscow and Cairo in turn, on all questions of interest to the USSR and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Ismail Fahmy extended an invitation from the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to Andrei Gromyko to visit Cairo. The invitation was accepted with gratitude. The time of the visit is to be agreed later through diplomatic channels.

### 110

#### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of Prime Minister Khlayfawi of Syria (excerpt)<sup>105</sup>**

Belgrade, June 13, 1977

At the invitation of the President of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Veselin Djuranović, the President

<sup>104</sup> Partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5885 (June 14, 1977), p. 211.

<sup>105</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVIII, 653 (June 20, 1977), pp. 19-20.

of the Council of Ministers of the Syrian Arab Republic, Abdel Rahman Hleifawi, paid a visit to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from June 8 to 13, 1977, at the head of an official delegation.

. . . . .

The Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Syria, A. Hleifawi, told the President of the FEC, V. Djuranović, about Syria's views on the latest development of the situation in the Middle East.

The President of the FEC, V. Djuranović, for his part, briefed the Syrian Prime Minister on Yugoslavia's estimates of the present course of development in the Middle East and wider African region.

The two sides gave special consideration to the present situation in the Middle East and to its latest development. They voiced their deep concern because of the tense situation created by Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and her refusal to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The two sides denounced Israel's policy in the occupied territories and the measures of the Israeli Government leading to changes of the demographic, cultural and historical characteristics of these territories and the continuation of the practice of violating human rights, building settlements for new settlers, demolishing houses, torturing prisoners, expropriation and economic discrimination against the Arab population.

The two delegations reiterated that unless Israel completely withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and recognized the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent Palestinian state, there could be no solution to the Middle East crisis or a durable peace. To deviate from these principles, which are endorsed by the broadest international community, and to attempt in any way to delay or impose a solution of the crisis could not only aggravate the situation in the region still further but provoke a new armed conflict in the Middle East with all its inherent hazards to peace in the world.

The two sides consider that the conditions exist for a continuation of political and diplomatic actions aimed at finding a settlement to the crisis along the lines of the UN resolutions. However, they hold that the latest statements of certain

Israeli officials, made since the parliamentary elections in Israel, pose a new obstacle in the way to a just and durable settlement of the Middle East problem.

They pointed out that Arab unity and solidarity and increased pressure from the international community, the non-aligned countries in particular, were necessary in the aim of enforcing the above mentioned UN resolutions.

In that context, the two sides underlined the need that the Geneva peace conference be reconvened as soon as possible with the participation of all interested parties including from the outset the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, on an equal footing with the other participants, in order that a global, just and durable solution may be found to the Middle East dispute and to the Palestine question, which is at the core of the conflict, on the basis of the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the re-establishment of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people including their right to set up a state of their own on national territory.

The Yugoslav side appreciates the engagement of the Arab League in Lebanon, and within its framework that of Syria, in the aim of normalizing conditions in that country as soon as possible.

The two delegations assessed that the process of stabilization in Lebanon was continuing and expressed their support for the efforts of the Lebanese Government to preserve the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to ensure the status and rights of Palestinians in Lebanon through the implementation of the Cairo agreement.<sup>106</sup>

They condemned the renewed attacks of Israel against the south of Lebanon and her interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon manifest in the constant provocations being carried out in the south of that country.

. . . . .

<sup>106</sup> An alleged text of the agreement is doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

111

**Communiqué issued by the Commonwealth heads of government reaffirming their belief that a Middle East peace must be based on UN resolutions and on the Palestinians' right to a homeland (excerpt)<sup>107</sup>**

London, June 15, 1977

Heads of government earnestly hope that negotiations towards a Middle East peace settlement will soon be resumed and will prove successful. They are deeply concerned over the increasing danger of the renewed break-out of even more intense armed hostilities in the Middle East. They renewed their conviction that no real progress towards peace in the area is possible until the relevant resolutions of the United Nations are implemented and the right of the Palestinian people to their own homeland is recognized. While urging all parties concerned vigorously to renew their efforts for the establishment of a durable peace in the area, heads of government called for the early convening of the Geneva Conference with the full participation of the authentic and legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Most heads of government recognized that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

112

**Press interview statement by President Brezhnev of the USSR outlining his country's Middle East policy<sup>108</sup>**

Paris, mid-June, 1977

*Q. How do you conceive the evolution of the Middle East situation? Do you think Israel may agree to the idea of a Palestinian state?*

<sup>107</sup> English text, *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (Bath), XXIII, 32 (August 12, 1977), p. 28505.

<sup>108</sup> Interview granted to *Le Monde* (Paris); excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5886 (June 21, 1977), p. 216.

A. Our position on Middle East affairs is permeated with concern for having a dangerous centre of tension extinguished and for having justice restored and lasting peace ensured in that area.

The task of a Middle East peace settlement is assuming an increasingly urgent character. In the light of this, I believe that the fact that the Soviet Union and the USA, the co-chairmen of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, have agreed to make efforts for the conference to resume in the autumn of this year, should be assessed in a positive way.

Of course, a Middle East settlement involves not only the participants in the Geneva Conference, but all those who are interested in ending the conflict. We have always attached and we continue to attach great importance to co-operation with France in this matter. We believe that France, in view of her international weight and influence, can effectively facilitate a Middle East settlement and take part in its guarantees.

As for the second part of your question, it should evidently be addressed to the Israeli government.

113

**Statement issued by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations expressing apprehension about US Middle East policy<sup>109</sup>**

Mid-June 1977

The Jewish community continues to be apprehensive about the Administration's policy toward the Middle East. Recent statements by Administration spokesmen have not served to allay these fears. They have been mere restatements of what gave rise to these apprehensions in the first place.

Our concern is clear: we perceive a step-by-step disengagement from the traditional American Middle Eastern policy which calls for negotiations without preconditions. The dim outline of an American blueprint for an imposed settlement can be seen. They may not be intended as such a blueprint, but they are perceived as such. This

<sup>109</sup> Text inserted by Congressman Eilberg (Dem.); *Congressional Record* (daily), June 22, 1977, p. E3972.



perturbs the American Jew and worst of all it raises the expectations of the Arab world which if frustrated to the slightest degree, will impede the process toward peace if not plunge all into disaster.

## 114

**Speech by US Vice President Mondale stating that the Palestinians must recognize Israel in return for a homeland (excerpt)<sup>110</sup>**

San Francisco, June 17, 1977

A further major issue is that of the future of the Palestinian people. It has been the source of continuing tragedy in the Middle East. There are two prerequisites for a lasting peace in this regard. First, there must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the Palestinians to live in peace alongside Israel. Second, the Palestinians must be given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past and toward a future in which they can express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully.

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to demonstrate that willingness, by recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace, the President has made clear that, in the context of a peace settlement we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully of the benefits of peace in the Middle East, including the possibility of some arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity—preferably in association with Jordan.

How this would be accomplished and the exact character of such an entity is, of course, something that would have to be decided by the parties themselves in the course of negotiation. However, the President has suggested that the viability of this concept and the security of the region might be enhanced if this involved an association with Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are for the parties themselves to decide.

## 115

**Speech by Likud Party leader Begin presenting the Likud government and its policy to the Knesset (excerpts)<sup>111</sup>**

Jerusalem, June 20, 1977

By virtue of this age-long heritage, I wish to declare that the government of Israel will not ask any nation, be it near or far, mighty or small, to recognize our right to exist. The right to exist? It would not enter the mind of any Briton or Frenchman, Belgian or Dutchman, Hungarian or Bulgarian, Russian or American, to request for his people recognition of its right to exist. Their existence *per se* is their right to exist. The same holds true for Israel. We were granted our right to exist by the God of our fathers, at the glimmer of the dawn of human civilization nearly 4,000 years ago. For that right, which has been sanctified in Jewish blood from generation to generation, we have paid a price unexampled in the annals of nations. Certainly, this fact does not diminish or enfeeble our right. On the contrary. Therefore, I re-emphasize that we do not expect anyone to request, on our behalf, that our right to exist in the land of our fathers be recognized. It is a different recognition which is required between ourselves and our neighbours; recognition of sovereignty and of the mutual need for a life of peace and understanding. It is this mutual recognition that we look forward to: for it we shall make every possible effort.

Eretz Yisrael, the beloved place of our fathers, our only country—we have cleaved to it throughout the ages, we have never severed ties with it. We have prayed for it, yearned for it, loved it with all our heart and soul. We did not forget it for a single day in our wandering in the Diaspora. Our Holy Fathers carried its name on their lips when they were dragged by ruthless, destructive foes to all the wanton deaths. We were exiled from it and returned to it with faith, right and sacrifice, with celebrated pioneering construction and a magnificent war of independence, of self-liberation. No man gave us our liberty. We

<sup>110</sup> Made to the World Affairs Council; text as inserted by US Senator Abraham Ribicoff (dem); *The Congressional Record* (Daily), June 17, 1977, pp. S10139–S10141.

<sup>111</sup> English translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, as published in *Who is Menachem Begin? A Documentary Sketch* 2nd ed. (June, 1977), IPS, Beirut.

conquered it with what was left of our national strength, in an era when a third of our people was exterminated and no one came to their rescue.

Over 70 years ago, Ze'ev Jabotinsky wrote of this land: "Our brethren the true seed of our national unity is the pure fruit of Eretz Yisrael. Before coming to Eretz Yisrael we were not a nation and we had no existence. On the soil of Eretz Yisrael the Hebrew people has been created from the fragments of various peoples. We have grown up on the soil of Eretz Yisrael, on it we have become citizens. Fortifying the faith in one God, we have inhaled the spirit of the land, and in our struggle for independence and rule we have been pervaded by its atmosphere. Our body has been nourished by the grain growing from its soil. The ideas of our prophets developed in Eretz Yisrael, and in it the Song of Solomon was first uttered. All that is Hebrew within us has been bestowed upon us by Eretz Yisrael. Everything else that is within us is not Hebrew. The people of Israel and Eretz Yisrael are one."

And indeed, as we have written in the basic guidelines of the government policy: The Jewish people has an eternal, historic right to Eretz Yisrael, the inheritance of our fathers, a right that is not to be disputed and undermined.

My teachers and superiors, the Knesset members, we will try to deepen the friendship between us and the United States. This will be the firm foundation of the government policy. America and Israel have in common not only profound feelings for and faith in the values of morality and democracy. We believe they are united also by a true and profound partnership of interests. Israel is an integral part of the free world. But the free—the democratic—world has of late greatly shrunk. It may be likened to an island whose shores are swept by stormy waves and tempestuous seas of turbid totalitarianism. A famous 19th century slogan must be altered in our day: Free men of all countries, unite, We must all stand together to repulse the threat and preserve the freedom of man.

We shall work for renewal of the friendship between Israel and France. There existed more than friendship; there was an alliance between our two countries. I hereby call on the president of France and its government to resume those relations with Israel. Of course, Israel has excellent friends in France. From the two ends of the

Mediterranean we shall stretch out a hand to one another and work for the revival of the friendship between the two people.

We are interested in normalization of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. Three periods can be noted in relations between the Zionism in Eretz Yisrael and the Soviet Union. Starting with the Bolshevik Revolution, for nearly 30 years, the relations were of unbridgeable hostility initiated by Moscow. In the late forties came the great turning point. Under the influence of the war of liberation against British rule, Moscow began to view the aspiration for the renaissance of the State as one of human progress. We all recall the speeches by Messrs. Gromyko and Tsarapkin, about the urgent need for establishing the Jewish state. And then the 'Fifties', in which there came a turn for the worse, Moscow lending a hand to our enemies and equipping them with lethal weapons—knowing well that one day these would be directed against the remnants of the Jewish people, whose destruction its rulers had seen with their own eyes on the soil of their country and elsewhere.

Upon the outbreak of the six-Day War, the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Resumption of these normal relations depends, in the nature of things, on Moscow's initiative. Should such initiative be forthcoming, we shall demand that an end be put to persecution of Judaism and of Zionism, to the incitement against them, that all Prisoners of Zion be released and every Jew throughout the Soviet Union so desiring, be allowed to immigrate, to return to Eretz Yisrael or, in the words of our brethren, the seekers of Zion in the Soviet Union, to the "Jewish People's Historic Homeland."

Mr. Chairman, our prime concern is prevention of a new war in the Middle East. I call upon King Husayn, President as-Sadat and President al-Asad to meet with me—whether in our capitals or on neutral soil, in public or away from the spotlights of publicity in order to discuss the establishment of true peace between their countries and Israel. Much blood, too much, has been shed in the region—Jewish and Arab. Let us put an end to the bloodshed that is abhorrent to us, and sit down to the negotiating table in sincerity and seriousness. Should this plea encounter refusal, we shall make a note of the Arab intransigence. It will not be new. Five prime ministers who

preceded me—David Ben Gurion, Moshe Sharet and Levy Eshkol of blessed memory, and Mrs. Golda Meir and Yitzhaq Rabin, to whom I wish long life—repeatedly called for holding such meetings, and there was no response—or, rather, there was a negative response from the other side. But we shall not weary of sounding the call—not for propaganda purposes, but for the vital needs of our peoples and our countries.

And now, Members of the Knesset, the appeal to ourselves, to our people. I call on all citizens of Israel who have left their country to return home. In days past, Jew-haters were wont to say that the Jew pursues the following rule: *ubi bene, ibi patria*, wherever I feel good—there my homeland be. We shall take no account of them. We shall prove to ourselves that with the revival of independence, the Jew pursues an opposite rule: *ubi patria, ibi bene*, where my homeland be, there be it good for me—even though it be difficult for me. The government will act to ease matters for the returning families. We shall not address these people by derogatory terms, insults solve no problem. We shall say to them simply: the time has come to return home.

We call on the young generation, in the homeland and in the Diaspora, to arise, go forth and settle. Come from the east and west, north and south, to build together Eretz Yisrael. There is room in it for millions of returnees to Zion. We do not wish to evict, nor shall we evict any Arab resident from his land. Jews and Arabs, Druze and Circassians, can live together in this land, and they must live together in peace, mutual respect, equal rights, in freedom and with social and economic progress.

116

**Press interview statement by Prime Minister Suarez of Spain expressing sympathy with the Arab view of the conflict with Israel<sup>112</sup>**

Madrid, June 21, 1977

*Q. Diplomatic relations with Israel?*

A. We have often said there is no objection in principle. But we must bear in mind the circumstances. A special relationship as neighbours unites us with the great Arab nation. She is in conflict with Israel which is occupying her territories by force and refusing to recognize the human, historic and national rights of the Palestinian people. We hope that, on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the beginning of a satisfying and peaceful solution to the problem will emerge. In this respect there is, of course, no anti-Israeli feeling in Spain, either in the government or among the people.

117

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to France of President Brezhnev of the USSR (excerpts)<sup>113</sup>**

Paris, June 22, 1977

Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, paid an official visit to France from June 20 to 22, 1977, at the invitation of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of the French Republic.

The two sides noted that circumstances are now more favourable for progress towards an overall settlement in the Middle East. The sides expressed satisfaction that their positions on the basic aspects of a settlement, to which they had adhered for a

<sup>112</sup> Translated from the partial French text of the interview conducted by Yves Cuau and André Pautard, *L'Express* (Paris), June 27, 1977, p. 41.

<sup>113</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5887 (June 28, 1977), p. 230.

long time, now enjoy broad approval. They accept that the establishment of a just and lasting peace must be based on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, on ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestine Arab people, including their right to have a national homeland, and on respect for the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to an independent existence in secure and recognized frontiers.

The USSR and France expressed the hope that the Geneva Peace Conference can be reconvened before the end of this year with the participation of all the parties involved, including representatives of the Palestine Arab people, on the basis of full rights.

## 118

### **Speech by President Tito of Yugoslavia calling for Arab unity to achieve a just peace in the Middle East (excerpt)<sup>114</sup>**

**Belgrade, June 25, 1977**

Mr President, Mrs. Asad,

On behalf of my wife, of my aides and of myself I am pleased to welcome you once more to our country. I remember with pleasure all the contacts established between us so far, at all times characterized by great mutual confidence and understanding.

Our talks have always inspired tangible action which has contributed to a deepening of cooperation and to the achievement of our common goals in the field of foreign policy. This was inevitable, because there are many common interests linking our two friendly and non-aligned countries. In these present extremely complex circumstances, the need arose and a common desire was expressed for our renewed meeting. Therefore, we attach great importance to your visit because it enables us to exchange views regarding current international issues, especially developments in the Middle East and Lebanon, which for obvious reasons, cause us and the international community

grave concern.

You have no doubt ascertained for yourself that we, on our part, are doing all in our power to contribute to a settlement of the Middle East crisis in a manner that would satisfy the just demands of the Arab countries and of the Palestinian Arab people. When Comrade Milos Minic recently visited your country, he relayed to you our own viewpoint regarding recent developments.

Mr. President, I also take this opportunity to express my deep anxiety about the progress of the Lebanese crisis and its tragic results. If this crisis continues, it will rapidly lead to the expansion of the conflict and endanger the other countries in the region.

The present situation allows foreign, i.e. non-Arab, factors to become active, since these factors regard the continuation of the crisis and of inter-Arab conflict as providing new opportunities for entrenching their positions and expanding their influence so that it would include the remaining regions of the Middle East. Therefore, the primary task to be shouldered by all forces inside Lebanon and all friendly states is to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate to the point where it threatens the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the friendly and non-aligned country Lebanon.

The Arab countries today bear an historic responsibility, for they are duty-bound to transcend inter-Arab conflicts before it is too late, since this would serve their common goals. However, it is certain that if no coordination takes place in the policies of the Arab countries, especially of Syria, the PLO and Egypt, there can be no settlement of the Lebanese crisis, no liberation of occupied territories and no fulfillment of the national rights of the Palestinians. There can also be no just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

We believe that the recent meeting of the Arab League resulted in the adoption of a first positive step. We offer our total support to the resolutions that were adopted, and we take a positive view of the efforts being made by certain Arab countries and personalities to implement these resolutions and to contribute effectively to their adoption.

It is evident that each Arab country should play its own role in these efforts and assume its share of responsibility regarding them. Never-

<sup>114</sup> Made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Asad of Syria; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 26, 1977, p. 3.

theless, their common aim ought to be the pacification of the situation in Lebanon and the creation of conditions that would lead to a political settlement in accordance with the interests of the Lebanese people, a settlement safeguarding the status and interests of the Palestine liberation movement and the Palestinians in Lebanon.

We hope that the Arab countries will not stop at these preliminary measures, since it is necessary, in our view, that these countries should draw up, as soon as possible, a joint programme which seeks to attain a comprehensive and just solution of the Middle East crisis.

With such a programme in hand and such a policy, the Arab countries will receive the full support of the non-aligned countries and, on a wider scale, the support of the international community. I am confident that this will be an important contribution by the Arab countries to the preparations being made to convene the fifth non-aligned conference.

## 119

### **Statement issued by the US Department of State reiterating US Middle East policy and stressing that all occupied territories are negotiable<sup>115</sup>**

**Washington, June 27, 1977**

We believe strongly that progress toward a negotiated peace in the Middle East is essential this year if future disaster is to be avoided. We also believe that the only true security for any country in that troubled area is a true peace negotiated between the parties.

Fortunately we do not begin our efforts in a vacuum. A starting point exists in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November, 1967, which all the governments involved have accepted. The United States policy since 1967 has consistently sought to apply the principles agreed in that

resolution through the process of negotiations called for in Security Council Resolution 338 of October, 1973, which all the parties have also accepted.

The peace foreseen in these resolutions requires both sides to the dispute to make difficult compromises. We are not asking for one-sided concessions from anyone.

The Arab states will have to agree to implement a kind of peace which produces confidence in its durability. In our view that means security arrangements on all fronts satisfactory to all parties to guarantee established borders and steps toward the normalization of relations with Israel.

That peace, to be durable, must also deal with the Palestinian issue. In this connection the President has spoken of the need for a homeland for the Palestinians, whose exact nature should be negotiated between the parties. Clearly whatever arrangements are made would have to take into account the security requirements of all parties involved.

Within the terms of Resolution 242, in return for this kind of peace Israel clearly should withdraw from occupied territories. We consider that this resolution means withdrawal on all three fronts in the Middle East dispute—Sinai, Golan, West Bank-Gaza—with the exact borders and security arrangements being agreed in the negotiations.

These negotiations must start without any preconditions from any side. This means no territories, including the West Bank, are automatically excluded from the items to be negotiated. This strikes us as contradictory to the principles of negotiating without preconditions, nor does it conform to the spirit of Resolution 242 which forms the framework for these negotiations.

Every Administration since 1967 has supported Resolution 242, and it has the widest international support as well.

<sup>115</sup> Statement read by Press Spokesman Hodding Carter at his daily news briefing; text published by the US embassy in Beirut on June 28, 1977. The embassy's introduction said that the statement was prepared but that it "was not volunteered to the press." It was read "in response to a reporter's request for reaction to a June 27 speech by Senator Jacob Javits."

## 120

**Statement by EEC Council of Ministers outlining a common policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict<sup>116</sup>****London, June 29, 1977**

1. At the current critical stage of the situation in the Middle East, the Nine favourably welcome all efforts made to put an end to this tragic conflict. They firmly stress the fundamental interest that they see in urgent and fruitful negotiations with a view to establishing a just and lasting peace. They urgently call on all parties concerned to participate in such negotiations in a constructive and realistic spirit. At this particular point all parties should refrain from any statement or policy which might constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.

2. The Nine have at many times in the past, for example in their statements of November 6, 1973, September 28, 1976 and December 7, 1976, expressed their conviction that a peace settlement should be founded on resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council and on:

—the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

—the necessity for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation she has maintained since the 1967 conflict.

—respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each state in the region and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

—the recognition that, in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians should be taken into consideration.

They remain firmly convinced that all these aspects must be considered as constituting a whole.

3. The Nine are convinced that a solution to the Middle East conflict will not be possible unless the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into reality, which would take into account the necessity of a country for the Palestinian people. They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, should participate in the negotia-

tions in an appropriate manner to be defined in consultation with all the interested parties. Within the framework of a comprehensive settlement, Israel should be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; at the same time, the Arab party must be ready to recognize Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not through the acquisition of territory by force that the security of the states in the region can be assured; it must be founded on peace commitments exchanged between all the parties concerned with a view to establishing real peaceful relations.

4. The Nine consider that the peace negotiations, which aim at defining and implementing a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement to the conflict, must take place as soon as possible. They remain ready to help, to the extent desired by the parties, to find a solution and contribute to its implementation. They are also ready to consider participating in guarantees within the framework of the United Nations.

## 121

**Statement by Chairman Hua of China supporting the Palestinian-Arab struggle<sup>117</sup>****Peking, June 29, 1977**

The Palestinian brothers' struggle at the front is very arduous. Because of superpower aggression and contention in the Middle East, the struggle of the Palestinian and Arab people is complicated and arduous and will be protracted. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the Palestinian and Arab people's struggle is just, and a just struggle is bound to triumph. The Palestinian and Arab people are bound to win final victory so long as they persevere in armed struggle and uphold unity.

<sup>116</sup> Translated from the French text supplied on request by the EEC.

<sup>117</sup> Made at a meeting with a Fatah delegation; partial English text, *Peking Review*, XX, 28 (July 8, 1977), p. 3.

122

### **Statement by Foreign Minister Huang-Hua of China supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people<sup>118</sup>**

**Peking, late June 1977**

The situation in the Middle East has further developed. On the one hand, the superpowers have intensified their contention over the Middle East. Each has tried its utmost to keep the Middle East in a state of "no war and no peace" so as to attack and edge out the other side. That superpower which flaunts the banner of "supporting national liberation" is particularly vicious and despicable in its trickery. It is doing everything possible to undermine the unity of the Arab people and has gone so far as to carry out subversive activities against the Arab countries. On the other hand, the Arab people have further strengthened their unity. They have time and again frustrated the plots of the superpowers to stir up ill feelings among them and sabotage their unity. They have come to see more and more clearly the true features of that superpower which styles itself as the "natural" ally of the Arab people.

The heroic Palestinian people have persevered in armed struggle, defeated the wanton military attacks of imperialism and Zionism and resisted all kinds of pressure from the superpowers. Through struggle they have accumulated rich experience, both positive and negative.

Facts show that so long as they further strengthen their unity with the great people of all Arab countries, heighten their vigilance and persevere in struggle, especially in armed struggle, the heroic Palestinian people will surely defeat all kinds of plots hatched by Zionism and big-power hegemonism that supports and abets Zionism and win complete victory in their liberation struggle.

123

### **Report on the violation of human rights in the West Bank by the Swiss League for Human Rights observation mission<sup>119</sup>**

**July 2, 1977**

In going to the West Bank, our delegation had no other purpose but to form a concrete idea concerning the situation of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Therefore, our objective here is not to develop theories or make legalistic or political evaluations, but to re-state, as faithfully as possible, the evidence collected by us and the observations noted.

If the great similarity in the evidence gathered has led to some generalizations on our part, the reader should take note that the present report is no more than an account of facts that have been described and verified.

We have categorically rejected cases of isolated testimony, assertions lacking certainty, developments uncorroborated by actual and verifiable facts, and we have only retained the facts that we ourselves were able to observe, or those concerning which we heard testimony and which we were able to verify by cross-checking the evidence several times.

Thus, we were forced to discard important information which we were not in a position to verify.

If the present report contains practically no names of persons, the reasons are quite obvious and are due to our concern for the safety of our witnesses; nevertheless, our delegation has retained only evidence submitted by persons whose identity was known to it.

We draw the reader's attention to the fact that the present report concerns itself only with the situation affecting human rights in the occupied West Bank, and not with the situation in Israel proper.

We have adopted United Nations terminology insofar as the term "occupied territories" is concerned, as well as with regard to the appropriate vocabulary used to describe the situation of the Palestinians living in the West Bank.

#### **WEST BANK MUNICIPALITIES**

Our delegation was able to talk with various

<sup>118</sup> Made during a visit by a Fatah delegation; partial English text, *Peking Review*, XX 28, (July 8, 1977), p. 11.

<sup>119</sup> English text, *The Link* (New York), X, 4 (Fall, 1977), pp. 5-8.

municipal officials in the towns of West Jordan; in particular, it was received by the mayor of Jericho, the mayor of Ramallah, the mayor of El-Bira and the deputy mayor of Bethlehem.

From these conversations, the following stands out:

1. The authority of the mayors of Arab towns in the West Bank extends only over municipal questions, the real power being in the hands of the Israeli military governor.

2. The municipalities have practically no funds to dispose of, except for the assistance extended for social ends by various Arab states. Additionally, it should be emphasized that entry into Israel of such funds is extremely difficult, and that substantial sums are lying dormant in Jordanian banks, awaiting the possibility of being transferred to municipalities in the West Bank, if authorization can be obtained from the military authorities.

3. The social infra-structure is largely missing and the municipalities lack the means of acquiring the necessary equipment. To cite an example, the town of Bethlehem (population 35,000) has no fire-fighting vehicles.

4. The mayors are often denied permits to leave the occupied territories, even to respond to invitations from foreign countries or municipalities, or to travel abroad to raise funds for assistance. It is to be noted that the majority of towns in the West Bank are "twinned" with foreign towns and that the occupying authorities prohibit exchanges between the twin localities.

5. The function of mayor or that of municipal counsellor does not provide immunity, for those who hold it, against arbitrary arrest, pressure of all sorts or even deportation. The same applies to candidates for office in municipal elections.

6. During the period when the now-occupied territories were under Jordanian sovereignty, the mayor who has inherited ancient traditions exercised the customary power of conciliating or settling family disputes. This judiciary function has been abolished by the occupying power.

#### TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

From various depositions, as well as on-the-spot observations which we ourselves were able to make directly, it is evident that expropriation of numerous houses or of land owned by Arabs is a current practice in the West Bank, and is of such magnitude as to lead one to think that the

underlying motive is a political one, that is confiscation, pure and simple, of the occupied territories by the Israeli authorities.

The following examples may be cited:

1. An inhabitant from Bethany found himself notified by official letter of the expropriation of his land against indemnification. No useful public service was cited as the reason for the act of expropriation. He was left with no choice but to either accept it, and to risk being regarded as a traitor in the eyes of his compatriots, or to refuse it as more and more Palestinians are doing.

2. For over three months, the village of Deir Abu Mishal, the geographic location of which is strategically important, has been the target of violent incursions by Israeli troops, who shoot automatic rifles into the air and break windows and doors. The terrorized inhabitants, who seek refuge on the rooftops are unable to sleep at night and are forced to rest a few hours during the day, which puts them in a state wherein they are unable to pursue their daily chores. The obvious objective of this operation is to coerce the inhabitants into evacuating the village, or to justify using force to evict them should they react violently to the nocturnal raids by the Israeli troops.

3. A neighborhood of Arab houses, situated between Jericho and the Jordan River, was occupied by the Israeli Army in 1967, and again in 1973. During the latter occupation, the Israeli Army totally destroyed the interior of the houses, even carrying off the furniture, leaving nothing in place except walls and roofs. All the inhabitants have departed, fearing a renewed occupation.

4. In the proximity of the town of Ramallah, the Army has taken over a hill which abuts the water reservoir belonging to the town of El-Bira.

5. Starting at Bethlehem Hill, the view of the Old City of Jerusalem, encircled following expropriation by buildings constructed for Jews only, is indicative of the determination of the Jewish State to retain the West Bank.

6. Near Hebron we visited the town of Qiryat Arba, which is a typical example of the Jewish settlements established in the West Bank.

7. Several persons confirmed to us, by citing precise cases, that not only have lands and houses been confiscated, but many houses in the occupied territories, owned by people who have been arrested or who were suspected of sympathizing with Palestinian organizations have been demol-



ished since 1968.

The various facts cited above, as well as observations made by the United Nations, attest to the State of Israel's determination to appropriate or annex the occupied territories.

In particular, the objective of the expropriation, the confiscation and the demolition of houses is to coerce the inhabitants into leaving the West Bank.

### PRISONS

In light of the numerous depositions gathered by our delegation, it is in a position to affirm the following with regard to detention of Palestinian prisoners:

1. In extremely frequent cases, the crowded conditions in prisons reach dramatic proportions; detainees are so crammed together that, for lack of space, they cannot stretch on the floor to sleep. As an example, Ramallah Prison houses 200 inmates, of whom 10 percent may be described as common law prisoners, although its capacity does not exceed 40 inmates.

2. Several detainees have been driven to insanity under the effect of torture practiced on them before or after their trials.

3. Arrested persons are not allowed to be in touch, either with their families or their lawyers, so long as their interrogators remain unsatisfied with the statements obtained from them. We encountered families that remained for weeks ignorant of the whereabouts of some of their members.

4. Serious discrimination exists between Jewish and Palestinian detainees. For example, in Beer-sheba Prison: Jews have beds while the Arabs must sleep on the bare floor; Jews receive 4 visitors a month, while the Arabs receive only 1; Jews may use 10 blankets, while the Arabs can only use 5 or 6, particularly during the rigorous winter months.

5. Medical and dental care are almost nonexistent, or often too late, because a detained person must inscribe his name in a list for a visit, and then await his turn to see the doctor or dentist—usually several days later, or even weeks.

6. Imprisoned children and students have no possibility of pursuing their studies in prison. However, the families can, in the meantime and as a general rule, send them books through the sole intermediary of the Red Cross.

7. We gathered a great deal of evidence on cases of detention lasting several months, without interrogation, a trial or sentence.

### MILITARY TRIALS

On June 29, 1977, one of us—Me. Moutinot—was accorded the opportunity of witnessing the trial of four Arab youths before a military court which met at Lod.

The facts, acknowledged by all, were as follows: four young Arabs, aged 16 to 17, had prepared six bottles filled with gasoline, which they had intended to hurl at the Jews. In fact, they only threw two bottles, which caused minor wounds to two Arabs.

The charges against the defendants, according to the 1945 Emergency Defense Act promulgated by the British, were:

1. Military training: punishable by a seven-year prison sentence.

2. Preparation of explosive devices: punishable by a life sentence or death.

3. Transporting explosive devices: punishable by a life sentence or death.

4. Hurling explosive devices: punishable by a life sentence or death.

The court was composed of three judges, of whom one only had had a legal education: two of the judges were lieutenants and one a major.

### PROCEEDINGS AT THE TRIAL

At 9:50 a.m., the four defendants were brought into the hall handcuffed to each other. The handcuffs were removed as soon as they were seated in the dock.

The trial took place inside a military camp. Thirty seats, allotted to the public, were practically all occupied by relatives of the defendants.

About a dozen armed soldiers from the military police stood guard inside the hall.

A military interpreter sporadically translated for the benefit of the defendants, from Hebrew into Arabic. The proceedings were conducted entirely in Hebrew.

The dossier, which was a very thin one, contained mainly the confessions of the defendants, in Hebrew, a language which the said defendants neither speak nor understand.

The language of the document reflects the foregoing: phrases such as "I am a terrorist" are put into the mouth of a defendant who would

never have used such terms, but rather would have said something like "I am a fighter for the liberation of Palestine."

The personal dossier is almost non-existent, except for a brief *curriculum vitae*.

The defendants were interrogated by the court. The only witnesses were the security agent, who had taken down their confessions and who affirmed that the defendants made the statements which he had recorded of their own free will, in addition to the father and uncle of each of the defendants, who testified as to the good character of the youths.

In an indictment lasting five minutes, the prosecution called for "a severe penalty." The defense, undertaken by Me. Lea Tsemel, pleaded for 30 minutes, asking for the indulgence of the court in view of the youth of the defendants. The defense introduced the expert opinion of a chemist who demonstrated that the bottles were not explosive, but rather incendiary devices; she insisted that the four charges against the defendants sprang from one and the same act.

The session was adjourned at 12:15 p.m. for lunch and for deliberation by the court.

It returned at 14:15 and the four defendants were pronounced guilty of all the charges, the verdict being as follows:

1. One of the defendants was sentenced to a 6-year prison term of which 2 were suspended.
2. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 5 years of which 2 and a half were suspended.
3. The last defendant was sentenced to 2 years of which one was suspended.

It is noteworthy that there is no penitentiary in Israel for youthful offenders, at least insofar as Arabs are concerned, and during their period of detention, all the defendants had been raped by their co-detainees.

#### PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

The defendants were apprehended on April 3 and 4. Three of them were arrested in school. All were beaten and brutalized by interrogators from the security forces.

It is relevant to state that the inquiry is conducted entirely by the police without any legal supervision, or the right of resort to legal aid.

The attorney may not see his client except after he has confessed, which happened in this case, on April 17, 1977, approximately two weeks after

the arrest.

It would be pertinent to point out that the 1947 Emergency Defense Act was passed by Great Britain during its struggle against the Jews, who at that time described it as "Nazi-like, inhumane and contradicts all human rights," and that currently they are enforcing this same law against the Palestinians.

#### TORTURE

We have gathered concurrent testimony from former prisoners, attorneys, prisoners' families and from members of municipal authorities, attesting to the fact that the use of torture in the West Bank is a systematic practice.

Following is a list of the different forms of torture practiced on persons previously apprehended by the occupying authorities. It is not an exhaustive one, and includes only the forms described to us as the most common.

##### *Locations Where Torture Takes Place:*

1. Sarafand (near Tel-Aviv)
2. Hebron
3. The Russian Compound (near Jerusalem)

It appears that if torture is a common practice, these three locations are, sad to say, famous as centers that specialize in the use of torture, as we were told by numerous prisoners.

##### *Forms of Torture*

1. Burning by applying lighted cigarette butts to any part of the body.
2. Using irritants (powders or sprays), which cause itching or sharpen the pain brought on by other forms of torture.
3. Beatings by sticks, canes or bludgeons.
4. Electric shocks applied to all parts of the body, especially and particularly to sensitive parts (ears, genitals).
5. Forcing bottles or other objects up the rectum or the vagina.
6. Pulling finger nails.
7. A form of torture known as "the water drop," which consists of causing a drop of water to fall at regular intervals, and for hours on end, over an individual who cannot escape it. This form of torture frequently leads to insanity.
8. Exposing an individual, in the nude, to full sunlight for hours on end.
9. The so-called "balance" torture, which consists of balancing an individual for hours on end,

either by strapping him to a swing or by suspending him.

10. The so-called "tiger cage," which consists of locking the individual inside a cage too small for standing up or for stretching, so that he is forced to crouch. The floor of the cage may be encrusted with sharp spikes.

11. Depriving an individual of sleep for several days.

12. Suspending by the feet or hands.

13. Plunging an individual in an icy bath, then plunging him in a boiling one, and repeating the process.

14. Locking the individual inside a place with wild dogs and cats.

15. Prolonged and systematic use of lacrimatory agents.

16. Forcing an individual to lap his food directly off the floor.

These forms of torture are used mostly to obtain confessions from the apprehended person, and they continue for as long as necessary until the desired statement is obtained. Equally, these forms of torture may be practiced with the simple purpose of breaking the tortured person both physically and morally.

It is relevant to note, as the above demonstrates, that when conditions during detention are particularly bad, they tend to be the equivalent of torture.

#### RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT

West Bank inhabitants cannot move freely from place to place. The following situation prevails;

1. Even within the West Bank itself restrictions on movement can be found, either through forced residence inside a given area or, in a more general way, by making moving to another place subject to authorization.

2. Several persons, especially mayors of Arab towns, complained to us that they were denied permits allowing them to travel abroad, even if such travel was to be undertaken in response to an invitation from abroad.

3. It can happen also that certain persons may receive permits to leave the country, along with an interdiction prohibiting them from returning to the West Bank.

4. We were even apprised of cases where certain persons were escorted to the frontier, without

hope of return; in particular, two Arab doctors were arrested and taken during the night to southern Lebanon by helicopter.

5. Travel between Jordan and Israel via the Allenby Bridge has been made difficult by the very fact that travelers must pay a high tax.

6. This measure hinders families separated by the frontier from seeing each other often enough, if they happen to lack the necessary financial means.

7. Visits abroad are encouraged if the person does not wish to return to the West Bank, but they are prohibited if the voyage is simply a round trip. This latter policy favors emigration by prohibiting contacts with the outside. We are aware of the case of a young student who obtained a permit to travel to the United States. To return to his homeland, he was required to make the trip back within a year, something he was unable to do. He was not allowed to rejoin his family.

#### CONCLUSION

Our inquiry leads one to the conclusion that the occupation of the West Bank has brought about repeated violation of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

1. The numerous arbitrary arrests, prolonged cases of detention without legal supervision, and the deportations are flagrant violations of the provisions of *Article 3* of the Declaration.

2. Cases of enforced residence, serious restrictions on border crossing, and prohibiting certain Palestinians from returning are all violations of the provisions of *Article 13*, which guarantees the right of free movement and of free choice of residence and which stipulate in particular that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."

3. The numerous violations of property rights, such as arbitrary expropriation, the prohibiting of construction, and the demolition of buildings are inconsistent with the provisions of *Article 17* of the Declaration, which guarantees the right to property and stipulates that "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

4. Torture is commonly and systematically practiced, in contradiction of the principles of law, and in particular *Article 5* of the Universal Declaration.

5. The flagrant inequalities between Jews and Arabs in the West Bank are in contravention of

*Article 2. Paragraph 2*, which stipulates that “no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”

Finally, our delegation cannot but feel concern with respect to the right to a nationality, cited in *Article 15* of the Declaration. In effect, the very state of an occupied territory results in the denial of a nationality to its inhabitant.

## 124

### **Resolution of the OAU Council of Ministers on the question of Palestine<sup>120</sup>**

**Libreville, July 3, 1977**

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session in Libreville, Gabon, from 23 June to 3 July 1977,

*Having considered* the report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU on the Palestinian question, document CM/831(XXIX),

*Recalling* the resolutions adopted by previous sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on the Palestinian question and in particular AHG/Res. 77(XII), CM/Res. 460 (XXVI) and CM/Res. 482 (XXVII) and CM/Res. 529 (XXVIII),

*Recalling further* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People which reaffirms the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to their national homeland in Palestine and the establishment of their independent and sovereign State,

*Guided* by the principles and objectives of the Charters of the OAU and the UN and the common destiny of the African and Arab peoples and their continued joint struggle to recover their land and for the exercise of their inalienable rights to freedom, peace, self-determination and independence,

*Having examined* the developments of the Palestinian cause and the serious situation which prevails due to the continuation of the Israeli occupation

of the Arab countries and its usurpation of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, its refusal to abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly,

*Gravely concerned* about the reaffirmation of the aggressive designs and the policy of expansion reiterated in the statements made by all Israeli governments including by the newly formed Israeli Government and, in particular, its vicious and expansionist plans in the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza and its refusal to recognize the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the exercise of their sovereignty on their territory,

*Noting* that the Palestinian question is the main cause of the problem against Israel,

*Reaffirming* the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO for the restoration of all their national rights,

*Reaffirming* that a just and lasting peace cannot be attained except on the basis of total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to their territory, its sovereignty and national independence and its right to self-determination and the creation of its own independent State on its national territory,

*Noting with indignation* that the alliance between Israel and the racist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia aims at the continuation of the policy of terrorism, extermination of the Palestinian and Arab peoples in the occupied Arab territories and the African people in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia, and that Israel and the racist régimes are pursuing identical methods and manoeuvres,

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General as contained in document CM/831 (XXIX);

2. *Further endorses* all previous resolutions by which the Council re-affirmed its total and effective support for the Palestinian people;

3. *Reaffirms* its total support to the Arab frontline States and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle in order to restore, by all means, the occupied territories and the usurped rights;

4. *Declares* its total support to the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and its heroic struggle against zionism and racism;

5. *Strongly condemns* the Israeli aggressive designs

<sup>120</sup> UN doc. A/32/310, Annex I, November 1, 1977, pp. 51–52.

and policy of expansion as reiterated in the statements of the newly formed Israeli Government;

6. *Strongly condemns*, once more, the alliance between Israel and the racist régimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and invites all Member States to be vigilant against the dangers of this alliance;

7. *Calls on OAU Member States* to step up their diplomatic, economic, political and military isolation of Israel and to support the just cause of the Palestinian people;

8. *Endorses* the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and, in particular, their legitimate and inalienable rights to return to their national homeland and to create an independent State of Palestine and requests the General Assembly of the UN to take all measures for the implementation of these recommendations;

9. *Requests* the Security Council to reconsider its position concerning the recommendations made by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to take all the necessary measures with a view to implementing these recommendations after they have become the expression of international will by virtue of their adoption by the Thirty-first Session of the General Assembly;

10. *Requests* the Administrative Secretary-General to follow up the developments of the Palestinian question and present a report to the Thirtieth Session of the Council of Ministers.

## 125

### **Resolution of the OAU Council of Ministers on the Middle East problem<sup>121</sup>**

**Libreville, July 3, 1977**

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session in Libreville, Gabon, from 23 June to 3 July 1977,

*Having considered* the reports of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU on the Middle East problem (document CM/Res. 830 (XXIX),

*Having heard* the statement delivered during the Session by H.E. the Minister of State for Foreign Relations of the Arab Republic of Egypt,

*Recalling* the resolutions adopted by previous

sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on the Middle East and the occupied Arab territories and on the Palestinian problem and, in particular, AHG/Res. 76 (XII) and CM/Res. 459 (XXVI), and CM/Res. 481 (XXVII) and CM/Res. 529 (XXVIII),

*Recalling further* the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People which reaffirms the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to their national homeland in Palestine and the establishment of their independent sovereign State,

*Guided by* the principles and objectives of the OAU and the UN Charters and the common destiny of the African and Arab peoples and their continued joint struggle for the exercise of their rights, freedom, peace and independence,

*Reaffirming* that a joint and lasting peace cannot be attained except on the basis of total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the recognition of the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence and its right to self-determination and the creation of its own State,

*Noting with indignation* that the alliance between Israel and the racist régimes in South Africa and Rhodesia aims at the continuation of the policy of terrorism and extermination of the Palestinian and Arab peoples in the occupied Arab territories and the African peoples in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe and that Israel and the racist régimes are pursuing identical methods and manoeuvres,

*Gravely concerned* about the reconfirmation of the aggressive designs and policy of expansion reiterated in the statements by the newly formed Israeli Government and in particular its vicious and expansionist plans in the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza which constitute a flagrant violation of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

1. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General as contained in document CM/830 (XXVIII);

2. *Takes note* of the statement by the Minister of State of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Middle East problem and the Palestinian question;

3. *Further endorses* all previous resolutions by which the Council reaffirmed its total and effective support for Egypt, the Arab frontline States and the Palestinian people;

<sup>121</sup> UN doc. A/32/310, Annex I, November 1, 1977, pp. 53–54.

4. *Strongly condemns* the Israeli aggressive designs and policy of expansion as reiterated in the statements of the newly formed Israeli Government;

5. *Strongly condemns*, once more, the alliance between Israel and the racist régimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and invites all Member States to be vigilant against the dangers of this alliance;

6. *Calls on OAU Member States* to step up their diplomatic, economic, political and military isolation of Israel and to support the just cause of the Palestinian people;

7. *Requests* the Administrative Secretary-General to follow up the developments on the two questions and present a report to the Thirtieth Session of the Council of Ministers.

## 126

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Hungary of Assistant Secretary General Ahmar of Syria<sup>122</sup>**

Budapest, July 10, 1977

Syria and the Socialist Popular Republic of Hungary estimate that the situation will always remain tight and explosive in the region of the Middle East because of the maintenance of the Israeli occupation and of the obstinate attitude of Israel, which refuses to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and also because of the maneuvers of imperialistic centres and their agents, such maneuvers having led to the complication of the Middle East affair and to the adjournment of its settlement, which in other respects threatens the world peace.

The two parties proclaim that the just and lasting peace of the Middle East is possible on the basis of the complete retreat of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and of the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including its right of self-determination and foundation of its independent homeland.

The two parties affirm their determination to pursue their cooperation in order to attain a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, insisting at the same time on the great importance of a unified Arab attitude and of the consolidation of

the Arab solidarity against the attempts of Israel and imperialistic forces to torpedo the unity of the standing of Arab States for weakening their struggle against the Israeli aggression.

The two parties expressed their satisfaction as for the normalization of the situation in Lebanon and for the efforts made for the reestablishment of peace and security on the Lebanese territories and for the protection of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

The two parties underline the necessity of holding the Conference of Geneva as soon as possible with the participation of PLO and all the interested parties. They have in this respect underlined the importance of the role the USSR should play in preparation for the meeting of Geneva Conference.

The communique, which underlines that the visit paid to Hungary by the Socialist Arab Baath Party has contributed to the reinforcement of friendly relations between the two parties, the two countries and the two peoples, announces that a delegation of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party of Workers is to visit Syria by the invitation of the delegation of the Socialist Arab Baath Party and that the date of such visit will be fixed later on.

## 127

**Press conference by US President Carter discussing the forthcoming visit to the US by Prime Minister Begin of Israel and the nature of a Palestinian entity<sup>123</sup>**

Washington, July 12, 1977

*Q. Mr. President, with Mr. Begin coming to visit, I'd like to ask a question about the Middle East, a two-part question.*

*When you talk about the necessity for a Palestinian homeland, are you thinking of locating that homeland in territory that at one time was Palestine, or in your mind, could it be located anywhere?*

*The second part of the question is: Do you still believe, as you said a few weeks ago, that Israel eventually must withdraw with only minor changes to the pre-1967 borders?*

<sup>122</sup> English text, *Flash* (Damascus), no. 63 (August 1977), pp. 16-17.

<sup>123</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVIII, 1989 (August 8, 1977), pp. 176-177.

4. I have not changed my opinion since the earlier statements that I made concerning the general outline of terms to be sought at a possible Geneva conference.

We have never tried to define geographical boundaries for a so-called Palestinian entity. My own preference, which I have expressed since I've been President and also as a candidate, was that the Palestinian entity, whatever form it might take and whatever area it might occupy, should be tied in with Jordan and not be independent. But I don't have the authority nor the inclination to try to impose that preference on the parties that will negotiate.

I think that in his coming over here to our country next week, on the 19th, that Prime Minister Begin is trying to bring with him an open mind and an ability to go to a possible peace conference with all items being negotiable. He said this publicly, and he's also sent me private messages to that effect.

I've seen an inclination in the Middle East in recent days toward an alleviation of tension. I got a private message from President Sadat, for instance, that he is going to make every effort again to comply with the Sinai agreement.

He had a few extra troops in the territory that had been identified. He's withdrawing those. He authorized me to announce that he's returning will full military honors 19 Israeli bodies that had been left in Egypt. He's expressed his willingness to go to Geneva without prior commitments. He's had negotiations or talks lately with the King of Jordan, and they have agreed that the Palestinian entity ought to be tied in with Jordan.

So, there's a general inclination on all parties for success, but I don't think it's advisable now for me to get any more specific than I have in the past.

And although I haven't changed my position, I want to reemphasize that we are not going to go to the different nations involved and say, "This is an American plan. You've got to accept it as a precondition to going to Geneva. It's what we think would be fair." It's been deliberately general in nature, and the ultimate results would have to be agreed to by the Arab and Israeli nations.

128

**Statement by the White House describing the meeting between Prime Minister Begin of Israel and US President Carter<sup>124</sup>**

Washington, July 19, 1977

President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin met in the Cabinet Room for two hours. The meeting was also attended by the Vice President, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant Secretary of State [for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis, and William Quandt of the National Security Council staff on the American side; and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, Advisor to the Prime Minister Shmuel Katz, Minister of the Embassy of Israel Hanan Bar-On, Director of the Prime Minister's Bureau Yechiel Kadishai, Political Advisor to the Prime Minister Eli Mizrahi, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, and Advisor to the Prime Minister Yehuda Avner on the Israeli side.

The President began by repeating his personal pleasure at welcoming Prime Minister Begin to the White House so soon after his taking office last month. The President congratulated Mr. Begin once again on his accession to national leadership and expressed confidence that this first visit will inaugurate the close working relationship natural to the leaders of two democracies with such longstanding and deep ties of friendship. Their talks were conducted in the spirit of mutual respect common to that warm friendship between our two peoples. The President and Prime Minister agreed that their meeting and the others to follow here mark a good starting point for seeking ways toward a just and durable peace in the Middle East. They pledged their determination to achieve that peace, noting that imaginative and responsible statesmanship is essential to overcoming the challenges posed.

The meeting this morning was devoted to a thorough and searching discussion of how to move toward an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The President and Prime Minister

<sup>124</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1990, (August 15, 1977), pp. 201-202.

each developed their ideas on the issues involved. They agreed that all the issues must be settled through negotiations between the parties based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which all the governments directly concerned have accepted. They also agreed that this goal would best be served by moving rapidly toward the reconvening of the Geneva conference this year, keeping in mind at the same time the importance of careful preparation.

In this connection, they focused on the practical requirements for convening the conference, looking toward Secretary of State Vance's forthcoming trip to the area for more talks with all the leaders involved. They expressed a hope that the Prime Minister's visit will help lay the groundwork for rapid movement toward negotiations.

In the course of the talk this morning on the diplomacy of peace, the President reaffirmed the enduring American commitment to the security and well-being of Israel. He assured the Prime Minister that any differences that may occur from time to time should not be allowed to obscure America's and his personal dedication to this historic American commitment. He asked the Prime Minister to express to the people of Israel the determination of the people of the United States to help them find true peace, Discussions on how to get negotiations started between the parties will continue this afternoon in the Prime Minister's meeting with Secretary Vance. No bilateral issues were discussed at this first meeting. The President and Prime Minister will meet again tonight at the working dinner which the President is giving at the White House, and in the Cabinet Room again tomorrow morning at 10.

## 129

### **Statement by US Department of State spokesman Hodding Carter deploring Israel's decision to legalize three West Bank settlements**<sup>125</sup>

Washington, July 26, 1977

We have been in touch with the Israel Government about the report [of the settlements], and it has informed us that it is taking action to give

legal status to three existing settlements on the West Bank. It is our understanding that the former government had refused to legalize at least one of these settlements.

We have consistently made clear, including in our recent talks in Washington, our view that the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories is not only contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention but also constitutes an obstacle to progress in the peacemaking process.

We are deeply disappointed by this development.

## 130

### **Speech by Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the Knesset replying to US criticism of the legalization of Jewish settlements in the West Bank**<sup>126</sup>

Jerusalem, July 27, 1977

I want—against the background of the decision adopted yesterday by the ministerial committee for settlement affairs, according to which Elon Moreh, Ofra and Ma'aleh-Edumim were given recognition—I want announce the Government's position relating to the announcement of the Secretary of State. He said yesterday that the settlements are against international law. With all due respect, I would tell the Secretary of State that this is an unfounded accusation. The State of Israel maintains the international law, should someone use as his base the Geneva treaty of 1949, a treaty aimed at defending the civilian population in conquered areas, I must say the following. First, Jewish settlement does not at all harm the Arabs in Eretz Yisrael. We have not expropriated, nor will we expropriate, land from any Arab. The decision adopted yesterday applies to three existing settlements. No Arab land was expropriated for the establishment of these settlements. They are existing settlements.

It is true that the previous Government had doubts concerning one settlement, namely Elon Moreh, and that from time to time it issued announcements to the effect that the settlers there will perhaps not be able to remain on their land.

<sup>126</sup> Broadcast on Israel radio in Hebrew; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5575/A/1-2; reprinted by permission. See doc. above for US State Department statements.

<sup>125</sup> Text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, July 27, 1977, p. 1.



However, the position of the new Government differs from that of the previous one on this matter. We think that Jews have every right to be in Elon Moreh...

I want, in the name of the Israeli Government, to express deep regret about the deep disappointment with the announcement by the Secretary of State. The announcement had no justification. In our talks we did not leave any room for doubt regarding our basic position about settlement in Eretz Yisrael. We do not want to leave any room for doubt today either and therefore I have said what I have said. True, on the matter of settlement there are differences of opinion between the US Government and Israel's Government. The differences in opinion were not hatched yesterday, they have existed since the six-day war...

There is a possible question, of course. Will the Arab states insist of the participation of the organization called the PLO at the Geneva conference. We have made our position clear. We have left no doubt about the nature of our position. However, we accepted that Egypt and Syria may intentionally demand that this organization of murderers take part in the new session of the Geneva conference and, therefore, we had to think about an alternative in case these Arab countries insist on and demand the participation of the PLO in the Geneva conference. If they demonstrate stubbornness on this matter, if they insist on the PLO participating in the Geneva conference, they will render the convening of the new session of the conference impossible.

What is the alternative then? We made two alternative proposals to the US Government: (a) We agree that the US Government should use its good offices in all the capitals concerned, namely, Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman, Damascus and, if we add Lebanon, Beirut, in order to set up the mixed committees, either three of four committee as I have mentioned—these committees will conduct the negotiations on a peace treaty; (b) the other possibility is holding the proximity talks as proposed to us by the United States in 1972. We agree that the United States will provide its good offices so that these talks may be held. Again, in the framework of these talks there will be negotiations about a peace treaty.

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**Press conference statements by US President Carter regretting Israel's legalization of the West Bank settlements and reviewing his attitude to the Middle East (excerpts)<sup>127</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1977

*Q. Mr. President, in your view, did the Israeli embrace of the three settlements on the West Bank diminish in any way the prospects for a negotiated settlement in that part of the world?*

A. Yes. I think that any move toward making permanent the settlements in the occupied territories or the establishment of new settlements obviously increases the difficulty in ultimate peace.

It's not an insurmountable problem. The matter of legalizing existing settlements was a subject that was never discussed by me or Prime Minister Begin. My own concern was with the establishment of new settlements. And I let him know very strongly that this would be a matter that would cause our own government deep concern.

This matter of settlements in the occupied territories has always been characterized by our government—by me and my predecessors—as an illegal action. But I think that the establishment of new territories [settlements] or the recognition of existing territories [settlements] to be legal, both provide obstacles to peace, obstacles which I think we can overcome, by the way.

*Q. I'd like to go back to the Mideast, if I may. Some people believe that in your meetings with Mr. Begin, Mr. Begin came away with sort of the best of it. They think that you rather embraced him to the extent that our leverage with Israel has now been reduced. Would you comment on that, and would you also tell us what you think now the prospects for peace versus another war are in the Mideast?*

A. After I met with President Sadat and King Hussein and President Asad, there were major outcries in Israel and among the American Jewish community that I had overly embraced

<sup>127</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1991 (August 22, 1977), pp. 221–224.

the Arab cause. And I think now that Mr. Begin has visited me, there's a concern we have overly embraced the Israeli cause. Obviously, when these leaders come to see me or when I go to see them, there is an effort to understand one another, to have a base of comprehension and consultation that can provide hope for the future.

Our position on the Middle East has been very carefully spelled out to the degree of specificity that I choose. We've always made it clear that, ultimately, the agreement had to be approved and mutually beneficial to the Israelis and also their Arab neighbours as well.

I think that we have a good chance to go to Geneva. There are obstacles still to be resolved. I hope that every leader involved directly in the discussions—the four major countries there—will join with us and the cochairman of the prospective conference—the Soviet Union—in restraining their statements, not being so adamant on issues, and trying to cool down the situation until all can search out common ground, and then hope to minimize the differences.

Secretary Vance will leave this weekend to visit the three Arab nations plus Saudi Arabia, and then come back through Israel as well.<sup>128</sup> When he returns to the United States after about a week or so, we'll have a clearer picture of the differences that still divide the countries.

I think the major stumbling block at this point is the participation in the negotiations by the Palestinian representatives. Our position has been that they ought to be represented and that we will discuss with them these elements that involve the Palestinians and other refugees at the time they forego their commitment, presently publicly espoused, that Israel should be destroyed. But until the Palestinian leaders adopt the proposition that Israel is a nation, that it will be a nation permanently, that it has a right to live in peace—until that happens, I see no way that we would advocate participation by them in the peace negotiations.

But these matters are still very fluid. What gives me hope is that I believe that all national leaders with whom I've talked genuinely want to go to Geneva to try to work out permanent peace. That's the primary basis for my optimism. But it's difficult, and past statements by these leaders

when they were at war, or in the status of prospective war, have been very rigid and very adamant and sometimes abusive and filled with hatred and distrust. We're trying to get them to change from those positions of distrust to one of genuine search for peace.

I think it's accurate to say, in closing my answer, that both sides now have at least a moderate amount of confidence in us, and I've tried to take a balanced position to enhance that trust in us. If I should ever take a biased position on the part of one of the parties, then the other parties would simply forego any dependence upon us.

So, I'm very careful in my statements—privately and publicly—to be consistent and also to be fair.

*Q. Could I follow up on that, Mr. President? I believe you said just a moment ago that Mr. Begin gave you no advance hint of this action that he took this week on the settlements. You said that you discussed future settlements? Can you tell us what he said about that? Is he going to encourage new settlements there, and what did you tell him about that?*

A. Mr. Begin did not give me any promise about his action on the settlement question. I did describe to him our longstanding position on the settlements, which I've already outlined, and told him that this was a major item of potential differences between Israel and the Arab countries and my strong hope that nothing would be done by the Israeli Government in establishing new settlements that might exacerbate an already difficult position.

He listened to me very carefully. He said this was a major political issue in Israel, that in many instances he and his opposition, political parties in Israel, felt the same about it, but that he was certainly aware of our concern. But he did not give me any commitments about what he would do.

And to answer the other part of your question, he did not give me any prior notice that they were going to recognize the legality of the settlements involved.

*Q. Mr. President, isn't there a basic conflict between all the talk of progress we heard around here during the Begin visit and at the time he left, and the first action that he took upon returning to Israel and the rejection of the idea that we could have any influence over what moves he might make to the West Bank settlements?*

A. Well, I think it's not fair to overly criticize

<sup>128</sup> See docs. 134, 136 below.

Prime Minister Begin. The fact is that under the previous Mapai coalition—the labor government—that settlements have been built there, a fairly large number. The number of people involved is quite small. And this is not a new thing. I think it would be a mistake to overemphasize it or to exaggerate the significance of it. We feel that any restraint that Prime Minister Begin might want to exert on this subject would certainly be contributory toward peace.

I think he's in a position now of great strength in Israel. I think that his voice would be honored by the Israeli people. But he, like myself, has run on campaign commitments, and I think he's trying to accommodate the interest of peace as best he can. That doesn't mean that the settlements are right, but I think it would not be proper to castigate him unnecessarily about it because he's continuing policies that have been extant in Israel for a long time. And the Israeli Government has never claimed that these settlements are permanent. What they have done is to say that they are legal at the present time.

I think that that's all I know about the subject, and that's certainly all that I'm going to say now.

*Q. Mr. President, at the risk of going back over well-plowed ground, I'd like to ask you why it is that you did not ask Mr. Begin what his plans were concerning the existing settlements on the West Bank, and more specifically, were you led to believe from your own studies in advance of those talks that he was not going to take this action?*

*A.* I hate to admit it to you, but I did not think about raising the subject of recognizing the legality of those settlements. The item that I wanted to discuss with him—and I did—both in the public meeting with Cabinet members and also privately upstairs in the White House, was the establishment of new settlements. And I pointed out to him, as I've said earlier, that I thought the establishment of new settlements would be a very difficult thing for public opinion to accept, both here and in the Arab countries, and that if—he pointed out to me that new settlers, as a result of his campaign statements and those of his opponents, were eager to go into the area—I don't think it's violating any confidence to tell you what I said, and that was that I thought it would be easier for us to accept an increase in

the population of existing settlements than it would be to accept the establishment of new settlements. But I did not think about talking to him concerning the granting of legal status to those settlements. It was an oversight which never was discussed.

## 132

**Press interview statements by President Giscard d'Estaing of France discussing a Middle East peace settlement<sup>129</sup>**

Paris, late July, 1977

*Q. You said at the beginning of the year that 1977 would be the year of peace in the Mideast. Do you still feel that way?*

*A.* I felt things would be ripe in 1977 because evolutionary processes had defined the essential elements of an over-all solution. Certain tough problems remained but they were very limited in scope and could be taken care of in a negotiation. Provided the over-all perception were spelled out clearly, no one would have an interest in dragging his heels. Once you have a consensus on Israel's territorial integrity and security, as we indeed have, there is no reason for Israel to delay any longer. Now the essential problem is to avoid a loss of momentum and to translate what is now a consensus about a settlement into reality.

*Q. What is the consensus?*

*A.* The need to establish a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank, to restore the territories occupied in 1967 and, for the Arabs, to establish real peace and normal relations with Israel. What is difficult to understand is why Israeli opinion does not comprehend that if real peace is achieved, the entire Mideast situation would be transformed. Instead, they seem to believe that even with real peace, as was achieved between France and Germany after World War II, the situation would be the same as today—only worse. Real peace, on the contrary, would give Israel more security than its present beleaguered-state status.

*Q. If I read you correctly, the nine Common Market countries have adopted Israel's definition of real peace and the Arab position on the 1967 frontiers?*

<sup>129</sup> Excerpted from the partial text of the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (New York-International edition), July 18, 1977, pp. 13-14.

A. Yes, that sums it up. That's why I feel the two positions are negotiable. The Arab position on 1967 borders is unimpeachable. The war of 1967 was not a war of conquest designed to annex Arab territories. It was a defensive war against a threat of asphyxiation and the occupation was designed to bring the Arabs around to the realization that real peace was the only solution. And this the Arabs are now willing to negotiate.

*Q. Wouldn't a PLO-run West Bank Palestinian state be yet another radical, Marxist state—and a destabilizing factor in the Middle East area? Do you see a possibility of any other solution for a Palestinian homeland? Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin and his friends seem to think that the solution lies on the East Bank, which they say is already 60 per cent Palestinian.*

A. We share the same interest as Israel and its neighboring moderate Arab states in making sure that no such destabilizing factor arises. In any event, such a Palestinian homeland would be enclaved and disarmed and hemmed in between important countries which are all equally anxious to prevent a hotbed of instability in their midst. But one cannot impose in advance, as some are insisting, that such a homeland must be linked to Jordan. What would happen then if, for example, six months later the local assembly on the West Bank—because it will want to be an autonomous state—decided to sever its connection with Amman on the East Bank. We would have another crisis on our hands. That's why it must be created as a viable autonomous entity right from the start—one which can then decide, if it so wishes, to establish special links with Jordan.

*Q. Another Middle East war would be catastrophic for West Europe's economies and perhaps hasten the advent of popular-front governments. So why don't the European powers take a more active part in promoting a settlement?*

A. That was the consensus in London<sup>130</sup> and we plan to do just that.

*Q. In coordination with the U.S.?*

A. Our policies will not be identical because relations between the U.S. and various Middle Eastern countries are not exactly the same as our own special links in the area. But there is definitely room for coordination.

**Memorandum from US President Carter to US Secretary of State Vance finding that the sale of defence equipment to Egypt will promote world peace<sup>131</sup>**

Washington, August 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

*Subject: Eligibility of Egypt for the Purchase of Defense Articles and Defense Services Under the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended*

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 3 (a) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, I hereby find that the sale to Egypt of defense articles and defense services will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this finding to the Congress.

This finding further amends Presidential Determination No. 73-10 of January 2, 1973 (38 F.R. 7211), as amended by Presidential Determinations No. 73-12 of April 26, 1973 (38 F.R. 12799), No. 74-9 of December 13, 1973 (39 F.R. 3537), No. 75-2 of October 29, 1974 (39 F.R. 39863), No. 75-21 of May 20, 1975 (40 F.R. 24889), No. 76-1 of August 5, 1975 (40 F.R. 37205), No. 76-12 of April 14, 1976 (41 F.R. 18281), and No. 77-5 of November 5, 1976 (41 F.R. 50625), and supersedes Presidential Determination No. 76-11 of March 25, 1976 (41 F.R. 14163). It shall be published in the *Federal Register*.  
cc: The Secretary of Defense.

[SIGNED] JIMMY CARTER

**JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION ON THE ELIGIBILITY OF EGYPT TO PURCHASE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, AS AMENDED**

Section 3 (a) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), requires, as a condition of eligibility for the purchase of defense articles or defense services from the United States under the Act, that the President find that the furnishing of defense articles and

<sup>130</sup> See doc. 120 above.

<sup>131</sup> Presidential determination no. 77-71; from a photocopy of the original memorandum.

services to the country concerned "will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace."

Egyptian President Sadat has taken major steps toward a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict and away from the possibility of further war and bloodshed. He has moved decisively to reduce Egypt's dependence on the USSR and desires to devote Egypt's resources to economic and social development.

The United States supports President Sadat's desires for a negotiated peace settlement in the Middle East. As a small part of our overall relationship with the Government of Egypt, to support its determination and ability to continue to contribute to the forward movement of the Middle East peace process, and to give Egypt a partial alternative to the USSR, it is important to the interests of the United States that Egypt become eligible to purchase reasonable amounts of defense articles and services from the United States. The sale of defense articles and services will strengthen the confidence of Egyptians in the United States, as well as in their own government. This eligibility will further the close relationship between the two countries and encourage Egypt to continue the moderate policies it has been pursuing.

This finding of eligibility does not, in itself, determine that defense articles and defense services will be sold. Each request for a sale will be subject to careful review in light of United States policy and statutory requirements. Sales will be approved only when they are consistent with law and found to be in accord with United States policy objectives.

### 134

#### **Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing the gap in the negotiating positions of Israel and the Arab countries and the prospects for a Geneva conference<sup>132</sup>**

Amman, August 6, 1977

*Q. You, a long time ago, defined the "core issues." The short version of the issues are Palestinians, withdrawal, and definition of peace. Having completed almost a week now, can you give us any idea if the two sides are any closer together on any or all of those issues?*

*A. I think I can see some narrowing of differences on the issues of the nature of peace.*

*On the Palestinian question, at this moment, I do not see any narrowing of differences between the parties. But I have not yet, I would caution, been to Israel, so it is too early to give any definite answer. On the basis of what we heard in Washington, I would say there has been no narrowing of the issue.*

*Q. Can you say anything about the third—territory?*

*A. On the question of territory there have been indications by the Israelis that they are prepared to negotiate on the question of borders, but as to how far they would be prepared to go into such negotiations, they have said that is a question for the negotiations and one which they do not wish to discuss in advance of the negotiations. The Arab position is clear on this issue and that is that there should be withdrawal from all occupied territories.*

*Q. As it stands now, what is going to happen in New York during the General Assembly session? Is there going to be some kind of consultation or a continuation of these talks you've been having?*

*A. I would hope very much that there would be a continuation of the talks which I have been having with the individual parties in New York during the General Assembly. From the conversations I have had to date, I believe that there will be such bilateral talks that I can have with each of the parties during the General Assembly session.*

*Q. But nothing that you would have described the other night as a "working group"?*

*A. I don't see anything as formal as a working group, although I haven't, again, completed all of my visits. It is clear from what President Assad said that he does not support something as formal as a working group. On the other hand, he has indicated that he supports wholeheartedly discussions between his Foreign Minister and me with respect to the issues which may remain to be resolved and the preparations for a Geneva conference and, indeed, has indicated that he would like to see those intensified.*

*Q. In view of the extraordinarily important American role in negotiating and mediating the Middle East conflict and in view of the situation, which you yourself stated many times, that the Palestinian issue is one of the core of the factors, isn't it something of a contradiction for*

<sup>132</sup> Department of State Bulletin (Washington), LXXVII, 1944 (September 12, 1977), pp. 335-339.

*the United States not to talk to the PLO until they recognize the Israelis, in view of the fact that you are trying to get Geneva without any preconditions? Now isn't this a precondition?*

A. Insofar as the United States is concerned, I think our position is well known and clear on this. At the time of Sinai II<sup>133</sup> the United States stated that it would not have discussions with the PLO as long as it refused to recognize the right of Israel to exist. That commitment exists, and until that impediment is removed, we will be bound by that commitment.

*Q. Will you please elaborate on your point that you think you have narrowed the differences on the nature of the peace question? And also, did you make any progress on the procedural question of representation at Geneva?*

A. With respect to the first question—will I be more precise on the narrowing of the differences—I don't want to be any more precise at this point on that. There has, in my judgment, been some narrowing of differences. But that would get me into what the views of various parties are with respect to this issue. I have said before that I am not going to disclose the positions of the various parties on this issue or any other issue while I am in the process of trying to act as intermediary. Your second question was what?

*Q. It was on the procedural question at Geneva—who would be seated? Have you made any progress on that?*

A. I would say among the parties that I have talked to, I find some progress although there are still differences among those parties. I still have two other stops to make, and again it would be premature to try and draw any conclusion. The differences or the narrowing is small at this point, but there has been some degree of agreement on how this might be attacked.

*Q. You're on this trip in part because it's necessary for you to talk to chiefs of government in order to get the view of what policies are and what flexibility might exist. How can the Foreign Minister's meetings in New York in any way close the gaps that might exist?*

A. I think as a result of these discussions it has been possible for me to get down to concrete exploration of substantive issues, the nature of those issues, and the possible resolution of those issues. I think it is now clear in each of the states that I

have visited what it is we feel would be helpful in further dealing with those issues. Therefore, I think it will be possible for the heads of government to give instructions to their Foreign Ministers or to communicate with us between now and that time in a fashion which will give us a clearer and more precise understanding of the position of each of these countries on those various issues.

Let me emphasize that during the talks which I have had, most of the time has been spent on substantive questions, not on procedural questions. And I expect that to be the fact during the balance of my trip.

*Q. You talk about the commitment made during Sinai II about the United States not dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization because of such and such. You refer to it as something that the Carter Administration inherited from the Ford Administration—or was it Nixon's, I'm not sure on this point. My question is, do you feel that commitment is correct or do you feel that this is a commitment you've inherited?*

A. It is a commitment. Our country made it, and we will adhere to it.

*Q. What is your appraisal of your talks with His Majesty in Amman?*

A. The talks were very constructive. I found His Majesty, as always, very wise and thoughtful. He had very constructive suggestions to make to us as to how we might grapple with some of these problems, particularly those respecting a Palestinian entity. Of course, we covered in detail the other core issues as well. I really was heartened by the discussions which I had today and yesterday with His Majesty.

*Q. Do you feel now that it is possible to renew Geneva with formal U.S. participation now or in October or even by the end of this year—which was the original objective of the Administration?*

A. Let me just say on the October date, I think the October date came about because one head of government suggested October, and another one said that would be fine. October was never accepted by all the parties as a date on which to begin it. We have said all along that we thought it would be possible to convene a Geneva conference in the fall of 1977. I still would believe and hope that it may be possible to convene a Geneva conference in the fall.

But there is a lot to be done between now and

<sup>133</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

then, and what we have to do is to intensify our effort for discussion among the parties by our talking to each of them. We must intensify that process so that we can build a more complete base for going to Geneva. If we went to Geneva with too shallow a base, there is always the danger that you might run into an immediate stalemate. If we can prevent this by taking a little more time, then we should do it, and that is a course I think we should follow.

*Q. It has been reported from Paris that you came with a new American proposal. How true is that? Is it true in full or in part? What are your comments on that?*

A. I made a number of suggestions in my discussions at the palace on a large number of issues, mostly substantive issues. Those comments and suggestions are similar to those which I raised with each of the other heads of government whom I have visited.

So the answer is, yes, I did come with specific suggestions which were discussed with His Majesty.

*Q. From what we have heard from the leaders of the various countries, there is a major problem in that the Government, at least up to now, seems to want to go to Geneva and negotiate an agreement there. Whereas from what we've heard on this trip, it seems that, at least in Syria and in Jordan, the heads of government want an agreement to be virtually worked out at least in principle before going to Geneva.*

The question is, at one time the United States, I think, shared that view of having a preagreement in a sense before Geneva. Where do you stand now and is this a correct interpretation of the various positions?

A. I think it is correct that Israel would like to see negotiations, except on procedural questions, be resolved at Geneva.

With respect to the Arab states which I have visited, most of them would like to see as much of the substantive matters be resolved as is possible. I, myself, believe that the more that can be resolved, the better off we will be and the less likelihood that we will run into snags and obstacles which will delay progress when one gets to Geneva.

*Q. The status of the West Bank seems to be a little bit confused. I would like to ask a two-part question. What is the official U.S. view on the reestablishment of the West Bank? Two, when you visit Israel and the occupied territories in a couple of day's time, will you talk to some of the mayors of the West Bank who have*

*expressed an interest in meeting you?*

A. Our position on the West Bank has been stated many, many times and it remains as it was. On the question of whether I will meet with any of the mayors on the West Bank, I am told that the mayors do not wish to meet with me, but wish to send me a memorandum expressing their views.<sup>134</sup> I will, of course, be happy to receive that.

*Q. When you say, as you did in the question before that, you think the more that can be resolved in advance the better off, and you say the Arabs certainly want this, aren't you undercutting—and I use the word advisedly—aren't you undercutting Israel's interest in direct negotiations? Because with all the things decided beforehand through you, Israel isn't deciding these things directly with the Arab confrontation states as they wish to.*

A. No, I think that the Israelis—and they shall have to speak for themselves on this—would also welcome our doing what we can to narrow the issues. And if we can in this process narrow the issues, they certainly would accept that. There are many of the issues which we ultimately will not be able to narrow but must be negotiated by the parties themselves. That's been clear since the outset and remains so.

*Q. You spoke earlier of the King helping you with your ideas on formation of a Palestinian entity, as well as four other issues. What were the other four issues?*

A. The other issues were the question of borders and withdrawals and the question of Palestinian representation. And indeed, also, his suggestions in connection with the nature of peace were helpful as well.

*Q. After we left Alexandria, Mr. Arafat came around to talk to President Sadat and a paragraph was added to President Sadat's proposal, as we understand it, referring to right of return or compensation or repatriation. To what extent does that change President Sadat's proposals as far as you're concerned? Does it keep his proposals alive anymore at all or, for all intents and purposes, is the working group dead? What is basically your reaction to the addition of that proposal, that paragraph?*

A. Insofar as the question "is the working group dead," again this is a question that the Arabs are going to have to take up among themselves.

<sup>134</sup> Doc. 258 below.

I am going to have to raise it with the Israelis when I go to Israel. But I do think—and I want to emphasize this again—that all of them are saying, whether or not you have a working group, they all agree that we have to intensify the discussions in preparation for a Geneva conference, discussions which will try to come to grips with the substantive issues as well as the procedural issues and that they are all willing to cooperate in that kind of preparation. I think the problem arises in whether or not the working group creates too formal a structure.

*Q. But does the paragraph of additions change anything as far as you are concerned?*

A. I have not read the exact language of the paragraph, and so I don't want to comment.

*Q. What do you mean "by the fall" when you say you hope the Geneva conference will be convened?*

A. Sometime before the end of the year.

*Q. Secondly, if it proves, as a result of your talks here in the fall, that there is still a wide gap between the parties on the procedure of getting to Geneva or on some of the substantive matters that ought really to be narrowed before Geneva starts, would the United States consider stating its view of what a fair settlement would be, either to the parties in private or stating it publicly, if you felt that this could move things along?*

A. I think that the United States would be willing to suggest its views, as we are doing now, as to what we believe are fair suggestions with respect to the various issues. We are doing it right now, and we would be prepared to continue that in the future.

*Q. One, are you going to come back to revisit all of the Arab capitals after you leave Israel? Another question, totally unrelated—*

A. I thought you already knew the answer to that. I've read in the paper that you all said I was going to do that.

*Q. I haven't heard you say it though.*

A. Yes. I will be going back on my last day to Amman, to Damascus, and to Alexandria on my way to London.

*Q. The other question, is France trying to get a new version of Resolution 242 in the Security Council?*

A. I haven't heard of it if they are.

*Q. Does the question of compensation and repatriation*

*enter into the play of negotiations at this stage?*

A. That is an issue which has been raised in my conversations with the heads of government.

*Q. Can we regard that old General Assembly [sic] resolution having validity in this context?*

A. The question has been raised in even a broader context than that.

*Q. Does the old resolution hold some weight?*

A. It holds some weight.

*Q. Does the United States support the idea of return or compensation, and if so, do you have any ideas on where the compensation might come from?*

A. That is a question that we have looked into over a number of times during the years. As you know, it's been investigated several times. There are positions that the United States has taken with respect to that issue in the past. It is an issue, I think, that will probably have to be dealt with in connection with any settlement. I don't wish to go further than that at this point.

*Q. I would like to know if a person in your position sincerely believes in the good intentions of Prime Minister Begin?*

A. Yes, I accept the good intentions of all of the chiefs of state.

*Q. One of the elements of Resolutions 242 and 338, which is the most controversial among the Arabs in the confrontation states especially, is the fact that it refers to the Palestinians as a refugee problem. Suppose the situation were to arise that the entry of the PLO, or any other Palestinian organization, into the negotiating process at Geneva would have to include changing that wording and putting in its place wording that would treat the Palestinians as a national issue. What would the U.S. position be on that?*

A. We have always indicated that we think that the problem is a broader problem than a refugee problem.

*Q. It has been suggested that the Israeli Government will offer the kibbutzim and the Israeli settlements as compensation for the Palestinian refugees in case there is any withdrawal of the West Bank, as part of the settlement and as part of the compensation. What are your comments on that?*

A. First of all, I don't know whether that is, in fact, their position and a position which they will put forward. They have not yet expressed their position to us with respect to what they are or



are not prepared to do with respect to the West Bank. And I don't want to jump to conclusions in taking pieces that are reported to be fact. I want to wait and get firsthand from Mr. Begin what he is prepared to say with respect to this issue.

## 135

**Press conference statements by US President Carter calling for PLO acceptance of UN resolution 242<sup>135</sup>**

Plains, August 8, 1977

*Q. There's encouraging news out of the Middle East this morning. Any comment on the reports of the PLO?*

*A.* No. We don't know yet what's going to happen until I get a complete report from Cy Vance—I get a message from him every night and then a briefing every morning. If the Palestinians will recognize the applicability of the U.N. Resolution 242, then it would open up a new opportunity for us to start discussions with them and also open up an avenue that they might participate in the Geneva conference. But whether they'll do that, we don't know yet.

*Q. If indeed they do recognize 242, wouldn't that more or less assure that the Geneva conference will indeed begin?*

*A.* I can't answer that question because there might be other obstacles to it. But I think I can be able to answer that question when Secretary Vance gets back. He's now decided, I think, to talk with some of the leaders in the Middle East. So, this might be an encouraging sign.

*Q. He would go back to the other Arab countries again?*

*A.* Either go back or have additional conversations with them before he leaves the Middle East. And he's going to stay over in London an extra day to talk to President Nyerere about Rhodesia and Namibia. So, I think things look better than they did. I hope we can work something out on the Palestinians. That is the biggest obstacle right now.

*Q. What about prospects for a Geneva conference in October? Still good?*

*A.* Well, I'd say they are about the same as they were. The biggest obstacle that we've detected, of course, is whether or not the Palestinians would participate in the discussions. And our position has been that until the Palestinians and their leaders recognize Israel's right to exist that we would not have conversations with them ourselves.

So, if the Palestinians do adopt as a basis for the discussions the U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, then that would certainly make it easier for them to go—

*Q. Have we had any contact with the Palestinians formally—informally to indicate their position?*

*A.* I think a better word would be indirectly. We've not had any direct conversations with them. But, of course, they are sending us messages though the Syrians and the Saudi Arabians, the Jordanians and the Egyptians.

So, we have a means to contact them and to exchange ideas with them indirectly. But we are not going to meet with the Palestinian leaders as long as they are committed to the destruction of Israel.

*Q. What were they saying, indirectly?*

*A.* That they may adopt U.N. Resolution 242, which does recognize Israel's right to exist permanently and in peace with secure borders.

The thing that has made the Palestinians reluctant to do this is, at the time 242 was passed, it only referred to Palestinians as refugees. And if the Palestinians should say, "We recognize U.N. Resolution 242 in its entirety, but we think the Palestinians have additional status other than just refugees," that would suit us okay.

<sup>135</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1995 (September 19, 1977), pp. 379–380.

## 136

**Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Vance admitting to indirect contacts between the US and the PLO<sup>136</sup>**

**Taif, August 9, 1977**

*Secretary Vance:* I want to thank His Majesty King Khalid, Prince Fahd, His Royal Highness the Foreign Minister for their generous hospitality to me and my colleagues during our stay in Taif. We benefited greatly from their wise insight into the difficult problem of a Middle East settlement.

As Prince Sa'ud indicated to you, we have discussed at length both substantive and procedural matters relating to a Middle East settlement. As a result of these discussions I feel that we have made progress. I conveyed to His Majesty and their Royal Highnesses President Carter's undiminished commitment to search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and we shall work together in a cooperative and constructive fashion with our Saudi Arabian colleagues and the other parties to achieve this end.

I might say that I believe that the nature of our discussion was both excellent and extremely constructive, and I am most appreciative of the time that was given to us by His Majesty and by the Crown Prince, so as to enable us to devote the necessary effort to probing deeply these fundamental questions.

*Q. Is the United States in contact with the PLO?*

*A.* We have no direct contact with the PLO. We are informed by the various Arab parties as to the positions of the PLO and have been so informed as we have proceeded through my visit.

*Q. Do you have indirect contact? Is the United States asking, for example, Saudi Arabia to communicate messages either in request of substance or clarification directly to the PLO?*

*A.* We have had indirect contact.

*Q. Would the United States be willing, in exchange for Palestinian recognition of Resolution 242, to guarantee or at least to assure what is commonly called Palestinian national rights?*

*A.* It is premature to answer that question. We'll wait and see what happens.

*Q. Could you amplify on your reply about the United States having indirect contacts with the PLO? Of what nature and how extensive?*

We have heard views expressed with respect to the PLO through the various Arab countries, and we have asked questions of all the Arab parties as to what is meant by some of the things which have been reported.

*Q. Could you tell us what your understanding is now of what the PLO would be willing to do in terms of their accepting 242 or asking for a modification?*

*A.* I think the PLO had better speak for themselves.

*Q. Have you heard anything during your visit here that might make you optimistic, or more optimistic, that the PLO might be considering a change in its position on 242?*

*A.* I have heard some rumors that they may be considering such a change, but I have seen nothing concrete.

*Q. Is the United States moving away from its commitment not to deal with the PLO until they recognize 242 and, as you said last February in Jerusalem, revise the charter which calls for Israel's destruction; have you changed your mind about the double commitment?*

*A.* Well, actually, the double commitment is contained in 242 itself, because if one accepts 242, 242 provides for the fact that each state in the Middle East shall live in peace and within secure and recognized boundaries.

*Q. Well, how can the United States enter—presuming they [PLO] adopt 242—how can the United States enter into negotiation with a party which has sworn to destroy another country, which the covenant does?*

*A.* If the PLO were to accept 242, they would be accepting the principle that they recognize the right of Israel to exist in a state of peace within secure and recognized boundaries which, in my judgement, would revoke the covenant.

*Q. Has the PLO sent you such an assurance, or is that your interpretation of such an action?*

*A.* I have not received any such assurances.

<sup>136</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1944 (September 12, 1977), pp. 339–340. For statements by Foreign Minister Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia on the same occasion see doc. 261 below.

137

**Communiqué issued by the ambassador of Belgium to the EEC expressing the EEC's condemnation of Israeli settlements on the occupied West Bank<sup>137</sup>**

Brussels, August 19, 1977

Following the recent decision by the Israeli government to legalize three new settlements in the West Bank, the ambassador of Belgium approached the Israeli authorities on August 19, 1977 in the name of the nine countries of the European Community. In the spirit of the statement made on June 29, 1977, by the European Council, he conveyed the anxiety of the European governments over such a step and recalled the traditional position of the Nine on the issue as it has frequently been expressed at the United Nations.

138

**Resolution adopted by the US National Lawyers Guild recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and calling on Israel to withdraw from all occupied territory<sup>138</sup>**

Seattle, August 21, 1977

THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

*Be it resolved* that the National Lawyers Guild:

1. Calls for the cessation of all Israeli settlement in the occupied territories and effect a complete withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967.
2. Recognizes the right of self-determination and national independence for the Palestinian people.
3. Recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and its right to participate on an equal footing as a principal party in any discussion of the Palestinian Israeli conflict.
4. Recognizes the right of return or compensa-

<sup>137</sup> Translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the EEC.

<sup>138</sup> Adopted at the National Lawyers Guild convention; text as inserted by US Congressman McDonald (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (Daily), October 25, 1977, p. E6536.

tion for all Palestinians displaced or dispossessed in the creation of Israel in 1948 pursuant to the United Nations resolution No. 194.

5. Calls for the elimination in all the states in the Middle East of laws, institutions, regulations, and practices which have the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of religion, national or ethnic origin, sex or sexual orientation or race.

6. Calls on the Palestine Liberation Organization and the state of Israel to commit themselves to the exchange of mutual recognition between an independent sovereign Palestinian state and the state of Israel, and the development of a full program of peace between them.

139

**Press conference statements by US President Carter denying the legality of Israel's settlements in the West Bank and calling them an obstacle to peace<sup>139</sup>**

Washington, August 23, 1977

*Q. Twice in recent weeks the United States has said that Israel is in violation of international law in terms of the West Bank settlements, which some view as an annexation plan. My question is: What does the United States plan to do to protect the rights of the people in the occupied lands?*

*A. Well, it's been the position of our own government, long before I was elected President, that the West Bank territory, the Gaza Strip, areas of the Golan Heights, Sinai region—the occupied territories, in other words—were not a part of Israel. Our government has expressed on several occasions—the President, our Ambassadors to the United Nations, and otherwise—that settlement of Israeli citizens in some of these areas was in violation of the Geneva convention and that, therefore, the settlements were illegal.*

We have private assurances and there have been public statements made by Mr. Begin that these settlements were not intended to show that Israel was to occupy these territories permanently, that the final boundaries to be established through mutual agreement between Israel and the Arab

<sup>139</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1995 (September 19, 1977), p. 378.

countries was to be decided without prior commitment, and negotiations would include these areas.

So, at this time, our pointing out to Israel that these three settlements that were just established are illegal because they were made on occupied territory, is the extent of our intention.

I concur with the statement that was made by Secretary Vance—the State Department—that this kind of action on the part of Israel, when we are trying to put together a Middle Eastern conference leading to a permanent peace, creates an unnecessary obstacle to peace. I believe that our opinion is shared by the overwhelming number of nations in the world, but we don't intend to go further than our caution to Israel, our open expression of our own concern, and the identification of these settlements as being illegal.

*Q. But you don't feel that you have any leverage at all to move in any direction in terms of military aid to Israel to keep her from violating—*

*A. Obviously, we could exert pressure on Israel in other ways, but I have no intention to do so.*

#### 140

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Rumania of Prime Minister Begin of Israel<sup>140</sup>**

**Bucharest, August 30, 1977**

At the invitation of Comrade Manea Manescu, Prime Minister of the Rumanian government, Menahem Begin, Prime Minister of the State of Israel paid an official visit to the Socialist Republic of Rumania from 25 to 30 August 1977. During the visit, the Israeli Prime Minister was accompanied by Mrs. Aliza Begin, as well as by Ephraim Evron, director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yehiel Kadishai, director of the office of the Prime Minister and by other officials.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, received the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Mr. Menahem Begin, with whom he had talks on some aspects of the bilateral relations, as well as some present

day international problems, especially with regard to the settlement of the conflictual situation in the Middle East.

Expressing their known points of view, the two sides underlined the necessity of the establishment as soon as possible of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Both sides considered that although there were differences of opinions concerning the ways towards the settlements of the situation in the Middle East, it was essential to increase the efforts aiming at the instauration of a fair and durable peace in this area. Those differences of views in this matter should not affect the friendly relations between the two peoples.

Attending these talks were, on the Rumanian side, Comrades Manea Manescu, Prime Minister of the Rumanian government, and Gheorghe Macovescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the Israeli side Ephraim Evron, director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also present were Ion Covaci, ambassador of Rumania to the State of Israel, and Shamai Kahana, ambassador of Israel to Rumania.

The Prime Minister of the Rumanian government, Comrade Manea Manescu, and the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Menahem Begin, held official talks which took place in a relaxed atmosphere of complete sincerity. During these talks a wide exchange of information was carried out on the present-day preoccupations of the two countries in the economic, social and political fields. The Rumanian and Israeli Prime Ministers also had an exchange of views on the present stage and prospects of bilateral relations in various fields of common interest as well as on some international issues.

It was agreed that further action should be taken for the development of relations on the bilateral and international levels, in fields of common interest.

The Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Menahem Begin, as well as the persons accompanying him visited social and cultural objectives in Bucharest and in the Brasov county. The Israel Prime Minister laid a wreath at the monument of the heroes of the struggle for the freedom of the people and homeland for socialism. The Prime Minister of the Rumanian government gave an official dinner in honour of the Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

At the conclusion of the visit, the Prime Min-

<sup>140</sup> English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), August 31, 1977, p. 2.

ister Menahem Begin expressed sincere thanks to the Prime Minister Manea Manescu and to the Rumanian government for the reception afforded him during his official visit to Rumania.

The Prime Minister of the State of Israel invited the Prime Minister of the Rumanian government to pay an official visit to Israel. The invitation was accepted and the date of the visit is to be fixed subsequently through diplomatic channels.

#### 141

#### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of a delegation headed by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>141</sup>**

**Moscow, August 31, 1977**

A PLO delegation headed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat visited Moscow from August 29 until August 31. Arafat and the accompanying delegation were received by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

During the meetings, which were held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, detailed points of view were exchanged as regards the establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East, the guarantee of the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights and other major issues concerning the two parties.

Discussions pointed out the increasing danger threatening the peace issue in the Middle East due to continuous attempts by Israel and its benefactors to check all just peace settlements in the region and to undermine efforts to revive the Geneva Conference. Israel is furthermore distracting attention from this representative forum by all kinds of ideas on the discussion of Middle East problems without the participation of the representatives of the PLO and the Soviet Union. All this aims above all at weakening the Arab unified front, splitting the Arab countries and sidestepping the PLO in any negotiated peace settlement. At the same time, Israel seeks to impose a settlement which would enable her to annex the occupied Arab territories and thus deprive the Palestinian people from their legitimate rights, including the right to statehood and return.

It was reaffirmed that the recent developments of the situation in the Middle East and the neighbouring region make it evident that any overall settlement can only be achieved through a Geneva Peace Conference with the participation of all directly concerned parties, including the PLO, the recognized representative of the Palestinian people. For this in particular, the Soviet Union and the PLO have affirmed their determination to exert all possible efforts so that the Geneva Conference resumes its work in the near future.

Andrei Gromyko declared that the Soviet Union has, and will always stand alongside the just cause of the Palestinian people who are struggling for their national rights, freedom, and national independence and for the establishment of a just peace in this region. He re-stated the consistent policy of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the achievement of an overall and just settlement in the Middle East which should unequivocally guarantee the national and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self-determination, return and the establishment of their independent state in accordance with UN resolutions.

The stand of the Soviet Union has and will always be based on the belief that a stable peace in the Middle East cannot be realized without the liberation of all territories occupied in 1967 and the working out of a just solution to the Palestine problem.

Yasser Arafat reviewed the struggle of the Palestinian people for the realization of their national aspirations as well as the results of the recently held PLO Central Council meeting. Arafat also expressed his sincere thanks to the Soviet Union for its active and full support for the struggle of the Palestinian people. The two sides condemned the continued practice of establishing Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab lands as well as the decision of the Israeli authorities to extend Israeli laws to the Arab territories on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They also expressed serious concern over Israeli military provocations against Lebanon and attempts to interfere in Lebanese internal affairs, which tends to increase tension, especially in South Lebanon.

The two sides stressed the necessity of pursuing the struggle to efface the traces of Israeli aggression and to establish a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

Arafat extended to the people and leadership

<sup>141</sup> English text, *Wafa*, September 1, 1977, pp. 1-3.

of the Soviet Union his deep congratulations on behalf of the Palestinian people on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the great October Revolution which was an important international historic event in that it strengthened confidence in peoples' wars of liberation. Arafat asserted that strengthening ties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries is part of the principled policy of the PLO.

The two sides agreed to continue regular contacts and exchange of views as regards all issues which concern them.

Participating in the Palestinian-Soviet talks on the Palestinian side were:—Farouq Qaddoumi, PLO Executive Committee member and Head of the PLO Political Department; Zuheir Muhsin, PLO Executive Committee member and Head of the PLO Military Department; as well as PLO Executive Committee members Abdel Muhsin Abu Maizar, Yasser Abd Rabbo, Talal Naji, Nimr Saleh, member of the Fateh leadership, and PLO representative in Moscow Muhammad al-Sha'er.

## 142

**Communiqué issued by Yugoslavia denouncing Israel's actions in the occupied West Bank and Gaza (excerpt)<sup>142</sup>**

Belgrade, August 31, 1977

The new Israeli government's measures of extending Israeli law to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and establishing new settlements in these territories are arbitrary moves and a continuation of Israel's aggressive policy. These practices constitute a challenge to the international stand and UN resolutions and ignore the rights of the Palestinian people. They are also directed against all efforts to reach a just peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

Yugoslavia strongly condemns these aggressive acts and declares its full solidarity with the just struggle of the Arab countries and the PLO. At the same time it calls for a full and immediate Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied after 1967 and for a just and permanent solution to the prob-

lem, the key to which is the recovery by the Palestinian people of their national rights.

## 143

**Statement by Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel asserting that Middle East negotiations should proceed without any preconditions and without there being any need for territorial concessions by the Arabs<sup>143</sup>**

Jerusalem, September 1, 1977

Finally, I would like to set forth the government's policy in its broad outlines before the discussions that are due to take place in Washington. Israel's proposals and its specific goals as regards the issues that will be discussed in Washington—and I refer to the issues of substance, not of procedure—consist of two parts: First, there is a proposal for a formulation of a comprehensive peace agreement complete with all its provisions; secondly, there is a specification of our attitude in discussions and negotiations with respect to various issues. The second part, which is related to this attitude, includes three constituent elements. First, there is a review of the problems relating to the peace agreement between ourselves and each one of our neighbours, including such issues as Israel's security, a guarantee of the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Eilat and the Suez Canal, an expression of our nationalist and historic attachment to Judea and Samaria, safeguarding the sources of the Jordan River waters in the north and other topics of this nature. In other words, it is a review of the problems facing us seen from our point of view at a time when we will also be preparing for a peace agreement between ourselves and every single neighbouring Arab state.

The second element in this attitude is our policy towards and our proposals for solving these problems. The third element is the principle which maintains that negotiations should proceed without any prior condition. This principle does not only mean that each side does not commit the other

<sup>142</sup> Partial English translation as published in *Palestine* (Beirut), III, 13 (September 16, 1977), pp. 17–18.

<sup>143</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, first session, September 1, 1977, pp. 718–719.

to agree in advance to every condition, but it means rather, that all topics and issues are open to negotiation and that we shall undertake, with complete openness and sincerity, to hear, discuss and examine the proposals of the other parties. As an example, we believe that the settlement relating to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip must be based upon a common life between us and the Palestinian Arabs living in these territories, not on the basis of a partition of territory. But if the Arabs come forward with a proposal to partition this territory between us and them, we shall discuss their proposal and examine it so that we can later conclude whether we are ready to agree to their proposals or not.

As regards this particular example, I would like to tell the Knesset members that we have gone back and closely examined the positions of Jordan, the Arabs, the Palestinians and the USA and have not found in any of them any inclination to a solution that is based on partitioning Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip between us and them. We found no reference to this either from Jordan or from the Americans or from any other Arab state.

I end my remarks by stating that we do not, of course, know whether we shall succeed in arriving at an agreement with the Arabs. Nevertheless, we must do all in our power and efforts to try to achieve that objective. There is no reason to dwell at length on the extreme urgency of this issue. The people as a whole are agreed that the attainment of real peace with our neighbours is a major objective of our policy. I would like to affirm in this regard four facts that, in my view, make the chances of attaining a settlement at this stage greater than they have been in the past.

1. Increased US influence with Arab states and a decrease in their, especially Egypt's, dependence on the Soviet Union.

2. The readiness, in principle, of certain Arab leaders to put an end to the state of war with Israel. I have never suggested in the past, nor am I suggesting now, that Israel should reduce its military and political watchfulness and readiness in order to face the possibility of a war waged against us by the Arab states, led by Egypt. We must bear in mind that this is an eventuality that can arise at any time, especially if peace talks are deadlocked.

Nevertheless, we should not ignore the difference between the policy of Nasser, a policy of "what is taken by force can only be recovered by force" and of "no negotiations, no recognition and no peace with Israel," and the policy of Sadat, who seeks to attain his ends through political means and openly declares his readiness to sign a peace with Israel. I do not think we should consider his remarks to be merely figurative or deceptive. I do not believe so. We must therefore put his statements to the test of reality and, at the same time, we ought, as I mentioned, to take into consideration the possibility that Egypt, in spite of Sadat's statements, might wage war against us.

3. The third fact is our military and civilian control over the territories we retain. Even the Yom Kippur War, despite its difficulties, did not alter this state of affairs in any way. Accordingly, we ought to conduct peaceful negotiations without there being any need for any Arab territorial concessions. We can give territory away without requesting territory in return.

4. Finally, there is the style of life of "all living side by side" which has for the past ten years predominated between ourselves and the Arabs of Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip and Sinai. This present style of life is not an ideal one nor is it even the end of the road. But so long as we have not achieved a better settlement, we can continue with it. And this is something that both we and our neighbours should realize.

#### 144

#### **Television interview statements by Minister of Agriculture Sharon of Israel discussing Israel's plan for settlements in the occupied territories<sup>144</sup>**

September 2, 1977

*Q. Mr Sharon, lately there have been all kinds of rumours concerning the Israeli Government's settlement plan. Does the Israeli Government have a settlement plan?*

<sup>144</sup> Interview conducted by Yigal Goren and broadcast on Israel television in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5606/A/1-3; reprinted by permission.

A. Certainly there is a settlement plan. I myself have views on settlement. I have consolidated a plan, which I have presented to the Prime Minister and to the Ministers who are members of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs.

*Q. What are the basic points of this plan?*

A. The plan is, of course, a part of a comprehensive plan. I approach the subject with a long-term view. The main question is how we want to see Israel in 20 or 30 years time.

*Q. Could you explain its basic points on the map?*

A. I cannot go into the details of the plan here. Naturally, a plan must be presented to the Cabinet and discussed by it. I can certainly explain the factors that influence such a plan. The areas devoid of population are, first of all, the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the mountains. Another strip in which the population is very sparse is the strip located west of the mountains. This is this strip [pointing to the area on the map]. We see it here. The previous strip that I mentioned is the strip on the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the mountains. What are the problems that Israel faces in this area? The first is the problem of Jerusalem. Since the Jewish corridor to Jerusalem is narrow, it is absolutely inevitable, from the point of view of the continuation of Jewish settlement and the long-term map of the state of Israel, to enlarge the Jerusalem corridor or to expand Jerusalem.

*Q. In what way?*

A. Generally, when we talk of expanding an area it is clear that we are talking of settlement. Jerusalem must be expanded.

*Q. What do you foresee in this area—an urban or a rural settlement?*

A. I won't go into details now. It is natural that in the Jerusalem area the settlement will be urban. We can, of course, see a first stage of expanding Jerusalem in the settlement, or plan, of Ma'ale Haedumim. The second problem we face is that of forming a link between the coastal strip and the Jordan Valley, which is populated and will in the future certainly be more massively populated as part of the plan to establish a parallel settlement strip from the Golan Heights in the north of Ofira in the south. We must connect these two strips with a sound, quick and reliable link. The most suitable location for forming this link is surely in the area spreading out from Petah Tiqwa eastward to the

Jordan Valley.

The next problem stems from the fact that there are several dense concentrations of Arab population on the mountains and another concentration bordering the Green Line and within our border across the Green Line. If we do want our border—and I am not talking here of a political but a practical border—to pass inside the Hasharon area, we must enter that sparsely populated strip located between the two densely populated Arab strips. This is the line, here [indicating it on the map]. The final problem is the problem of the takeover by Arabs of tens of thousands of dunams inside the Green Line, dunams which are State land and located south of the Hebron mountain, within the previous boundaries of the State of Israel. These are, for example, the areas which the Arabs have taken over and will take over in this region.

This must be prevented. This is certainly not a detailed plan; I am here presenting only the main factors that influence the settlement plan, factors that are meant to answer the problems I have presented here.

*Q. Mr Sharon, what is the timetable you have decided on for carrying out this plan?*

A. As I have said, this is a long-term plan. Its full implementation will certainly be spread out over a period of 20 years. It includes various parts and stages. There are early parts and there are parts that are already being implemented. Now, as well, there is a settlement being established. There is a timetable. The timetable depends both on political and other considerations by the Government.

*Q. You are talking of a long-term settlement plan that will include, as I understand it, dozens of thousands of settlers throughout the country. What actually is the source of the manpower for this plan? Where will all of these settlers come from?*

A. I am talking of a settlement plan that will comprise not dozens of thousands of settlers but, ultimately, millions of settlers. We must look forward and understand that the central national objective of Israel is doubling the Jewish settlement in the country. We must, within 20 or 30 years, reach a Jewish settlement of between 6–8,000,000 Jews. Surely, as I have said before, we should decide where we want this settlement—whether we want a narrow, concrete strip along the coast,



subject to the favours of our neighbours or a friendly world power, or whether we want to build an independent country. If we really want to build a strong and independent country, the population of which is dispersed, we must abandon the thought that settlement is only along the coastal strip. We must go on to make new settlements.

*Q. Is not the presentation of a comprehensive settlement plan in Judea and Samaria now an obstacle in the way of achieving the political aims?*

*A.* I am certainly for settlement throughout Eretz Yisra'el. I can certainly only welcome the fact that there are hundreds of families today that are ready to settle in Judea and Samaria, in the Gaza Strip, Galilee, the Negev and everywhere else. We, all of us, can only congratulate ourselves on this. Nonetheless, the consolidated plan is in my opinion a plan that does not shut off options for settlements. It absolutely leaves options open for various settlements.

*Q. Recognizing the Gush Emunim settlements and deciding on the establishment of the three settlements were followed by very sharp reactions throughout the world, despite the fact that these were only the plans of the previous Government. In your opinion, is an overall settlement possible under present political conditions?*

*A.* First of all, it should be pointed out that these settlements were not the plan of the previous Government. The previous Government never thought that we should sit in Qaddum, nor did it think that we should sit in (?Ofira). It accepted this settlement because it had no choice. We, of course, welcome this settlement. I think this should be clear. There are things Israel will not be able to accept. Israel will not be able to accept a situation whereby Jews would not be able to settle in certain areas of Eretz Yisra'el.

*Q. Gush Emunim announced yesterday that the Government's decision giving every Jew a right in principle to settle in Judea and Samaria was sufficient for it, for the purpose of settling; and indeed they intend to effect settlement without the direct aid of the Government. Do you support such an approach?*

*A.* I do not see any place in Eretz Yisra'el in which the right of a Jew to settle can be denied. Nevertheless, settlement in the State of Israel is carried out with the Government's approval and according to its plans, timetable and priorities. Movements in the State of Israel determine neither

the location for a settlement nor the priority of settlement. I am talking not only of the area beyond the Green Line, but also of the area within the previous boundaries of the State of Israel.

*Q. And if there is a settlement by the Gush Emunim which does not agree with a Government plan; will you give the order that they be evicted from the area?*

*A.* I believe that a confrontation will not be reached, since a Government plan exists. There is no confrontation here at all. We have here, on the one hand, a body that wants to settle and, on the other, a Government that wants to settle. Therefore, I am convinced that there will not be any confrontation here.

#### 145

#### **Communiqué issued on the occasion of a meeting of Nordic foreign ministers maintaining that peace in the Middle East must be based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338<sup>145</sup>**

**Helsinki, September 2, 1977**

The ministers expressed their support for the on-going efforts to bring the parties involved in the Middle East conflict to the negotiating table. A just and lasting peace should be based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The Ministers emphasized the main elements of these resolutions: that Israel must cease its occupation of territories seized in 1967, and that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of all the states in the area and for their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries be respected. The Ministers agreed, in addition, that a solution must take into account the Palestinians' right to a homeland. The Palestinians must, for their part, recognize the right of Israel to exist. The Palestinians should be secured participation in the negotiations for a peaceful solution in a manner to be worked out in consultation with all the parties concerned. The Ministers considered it important that no party takes measures which

<sup>145</sup> Countries participating in the meeting were: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland; excerpted from the unofficial English translation as published in *UD-information* (Oslo), no. 33B (September 8, 1977), p. 2.

would make the on-going peace efforts still more difficult.

## 146

**Statement by President Giscard d'Estaing of France calling for peace in the Middle East (excerpt)<sup>146</sup>**

Paris, September 5, 1977

In mentioning just now the circumstances of your visit, I was thinking above all, as I am sure you, sir, were also, of the conflict which is going on in the Middle East and which remains for France, as for Jordan, a subject of constant and serious preoccupation.

If your country is one of the first to be subjected to its consequences, these do not stop at the borders of the region. They threaten the stability and, as has been confirmed, the prosperity of the world. No country can be indifferent to this.

France's position on the subject is derived from a simple conviction, that the establishment of peace would be the most advantageous solution, and by far, for all the states in the region. I see no alternative on which the lasting security and prosperity of the Middle East states could be found. Since our choice is that of peace, we must accept the logic of peace and examine in depth the points under discussion.

That is why France considers it her duty to make known the conditions she judges indispensable for arriving at an overall, just and lasting settlement. She does this without taking sides, nor seeking to please, but being fully aware of her responsibilities. The development of attitudes as well as the course of events that we are witnessing confirm my conviction that this is the only way that meets the requirements of the situation. In defining the principles of a settlement, France is only expressing, before others, the feeling of the international community as a whole, as is established by the very large consensus in their favour. And it can clearly be seen, depending on whether one draws nearer to or departs from

these conditions, that as prospects become brighter or gloomier the hope for peace is reborn or recedes.

## 147

**Statement issued by the US State Department emphasizing the necessity of Palestinian participation in peace negotiations<sup>147</sup>**

Washington, September 12, 1977

Along with the issues of the nature of peace, recognition, security, and borders, the status of the Palestinians must be settled in a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. This issue cannot be ignored if the others are to be solved.

Moreover, to be lasting, a peace agreement must be positively supported by all of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinians. This means that the Palestinians must be involved in the peace-making process. Their representatives will have to be at Geneva for the Palestinian question to be solved.

As cochairman of the Geneva conference, the United States has a special responsibility for insuring the success of the conference. We have therefore been exploring with the confrontation states and Saudi Arabia a number of alternatives with regard to the participation of the Palestinians in the peace negotiations.

With respect to U.N. Resolution 242, all of the participants in the peace conference should adhere to the terms of that resolution and Resolution 338 which presently form the only agreed basis for negotiations.

<sup>146</sup> Statement made after a dinner in honour of King Hussain of Jordan; excerpted and translated from the French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), September 7, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>147</sup> Statement read by press spokesman Hodding Carter; *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1998 (October 10, 1977), p. 463.

**Resolution by the Bureau of the World Peace Council Presidential Committee reaffirming that the Palestine question is the core of the Middle East crisis<sup>148</sup>**

**Berlin, September 12, 1977**

The Bureau of the WPC Presidential Committee, meeting in Berlin, capital of the GDR, from 9th to 12th September 1977, expresses its grave concern over the latest developments in the Middle East. The Israeli government has stepped up its policy of establishing colonial settlements in the occupied territories with the view of annexing new Arab land. Israeli aggression in Southern Lebanon is developing with the open backing of local fascist and partitionist elements. Every effort is now made to deny sole representation to the PLO and to exclude it from the Geneva Conference. The USA government and the Israeli rulers continue to brazenly ignore the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, particularly their right to self-determination and to establish their own independent state. New intrigues are hatched, to reach separate agreements with Israel in order to disrupt the unity of the Arab countries and forces.

The Bureau stresses that these developments make more urgent the immediate reconvening of the Geneva Conference with the participation of the PLO from the very beginning and on an equal footing, in order to achieve full-scale agreement which will serve peace in the region.

The WPC Bureau reaffirms that the Palestine question is the core of the Middle East crisis. Ignoring the national rights of the Palestinian people and excluding the PLO from the efforts to solve the problem will further deteriorate the already dangerous situation in the Middle East.

The Bureau declares that the unity of the Arab anti-imperialist forces and their alliance with the forces of peace and democracy the world over particularly the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, are decisive factors in the struggle to foil the present American-Israeli intrigues and to achieve a just settlement to the Middle East crisis.

The Bureau reaffirms that the interests and

security of all the peoples and states of the region can only be achieved through the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions that call for the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied since June, 1967, for the realisation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people particularly their right to self-determination and to establish their independent state and for the respect of the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.

To this end, the Bureau decides:

—To fully support the International Conference for a just settlement to the Middle East crisis which will be convened by the International Campaign Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East, in Paris, on October 14 to 16, 1977.<sup>149</sup>

—To launch a campaign in support of the national rights of the Palestinian people, above all, their right to establish their independent state during the coming session of the UN General Assembly.

—To hold further sessions of the WPC Inquiry Commission on the Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories and to launch a broad campaign against the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

—To ask the Secretariat of the World Peace Council to take the necessary measures to convene an International Conference in Support of the Palestinian People.

—To extend every support to the struggle of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

—To urge the peace forces to condemn the Israeli aggression in Southern Lebanon that aims at annexing part of its territory and at manipulating its division.

—To fully support the struggle of the democratic forces in Israel against the aggressive policy of the Israeli government and for peace and justice in the Middle East.

—To launch a campaign against the US manipulation of the crisis in order to increase the activities of the multinational corporations and the imperialist military presence in the Middle East.

<sup>148</sup> English text, *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), VIII, (7 October 1977), p. 12.

<sup>149</sup> See doc. 166 below.

**Press interview statements by US President Carter denying US endorsement of the PLO and distinguishing between a Palestinian "country" and "entity"**<sup>150</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1977

I've never endorsed the PLO. Our government has had no communication, at all, directly with the PLO. The only communication has been when representatives of the PLO have been to Arab leaders immediately prior to a Cy Vance visit with them or their visit to our country and have delivered messages to us indirectly.

Our agreement with the Israeli Government several years ago—before I became President—was that we would not communicate with the PLO as long as they did not refute their commitment to destroy the nation of Israel and did not accept the right of Israel to exist. Our public position is the same as our private position. There is no difference between them.

We have said that if the PLO would accept publicly the right of Israel to exist and exist in peace, as described under U.N. Resolution 242, that we would meet with them and discuss the future of the Palestinians in the Middle East. We have never called on the PLO to be part of the future negotiations. We have said that the Palestinian people should be represented in the future negotiations. That is one of the three major elements of any agreement that might lead to lasting peace—one is the territorial boundaries; the other one is the Arab countries accepting Israel, to live in peace as neighbors; and the third one is some resolution of the Palestinian question.

I've never called for an independent Palestinian country. We have used the word "entity." And my own preference as expressed in that talk that I made in New Jersey, I think, and now, is that we think that if there is a Palestinian entity established on the West Bank, that it ought to be associated with Jordan, for instance. I think this was the case among many Israeli leaders as their preference in the past.

So, we have been very cautious, very careful, very consistent in spelling out our posture on the Middle Eastern settlements. When we have gone around, for instance—I haven't, but Cy Vance has gone around to Israel, to Jordan, to Syria, to Egypt, to Saudi Arabia—to talk about the future Middle Eastern conference and, hopefully, a settlement, we have taken the same exact written set of principles so there would be no difference among them, and discussed it with Sadat and Hussein and Asad and Fahd and with Mr. Begin, so that there would never be any allegation on any part of theirs that we took one position with the Israelis and a different position with the Arabs.

Sometimes the Israelis would say, "We don't accept this principle number 4." Sometimes the Arabs would say, "We don't accept principle number 1." But we've tried to negotiate in good faith.

I might say one other thing. We are not just an idle bystander. We are not just an uninterested intermediary or mediator. Our country has a direct, substantial interest in a permanent peace in the Middle East. And I sincerely hope and I believe that the nations who live there also want to have a permanent settlement and a permanent peace in the Middle East. And the principles that I described in that speech, the principles that the Vice President described in a speech he made in California earlier this year, and the principles that we espouse in our public and private conversations with Arabs and Israelis and with Prime Minister Barre, yesterday, from France, and others who are interested, are exactly the same. We've never deviated.

We have learned a lot. And as we've learned, we've added additional new items onto our basic proposal. But ultimately, the Middle Eastern settlement has got to be an agreement among the parties involved.

Now, I hope that all the countries are eager to negotiate in good faith. I hope that none of them are putting up deliberate obstacles to prevent a Geneva conference from being convened. That's my hope and that's my present expectation.

<sup>150</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2000 (October 24, 1977), pp. 570-572.

150

**Press communiqué by Federal Secretary Mitchen of Yugoslavia reaffirming support for the Palestine revolution<sup>151</sup> (excerpt)**

Belgrade, September 20, 1977

The Federal Secretary and President of the Federal Council Milosh Mitchen held talks with the Head of the PLO Political Department related to international issues, and particularly to the Middle East situation. During the sincere and cordial talks, Mitchen and Farouq Kaddoumi shared common views about the situation in the Middle East. The Yugoslav side expressed its full support for the PLO and Yasser Arafat's efforts in working out a just settlement to the Middle East conflict and to the Palestinian cause, and in reinforcing inter-Arab relations. The stands of the Palestinian and Yugoslav sides reaffirmed that there could be no solution of the Middle East conflict and no just and lasting peace in the region without achieving the Palestinian people's rights including its right to establish an independent state. Thus the Yugoslav side restated its insistent support for the right of the PLO, being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people, to participate in all stages in solving the Middle East problem, including its right to participate in the Geneva peace conference on equal footing with all other parties.

The Yugoslav side voiced its definite objection to all political and military pressures exerted by Israel and other parties in the Middle East conflict on the Palestinian people and the PLO from inside and outside. These pressures, it declared, are aimed at undermining their unity and weakening international positions vis-a-vis the Palestinian Liberation Movement and thus force the Palestinian people to give concessions contradicting its national projects.

The Yugoslav party expressed moreover its condemnation of Israel's policy as particularly represented in the establishment of new Israeli settlements on the occupied territories. Israel's policy was described, during talks, as a very dangerous obstacle to all constructive initiatives to solve the Middle East conflict. The talks under-

lined the necessity of firmly confronting the aggressive and expansionist Israeli policy by the international community...

151

**Communiqué issued by the White House on the occasion of the visit to the US of Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy of Egypt<sup>152</sup>**

Washington, September 21, 1977

President Carter and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy met in the Cabinet Room for 1 hour, 5 minutes. The meeting was also attended by Vice President Walter Mondale; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President; Robert Lipshutz, Counsel to the President; David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Herman Elits, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt; and William Quandt, National Security Council staff member, on the American side; and Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Under Secretary Osama al-Baz; First Secretary Dr. Mohammed Baradaï, Executive Secretary of Foreign Minister's Cabinet; and Minister Counselor Mohammed Shaker, Egyptian Embassy, on the Egyptian side.

The President began by expressing his pleasure at welcoming Foreign Minister Fahmy to the White House in this latest round of his meetings with Middle Eastern foreign ministers. The President was gratified to receive a personal letter from President Sadat conveyed by the Foreign Minister. He repeated to the Foreign Minister his support for the key role Egypt continues to play in efforts to reach a negotiated peace settlement of the Middle East conflict. The President underlined his own conviction that a just and lasting peace in this vital area of the world requires compromise and courageous leadership from all the parties to the negotiations.

The President and Foreign Minister agreed on

<sup>151</sup> English translation, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 21, 1977, pp. 3-4.

<sup>152</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2002 (November 7, 1977), p. 635.

the importance of reconvening the Geneva conference by the end of this year, thus beginning the process of negotiations between the parties. To that end, they discussed the substantive issues of a settlement. Secretary Vance will pursue the discussion of these issues with the Foreign Minister, both to hear Egypt's concrete ideas on these issues and to explain some specific American suggestions on the elements of a peace treaty designed to help reconcile the differences between the parties. The President and the Foreign Minister also addressed the problem of Palestinian representation at Geneva, with a view to finding a solution during the course of these current talks the President and Secretary Vance are holding with Middle East foreign ministers.

The President reaffirmed the importance he attaches to U.S. relations with Egypt and continued American support for Egyptian economic development efforts. Finally, the President asked the Foreign Minister to convey to President Sadat assurances that the United States remains committed to the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

## 152

### **Resolution adopted by a Euro-Arab symposium affirming that recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and the establishment of an independent sovereign state constitute the key to the Middle East crisis<sup>153</sup>**

Paris, September 22, 1977

On the initiative of the ASFA and Le Comité Européen de Coordination des Associations d'Amitié avec le Monde Arabe (Eurabia), a Euro-Arab symposium was held on September 20, 21 and 22, 1977 in Paris, with the participation of the representatives of twelve European countries FRG, United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, France, Switzerland, Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Ireland, Spain), as well as Arab League representatives and European and American fig-

ures from political, economic, university and journalistic circles.

During this meeting a joint desire emerged to involve Europe in the process of initiative and negotiations which should lead to an equitable and lasting solution to the situation of permanent crisis in the Middle East. Europe should speak and act so as to prevent a settlement arrived at bloc by bloc, as such a solution would be marked by competition between the superpowers and their acquisition of spheres of influence.

1. The participants reaffirmed that recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people and its establishment in a sovereign and independent state constitute the key to the problem, without forgetting total and unconditional withdrawal from all the territories acquired by force.

2. The participants insist on the immediate reconvening of the Geneva conference. The effective presence of all interested parties, including the PLO, would entail, on the part of each participant, the recognition of all participants' equal right to take part in negotiations. No preconditions should be stipulated, the basis of negotiation being the United Nations resolutions in their entirety. The symposium proposes that resolution 3236 of the United Nations General Assembly be officially transmitted to the Geneva conference.

3. If the conference is not held in the near future, the symposium suggests that the European Economic Council take the initiative to hold a Paris conference to which would be invited all the parties affected by the situation in the Middle East, including the PLO.

4. The symposium proposes that the European countries place on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly, the question of international sanctions which should be taken against Israel until that country stops its colonization of the occupied territories, which violates the Fourth Geneva Convention and constitutes a major obstacle to any peaceful settlement.

5. The symposium asks that the conference known as the "Euro-Arab Dialogue" be open, realistically and without restriction, to problems of a political nature, while continuing the process of establishing the procedures and the development of activities of economic and cultural cooperation.

6. The symposium draws the attention of governments and international opinion to the serious consequences of the Israeli military intervention

<sup>153</sup> The conference was held on the initiative of the "Association de Solidarité Franco-Arabe" and "Le Comité Européen de Coordination des Associations d'Amitié avec le Monde Arabe" (Eurabia); translated from the French text, *France Pays-Arabs* (Paris), no. 72 (November 1977), p. 8.

in South Lebanon which threatens to make tragic an already critical situation and to endanger not only the equilibrium of the whole region, but also world peace.

## 153

**Communiqué issued by the White House on the occasion of the visit to the US of Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria<sup>154</sup>**

**Washington, September 28, 1977**

The President and Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abd al Halim Khaddam met in the Cabinet Room for 1 hour and 5 minutes. The meeting was also attended by Vice President Mondale; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance; Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President; David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Richard Murphy, U.S. Ambassador to Syria; and William Quandt, National Security Council staff member, on the American side; and His Excellency Dr. Sabah Kabbani, Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United States; and Mr. Abd al-Salam Aqil, private secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister, on the Syrian side.

The President began by expressing his pleasure at this opportunity to meet again with Minister Khaddam, recalling their friendly talks at the White House last April and at the time of President Carter's meeting with President Asad in Geneva in May. The President underlined the importance he attributes to Syrian participation in the peace efforts underway in the Middle East and reaffirmed his determination to continue those efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this connection, the President repeated his own conviction that a just and lasting peace in this vital area of the world requires compromise and courageous leadership from all the parties to the negotiations.

The President and the Minister agreed on the importance of working to reconvene the Geneva conference by the end of this year. They discussed the substantive issues of a settlement and, while

noting that differences exist between our respective views on some points, they agreed that these efforts at finding concrete solutions to the core issues of the conflict should continue. Secretary Vance will pursue the discussion with the Minister, listening to his ideas and explaining in detail American suggestions for reconciling differences between the parties on the key elements of a settlement. The President and the Minister also discussed the problem of Palestinian representation at Geneva, agreeing that this question must be resolved if the Geneva conference is to be reconvened.

The President concluded by expressing his gratification with the steady improvement in relations between Syria and the United States. He emphasized that these good relations aid the cause of reaching a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The President asked the Minister to assure President Asad that he intends to carry on American efforts to that end.

## 154

**Joint communiqué issued following the visit by a delegation of the French "Rassemblement pour la République" party to Syria (excerpts)<sup>155</sup>**

**Damascus, September 29, 1977**

At the invitation of the National Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, a delegation representing the French "Rassemblement pour la République" party visited Arab Syria in the period between September 26 and 29, 1977, in fulfillment of a prior agreement for cooperation between the two parties specifying an annual exchange of visits. The delegation was headed by M. Jean de Lipkowski, head of the international relations bureau and former Minister, M. Jacques Chaumont, a member of the French Senate.

The two delegations agreed that the situation in the Middle East is cause for grave anxiety, as a result of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories invaded in 1967 and of Israel's refusal to recognize the necessity of founding a nation for the Palestinians. The two delegations reaffirmed

<sup>154</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2002 (November 7, 1977), p. 636.

<sup>155</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), September 30 1977.

that the essential prerequisite for the establishment of permanent peace in the Middle East is based upon the implementation of UN Resolutions. The two sides affirmed in particular the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and of the recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, especially its right to self-determination, which necessitates the creation of its own independent homeland.

The two delegations agreed that recent Israeli measures and decisions taken to found settlements constitute a new and dangerous impediment and obstruct the attainment of a settlement of the dispute through negotiations. These Israeli measures are nothing but a clear expression of Israel's desire to annex these territories, which thwarts the possibility of establishing a just peace in the Middle East. The two sides pointed out that these Israeli measures represent a policy of imposing a *fait accompli* and constitute a violation of international laws and of UN resolutions, at a time when the Arab states are declaring their readiness to arrive at a peace agreement. Accordingly, this policy of *fait accompli* represents a threat to continued efforts and negotiations in this regard.

The two delegations also reviewed the painful events that Lebanon has witnessed in the past two years. The delegation of the Arab Baath Socialist Party acquainted the French delegation with the efforts made by the Party and Arab Syria for the sake of restoring security, peace and national accord in Lebanon and of guaranteeing the implementation of the agreements arrived at in this regard.

The two delegations affirm this common determination to safeguard Lebanon's unity, security and independence. The two sides noted the grave deterioration of the situation in South Lebanon, agreed that Israeli interference in that region represents a new focal point of conflict and emphasized that the expansion of Israel's frontiers at the expense of Lebanese territory is to be categorically rejected.

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Cuba of President Rubayi Ali of South Yemen<sup>156</sup> (excerpts)**

**Havana, September 29, 1977**

At the invitation of Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and president of the Council of State, Comrade Salem Robaya Ali, assistant general secretary of the Central Committee of the United National Front Political Organization and chairman of the Presidential Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, made an official, friendly visit to the Republic of Cuba September 23–29, 1977.

Both sides expressed particular interest in the evolution of the situation in the Middle East and energetically condemned all the measures taken by the Zionist regime in occupied Arab territory.

Both sides expressed their conviction that genuine peace in that region is unattainable without the full implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, the one and only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; the full withdrawal from occupied Arab territory; and the establishment of a national state of their own.

In this respect, both sides denounced the defeatist policy aimed at the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and expressed their conviction that such attempts will only lead to further tension and serve exclusively the interests of the imperialists, the Zionists and their agents.

The two sides share the opinion that the origin and cause of the tragic events in Lebanon was the implementation of the imperialist policy aimed at dominating the Arab countries.

Both sides expressed their support for the efforts made by the Lebanese national progressive forces in their struggle to protect territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty and to defeat the plot aimed at liquidating the Palestinian resistance.

Both sides energetically condemn the imperialists' and Zionists' attempts to deal blows to the

<sup>156</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Granma* (Havana), no. 42, (October 16, 1977), p. 10.



Arab nationalist states and frustrate their progressive processes.

Both sides consider that the realization of Arab solidarity on the basis of anticolonialism, anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism is the main guarantee for the success of the Arab people's struggle against the colonialists, the neocolonialists, the Zionists, the imperialists and their agents.

## 156

### **Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing Palestinian participation in the Geneva conference<sup>157</sup>**

**Washington, September 29, 1977**

*Q. There have been a lot of confusing statements from the White House and from leaders who have seen you recently on where exactly the United States stands in terms of Palestinian—PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] participation in a Geneva peace conference, if one comes about. Can you really clarify this point?*

*A.* I doubt it but I would be glad to try. What we are trying to do now is—as a first and immediate goal—is to bring all the parties in the Mideast dispute to Geneva for a conference. We are dealing with Israel directly. We are dealing directly with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. We are trying to act as an intermediary between Israel and each one of those Arab countries that border their own country.

There are some differences among the Arab nations, which we are trying to resolve, concerning a unified Arab delegation or individual Arab delegations and the format which might be used to let the Palestinian views be represented.

At the same time, we have a further complicating factor in that we are joint chairmen of the Geneva conference along with the Soviet Union. So, in the call for the conference, in the negotiations preceding the format of the conference, we have to deal with the Soviet Union as well. So, on top of all that, and perhaps preeminent in my own mind, is that we are not an idle observer or bystander, we are not just an intermediary or mediator. We have a vital national interest in

the ultimate peace in the Middle East.

It's obvious to me that there can be no Middle Eastern peace settlement without adequate Palestinian representation. The Arab countries maintain that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian interests. The Israelis say that they won't deal with the Palestinians, or certainly not the well-known PLO members, because they have been identified in the past as committed to the destruction of the nation of Israel.

So, we are trying to get an agreement between the Israelis and the Arab countries, with widely divergent views, about the format of the meeting and, also, who would be welcomed to the conference to represent the Palestinians.

This is something that is still in the negotiating stage, and I cannot predict a final outcome. We have no national position on exactly who would represent the Palestinians or exactly what form the Arab group would take in which the Palestinians would be represented. I just can't answer that question yet because the question has not been answered in my mind.

*Q. Does the United States recognize—"recognize" is the wrong word—but accept the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians?*

*A.* We have pledged to the Israelis in the past, and I have confirmed the pledge, that we will not negotiate with, nor deal directly with, the PLO until they adopt U.N. Resolution 242 as a basis for their involvement, which includes a recognition of the right of Israel to exist. We have let this be known to the PLO leaders through various intermediaries, through intermediaries through the United Nations, leaders in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and so forth. They know our position.

If the PLO should go ahead and say, "We endorse U.N. Resolution 242; we don't think it adequately addresses the Palestinian issue because it only refers to refugees and we think we have a further interest in that," that would suit us okay.

We would then begin to meet and to work with the PLO. Obviously, they don't represent a nation. It is a group that represents, certainly, a substantial part of the Palestinians. I certainly don't think they are the exclusive representatives of the Palestinians. Obviously, there are mayors, for instance, and local officials in the West Bank area who represent Palestinians. They may or may not

<sup>157</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2001 (October 31, 1977), pp. 584–586.

be members of the PLO. So, we are not trying to define an exact formula that we would prescribe for others. We are trying to find some common ground on which the Israelis and Arabs might get together to meet in Geneva.

I think, by the way, that both the groups—the Arabs and the Israelis—have come a long way. They are genuinely searching for a formula by which they can meet. They want peace. And I think they are to be congratulated already, because in the past number of years they have made very strong and provocative statements against one another and now to move toward an accommodation is a difficult thing for them. And we are trying not to make it any more difficult.

*Q. What are the assurances given to the PLO in the event of accepting 242?*

*A.* If they accept U.N. 242 and the right of Israel to exist, then we will begin discussions with the leaders of the PLO. We are not giving them any further assurance of that because we are not trying to prescribe, as I said, the status of the PLO itself in any Geneva conference. But it would give us a means to understand the special problems of the Palestinians. And as you know, many of the Israeli—some of the Israeli leaders have said that they recognize that the Palestinian question is one of the three major elements. But I can't and have no inclination to give the PLO any assurances other than we will begin to meet with them and to search for some accommodation and some reasonable approach to the Palestinian question if they adopt 242 and recognize publicly the right of Israel to exist.

. . . . .

**Declaration adopted at the extraordinary meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of non-aligned countries on the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine in the light of recent developments<sup>158</sup>**

**New York, September 30, 1977**

The Foreign Ministers of non-aligned countries, assembling in an extraordinary meeting in New York on 30 September 1977 to consider the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine in the light of recent developments, have adopted unanimously the following Declaration:

1. The Ministers reviewed the seriously deteriorating situation in the Middle East resulting from continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, the extension of Israeli laws and the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza in a clear attempt to prepare for their annexation, and the escalation of Israeli violations and oppressive practices in the area. They consider that such measures constitute an obstacle to the endeavours for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

2. The Ministers reaffirm that Israel's continued illegal occupation of Arab territories by force constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

3. The Ministers also consider that illegal occupation does not authorize the occupying Power to carry out any changes which would affect sovereign and other established rights and that such changes are in contravention of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

4. The Ministers condemn Israel for taking these illegal measures in Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories with the objective of changing the geographic, demographic, economic, cultural or historical characteristics of the occupied territories. Such measures are not compatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and Israel's obligations under the fourth Geneva Convention. The Ministers consider such measures as null and void and affirm that the measures constitute an obstacle to the endeavours

<sup>158</sup> *U.N. doc. A/32/255*, October 3, 1977.

towards the achievement of peace in the Middle East.

5. The Ministers reject the statements recently made by the Israeli Government describing the occupied Arab territories as "liberated Israeli lands".

6. The Ministers call attention to Israel's persistent violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as its failure to fulfil the fundamental conditions on which it was admitted as a Member of the United Nations under General Assembly resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949 (namely General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III)).

7. The Ministers affirm that just and lasting peace cannot be established except through the implementation of the following two principles:

(a) Firstly, the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967, including the City of Jerusalem;

(b) Secondly, the restoration of all the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right of return, their right to self-determination and their right to establish an independent State in Palestine.

8. In this connexion the Ministers recall that the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries<sup>159</sup> *inter alia* adopted the following:

The international community is fully convinced that a just and lasting peace can only be established through an over-all settlement based on Israel's total withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian people's recovery and exercise of their inalienable national rights. Such an over-all settlement can only be reached through the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX).

The Conference called upon all countries:

(a) To give all-out support and military, moral and material assistance to the Arab States and the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the struggle to end the Israeli aggression.

(b) To desist forthwith from any action which could contribute to Israel's financial, military or human potential or give moral support to its policy.

(c) Not to recognize any alterations made by Israel in the geographic, demographic, economic, cultural or historical characteristics of the occupied territories, and hold it responsible for the exploitation of the wealth and

resources of these territories.

(d) To stress the non-aligned countries' support for the preservation of the national, religious and spiritual values of Jerusalem and regard all annexation measures taken by Israel as null and void.

(e) To condemn the racist and hostile collusion between South Africa and Israel which aims at creating a racist and expansionist axis to wage war against peoples and deprive them of their national rights.<sup>160</sup>

9. The Ministers call upon the Secretary-General and the organs and agencies of the United Nations to keep under constant review the explosive and serious situation arising from the most recent Israeli actions and to take adequate steps to put an end to the Israeli policies of settler-colonization and annexation.

10. In this respect, the Ministers call upon the Security Council to follow closely the deteriorating situation in the region and to assert its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

11. The Ministers call upon all States Members of the United Nations to endeavour to halt emigration of their citizens to Israel, as such emigration will consolidate the occupation and establishment of settlements in occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, resulting in the forced evacuation of the indigenous inhabitants of the occupied territories.

12. The Ministers consider it of prime importance that the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People should continue to pursue its task and keep under close attention the above developments in fulfilment of the Committee's mandate. In this connexion, they invite all delegations to give their active support to the adoption of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People in the forthcoming debates of the Security Council and of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine.

13. The Ministers call upon all States Members of the United Nations to desist from assisting the Israeli authorities to exploit the natural resources of the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories.

14. The Ministers call upon Western countries, in particular the United States of America, to cease their political, economic and military support to Israel which has, *inter alia*, enabled Israel to

<sup>159</sup> See docs. 143, 144, 145 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>160</sup> A/31/197, annex I, paras. 73 and 74.

persist in its dilatory tactics and its efforts to prolong its occupation.

## 158

**Resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Conference concerning the behaviour of Israel in the occupied Arab territories<sup>161</sup>**

Sofia, September 30, 1977

The 64th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

*Recalling* the previous resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and of the United Nations on the Middle East,

*Considering* that peace in the Middle East is essential for the well-being of the peoples of that region, the security of the Mediterranean basin and world peace, and that increased tension jeopardizes the possibilities for negotiation, progress and peace,

*Considering* that Israeli authorities at the highest level have stated that they want to continue and intensify the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories and extend Israeli domestic civil legislation thereto with the risk of making their occupation permanent,

*Considering* the increasing number of incidents and demonstrations hostile to the occupation of those territories,

*Considering* that this occupation gives rise, on the part of the Israeli authorities, to repressive actions affecting persons and property,

1. *Strongly reprobates* this policy and these practices which seriously contravene the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Security Council;

2. *Urges* Israel:

(a) To comply with its obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;

(b) To abstain from all measures tending to aggravate the situation in the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and to prolong that occupation, such measures only rendering more difficult the resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference between all the parties concerned, the only means

of reaching a just and lasting peace in the Middle East to be based on territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and on the right of all peoples to live in that area in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

3. *Calls* on all the parties concerned to refrain from any action likely to increase tension in the Middle East, and to support efforts for the earliest possible meeting of the Geneva Conference.

## 159

**Memorandum by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee criticizing the change in US policy toward the PLO<sup>162</sup>**

Washington, late September, 1977

In recent weeks, Administration officials have enunciated a policy shift on the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Specifically, State Department spokesmen stated on August 8 in Saudi Arabia that PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 would be sufficient to show PLO diplomatic responsibility and would allow the United States to begin a dialogue with the PLO. On the same day, President Carter went one step further by stating that PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 "would open an avenue that they might participate in the Geneva Conference."

Such a position represents a significant change of U.S. policy and represents an abrogation of U.S. moral and legal commitments to Israel. In September 1975, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Israeli Foreign Minister signed a U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement in which the United States pledged to "continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (emphasis added). The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace Conference on this

<sup>161</sup> Adopted by 605 votes to 73, with 106 abstentions; text supplied, on request, by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

<sup>162</sup> Excerpted from the text inserted by US Congressman Kemp (Rep.), *The Congressional Record* (Daily), October 3, 1977, pp. E5996-5997.

issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants."

In February 1977, in Israel, Secretary of State Vance reinforced this by stating that acceptance of Resolution 242 by the PLO would not suffice: "As long as they stand by the covenant and refuse to accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, this provides no basis for participation." The "covenant" referred to is the PLO's National Covenant which explicitly denies Israel's right to exist as a free and sovereign Jewish state.

The Administration now argues that PLO recognition of Resolution 242 implicitly means recognition of Israel. Such PLO action, however, cannot substitute for the explicit denunciation of the PLO's Covenant as called for by Vance in February. Acceptance of UN Resolution 242 is not a substitute for recognizing Israel's right to exist....

## 160

### **Joint statement issued by the governments of the US and the USSR specifying the necessary steps to be taken to ensure peace in the Middle East<sup>163</sup>**

**New York, October 1, 1977**

Having exchanged views regarding the unsafe situation which remains in the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko have the following statement to make on behalf of their countries, which are cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East:

1. Both governments are convinced that vital interests of the peoples of this area, as well as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general, urgently dictate the necessity

of achieving, as soon as possible, a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions.

The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for insuring the security of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab states as the establishment of demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of U.N. troops or observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as of the observance of the terms of the settlement can also be established should the contracting parties so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees, subject to their constitutional processes.

2. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference, specially convened for these purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people, and legal and contractual formalization of the decisions reached at the conference.

In their capacity as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the United States and the USSR affirm their intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than December 1977. The cochairmen note that there still exist several questions of a procedural and organizational nature which remain to be agreed upon by the participants to the conference.

3. Guided by the goal of achieving a just political

<sup>163</sup> English text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2002 (November 7, 1977), pp. 639-640.

settlement in the Middle East and of eliminating the explosive situation in this area of the world, the United States and the USSR appeal to all the parties in the conflict to understand the necessity for careful consideration of each other's legitimate rights and interests and to demonstrate mutual readiness to act accordingly.

## 161

**Statement issued by the government of Israel responding to the US-USSR joint declaration on the Middle East<sup>164</sup>**

Jerusalem, October 1, 1977

1. The Soviet Union's demand that Israel withdraw to the pre-June 1967 borders—a demand which contravenes the true meaning of Security Council Resolution 242—is known to all.

2. Despite the fact that the Governments of the U.S. and Israel agreed on July 7, 1977 that the aim of the negotiations at Geneva should be “an overall peace settlement to be expressed in a peace treaty,” the concept of a “peace treaty” is not mentioned at all in the Soviet-American statement.

3. There is no reference at all in this statement to Resolutions 242 and 338, despite the fact that the U.S. Government has repeatedly affirmed heretofore that these resolutions constitute the sole basis for the convening of the Geneva Conference.

4. There can be no doubt that this statement, issued at a time when discussions are proceeding on the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, cannot but still further harden the positions of the Arab states and make the Middle East peace process still more difficult.

5. As the Prime Minister has stated, Israel will continue to aspire to free negotiations with its neighbours with the purpose of signing a peace treaty with them.

## 162

**Joint communiqué issued following talks between a delegation representing the PLO and the Communist Party “AKEL” of Cyprus<sup>165</sup>**

October 2, 1977

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Cypriot Communist Party “AKEL”, a PLO delegation visited Cyprus in the period between September 30 and October 2, 1977, and held talks with an “AKEL” delegation. Taking part in these meetings were, on the Palestinian side, brothers Abu Hatim, head of the Foreign Relations Department, member of the revolutionary council and of the Palestine National Council, brother Zakariyya Abd al-Rahim, permanent representative of the PLO in Cyprus, and Mr. Wadi' Muhammad, member of the Foreign Relations Department; on the “AKEL” side, brother Ioannis Kastroid, member of the Politbureau and of the Central Committee Secretariat, brother Donis Kristofitis, member of the Central Committee in charge of the Foreign Relations Bureau, and brother Dr. Christoforos, member of the Foreign Relations Bureau.

The delegation conveyed the greetings of brother Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, and reaffirmed the Palestine Liberation Organization's support for the struggle of AKEL and of the people and government of Cyprus against imperialism and foreign expansionism and for the sake of independence, sovereignty, non-alignment, the return of refugees to their homes and the evacuation of all foreign troops from Cyprus.

The AKEL delegation affirmed its support for the struggle of the Palestinian people led by the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole representative, against imperialism and Zionism and for the sake of liberating its motherland, the return of Palestinians to their homes and the establishment of an independent and sovereign state led by the Palestine Liberation Organization. The two delegations exchanged information about current developments and emphasized their joint struggle against the common enemy: imperialism, Zionism, expansionism and reaction. They stressed the need

<sup>164</sup> English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, October 2, 1977, p. 2. For the US-USSR joint statement see doc. 160 above.

<sup>165</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 3, 1977, p. 2.

for greater mutual solidarity and coordination in their struggle which is being supported by friendly socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, the non-aligned states and all progressive forces in the world.

The two sides expressed their readiness to continue to support each other's causes at international forums.

They also expressed their total support for, and their solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa against the illegitimate, fascist and racist regimes and for the sake of liberation, as well as their support for the struggle of the people of Chile and of other Latin American countries that are fighting against fascist and dictatorial regimes imposed upon them with the help of imperialism and neo-imperialism against racism, Zionism and fascism, for the sake of national independence, democracy and social development,

The two sides agreed that by continuing to hold such meetings, the ties of amity and mutual solidarity will be strengthened in the interests of the just causes of their two peoples, which will inevitably triumph.

## 163

### **Speech by US President Carter outlining conditions for achieving peace in the Middle East (excerpts)<sup>166</sup>**

**New York, October 4, 1977**

. . . . .

Of all the regional conflicts in the world, none holds more menace than the Middle East. War there has already carried the world to the edge of nuclear confrontation. It has already disrupted the world economy and imposed severe hardships on the people in the developed and the developing nations alike. So true peace—peace embodied in binding treaties—is essential. It will be in the interest of the Israelis and the Arabs. It is in the interest of the American people. It is in the interest of the entire world.

The United Nations Security Council has pro-

vided the basis for peace in Resolutions 242 and 338, but negotiations in good faith by all parties are needed to give substance to peace.

Such good faith negotiations must be inspired by a recognition that all nations in the area—Israel and the Arab countries—have a right to exist in peace, with early establishment of economic and cultural exchange and of normal diplomatic relations. Peace must include a process in which the bitter divisions of generations—even centuries—hatreds, and suspicions can be overcome. Negotiations cannot be successful if any of the parties harbor the deceitful view that peace is simply an interlude in which to prepare for war.

Good faith negotiations will also require acceptance by all sides of the fundamental rights and interests of everyone involved.

—For Israel this means borders that are recognized and secure. Security arrangements are crucial to a nation that has fought for its survival in each of the last four decades. The commitment of the United States to Israel's security is unquestionable.

—For the Arabs the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be recognized. One of the things that binds the American people to Israel is our shared respect for human rights and the courage with which Israel has defended such rights. It is clear that a true and lasting peace in the Middle East must also respect the rights of all peoples of the area. How these rights are to be defined and implemented is, of course, for the interested parties to decide in detailed negotiations and not for us to dictate.

We do not intend to impose from the outside a settlement on the nations of the Middle East.

The United States has been meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the Arab nations involved in the search for peace. We are staying in close contact with the Soviet Union, with whom we share responsibility for reconvening the Geneva conference.

As a result of these consultations, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to call for the resumption of the Geneva conference before the end of this year. While a number of procedural questions remain, if the parties continue to act in good faith, I believe that these questions can be answered.

The major powers have a special responsibility to act with restraint in areas of the world where

<sup>166</sup> Made before the 32nd session of the UN General Assembly. Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2000 (October 24, 1977), p. 551.

they have competing interests, because the association of these interests with local rivalries and conflicts can lead to serious confrontation.

## 164

**Working document drawn up by US Secretary of State Vance and Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel outlining the composition and programme of the proposed Geneva conference**<sup>167</sup>

New York, October 5, 1977

1. The Arab parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening sessions, the conference will split into working groups.

2. The working groups for the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows:

- A. Egypt-Israel.
- B. Jordan-Israel.
- C. Syria-Israel.
- D. Lebanon-Israel.

3. The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Arabs.

4. The solution of the problem of the Arab refugees and of the Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.

5. The agreed basis for the negotiations at the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East are U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

6. All the initial terms of reference of the Geneva peace conference remain in force, except as may be agreed by the parties.

All the parties agree that Lebanon may join the conference when it so requests.

## 165

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of talks between US President Carter and Secretary of State Vance with Foreign Minister Dayan of Israel**<sup>168</sup>

New York, October 5, 1977

The United States and Israel agree that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the agreed basis for the resumption of the Geneva peace conference and that all the understandings and agreements between them on this subject remain in force.

Proposals for removing remaining obstacles to reconvening the Geneva conference were developed. Foreign Minister Dayan will consult his government on the results of these discussions. Secretary Vance will discuss these proposals with the other parties to the Geneva conference.

Acceptance of the Joint US-USSR Statement of October 1, 1977,<sup>169</sup> by the parties is not a prerequisite for the reconvening and conduct of the Geneva conference.

## 166

**Declaration issued by the International Conference for a Just Peace in the Middle East**<sup>170</sup>

Paris, October 16, 1977

The International Conference for a Just Settlement of the Middle East Crisis, met in Paris from 14 to 16 October 1977 with the participation of representatives of national organisations from 60 countries of all continents and of 20 international non-governmental organisations. Among them were delegates from Palestine, led by members of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, delegates representing the main political parties and forces of the Arab countries, as well as delegates representing the peace forces of Israel.

The Conference heard reports of the growing determination of the peoples everywhere to act

<sup>168</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2002 (November 7, 1977), p. 640.

<sup>169</sup> Doc. 160 above.

<sup>170</sup> English text, *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), VIII, 8-9, (November 18, 1977), p. 2.

<sup>167</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, October 14, 1977, p. 1.



to end the dangerous situation in the Middle East, which can lead to the outbreak of another war in the region and which could spark off a global conflagration. World public opinion has the power to act to ensure a solution of the crisis through peaceful means and on the just basis embodied in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

The Conference is unanimous that the key issue of the Middle East Crisis is the Palestinian problem. There can be no peace without ensuring the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the establishment of their own independent national State. There can be no peace without recognising the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Conference appreciates particularly in this connection the resolutions of the United Nations and the stand taken by the overwhelming majority of the governments of the world.

The Conference welcomes the recent Soviet-American joint statement on the Middle East, which could contribute to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. In this context, the Conference underlines the importance of the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, contained in this statement.

The International Conference for a Just Settlement of the Middle East Crisis condemns the dangerous measures taken by the Begin government aimed at perpetuating the Israeli occupation of Arab territories. The participants strongly protest against the increasing Israeli repression and persecution of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. The establishment of new colonies in the occupied territories has been universally denounced. The Conference condemns the continued aggression by Israel in Southern Lebanon.

The Conference unequivocally condemns the deliberate manoeuvres of the Israeli government, in collusion with the US administration, to sabotage the new possibilities for a just solution of the Middle East crisis. The Israeli-US "working paper"<sup>171</sup> on the Geneva Conference impedes all progress towards peace in the area.

The Geneva Conference cannot be convened without the full representation of the PLO on an equal basis with all other participants. The

Geneva Conference must include on its agenda the entire question of the rights of the Palestinian people, as embodied in Resolution 3236 of the UN General Assembly. The Geneva Conference must deal with the entire problem of the Middle East crisis in an integral way and not on a partial or "step-by-step" basis. The Geneva Conference must ensure the legitimate rights of all peoples of the region—the Palestinian people, the peoples of the Arab countries and the people of Israel.

The Geneva Conference can secure a just settlement which must be founded on the following conditions: withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied since June 1967; recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to establish their own independent national State and the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, in accordance with UN resolutions; and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all peoples and States of the region.

The Conference calls for world-wide actions by all peace movements, political parties, trade unions, religious and social organisations, youth and women's movements, by all who cherish peace, to ensure the early convening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East and its successful conclusion.

The participants in the International Conference view with deep concern the growing arms buildup by imperialist and reactionary forces in the Middle East, particularly in Israel. A just solution of the Middle East crisis is vital and essential for the success of the world-wide movement for peace and the ending of the arms race, for disarmament, national independence and social progress, for the consolidation of detente. The struggle for a just peace in the Middle East is inextricably linked with the efforts for peace and security in the Mediterranean and with the struggle of the people of Cyprus, of the Gulf, of Africa and the Indian Ocean.

The Conference appeals to all peace forces to unite their efforts to prevent a new conflict in the Middle East and for achieving a just peace in the interest of all peoples of the region and the world.

<sup>171</sup> Doc. 164 above.

**Statement by Dr. Shahak to the Refugee Subcommittee of the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Israel's settlements in the occupied territories<sup>172</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1977

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED  
TERRITORIES

*Preface*

I am an Israeli citizen interested in human rights. From March 1970 until the present day I have served as the Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. The last time I was elected to this post, together with the members of our executive committee, was on February 20, 1977. The League is composed solely of Israeli citizens.

In this capacity and previously as an individual I have been very interested in the nature of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Not only have I followed very carefully the reports in the Hebrew press, but I have also made a point of visiting most (perhaps all; I cannot be sure) settlements a short time after their founding. In the case of the more important settlements, I have repeated my visits, usually once a year or more often, and I have tried to investigate the nature of the settlements, using all possible sources of information.

*1. Violations of International Law and Human Rights Caused by Settlements in the Occupied Territories.*

I will not elaborate on the question of International Law, beyond pointing out again that the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which is supposed to be the governing document in cases of conquered territories, prohibits totally the settling of territories conquered by a state with settlers who are citizens of this state.

I will concentrate *more* on the violation of human rights involved in this settlement process. The two most significant aspects of those violations appear to be the confiscation of the land, carried out in a particularly cruel and unjust way, and the

creation of a regime of inequality and racist discrimination.

*A. The land on which the settlements in the occupied territories are founded.*

In all the countries which were a part of the old Ottoman Empire, a considerable part of the land was held in common for the benefit of the local population of a given village in the name of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Such land, which really corresponded to the English "common" land, was used either for pasture or for other common purposes of the villagers such as religious buildings. Under the successor states of this Empire, this land became "government" land, without changing its functions. The military government of the occupied territories has devoted this land, in principle and in fact, to the uses of the Israeli settlements only, without any regard to the fact that it has served the existing population of the conquered territories from time immemorial. Moreover, this use is racist use. Although the settlements are called "Israeli" in name, they are exclusively Jewish in fact. No Israeli citizen who is not a Jew, and of course no inhabitant of the occupied territories, is allowed to "settle" in those settlements, while Jews from all over the world are invited to settle there, merely because they are Jews. Such behaviour usually has a name: racist discrimination.

A second "source" of land for settlements are the lands belonging to the so-called "absentees". These are inhabitants of the occupied territories who are living outside, whether they were expelled or deported or left of their own free will or were by chance out of their homes when the 1967 war broke out and were not allowed to return. In all these cases the land which they may have owned is confiscated by the military government and devoted to the purposes of "Israeli"—really Jewish—settlement. Even in cases where a father dies and his son, the heir, is abroad and can not return, this procedure is followed.

The third "source" is sales, or rather forced sales, made by the inhabitants of the conquered territories to the Israel Land Authority or to the Jewish National Fund. I call these sales "forced" because they quite often take place in the offices of the military government and under the threats of the military governor and his representatives. If the threats are not enough then one of two things

<sup>172</sup> Dr. Shahak is Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; text as published in *Israeli Mirror* (London), no. 86 (December 5, 1977), pp. 1-7.

happens to the inhabitant who refuses to "sell" his ancestral land: Either he, or a close member of his family, is arrested and held in prison for long periods of time until the sale is agreed to; or the land in dispute is declared to be a "closed area" on which cultivation or building of houses are forbidden. It should be mentioned that such prohibition is absolute. In two cases, Azariyeh (which is a short distance east of Jerusalem) and Hebron, the owners of the land which was declared "closed" attempted to dedicate it to religious purposes by trying to build mosques on it. The foundations of these mosques were destroyed, on the orders of the military government, as illegal.

#### B. *Creation of a regime of inequality and discrimination.*

It is in the nature of natural justice, and it is implied in the equality of human beings, that one human being should not have more rights than another because of his birth or of his being converted to a particular religion. However, as the Israeli Prime Minister Mr. Begin has declared, "Jews have the right to settle in the area of the Land of Israel." The "Land of Israel" is a territory which includes *now* the area of the state of Israel in its June 6, 1967 borders and *all* the territories occupied by the state of Israel beyond those borders. Under this declaration and in actual fact, Jews living in the area of the State of Israel have the right to settle in the occupied territories, but the inhabitants of those territories have no corresponding right to settle in Israel. In fact, the situation is theoretically worse than it is in South Africa, because there, on paper at least, the whites are not allowed to settle in the "black" territory and the blacks in the "white" one. Here we have one group of human beings allowed to live where they please, merely because they were born Jews or converted to the Jewish religion, and a second one, not only denied a mutual right, but even squeezed out of their territory. To illustrate this with some examples: An American citizen who fulfills one of the two conditions—either he shows proof that he is born of a Jewish mother (and of three other female ancestors) or that he is converted to Judaism—can immediately come to settle either in Tel Aviv or in the West Bank, for example. An American citizen who does not fulfill either of those conditions can not, by right, settle in either place, even if he was born in Palestine. An Israeli citizen who is not a Jew

can not settle in the settlements in the occupied territories. An inhabitant of the territories who is not a Jew can not settle in Tel Aviv, for example, although Jews of Tel Aviv can settle in the territories.

#### 2. *Permanency of Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories.*

Since some statements have been made *outside* Israel which place the permanency of the Israeli settlements in some doubt, let me state here unequivocally that the general nature of the statements of purpose made by the ministers most responsible in the Israeli government, and by the highest officials of the Jewish Agency (the body that bears the major part of the costs of the settlements) is such as to leave no doubt about the intention of keeping the areas where Israeli settlements were founded as a permanent part of the State of Israel.

To give only two examples: The very title of the last settlement plan of General Ariel Sharon is, "A vision of Israel at century's end", and it is clearly implied there that all the settlements described there will remain a part of the state of Israel (*Jerusalem Post*, 9/9/77). On the same day, in an interview with *Maariv*, General Sharon, the Israeli minister of agriculture and the minister in charge of the settlements in the occupied territories, stated, speaking about the settlements on the Golan Heights, "There is absolutely no disagreement between me and the Prime Minister. It is only a matter of formulation. No disagreement. There is absolutely no possibility of retreat on the Golan. Not in the common use of the word. One might correct the border here and there, a matter of a few hundred meters, and I emphasize, no more. And even such border-corrections can not be done everywhere, but only in a limited number of places. That is it. Absolutely not more. There is no disagreement. In contrast to the former governments this one is new in not having disagreements and rivalries among the ministers. There are differences of opinions, differences of formulation, but the government acts as one body and has one stand" (*Maariv*, 9/9/77). Similarly, Professor Ra'anana Weitz, the Director of the Settlements Departments of the Jewish Agency, on 2nd September 1977, replied to questions as follows:

Question: "Is the meaning of a new settlement that we shall not move from that place?"

Professor Weitz: "Yes. Surely. My opinion of a new settlement which is founded, is that one is prohibited from leaving the site." (*Yedioth Aharonot*, 2/9/77.)

### 3. *The Reasons for Settling the Territories.*

There are in my opinion only two main reasons for the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories: The establishment of new frontiers for the State of Israel, and the holding down of the Arab population of the occupied territories in a state of permanent subjugation. The first, which has been referred to above, is to establish the permanent future borders of the State of Israel first of all in the consciousness of the Israeli Jews; secondly in the consciousness of the Diaspora Jews who are providing some of the money involved; and finally to complete the process by creating "*faits accomplis*" in the eyes of world opinion.

In this connection the plan of the "inland population strip" as enunciated by General Sharon (*Jerusalem Post*, 9/9/77), which was based on plans proposed informally at least a year before, clearly shows a "Greater Israel" with a heavily populated eastern border "extending from the Golan, through the Jordan Rift Valley, the Arava and down to Sharm el-Sheikh" (*ibid.*)

But there exists a second reason for the settlements, a reason as important as the first: To divide the Arabs of the occupied territories into small segments, and to separate one from another with "lines" or "wedges" of Jewish settlements, in order to make them "manageable" for future permanent subjugation. It should be clearly stated and as clearly understood that for General Sharon, the Israeli minister in charge of the settlements, *Arabs constitute a danger merely because they are Arabs and for no further reason.*

For example, the sole reason for "the insertion of a wedge of Israeli settlements" on "the western slopes of Samaria" is given as the presence of "a string of Arab villages", *inside* the area of the state of Israel, whose population numbers close to 100,000, and "another band of dense Arab settlements" which also numbers "close to 100,000 inhabitants" on "the other side of the *former Green Line*" (my emphasis, but Sharon's expression !). The sole purpose of inserting this "wedge" of Jewish settlements is "the danger", as General Sharon says, of one block of Arabs joining the other block. It is especially important to note that one

of the "blocks" of Arabs which constitutes "a danger" according to General Sharon, is composed of Israeli citizens, whose danger consists apparently in the fact that they do not happen to be Jews, and this racist argument is then used as the reason for the establishment of a "wedge" of Jewish settlements. (All quotations from *Jerusalem Post*, 9/9/77). The same argument appears in another, similar description of Sharon's settlement plans in *Maariv* of 1/9/77 where the reason for establishing Jewish settlements in this area is given as "to prevent such Arab continuity". The height of this racist approach was reached by General Sharon in an interview with *Maariv* on September 9, 1977, in which Arabs generally were stigmatised as "strangers" who steal the "national lands"—the clear implication being that Arabs, whether Israeli citizens or not are forever strangers in their own country in which they were born, and that only Jews should be allowed and encouraged to "settle" on state lands, whether in Israel or in the occupied territories.

In my opinion, it is this racist approach which is the strongest reason for the plans of settlements of the present Israeli government.

### 4. *Incentives for Jewish Settlers in the Occupied Territories.*

Although a minority of the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories are drawn there for "ideological" reasons, it should be clearly explained that the Israeli government employs a variety of material incentives—given only to Jews, of course, but to Jews from all countries of the world—in order to induce them to settle in the occupied territories. Other material benefits are given by the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, largely employing money collected in the USA as "charity" and as such deductible from US income tax.

As the most important example of such material incentives let me quote the very much reduced apartment prices offered in the town of Yamit—in Egyptian territory, in north-western Sinai—according to the advertisement of the Israeli Ministry of Building and Housing, of 2nd September 1977. From a variety of apartments and cottages offered in this ad, I am selecting the most expensive and the cheapest examples: "A cottage built in a row, of 5 rooms, area of 113 square meters, with a courtyard" will cost 270,000

Israeli Pounds (about \$26,000). Of this sum, a family which does not have an apartment in Israel can get I £100,000 in a government loan which is *not tied to the inflation rate* (which under the conditions of up to 40% rate of yearly inflation prevalent in Israel is more a gift than a loan), I £25,000 in the form of a "conditional grant" (conditional on the recipient's remaining some years in the settlement) and in addition a loan, under unspecified conditions, of I £30,000. Altogether, the loans and the grants can amount to I £155,000, so that the remaining sum to be paid will be only I £115,000 (about \$12,000). For comparison's sake, in the area of Tel Aviv such a cottage can cost from 500,000 to 1,000,000 Israeli Pounds with all the housing loans *tied* to inflation, and with a much higher proportion of the sum to be paid at once. The cheapest apartment in Yamit, of 3 rooms and of 82 square meters, in a house three stories high, costs I £175,000, of which the same total sum of I £155,000 can be obtained in the form of government loans or grants. This leaves a sum of I £20,000, (\$1900 approximately) for the settler to pay for receiving such an apartment as his freehold property.

Another example can be given about the prices of apartments in Kiriat Arba on the West Bank. The figures come from an article by Shimshon Ehrlich in *Ha'aretz* of 16th September 1977, and they are given by official Israeli sources. Mr. Ehrlich notes that the prices of the apartments in Kiriat Arba have not changed "for a long time", in spite of Israeli inflation which affects the prices of everything inside Israel. An apartment with four rooms of 96 square meters, is being sold for I £180,000 in Kiriat Arba, and one with three rooms of 86 square meters for I £160,000. A government loan of I £100,000 and a grant of I £35,000 are available, so that one can buy an apartment for the sum of I £25,000 (some \$2,300). In spite of this and of the highly favourable conditions under which the settlers are required to repay the loans, most of the settlers have obtained another and better concession: They are not required to buy their apartments at all, but they are renting them for the maximum sum of I £300 (about \$28) a month, which is probably a third of the rent for a similar apartment in Tel Aviv.

In spite of such material incentives, the number of apartments, cottages, and other housing built by the Israeli government remains larger than the

number of settlers. In order to solve this "problem" two of the officials of the Israeli government in charge of Kiriat Arba, Mr. Mayevsky, the director of the administration, and Mr. Shtrasberg, who is in charge of absorption there, have proposed that the Israeli government should cease all government building of houses, or government help for housing in "the centre of Israel" (meaning around Tel Aviv) in order to force people to settle in the occupied territories whether they want to or not (*Ha'aretz* 16/9/77). In my opinion something or the other of this kind will probably be attempted soon.

##### 5. *The Settlements as Centres of Exploitation and Child Labour.*

The most shocking area of child labour, and general exploitation of workers under conditions resembling slavery, is the north-western Sinai area (on Egyptian territory) called the "Rafah Approaches", and in Hebrew "Pithat Rafi'ah". There, as I can testify from the evidence of my own eyes, and as confirmed by many Israelis and others, children, sometimes only 7 or 8 years old, are employed habitually by the Jewish settlers of this area, who have become very rich indeed in the short span of about three years. The "official" wage of an adult worker is given by the regional settlements-council "Eshkol", which comprises *both* the settlements in this area and settlements inside Israel, as "12.5 Israel Pounds per hour of labour, 5 Israeli Pounds per hour of Arab labour." Of course Arab children are paid much less than this, and some of the payments, both for the children and for the adults, are made in kind, by "unloading" on them the most rotten produce of the fields in which they work instead of monetary payment! The people who are treated in this way are Egyptian citizens who were expelled from the places where they lived for supposed "security" reasons, but who are allowed, indeed encouraged, to work on their old lands under conditions of bondage to the settlers, which are more than feudal. Whole families, including children, are enslaved to a particular settler, and are working for him under the most atrocious conditions.

Although the conditions in this area are particularly horrible, the difference in the wages between Israeli citizens (including of course the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories) and the native inhabitants of the territories is both inten-

tional and general. For example, Mr. Mayevsky, the official in charge of Kiri'at Arba, referred to in the former section, explained that "a textile plant, which was built on the basis of a wage of 5 to 5.5 Israeli Pounds per hour was built from its beginning *for employing Arabs* (my emphasis) because Jews will not agree to work for such a wage." In my opinion many similar plants or settlements were built with the help and encouragement of the Israeli government in order to exploit the labour of the inhabitants of the occupied territories under conditions of near-slavery, and of course without any possibility of the formation of trade unions of any kind.

### Summary

The Israeli settlements in the occupied territories constitute by their very existence a violation of the most basic human rights and of international law. Their purpose is expansion and the permanent subjugation of the population of those territories. They are a source of discrimination, racism, and oppression. In the interest of all the parties to the conflict, *including the best interests of the Israeli citizens*, these settlements should be abolished as soon as possible. Otherwise, in addition to being a source of corruption to all, they will also become one of the main causes of the next war in the Middle East.

### 168

#### Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Algeria of President Tito of Yugoslavia (excerpts)<sup>173</sup>

Algiers, October 21, 1977

At the invitation of the President of the Democratic and People's Republic of Algeria and President of the Revolutionary Council, Houari Boumédiène, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, paid a friendly visit to Algeria on October 20 and 21, 1977.

The two presidents gave particular attention to the development of the situation in the Middle East, and expressed their firm belief that peace,

security, and stability in this region cannot be achieved without the establishment of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including, their right to form an independent state, nor without Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.

They particularly emphasized the need for the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on equal terms in the search for a solution to the problem in the Middle East.

### 169

#### Speech by UK Prime Minister James Callaghan calling for a Palestinian homeland as a basis for peace in the Middle East and secure boundaries for Israel<sup>174</sup>

London, October 24, 1977

Sixty years ago the Balfour Declaration was regarded as a very great step forward for the Jewish people. The years between have been years of achievement. They have seen the state of Israel take her place among the community of nations. Her democratic, political, economic and social development has been studied and admired throughout the world. Israel has made a major contribution to agriculture and economic development in every way throughout the world. And yet Israel still lacks what a country most needs and what she most desires—the recognition of her neighbours so that she can live in peace within secure and defined boundaries. The challenge facing us today whether we be Jew or non-Jew is to attain that goal. Without such a settlement the Balfour Declaration and even the foundation of the state of Israel will remain a story without an end.

I do not believe Israel's security can be guaranteed indefinitely by the occupation of territory. That is a standing invitation to continuing tension and the danger of renewed war. The borders of a state must be geographically relevant, but the possession of territory is no longer the only security

<sup>173</sup> Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXVIII, 662 (November 5, 1977), pp. 18, 19.

<sup>174</sup> Speech made before the Board of Deputies of British Jews on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Partial text supplied, on request, by the British embassy, Beirut.

factor with the development of modern weapons that has become even more marked. I've been encouraged by the experience in Sinai because this has shown that the development of sophisticated electronic devices can give advance warnings and therefore enhance security without the physical occupation of territory, and that a variety of demilitarized zones, surveillance techniques and confidence-building measures could all play a part in a final settlement that would reduce the emphasis on the need for Israel to hold territory. But it is important—no, vital—that in return Israel should secure commitments to peace and to the establishment of normal diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with her Arab neighbours. These commitments must be complemented by solid guarantees in which Israel can have full confidence. I note the United States—President Carter spoke yesterday on this matter—has expressed its readiness to take part in these. So does Britain and also the other members of the European community.

What Israel needs is a peace treaty which gives her recognition by her neighbours, secure borders and external guarantees. I say to you such a treaty would offer at least as great a certainty as the deployment of missiles or the occupation of land.

I know that in Israel there is fear that the new economic balance of power enjoyed by the Arab oil producing states will tip the political judgements against Israel. There is a fear that Israel may be seen as a disposable pawn in the interests of a global détente. There is even fear that the very act of trying to negotiate to a conclusion specific settlement points might prove too much for a fragile unity. All or part of these fears might be true as applied to some countries and some individuals. I don't believe it is true of Israel although peace negotiations never take place in a mood of absolute certainty.

Israel's friends, of whom Britain is one, are still aware of the agonising nature of each and every decision. Israel's national survival is at stake. All the policies of Israel's government must start from that overriding concern. Britain has many friends too among countries in the Arab world. They know—they have heard it from me—that Britain will not abandon Israel and I know that they would not respect us if we would.

We would not support any settlement which jeopardises Israel's existence or security. Our

commitment to an acceptable and lasting peace in the region is unqualified and is the ultimate British interest. But we have always been concerned, too, about the appalling human problems of those who lost their homes and their livelihood during various stages of the Arab/Israeli dispute. Unless we accept and understand their sense of grievance we will never achieve a peace that is acceptable or lasting.

There is no prospect of a lasting peace coming about in the Middle East unless the Palestinian problem is solved. We believe the way to solve it is by setting up a homeland of some kind for the Palestinian Arabs. It is not for us to say what form that homeland should take. That is a matter for the parties concerned. But it obviously cannot just be in Jordan. There are over 1 million Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who would neither be absorbed by Jordan nor would wish to be uprooted from their present homes. Most of these people are not refugees. Some means of satisfying their aspirations without posing an unacceptable threat to Israel's security has got to be found if peace is to come. That is the challenge for all of us—for you and for me and we will do our best to try to find a solution.

It is with these "gut issues" that I hope a reconvened Geneva conference will grapple. We stand ready to do all in our power, limited though that be, to make the conference a success. I look forward to discussing the prospects with Mr. Begin when he comes to London on 21 November.

In advance of these discussions, I conclude by assuring this audience with all the strength of emphasis at my command that Britain will continue to work for a Middle East in which Israel can live in peace with its neighbours, and fulfil the beneficial role which its enormously talented people can play in the area.

That would be a prize to crown the original foundations of the state. To achieve it will need patient negotiations. In those negotiations Israel will have our understanding, our sympathy and our encouragement. We support the present American peace initiative. We realise that our own contribution to peace may not be a dramatic one, but as the process of negotiations gets under way, I hope the Israeli government and the people of Israel will feel that here in Britain they have a friend—a friend who will speak the truth because as I said earlier that is the strongest weapon for friend-

ship, a friend who will speak the truth and a friend who will do all in our power to sustain Israel on the difficult road to a lasting peace.

## 170

**Speech by US National Security Advisor Brzezinski outlining US views on the importance of peace in the Middle East<sup>175</sup>**

**Bonn, October 25, 1977**

The third crucial problem on which we determined to concentrate was in the Middle East. Continued conflict in that region poses a direct threat to international peace, while increasingly radicalizing Israel's neighbors. Such conflict poses a danger as much to Europe and to Japan as to the United States, not to speak of Israel itself. We also perceived that an opportunity existed to move more rapidly towards truly a genuine peace. The Israelis, who have fought so courageously for their survival and to whose survival every morally sensitive person must be committed, have often stated that territories occupied in 1967 were being held until their Arab neighbors were prepared to undertake full scale peace commitments. Our administration, therefore, building on the step-by-step arrangements attained by the previous U.S. administration, has sought to elicit and to crystallize growing Arab moderation, thereby making possible direct negotiations between the parties. We hope that a full scale conference may be convened before too long, and that in the meantime all parties will maintain a posture of moderation, bearing in mind that sometimes excessive precision on details is an enemy of accommodation.

The road ahead, however, will be extraordinarily difficult, and we recognize this fact. I believe that Europe and Japan, and indeed most of mankind, share our commitment to promoting a settlement, and in different ways they, too, can exercise a constructive influence in pleading for the necessary spirit of moderation needed to settle a conflict so pregnant with political and moral complexities.

<sup>175</sup> Made before a meeting of the trilateral commission. Excerpted from the text as inserted by US Congressman Brademas (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (Daily), November 1, 1977, p. H12001.

## 171

**Communiqué issued by the third convention of the General Committee for Euro-Arab Dialogue calling on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territory and to abide by the Geneva Conventions (excerpts)<sup>176</sup>**

**Brussels, October 28, 1977**

1. The General Commission of Euro-Arab Dialogue convened its third session from October 26 to 28, 1977 in the Egmont Palace in Brussels. . . .

4. The delegations continued their exchange of opinion on all aspects of Euro-Arab cooperation —i.e. political, economic, social and cultural aspects—which was begun at the two preceding sessions of the General Commission in May 1976 in Luxembourg<sup>177</sup> and in February 1977 in Tunis.<sup>178</sup> They examined developments in the sphere of Euro-Arab Dialogue which have occurred since then.

5. The delegations dealt with the situation in the Middle East and with the most recent developments since the last session of the General Commission in February in Tunis. They agreed that the present situation still poses a danger to peace and security in the Middle East and a threat to peace and security in the world.

6. They stress their conviction that the security of Europe and of the Mediterranean and the Arab world are interdependent.

7. The Arab side welcomes the position which the European Council issued in London in its declaration of June 29, 1977 on the Middle East situation. . . .

8. Both sides recalled that they voted, on October 28, in favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution on its Agenda Item No. 126. In this resolution the following are included:

—Determining that the measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

<sup>176</sup> Excerpted and translated from the partial text, *Europa-Archiv* (Bonn), no. 10 (May 25, 1978), D325–330. The above document has been quoted from the number 10/78 of the review EUROPA-ARCHIV © VERLAG FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK GmbH, Bonn.

<sup>177</sup> See doc. 102 in *International Documents on Palestine, 1976*.

<sup>178</sup> See doc. 57 above.



—Strongly deploring that Israel persists in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories.

—Calling upon Israel to comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12, 1949.

—Calling once more upon the government of Israel as the occupying power to desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.

9. The Arab side again expressed its view that it is time for the Nine to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people after its recognition as such by all Arab states and most other countries, as well as the United Nations.

10. Both sides reinforced their conviction that the efforts for a just and durable peace in the Middle East must be strengthened. The Arab side believes that, in this connection, the Nine would have to play an important role and recognize that the Nine are willing to cooperate with the interested parties in the search for a general and final solution and to participate within the framework of the United Nations in guarantees which, according to their understanding, are of utmost importance for an overall solution to the problems of the Middle East.

11. Both sides reinforced their support for the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

12. Both sides expressed the hope that at the most suitable time there would be a session of the General Commission of Euro-Arab Dialogue at foreign minister level and agreed to examine the measures necessary to prepare for such a session.

13. It was basically agreed that the next session of the General Commission would take place in an Arab capital in the first half of 1978.

172

**Press interview statements by Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran expressing his views on a Middle East settlement<sup>179</sup>**

**Teheran, early November, 1977**

*Q. As a Chief of State who enjoys close contacts with both Arabs and Israelis, what are your own ideas on a Middle East settlement?*

A. It's clear to me that President Sadat has less of a complex about peace than anyone else, including the Israelis. He needs it and it is an imperative of his foreign policy. I wish Israel had fewer complexes... Everyone accepts that they are there—permanently. Now they must gamble on peace. And that means 242, peace treaties in return for evacuation of the occupied territories. The alternative is war.

*Q. If Geneva fails to get off the ground or crash-lands, what do you think should be the next step? Sinai III?*

A. Bilateral arrangements with the Arab confrontation states that are ready to make them. If Sinai III can avert another war, why not?

173

**Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing progress towards a Geneva conference and US commitments to the security of Israel<sup>180</sup>**

**Washington, November 2, 1977**

*Q. Could you bring us up to date on your discussions with the various parties on the likelihood of a Geneva peace conference this year?*

A. Yes. Since we last met, I have had extensive discussions with the foreign ministers of all of the countries involved in the Middle East negotiations. In addition to that, there have been exchanges of

<sup>179</sup> Excerpted from the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek*, (New York-International edition), November 14, 1977, pp. 22–23.

<sup>180</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2004 (November 21, 1977), pp. 712–715, 718.

cables between our countries and communications from the President to the chiefs of government of each of those countries.

The key questions which remain for resolution are, as I think most of you know, the question of how the composition of the Palestinian element of a united Arab delegation would be formed. The second is the final form of the working groups which would be needed to carry out the work of the Geneva conference after the opening sessions.

We have not completed our discussions with the parties on these two issues, and we are, as I have indicated, in almost constant and daily discussion through cables with them.

*Q. Can you go beyond the question of getting Geneva convened and tell us where we stand on the prospects of what might come out of Geneva? Are we actually working on that next step, or are we just hoping to get them started talking and then hoping something will come out?*

*A.* I would be delighted to, but let me just start back a little bit further and tell you what our objectives are here.

We are seeking a lasting peace. All of the leaders in the Middle East who are involved in these discussions agree that the only way to do this is to do it by seeking a comprehensive agreement or agreements.

Next, in order to get such comprehensive agreements, it is necessary to deal with three basic issues: the nature of peace; the question of withdrawals and borders; and, thirdly, the Palestinian question. All three of these issues have to be dealt with if one is to get a comprehensive and a lasting peace. It cannot be done if any one of these three is not dealt with.

Now, in order to get down to serious discussions on these various issues, one first has to get to the bargaining table. That is why it is essential to overcome the obstacles which we have been working so hard on in order to get us to the bargaining table where we could then deal with these fundamental, serious questions.

We have had discussions with each of the parties on the underlying substantive issues and how they might affect each of those countries in respect of peace treaties which would come out of a Geneva conference. We have had extensive discussions on these, and I can say in all candor that I think that a foundation is being laid that will be very helpful when we get to Geneva to move right on to a discussion of those questions.

Let me say one further thing, if I might. In all of this, I want to emphasize that we are committed to the security of Israel, and there has never been a moment of doubt upon this. I have seen comment in the press which has raised questions about this. And therefore I want to take this opportunity to lay this question to rest once and for all. There is no question at all that we are committed fully to the security of Israel.

*Q. Given that commitment, as you say, to the security of Israel, how do you explain the anxiety on the part of the Israelis with certain steps taken by the United States?*

*A.* I think as one moves forward toward negotiations which are going to deal with very complicated and fundamental questions, it means that one has to look into the future, and when one enters into a negotiation, it always means that there has to be a question of flexibility and a willingness to work out differences between the parties.

Therefore, there is the possibility of change, and whenever there is the possibility of change, I think that that obviously raises in the minds of all of the parties questions and concerns, so that I understand why these kinds of concerns arise. That is why I have been trying to talk to the people who are expressing these concerns and to explain to them what it is we are doing, what our fundamental principles are, and answer their questions on this. And I plan to do this not only with the people who have expressed concerns about Israel but those on the other side as well.

*Q. Has this Administration found the Begin government more accommodating and more flexible than you had anticipated when they first came to power and also in comparison with the previous Israeli Government?*

*A.* I don't want to make comparisons between Mr. Begin's government and any other government.

Let me say that I am pleased that we have reached agreement on the principle of a united Arab delegation with Palestinians in a united Arab delegation as a way of resolving that thorny question which has been on the table without resolution for the 10 months we have been in office.

Secondly, I think that we are making some progress in moving toward an organizational arrangement which would permit us to deal in an effective way with the issues that have to be

dealt with in Geneva, and I don't want to single out for praise or criticism at this point any country, whether it be on the Israeli side or the Arab side.

*Q. On these two major subjects of SALT and the Middle East, it is evident that the Administration is encountering an increasing crossfire politically on both of these fundamental issues.*

*Senator Baker [Howard Baker of Tennessee] yesterday charged that the Administration is playing Russian roulette in its Middle East policy and its drive for a Geneva conference. How does the Administration propose to deal with the political opposition that is building up on both of these subjects?*

*A. Let me answer what I think are two questions that you put into one.*

First, let me say we are not playing Russian roulette, as was suggested. What Senator Baker, I believe, is referring to is the fact that we issued a joint statement with the Soviet Union with respect to the convening of a Geneva conference.<sup>181</sup>

I believe very deeply that that was a constructive step which has helped to move us toward the convening of a Geneva conference. I think within that there were principles stated which will be useful and constructive in connection with negotiations at Geneva. And furthermore, it emphasized the importance of an early Geneva conference so that we can get on to the serious business of negotiating peace agreements.

With respect to how we expect to deal with these issues, as you say, from a political standpoint, I have been meeting regularly with the committees on the Hill who are cognizant or seized with these problems. I will be meeting tomorrow with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the question of SALT. I have been meeting regularly with Senator [Henry] Jackson's Subcommittee [on Arms Control] to also discuss the SALT question. I have appeared before both the International Relations Committee in the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the questions relating to the Middle East. And I have been engaged, along with my colleagues, in a very large number of meetings with one or more Congressmen or Senators to answer their questions and to discuss these issues with them. I would say that I spend the vast bulk

of my time these days working upon these two main areas.

*Q. You said before that you had found concern among the Arab countries as well as with Israel on the flexibility that might be required to have a Middle East settlement. Could you tell us about that concern? Is that concern toward the kind of Israel that would result, or are they concerned with the sort of radical Palestinian state that might be created? What are they concerned about, if you can share some of that with us?*

I will only share it in the most general sort of a way because I don't, in my discussions, feel it would be appropriate to go into the kind of detail which would be, rather than helpful, unhelpful.

I think that on both sides, there are continuing misgivings as to the sincerity of the other side, and this is understandable because of the deep roots of the conflict in the Middle East. And one of the biggest problems that we have faced right from the outset is our attempt to overcome this mistrust which exists on both sides. And therefore, as one moves into negotiations, there is concern on both sides: Should we be prepared to take this or that step? Because, if I take it, am I going to get a fair and honest response, or am I going to move into a trap? And this is the kind of basic concern that I think is really at the heart of the worry that both have as they move toward negotiations.

*Q. In connection with the Geneva conference, what do you now see as the prospects for having a conference by the end of the year? And, procedurally, how are you going to do it? Are you going to continue these exchanges by cable, or is it going to take another round of personal meetings with foreign ministers or chiefs of state?*

*A. We are continuing to press for a Geneva conference before the end of the year. We still have difficult problems to overcome, but our objective remains a Geneva conference before the end of the year. No one, of course, can say for sure whether that can be accomplished or not, but that is our objective and that is the target that we and the parties are setting for ourselves.*

I think, as you know, each of the parties has said they want to get to Geneva, they want to get to Geneva as soon as possible, and that therefore December is a target which they are willing to work toward.

Now, you had a second question—

<sup>181</sup> Doc. 160 above.

*Q. Are you going to continue in the same pattern—that is, can you get to Geneva—*

*A. I plan to continue in the same pattern that we are working in now; namely, to communicate through our normal diplomatic channels, our ambassadors in the various countries, and they doing the same with us here. And I do not see at this point the likelihood of the need for a trip to the Middle East.*

*Q. When Prince Sa'ud [bin Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia] was here he said that he didn't see much point in going to a Geneva table unless the parties had basically agreed what they were going to come out with in the end. He said there was too much talk about who was going to sit where and who was going to be there and we should be agreeing beforehand what we are going to come up with. Could you react to that?*

*A. I think all of us really know quite clearly what would come out at the end of it. You have to deal with the basic issues which I have outlined to you, and that means then that you have to end up with treaties which will deal with the so-called geographical problems between the four nations—namely, Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan, Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon. And then you have to deal with the Palestinian question which involves the West Bank and Gaza. And then you also in addition to that have to deal with the refugee question.*

*All of these questions have to be dealt with. It is quite clear where you have to come out. You have to have dealt with all of these and not ignore any of those problems.*

## 174

### **Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Libya by President Castro of Cuba (excerpts)<sup>182</sup>**

**Tripoli, November, 3, 1977**

In response to an invitation extended by brother Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, leader of the great revolution of September 1st in the Arab Libyan Popular Socialist Republic, President Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, President of the Council of State and Prime Minister, paid an official and friendly visit to the

Arab Libyan Popular Socialist Republic in the period between 1 and 10 Rabi al-Awwal, 1397 A.H. (corresponding to March 1 to 10, 1977) on the occasion of the historic announcement of the establishment of the authority of the people.

The two sides exchanged views regarding the current world situation. Both sides paid special attention to the situation in the Arab region, strongly condemning the Zionist Israeli aggression supported by the imperialist forces against the Arab nation. They stressed that this represents a grave threat to international peace and security and expressed their conviction that real peace in the region can only be attained when the entire soil of Palestine and of the occupied Arab territories is liberated. The two sides affirmed in particular their support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people, its rights to self-determination, to the liberation of all its soil and to the creation of its national state.

The two sides strongly condemned Arab policies of reaction and capitulation which seek to liquidate the Palestine problem. They expressed their belief that such attempts cannot under any circumstances lead to the establishment of peace and security in the region.

The two sides believe that what was happening in Lebanon is a link in the chain of continued imperialist hegemony and aggression against the Arab nation, aiming at control of the Arab region and at achieving a partial settlement so as to impose total hegemony over it.

Accordingly, the two sides believe that a settlement of the Lebanese crisis can only be effected through the Lebanese themselves and without any foreign interference. They express their support for the efforts of the Lebanese progressive forces in their struggle to preserve Lebanon's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty and to frustrate the imperialist conspiracy that seeks to partition Lebanon, strike at the progressive forces and eliminate the Palestine resistance movement.

The two sides also condemned the vicious media campaign against the Arab Libyan Popular Socialist Republic and its progressive policy which rejects solutions of surrender proffered by Arab reaction, the ally of imperialism and Israeli Zionism.

The Arab Libyan Popular Socialist Republic

<sup>182</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Arab Revolution News Agency* (Beirut), no. 2097, November 3, 1977, p. 1.

and the Republic of Cuba believe that Arab unity built upon progressive, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist foundations, is the most important guarantee of success for the liberation struggle waged by the Arab people against neo-imperialism, aggression, Zionism and reaction.

They declare their support for the strengthening and deepening of the ties of friendship and co-operation that exist between the Arab nation and its natural allies among Third World states and the countries of the socialist community and they resist strongly any attempt to damage these relations.

## 175

**Statement by Foreign Minister Fischer of East Germany discussing the situation in the Middle East (excerpts)<sup>183</sup>**

Teheran, November 9, 1977

This is a welcome opportunity for me to thank you, also on behalf of my party, for the extremely kind reception extended to us in your beautiful country. We are pleased that this visit also affords an opportunity to become acquainted with your country's immensely rich history.

We are deeply worried about the situation in the Middle East. Its explosive potential poses a threat to the peace of the world. The GDR wishes to see the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council implemented, as they would at the same time secure the rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

Peace in the Middle East can only become enduring if and when nobody is allowed to acquire territory by war. All the peoples of that region must be assured of a sovereign existence of their states and security.

To this end, we consider, the resumption of the Geneva Conference with the participation of the PLO on an equal footing is urgent and imperative.

## 176

**Speech by Prime Minister Begin of Israel addressed to the people of Egypt calling for peace in the area and expressing his willingness to go to Cairo<sup>184</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 10, 1977

Citizens of Egypt: This is the first time that I address you directly; but it is not for the first time that I think and speak of you. You are our neighbours and always will be.

For the last 29 years, a tragic, completely unnecessary conflict has continued between your country and ours. Since the time when the government of King Farouk gave the order to invade our land, Eretz Israel, in order to strangle our newly-restored freedom and independence, four major wars have taken place between you and us. Much blood was shed on both sides. Many families were orphaned and bereaved, in Egypt and Israel.

In retrospect, we know that all those attempts to destroy the Jewish state were in vain, as were all the sacrifices you were called upon to make—in life, in development, in economy, in social advancement—all these superfluous sacrifices were also in vain. And may I tell you, our neighbours, that so it will be in the future.

You should know that we have come back to the land of our forefathers, that it is we who liberated the country from British rule, and that we have established our independence in our land for all generations to come.

We wish you well. In fact, there is no reason whatsoever for hostility between our peoples. In ancient times, Egypt and Eretz Israel were allies, real friends and allies, against a common enemy from the north. Indeed, many changes have taken place since those days. But perhaps the intrinsic basis for friendship and mutual help remains unaltered.

We, the Israelis, stretch out our hand to you. It is not, as you know, a weak hand. If attacked, we shall always defend ourselves, as our forefathers, the Maccabees did—and won the day.

But we do not want any clashes with you. Let us say one to another and let it be a silent oath by both peoples, of Egypt and Israel: no more

<sup>183</sup> Made at a dinner in his honor on the occasion of his visit to Iran; excerpted from the partial English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (Berlin) XVII, 34 (December 13, 1977), pp. 268, 269.

<sup>184</sup> The address was made in English on US and Israel television and later broadcast in Arabic; English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, November 13, 1977 p. 2.

wars, no more bloodshed, and no more threats. Let us not only make peace. Let us also start on the road of friendship, of sincere and productive cooperation. We can help each other. We can make the lives of our nations better, easier, happier.

Your President said, two days ago, that he is ready to come to Jerusalem, to our parliament—the Knesset—in order to prevent one Egyptian soldier from being wounded. It is a good statement. I have already welcomed it, and it will be a pleasure to welcome and receive your President with the traditional hospitality you and we have inherited from our common father, Abraham. And I, for my part, will of course be ready to come to your capital, Cairo, for the same purpose: No more wars—peace—a real peace and forever. It is in the holy Koran, in Surah 5. that our right to this land was stated and sanctified. May I read it to you this eternal surah:

Recall when Moses said to his people: Oh my people, remember the goodness of Allah towards you when he appointed prophets amongst you... Oh my people, enter the holy land which Allah hath written down as yours...

It is in this spirit of our common belief in God, in divine providence, in right and in justice, in all the great human values which were handed down to you by the prophet Mohammed and by our prophets—Moses, Yeshayahu, Yirmiyahu, Yehezke'el—it is in this human spirit that I say to you with all my heart: Shalom.

It means *sulh*. And vice-versa: *sulh* means shalom.

## 177

### **Press conference statements by US President Carter praising the willingness of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel<sup>185</sup>**

**Washington, November 10, 1977**

*Q. It's our understanding that some of your top national security advisers met yesterday in the White House Situation Room to sort of reassess the situation in the Middle East in light of the recent trouble on the Lebanon border. Can you give us some assessment this morning, especially what effect this might have on the Middle East peace conference*

*later this year?*

A. This new outburst of violence is a great concern to us and, I think, to the nations in the Middle East, to all people of the world. The unwarranted and continuing terrorist attacks have been part of the Middle East picture for years. The retaliatory measures taken by nations who were attacked by terrorists have been a part of the picture in the Middle East for years. I think it shows the volatile nature there of the continuing problems.

I think it shows in a much more vivid way than perhaps in the past—recent past—the need for an immediate convening of the Geneva conference as soon as we can get these national leaders to sit down, or their representatives to sit down on a continuing basis and work out face-to-face these divisions that have existed in the Middle East for generations.

Loss of life is deplorable. But the situation is never going to be improved, in my opinion, until those nations there are willing to step beyond the procedural debates and squabbles about exactly how to go and exactly what representation will be present and start dealing with the real issues.

I've been pleased that the Israeli Government has adopted the procedures for the Geneva conference that we've proposed. I was pleased with the statement yesterday by President Sadat that he was willing to go to Geneva or anywhere else and begin to consult directly with Israel and with the other Arab nations without quibbling any more about the detailed wording of the procedures. That's our position.

I hope that Jordan and Syria and Lebanon very quickly will make a similar response to us and that we can then convene the Geneva conference. But the major all-encompassing question in the Middle East is that the bloodshed, in my opinion, will not be stopped until the nations are willing to negotiate on the basic divisions that have separated them so long.

*Q. Do you think the Israeli attack was justified—the retaliation?*

A. I think this is a question that's hard for me to answer—whether Israel can sit dormant and quiescent and accept repeated attacks on their border villages without retaliation, whether the retaliation was excessive. Those are questions that I think both answers would be, perhaps, yes. There ought not to be any attacks. If there are con-

<sup>185</sup> Partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2007, (December 12, 1977), pp. 839–840.

tinued attacks, some retaliation is required.

I don't know the details of it, but I think the overriding consideration is not to condemn Israel at this point for retaliation but just to say that if the provocations were absent that the retaliation would have been unnecessary. And the best way to resolve it is for Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, relating to that region of the Mideast, for Jordan and Egypt and Israel to start direct negotiations. The whole thing is just sitting and teetering on another outbreak of even more major violence. And I think that at this time, a condemnation of people is probably inappropriate, but an urge for all nations now to stop this present, recent outbreak and to move toward major consultations is the only answer that I can give.

178

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Junblat of Lebanon (excerpted)<sup>186</sup>**

**Moscow, November 11, 1977**

The two sides discussed matters related to the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East. The representatives of the Soviet Communist Party affirmed continued adherence of the USSR to its principled position regarding a settlement of the Middle East conflict. It was pointed out that the Soviet Union is working steadily in support of the efforts being made by Lebanese nationalists and Lebanon's legitimate authorities which seek to safeguard the national independence of the Lebanese republic, its sovereignty and its territorial integrity. Those taking part in the meeting decisively condemned Israel's aggressive acts in South Lebanon.

Walid Junblat expressed his appreciation to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government for their continued support of the progressive national and

patriotic forces and the national interests of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples as well as of all Arab peoples.

Those taking part in the meeting expressed their satisfaction with the relations that exist between the Soviet Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party and stressed the need to develop them further.

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of warmth and cordiality.

179

**Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Governing Board of the National Council of Churches in the USA<sup>187</sup>**

**November 11, 1977**

For the first time in thirty years, parties to the Middle East conflict seem to be moving in the direction of a peace conference which may resolve some of the basic issues which have kept the Middle East in turmoil for so long. The history of the Middle East conflict is a tragedy of missed opportunities for peace. We hope that the direct participants to the conflict will not allow the present opportunity to escape them. The alternatives to peace have become increasingly ominous for the whole world. We, as Christians, recognize our inextricable involvement in the Middle East, and will continue to search for ways to contribute toward justice, reconciliation and peace.

Therefore, the Governing Board of the NCCUSA:

Reiterates, with urgency, the following portion of the action of our NCCUSA Executive Committee of December, 1974, which we continue to see as the prerequisite for peace:

We call upon Israel and the Palestinians to recognize mutually the right of the other party to the same self-determination which each desires for itself. We affirm the right of Israel to exist as a free nation within secure borders. We equally affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and a national entity.;

*Commends* President Carter for his efforts  
—to assure recognition of the legitimate rights

<sup>186</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Nahar* (Beirut) November 12, 1977. Mr. Junblat visited the Soviet Union to participate in celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution.

<sup>187</sup> *The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter* (Geneva), no. 4/1977, (December 1977) pp. 13-14.

of the Palestinians as well as recognition of the State of Israel,

—to initiate specific actions towards reconvening the Geneva Conference, including the issuance of the Joint Soviet-American Statement (October 1, 1977)<sup>188</sup> and the Working Paper on the Resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference (October 5, 1977),<sup>189</sup>

—to address obstacles to peace negotiations, such as the issues of mutual recognition, Israeli establishment of civilian and military settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the continued reliance on violent means by all parties to achieve their ends;

*Encourages* President Carter in his efforts

—to continue a movement toward peace by bringing for negotiation the recognized representatives of all parties, including the Palestinians,

—to secure strong United Nations action for peace based on the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and those United Nations Resolutions which insure the existence of the State of Israel [Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)], the maintenance of peace [Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)], and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians [e.g. General Assembly Resolution 3236 (1974)];

*Expresses* new hope that these negotiations will bring security and peace with justice for all people in the Middle East;

*Requests* the General Secretary of the NCCUSA to communicate this statement of concern and hope to President Carter and other appropriate persons and organizations; and

*Requests* the President of the NCCUSA, with a delegation of his own choosing, to seek a conference with the President of the United States to personally communicate to him our concerns and our support; and

*Requests* the member churches of the NCCUSA to continue to be in fervent prayer and study as we circulate this resolution and the supporting documents within our communions, asking our membership to communicate regularly to President Carter and members of Congress statements of support of the Administration's Middle East policy and initiatives as these are consistent with the above guidelines.

**Letter from Prime Minister Begin of Israel to President Sadat of Egypt inviting the latter to visit Israel<sup>190</sup>**

**Jerusalem, November 15, 1977**

JERUSALEM, NOVEMBER 15, 1977

HIS EXCELLENCY

MR. ANWAR SADAT

PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT  
CAIRO

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

On behalf of the Government of Israel I have the honour to extend to you our cordial invitation to come to Jerusalem and to visit our country.

Your excellency's readiness to undertake such a visit, as expressed to the People's Council of Egypt, has been noted here with deep and positive interest, as has your statement<sup>191</sup> that you would wish to address the members of our parliament, the Knesset, and to meet with me.

If, as I hope, you will accept our invitation, arrangements will be made for you to address the Knesset from its rostrum. You will also, should you so desire, be enabled to meet with our various parliamentary groups, those supporting the government as well as those in opposition.

As to the date of the proposed visit, we shall be glad to meet with your convenience. It so happens that I am scheduled at the invitation of Prime Minister Callaghan to leave for London on Sunday, November 20, on an official visit to Great Britain. Should you advise me, Mr. President, that you would be ready to come to Jerusalem on Monday, November 21, I would ask Prime Minister Callaghan's indulgence and arrange to postpone my visit to Britain, so as to be able to receive you personally and to initiate together with you talks on the establishment of peace, for which, as we both know, the peoples of the Middle East yearn and pray.

Alternatively, should you decide to come here on Thursday, November 24, or thereafter, I would be back from London by Wednesday afternoon and greet you upon your arrival.

May I assure you, Mr. President, that the

<sup>190</sup>The invitation was made following President Sadat's statement that he was prepared to go to Israel; English text, *The Jerusalem Post*, November 18, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>191</sup> Doc. 287 below.

<sup>188</sup> Doc 160 above.

<sup>189</sup> Doc. 164 above.



parliament, the Government and the people of Israel will receive you with respect and cordiality.

YOURS SINCERELY,  
MENACHEM BEGIN

# 181

## **Speech by Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the Knesset on the occasion of the visit to Israel of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>192</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 20, 1977

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President of Israel, Mr. President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, members of the Knesset.

We congratulate the President and all members of the Islamic religion in our country and wherever they may be on the occasion of the feast of Id al-Adha.

This feast recalls the offering of Isaac as a sacrifice on the altar. It was an ordeal by which God tested the faith of our common ancestor, and Abraham passed this ordeal. But, from the viewpoint of human ethics and progress, human sacrifice was not permitted. Our two peoples, through their ancient traditions, learned this humanitarian prohibition against human sacrifice and taught it, while peoples around us were still offering sacrifices to their idols. Accordingly, the people of Israel and the Arab people contributed to the progress of man, as we are still contributing to human civilization up to this very day.

I welcome the President of Egypt, his coming to our country and his participation in this session of the Knesset. The distance by air between Cairo and Jerusalem is short. But the gap between them was unbridgeable until yesterday evening. President Sadat covered this distance courageously. We Jews know how to appreciate courage and know how to appreciate it in our guest, for we rose up in courage and we live in courage.

Mr. Speaker, this small people, the remnant of the Jewish people who has returned to its historic home, has always wanted peace. At the very dawn of our independence, on May 14, 1948, Ben-Gurion, when making the declaration of independence, said the following as regards the basic charter of our national freedom. "We stretch

forth the hand of peace and good neighbourliness to all surrounding states and peoples and we call upon them to cooperate and to exchange aid with the Jewish people who are independent in their country."

A year before that date, when we were still a secret movement, and as we waged a battle of destiny to liberate this land and save its people, we appealed to our neighbours as follows: "We shall live together in this country and shall progress together towards a free and happy life. Arab neighbours, do not disappoint the hand that is stretched forth to you for the sake of peace."

However, Mr. Speaker, I see it as my duty and not only as my right, to affirm today, basing myself on reality, that the hand we stretched for peace was not accepted. One day after renewing our independence in accordance with our right, a historic right that cannot be gainsaid, we were attacked on three fronts. We stood fast, almost without arms, a few opposed to many, the weak against the strong. This took place in an attempt to suffocate our independence by force, one day after it was announced, to put an end to the last hope of the Jewish people of the generation of the holocaust and of renaissance.

No, we do not believe in force. Our relations with the Arab people were never based on force. On the contrary, force was used against us throughout the years of this generation. We were always subject to forcible aggression against us aimed at annihilating our people, destroying our independence and destroying our right.

We defended ourselves. It is a fact that we defended our right, our existence, our dignity, our women and children, against repeated attempts to use force against us, and not only from one front. It is also true that, with the help of God, we won against the forces of aggression, guaranteeing the existence of our people not only for this generation but for future generations as well.

We do not believe in might. We believe in right and right alone. For this reason we have sought peace from the depth of our hearts, always and at all times, right up to the present.

Mr. President [of Israel], Mr. President of Egypt. Sitting with us in this democratic assembly today are the leaders of all the organizations of the secret Hebrew movement of struggle. They were forced to wage a battle of the few against the many, against an enormous world power. Sitting

<sup>192</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, forty-third session, November 20, 1977, pp. 460-463.

here also are senior officers and military men who led whole armies, indeed whole armies, into battles imposed upon them. Perhaps victory was inevitable because they were defending right. These men belong to various parties and hold various opinions. But I am confident, Mr. President, that I express the opinion of all of them without exception that we have one heartfelt desire, one will, and we are all united about that single desire and will, the establishment of peace, peace for our people who have not witnessed a single day of peace ever since we began to return to Zion, and peace for our neighbours, to whom we wish all the best. We believe that if peace, true peace, is established, we can help each other in all walks of life. A new era will begin in the Middle East, an era of prosperity and growth, construction, progress and greater power, as it was in days of old.

Therefore, allow me today to define the concept of peace as we understand it. We desire a comprehensive and genuine peace through a total reconciliation of the Jewish and Arab peoples and without delving deep into the memories of the past. There have been wars and there has been bloodshed. The sons of a wonderful youthful generation from both sides fell in battle. We shall always remember our heroes who laid down their lives so that this day might come, and this day will undoubtedly come. We respect the courage of our foe and we respect all the sons of that youthful generation of the Arab people who also fell in battle. We must not lose ourselves in memories of the past, even when these are bitter for us all. Rather, we must surmount them and pay heed to the future, our people, our children, our common future. We must look forward to living in this region together, to live throughout the generations: the great Arab people, their states and countries, and the Jewish people in its country: Eretz Israel. Therefore we must define the content of peace.

Let us negotiate, Mr. President, as free men, concerning a peace treaty. We firmly believe that, with God's help, the day will come when we shall sign this treaty with mutual respect. We shall then realize that the age of wars has ended. Each has stretched his hand forth to the other. We have shaken hands. The future will be prosperous for all peoples of the region. The front of wisdom in the peace treaty is to cancel the state of war.

I agree, Mr. President, that you did not come to our country and we did not invite you to our

country, in order, as was said in recent days, that we may "drive a wedge" among Arab peoples or as someone once said long ago, "Divide and rule," Israel does not want to dominate or to separate. We want peace with all our neighbours, with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. We want to hold negotiations... There is no need to separate a peace treaty from abrogation of the state of war. We are not proposing this nor do we want it. On the contrary. The first article in the peace treaty is the abrogation of the state of war—forever. We want to create normal relations between us as they exist among all nations, even after all these wars. We have learnt from history, Mr. President, that war can be avoided but peace is inescapable.

There have been many nations that have fought wars against each other, using in some cases the evil phrase "an eternal enemy." There are no eternal enemies. After all wars, the inevitable happened: peace. Therefore we would like in the peace treaty to specify diplomatic relations as is the case with all civilized peoples.

Today, two flags fly in Jerusalem, the Egyptian and the Israeli. Together, Mr. President, we watched our little children waving the two flags. Let us sign a peace treaty and let us establish such a state forever, whether in Jerusalem or in Cairo. I am hopeful that the day will come when Egyptian children will wave the two flags. You will have a faithful ambassador in Jerusalem, Mr. President, and we will have an ambassador in Cairo. Even if differences of opinion occur, between us we shall discuss them like two civilized peoples by means of our diplomatic envoys.

We propose an economic cooperation to develop our two countries. There are wonderful lands in the Middle East. This is how God created it: an oasis in the desert. But there are also deserts in it which can be reclaimed. Let us cooperate in this field. Let us develop our two countries, put an end to poverty, hunger, lack of housing and let us raise our two peoples to the level of the developed countries so that we would no longer be called developing countries.

With full respect, I am prepared to agree with the remarks of His Majesty the King of Morocco, who also said in public that if peace comes to the Middle East, the mixture of Arab and Jewish genius is capable of transforming this region into a Garden of Eden on earth.

Let us open our two countries to free movement.

Come to us and we shall visit you. I am ready to announce this today, Mr. Speaker. Our country is now open to the citizens of Egypt. I do not put any conditions from our side for this. I believe it is just and right that we should issue a joint communiqué about this. But as there are Egyptian flags in our streets, so today we have a respected delegation from Egypt in our capital and country. Let visitors multiply. Let our frontiers be open before you and let all the other frontiers be open also. As I mentioned, we want this in the South, the North and the East. Accordingly, I renew my invitation to the President of Syria to follow in your footsteps, Mr. President; let him come to us so that we can begin negotiations regarding the establishment of peace between Israel and Syria and the signing of a peace treaty between them.

I regret to say that there is no justification for the mourning they have declared beyond our northern frontiers. On the contrary, such visits, contacts and discussions can, indeed must, be days of rejoicing, days of happiness for all peoples. I call upon King Hussain to visit us so that we can talk with him about all outstanding problems between us and him. In addition, I call upon the true spokesmen of the Arabs of Eretz Israel to come so that we can discuss with them our common future, guaranteeing the freedom of man, social justice, peace and mutual respect.

If they invite us to go to their capitals, we shall respond to their invitations. If they invite us to commence negotiations in Damascus, Amman and Beirut, we shall go to these capitals and hold negotiations with them there. We do not want to divide. We want a genuine peace with all our neighbours, to be expressed in a treaty of peace, in accordance with the concept I have just clarified. Mr. Speaker, it is my duty to speak within hearing of my guest and of all peoples who are watching us and hearing our words, about the link between our people and this land. The President referred to the Balfour Declaration. No, Sir, we did not usurp an alien land. We returned home. The link between our people and this land is eternal. It began ever since the oldest ages of human history and has never been interrupted. In this country we built up our civilization. In it, our prophets appeared, whose sacred pronouncements you quoted today. Here prayed the Kings of Judah and Israel. Here we became a people and here we established our kingdom. When we were expelled

from our country by force that was used against us and when we were driven away from the land, we never forgot this land, not for a single day. We prayed for it, longed for it and believed in our return to it ever since these words were pronounced: "When the Lord restored the exiles of Zion, we were like dreamers; our mouths were full of smiles, our tongues were full of hymns of praise."

This psalm applies to all our exiles and all our sorrows: salvation through the return of Zion, which will undoubtedly come to pass.

This right of ours has been recognized. The Mandate document contained the Balfour Declaration, recognized by all nations of the world including the USA. In the introduction to that internationally recognized document, it is stated: "Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people in Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country." Here the document speaks of the historical link between the Jewish people and Palestine, or in Hebrew, Eretz-Israel. In 1919, we received recognition of that right from the spokesmen of the Arab people. In the agreement signed on January 3, 1919, between Prince Faisal and Chaim Weizman, it is stated: "Mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realizing that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab state and of Palestine." There follows all the other articles that concern cooperation between the Arab state and Eretz Israel. This is our right and our presence is real.

What happened to us when our homeland was taken away from us? I accompanied you this morning, Mr. President, to "Yad Vashim" and you saw with your own eyes what happened to the destiny of our people when their homeland was forcibly taken away from them.

We both agreed, Mr. President, that he who has not seen with his own eyes all that is found in "Yad Vashim" cannot possibly understand what happened to this people when it was without a homeland, its homeland usurped. Both of us read a document dated January 30, 1939, where the word "annihilation" is mentioned—if a war breaks out in Europe, the Jewish people in Europe will be annihilated. At that time we were told: You should not pay attention to words. The whole

world heard but no one stepped forth to save us, neither in the nine decisive months that followed that document, the like of which has never been issued ever since God created Adam and Adam created the devil—nor in the six years that followed during which six million of our people were destroyed, including one and a half million Jewish children, using all instruments of death. But neither in the East nor in the West did any one step forth to save us.

For this reason, we swore, and all this generation of annihilation and rebirth has sworn: We shall never expose our people to danger and shall never put our women and children within the range of destructive enemy guns. It is our duty to defend them, even if we have to lay down our lives as the price.

In addition to this, we must remember that throughout the generations, certain things have been said about our people which we must take seriously. For the sake of our people's future, we must not, God forbid, accept any advice that tells us to pay no heed to such talk.

President Sadat knows, and he has known this even before coming to Jerusalem, that we have a position different from his as regards permanent borders between us and our neighbours. Nevertheless, I appeal to the President of Egypt and to all our neighbours: Do not say No, there will not be negotiations concerning everything. I propose, in conformity with the view of the great majority of this parliament, that everything should be open to negotiation. He shall bear a dangerous burden who says: there are matters that should be excluded from negotiations in the relations between the Arab people or the surrounding Arab peoples, and the State of Israel. Everything is negotiable and let no party say the contrary. No party should advance any prior conditions. Negotiations will be conducted with respect. If there are differences in viewpoint, this is not an exceptional matter. Whoever studies the history of wars and of peace treaties realizes that all negotiations for a peace treaty began with differences of opinion among the parties and, through negotiation, they arrived at an agreement which facilitated the signing of a peace agreement or treaty.

This is the course we propose should be followed. Let us conduct negotiations as equals with no victor and no vanquished. All peoples of the region are equal and everyone respects the other. In

this open spirit, with readiness on all sides to listen to facts, justifications and explanations and with every attempt being made to convince each other in the customary human manner, let us conduct the negotiations as I have suggested. I propose that we begin them and continue with them without cease until we arrive at a point when we desire to sign a peace treaty between us.

We are ready, not merely to sit down with the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, if they so wish, at a peace conference in Geneva. We have proposed a resumption of the Geneva conference on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Rather, on the contrary, if any problem arises between us before the Geneva conference meets, we can discuss them today and tomorrow. If the President of Egypt wishes to continue discussion of them in Cairo or in any neutral location, we will have no objection. In any case, let us discuss problems before the Geneva conference is convened. Our eyes shall be open and our ears shall be attentive to any problem that may be raised.

Permit me to say a word about Jerusalem. Mr. President, today you prayed in the Sanctuary sacred to the Islamic faith and then you went to the Church of Resurrection. You realized like all visitors from all over the world, that ever since this city was unified, freedom of access to holy places without hindrance has been available in an absolute manner to the faithful of all religions. This positive phenomenon had not been in evidence in the previous 19 years. It has only been in existence for the past 11 years. We can guarantee to the Islamic and Christian worlds and to all peoples that access to the holy sites of all religions will be available forever.

We shall defend this right of free access because we believe in equality of human rights and citizenship and in respect for all creeds. Mr. Speaker, this is a unique day in our parliament. Assuredly, this day will be remembered for many years in the history of our people, of the people of Egypt and perhaps of the history of nations.

On this day, and on your behalf, members of the Knesset, I pray to the God of our common ancestors that He would grant us the wisdom necessary to overcome all difficulties and obstacles, all provocation and harm. With His divine help, we shall arrive at the desired day, the day for which all our people pray: peace. Let us respect the

words of the Psalms, "Accept justice and peace," and as the prophet Zachariah said, "Love truth and peace."

## 182

**Speech by opposition leader Peres of Israel to the Knesset on the occasion of the visit to Israel of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>193</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 20, 1977

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President of the Egyptian Arab Republic [as heard], Mr. President of the State of Israel, members of the Knesset and guests. I am not speaking today in the name of the Opposition but on behalf of what unites our people. Among our people there is no opposition to peace and even though there are differences about a possible and desirable settlement, there are no differences about the urgent need for a peace settlement. Mr. President, as you could feel wherever you went, our people are united in their desire for peace. At last, a full peace, a real peace.

We are also united in welcoming your visit to Jerusalem—the city of faith, peace and unity,<sup>194</sup> a city of hope and prayer. Your coming here is something new, a move by a leader of vision. The leader of Egypt is mapping a path for the Arabs, the representative of a long and illustrious history. Mainly, it is a move that must not be wasted. You have shown courage in taking the risk of abandoning old habits and inflexible ways for a new opening and a new way of approach. In war one also takes risks but the chances that it provides are always bitter. In wars even the winners pay a high price. If we take a risk to bring about peace, losses are also involved.<sup>195</sup>

Your coming signifies a new beginning. I promise you that all of us will try to free ourselves from preconceptions in order to see things in a new light and against a new background. We

shall support any move that the Israeli Government adopts for the sake of a peace settlement, and we shall continue to contribute as much as we are able so that your visit here is a real success for the sake of our peoples and for the sake of peace.

Mr. President, I listened very attentively to your remarks.<sup>196</sup> I could not agree with their content, not with regard to peace—we have a different view—and not with regard to a settlement. However, all negotiations begin with disagreement. We shall listen to you and you will listen to us. We can find either compromise or a third path that we have not thought about—neither you nor we. Therefore, this dialogue from this rostrum is very important.

In your standing here on the rostrum of our Knesset together with the Prime Minister of Israel, before the elected representatives of our people—its Jewish, Moslem, Christian and Druz residents—we can feel that a moment of breathtaking opportunity in the process of history has been created as hundreds of millions of peace-loving people are watching us now and are following every moment of this visit, Millions of viewers and thousands of years of history are directed towards this rostrum—Egyptian history and Jewish history. You and we are the descendants of the oldest histories of mankind—a history that has known conflict and co-operation, a history full of suffering, a history that knows hope. From the heights of the most famous of man's buildings—the Pyramids—from the pages of the oldest of man's writing—the Bible—the piercing question of whether we shall be able to reach the real heights in the goals of life is being posed so that we shall be able to escape the distress of war into the wide open spaces of peace, as we have been released from the burden of slavery to the nadir of liberty.

It is not only a long past that binds us but also a great future. The eyes of millions of anxious Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Palestinian and Jewish mothers are upon this rostrum in order to see if we can tell them and their children that there will no longer be war, no more threats, no more bereavement, destruction or refugees, and that beginning now, there is a chance for the youth of our peoples to be able to grow up in an atmosphere free from fear, enmity and the threat of catastrophe. All are waiting for the message that wisdom

<sup>193</sup> Broadcast on Israel radio and Cairo radio in Arabic, English and Hebrew; English text, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5673/D/1–5; reprinted by permission. The text was compared with the *Knesset Records*, (Hebrew) Ninth Knesset, second session, November 20, 1977, pp. 463–466 and where a discrepancy arises between the *Records* and the broadcast which, it is felt, alters the meaning, a footnote has been added to that effect.

<sup>194</sup> *Knesset Records*: "city of faith and peace."

<sup>195</sup> *Knesset Records*: "losses are also involved, but certainly not human losses."

<sup>196</sup> See doc. 301 below.

has overcome enmity and that political art has overcome military doctrine. Your coming here is a part of this task. You and we exist and are talking with each other, without even solving the differences of opinion between us. Your coming has created a possibility that did not exist before—a possibility for which, if we know how to invest even part of the effort in peace that we invested in the army,<sup>197</sup> then your visit will be remembered forever as the beginning for which we waited.

Members of the Knesset, we have waited for this moment—for this visit—for 30 years. We have always believed that a face to face meeting between the leaders of the peoples would create the conditions for fruitful dialogue and a momentum that will bring peace. Peace, Mr President, is not only in the tree tops but also in the grassroots; it is politicians, poets, workers, academicians, children, adults, of all of us, in life, in books and in work.

The Prime Minister spoke about this as all previous prime ministers have spoken of and developed such an approach. David Ben Gurion said that there was no conflict between us and the Egyptian people. We do not want to continue the anarchy that exists in relations with Egypt. We are ready to negotiate for a comprehensive<sup>198</sup> peace, co-operation and neighbourly relations on condition that there are direct negotiations without prior conditions, without imposition by any side. Sharett and Eshkol repeated the hope that the days of glory when Jews and Arabs together contributed to the culture of mankind could be renewed. Mrs Meir, may she have a long life, said: I am appealing to the Egyptian President as the president of a great people with a proposal that we meet as equals and make a joint supreme effort to achieve a solution to all the disputed problems. Mr Yitzhaq Rabin declared a readiness to meet any Arab head of government at any time and at any place for the sake of peace talks.

Ever since 1973 we have found solutions which none of us had expected in advance. Through the mediation of our friends the Americans we agreed to sign—and you mentioned this—an agreement, the interim agreement of 1974,<sup>199</sup> and a settlement on the way to a settlement in 1975.<sup>200</sup>

These agreements were criticized at the time. It was claimed that Israel was giving up very concrete things, withdrawing from territories that appeared to be essential to it while Egypt and Syria agreed to things which were basically political—a promise of calm in the field, renewal of life in the region, a striving towards peace. We should not have been able to do this had we not decided to believe that Egypt, the Egyptian President and the Egyptian people were facing in the direction of peace. Peace requires that attempts are made to conduct dialogue, and it also calls for patience; we must not deny this. It requires a response to the expectations of many citizens in both countries. You must also take some risks, even at the price of security and the danger of war, for the benefit of man, the improvement of society, the development of agriculture, the expansion of industry, the advance of science and the raising of the standard of living of every citizen. We preferred, as you did, the proposals of the United States as they were shuttled back and forth by air rather than having the menacing intervention of the USSR, which could have contributed to peace and instead of encouraging war.

Your coming here cuts across precedent and the ways of the past. [Peres is interrupted at this point and his next remark is addressed to the individual who interrupted] I admit that you are an expert in falseness but you do not have to disturb things all the time. [Peres returns to his speech] Your promise that everything is open to discussion gives your visit real, strong and immediate content. The desire to discuss your proposals with good will and to take a proper step forward brings the horizon closer. Everyone, we and you, will express his opinions and we will find the common path.

I am speaking on behalf of the Israeli labour movement—a movement which, from the day of its inception and up to now, has not ceased to believe in peace and good human relations between the workers at home and the peoples abroad<sup>201</sup>. I am convinced that the socialist movements of the world, including the Egyptian socialist movement, are not simply trade union class movements but peoples' movements which believe that the worker cannot do well unless his country is doing well. They are not only national movements but also universal ones. They support humane and demo-

<sup>197</sup> "Army"; *Knesset Records*: "military sphere."

<sup>198</sup> "Comprehensive"; *Knesset Records*: "stable."

<sup>199</sup> Doc. 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>200</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>201</sup> "Peoples abroad"; *Knesset Records*: "peoples in the area."

cratic socialism to liberate man from oppression, exploitation and discrimination, and to liberate peoples from tyranny and enmity. All efforts must be synchronized for this purpose which includes the dignity of man, the justice of his society and world peace.

On this rostrum we must tell each other, directly and without deceit, what things and real moves must be made for the sake of peace, over and above listening to the opinions of each and every one of us, and without rejecting any system or means that might lead to peace, be it a gradual approach or a step by step policy. Country after country, or country side by side with country, or if it be one big comprehensive step—the aim must be a permanent peace, a full peace, a real peace with all and between all; with ambassadors, with political, economic and commercial relations as is the case with peoples living in peace,<sup>202</sup> Peace must be founded on direct relations between the Arab peoples and the Jewish people, without any external barriers, without dependence on fronts,<sup>203</sup> without barriers imported from outside. We must be a country living next to its neighbour as a citizen lives next to his friend, similar to the situation between the peoples of Europe today for example, between the Scandinavian countries which have known long enmity and have achieved a high level of dialogue without blurring each one's self-identity.

Each and every people, Mr President, will determine its own identity and will have the ability to manifest its identity, to pray to its god,<sup>204</sup> to educate its children in the spirit of its heritage, to express its own opinion, to move freely, and to be in contact with members of other peoples, respecting the equality between people, honouring the differences between groups of people, and avoiding turning equality into privilege and difference into violence. There is no choice but for peace to be based on mutual compromise as opposed to war, which is built on one-sided decisions.

We shall support an honourable and real compromise and we shall not demand that any of the parties make compromises in one sphere—in its self-defence capability. We have announced that we are willing to make compromises with each of the

Arab countries—territorial compromises—so long as this does not endanger our security, just as our neighbours would not want their security to be endangered. What we gain in the sphere of peace we shall be able to save in the sphere of security, but peace will exist between us while security will exist for each of us.

What is important is that we are not seeking the involvement of foreign forces in our region. We have rejected them during periods that were difficult for us and we are not seeking them in a period in which the chances for peace—as I believe—have increased. Peace must create permanent and recognized borders and must provide an answer to the refugee problem. There are refugees on both sides. A third of Israel's residents came from Arab countries. They are not refugees, they are residents in all respects. About half of the Palestinians live between the Jordan river and the sea. Most of them are residents, but some of them are refugees. With joint forces we shall be able to raise them to a new standard of living, to a new life in which there is no refugee nor outcast but residents living normally in all respects.

We are prepared to advance towards peace in any settlement that is desirable for all of us—with every country separately, with all countries in parallel. We recognize that Egypt has a senior status, a position of leadership in the Arab world and in the whole region, and in the final analysis peace can be based on a progressive unity between the peoples so that they will not be stuck with a wedge dividing them. We have to replace the unities that created enmity with a new unity that will create peace.

As far as can be seen, Mr President, there is no reason, between us and Egypt, no shadow of a reason, to continue any sort of dispute. We are convinced that we have the strength to straighten out the things in dispute, or apparently in dispute, within the foreseeable future. The enmity between us was an extended mistake, and an arrangement between us is within reach.

There is no reason for a dispute between us and Jordan. We have had a taste of Jordanian shells, but we have also had a taste of the open bridges. We regret the shells, but we are also convinced that over the open bridges can come a real campaign of peace, with no obstacles.

We are prepared to conduct negotiations for a lasting peace with the Syrians. It is possible to

<sup>202</sup> "Peoples living in peace"; *Knesset Records*: "Peoples living in the area."

<sup>203</sup> "On fronts"; *Knesset Records*: "on foreigners."

<sup>204</sup> The phrase: "to pray to its god" does not exist in the *Knesset Records*.

reach a speedy peace agreement with Lebanon. And let us not hide it, let us not disregard it, we are aware of the existence of the Palestinian identity. Every people has the right to decide its own identity and this does not depend on the authorization of another nation. But the granting of expression to the Palestinian identity must be done without endangering Israel's security. I can also say that Jordan—no, that is not my affair. We have already seen how civilized nations found ways and solutions to the problem of different identities on one piece of land near another piece of land without having bitterness dictate the solution, a way of existing side by side in peace, every unit under its own leadership, running its own affairs, within existing political frameworks,<sup>205</sup> which make it possible to live. The holy places, economic needs, the security circumstances demand extra open-heartedness. No border whatsoever must prevent approach to the holy places. The drawing up of a political map should not distort an economic map, and security needs must not interfere with the spiritual legacy of each one of our nations. Negotiations for peace can be held anywhere, any time, in any way. They can be held in Geneva, in Cairo, in Jerusalem. They can be open, they can be secret, they can be direct, they can be intermingled with the participation of countries which will be called to them. They can be intensive, they can be gradual. The only thing which must not happen is that this should fail.

Mr President, we are very proud of our enterprise in Israel. History has been kind to the Egyptian people. They were never exiled from their country. History was not kind to us, and we knew suffering, insult and holocaust. We continued to exist by the strength of prayer, and the longing for Zion and the love of Zion.

Today you are an honoured and majestic guest on the soil of our country. We very much respect the new renaissance, in fact, the revolution of the great independence which you and your generation have brought to the Egyptian people and to the Arab world. This renaissance and the revival aroused hidden energies which we thought had already been lost and forgotten in the long history. But much energy was also wasted in the tragic conflict between the two peoples. Let us put an

end to it. Let us reunite our strengths, while we remain faithful, each of us, to his own way, his own belief, his dream. We should co-operate and together turn the area into the most fruitful area in the world, into the most flourishing society which this area has ever known. In the words of the Prophet Jeremiah, who said 2,500 years ago: "You shall not see the sword, nor shall you have famine, but I will give you assured peace in this place."

You covered the distance from Ismailia to Lod in less than an hour. We did not know how our meeting would be. As you know, it is hard to remember a single hour like that, when, in the eyes of almost the whole world, a great distance almost disappeared. It was a beautiful hour in all our lives. We feel that this is a great moment which must be a moment of truth. We shall have to concede things we want and you, Mr President, will have to concede things you want and we shall meet anywhere it is possible to build peace.

The long and bitter years of enmity have united us all. There is no issue between Israel and Egypt which cannot be solved peacefully. We must all work so that your dramatic, brave mission of peace, a mission we have greatly hoped for, will bear fruit and history will record this moment as a moment of the creation of new wisdom, the time when we began to make peace. There must be a will that a beautiful time will now begin, common to all of us in the Middle East. We shall establish unity for peace, because peace unites all of us.

### 183

#### **Statement issued on the occasion of the visit to Israel of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>206</sup>**

**Jerusalem, November 21, 1977**

In response to the sincere and courageous move by President Sadat, and believing in the need to continue the dialogue along the lines proposed by both sides during their exchanges and the presentation of their positions in their historic meeting in Jerusalem, and in order to enhance the prospect of a fruitful consummation of this significant visit,

<sup>205</sup> "Existing political frameworks"; *Knesset Records*: "existing and responsible political frameworks."

<sup>206</sup> The statement was read to the press by Prime Minister Begin; English translation, *The Jerusalem Post*, November 22, 1977, p. 1.



the Government of Israel, expressing the will of the people of Israel, proposes that this hopeful step be further pursued through dialogue between the two countries concerned, thereby paving the way toward successful negotiations leading to the signing of peace treaties in Geneva with all the neighbouring Arab states.

## 184

**Press conference statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel discussing the implications of his joint meeting with President Sadat of Egypt<sup>207</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 21, 1977

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you received an invitation to go to Cairo; and, if so, when will you go?*

*A.* We discussed this issue, with complete candour. I think that President Sadat would like to reciprocate. I would like to see Cairo, but I do understand the reasons why at this stage such an invitation was not issued. I would like to say, I do hope to visit Cairo, Mr. President.

*Q. In addition to agreeing in principle that the dialogue between the two countries will continue, did the two of you, during the course of President Sadat's visit, work out specific, practical details for the continuation of this dialogue even before the Geneva peace conference?*

[President Sadat's reply]

*Q. I would also like Prime Minister Begin to respond to that question. How do you continue a dialogue without an Israeli ambassador in Cairo and an Egyptian ambassador in Jerusalem—how will you do it, practically?*

*A.* The establishment of diplomatic relations usually goes together with the signing of peace treaties. In fact, sometimes the establishment of diplomatic relations does precede the signing of a peace treaty, as the case is between the Soviet Union and Japan, when they signed in October 1956, in Moscow, a peace declaration—which is no peace treaty, and yet it includes the establishment of diplomatic relations. But in our case, I suppose it will be logical to have diplomatic rela-

tions established as an integral part of the peace treaty, which in God's good time we hope to sign.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in view of the political and physical risks that the President of Egypt took by coming to Israel, do you feel that you have gone far enough in giving him something that he can take back home?*

*A.* We appreciate very much the courage of the President, of his decision to come from Cairo to Jerusalem. We did our best to make his stay enjoyable. I think he enjoyed his stay, and we had a frank discussion, both in public, from the platform of the Knesset, of our parliament, and in private. It's not a matter of a kind of compensation. What we wanted to achieve during this visit is to make sure that we started a serious direct dialogue about the ways to establish peace in the Middle East—not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and all the other neighbouring countries. I think we can say that we made progress on this issue, and the key word is "continuation." We agreed that we are going to continue our dialogue, and ultimately out of it will come peace.

*Q. A common key question to Mr. President Sadat and Mr. Prime Minister Begin: After so many conversations, did you really reach an agreement on the meaning of the word "security" concerning Israel and the neighbouring countries? The second question is directed to Mr. President Sadat: The Arab hospitality is very well known all over the world. Did you feel a little bit embarrassed about the fact that you had to postpone the invitation of Mr. Begin to Cairo?*

*A.* I am not embarrassed.

I would like to add one remark. I would say to the questioner and to all of you ladies and gentlemen that during the visit of President Sadat to our country and to Jerusalem, a momentous agreement was achieved already, namely: No more war, no more bloodshed, no more attacks, and collaboration in order to avoid any event which may lead to such tragic developments. When I addressed directly the Egyptian people, I said, let us give a silent oath, one to another: no more war, no more bloodshed, no more threats. May I say, that that mutual pledge was given in Jerusalem

<sup>207</sup> Excerpted from the English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, November 22, 1977, p. 4. For President Sadat's statements at the same press conference see doc. 303 below.

and we are very grateful to President Sadat that he said so from the platform of the Knesset, personally to me and today also to my colleagues in Parliament, both the supporters and the opponents of the government of the day. It is a great moral achievement for our nations, for the Middle East, indeed for the whole world.

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, according to the joint communique, it is understood that the dialogue is going to be resumed. How is it going to be resumed, where, and if there be any place for the Palestinians to participate in this dialogue, now or later on in the Geneva conference?*

*A. In the Geneva conference the proper representation of Palestinian Arabs will take place. We agree on it. As far as the places in which the dialogue will continue, believe me, President Sadat and I know some geography.*

*Q. I have two questions. First, after all your talks, are you now both convinced of the sincerity of the desire for peace of each of you? The second question: Did you fix a date for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference?*

*A. For the first question, yes, and we shall together work for the reconvening of the Geneva conference.*

*Q. Mr. President, what psychological and what substantive progress have you made in Israel on your visit?*

*A. The time was so short that I think that before I go to Cairo I will have to invite for a second time President Sadat to Jerusalem.*

*Q. I have a question for both Prime Minister Begin and for President Sadat, and the premise is the same for both questions. Since there are 23 other Arab countries with millions and millions of miles and plenty of money. And since Israel's territory is so small, by comparison. And since, as President Sadat just said, some of this land was not acquired by what he termed expansion, but was actually acquired by defensive war, after it was started, does Premier Begin believe that any of this land should be given up, in view of the biblical injunction not to surrender one inch of land acquired with the help of God. And my question to President Sadat, would a larger demilitarized Sinai with joint development of the oil resources or the other*

*resources of the area and with economic development and cooperation required to help his battered economy. Wouldn't this and tourism be better for Egypt and for Israel than giving up any of the land? Or is vanity to win territory more important?*

*A. My friends, if you asked me a question about security...*

*Q. No, the question was about territory, not about security.*

*A. Will you please allow me to reply?*

*Q. OK.*

*A. Thank you for your permission. I will explain now what is security to us. The lives of every man, woman and child. This is what national security means to us. We have long experience. In one generation we lost a third of our people and in this country, 11 times we had to defend ourselves against repeated attempts to destroy us. With such experience we will care for our people, for our women and children, as I said yesterday in Parliament. I think that we have almost a complete national consensus, with the exception of one party, the Communist party, which is completely subservient to Moscow, this is the consensus by the overwhelming majority of our Parliament, whether in coalition or in opposition. And this is going to be our attitude during negotiations. Of course, I can respect a statement as was made just now by President Sadat, "Our land is sacred." And because I respect it I can say now, "Our land is sacred."*

*Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you note a certain lack of symmetry in the fact that President Sadat is crossing a political canal and exposing himself (to risks) vis a vis his own people while you stayed within the relative safety of Israeli official concept? In other words, while President Sadat came to Jerusalem and addressed himself to us, you came to Jerusalem and addressed yourself to us. Is this symmetry?*

*A. As I told you, my friend, I am ready to go any day to Cairo. And then, if to accept your statement, I will take that risk. So if taking risks is a problem, both of us, I suppose, are prepared to take risks.*

*Q. Charles Weiss, Voice of America. Yesterday in his speech President Sadat spoke about the Palestinian problem being the crux of the Mideast conflict. Israel,*

*in his view, would have nothing to fear if a new state were established. No peace can be established without solving the problem. I should like to ask the Prime Minister, why did you not relate by so much as a word to what Mr. Sadat had to say?*

A. I did. But I spoke in Hebrew. And I must correct you, as I do always. Palestine is the name of a country, and in this country there are two nationalities. There are Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs. When you say Palestinians, you do not explain the problem at stake; we do recognize the Arab nationality in our country, and therefore I always say, "Please, the question of the Palestinian Arabs." And in Hebrew I say "Haba'aya shel Araviyei Eretz Yisrael," because in Hebrew, the name of this country is Eretz Yisrael. Since the book of Samuel, and President Sadat knows the Bible perfectly well, no less than the Koran, so he knows the book of Samuel as well, where it is written for the first time, "And no locksmith shall be found throughout Eretz Yisrael," the translation of Eretz Yisrael is Palestine. I spoke about the Arabs of Eretz Israel, or in other words about Palestinian Arabs. It is an issue, and we have proposals to solve this issue.

Ladies and gentlemen. It will take another two hours till President Sadat is on his way to his country, to Cairo. May I now sum up this momentous visit. We are formally in a state of war, our two countries. As far as I remember, I do not know of a precedent that the leader of a country that finds itself in a state of war with another country paid such a visit to that country, and was received with so much warmth, sincerity. The reaction was positive in the government, in parliament, but first and foremost among our people. We drove, President Sadat and I, several times together. We have seen our people in the streets, in their thousands, men, women and little children. And all of them greeting the President, taking them to their hearts. The children waved both flags, the Egyptian flag and the Israeli flag. I wish, with your permission, Mr. President, to express the hope, that the day is not too far when Egyptian children will wave the Israeli flag and the Egyptian flag. This visit is a real success for both countries and for the cause of peace. And as we both believe, the President and I, in Divine Prov-

idence, before the departure of the President and his party, we pray to the Almighty that he give all of us the wisdom to continue in our efforts to bring peace to our nations, real peace, and so make sure that this region, with all the nations dwelling here, achieve peace, advance, and live in liberty, in justice, and in happiness. Thank you.

## 185

### **Declaration by the EEC expressing support for the visit to Israel of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>208</sup>**

**Brussels, November 22, 1977**

The nine Foreign Ministers, convinced that distrust constitutes one of the principal obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, share the hope engendered by the courageous initiative of President Sadat and his historic meeting with Israel's leaders.

They hope that the unprecedented dialogue which opened in Jerusalem will open the way to a global negotiation leading to a just and durable overall settlement taking account of the rights and preoccupations of all the interested parties.

It is urgent that a real peace should be established at last for all the peoples of the region, including the Palestinian people, on the basis of the principles recognized by the international community, and which are enshrined in particular in the declaration of the European Council of 29 June 1977.<sup>209</sup>

They express the hope that it will be possible to reconvene the Geneva conference in the near future.

<sup>208</sup> English text as published in *Middle East International* (London), no. 79 (January 1978), p. 32.

<sup>209</sup> Doc. 120 above.

## 186

**Report of the Political Bureau of the GDR outlining its position on the Middle East situation (excerpt)<sup>210</sup>****Berlin, November 25, 1977**

The Political Bureau reaffirms the standpoint of the GDR: Crucial questions for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict are

—complete withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967;

—implementation of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including its right to establish a national state;

—recognition of the right of all states of this region to independent existence and security.

The competent forum for dealing with and deciding these questions is the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva. We support the attitude of the Soviet Union, whose initiatives are aimed at paving the way to the resumption of the Geneva Middle East Conference. The GDR backs the demand of the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to take part in this conference in accordance with UN resolutions on a basis of equality.

## 187

**Resolution adopted by the US Congress in support of the visit to Israel of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>211</sup>****Washington, November 29, 1977**

Resolved by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring, that it is the sense of Congress that Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister of Israel, be

commended for the courageous steps they have taken to resolve the difference between their nations and to bring peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors through face-to-face negotiations in the context of a Geneva conference. We hope this will result in further face-to-face negotiations which will lead to a comprehensive, just and durable peace.

## 188

**Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR discussing Soviet policy in the Middle East<sup>212</sup>****Moscow, November 29, 1977**

We have talked today about some of the specific questions that have arisen and are continuing to arise in the Middle East. You are going to have an exceptionally important meeting with L. I. Brezhnev. There is no doubt that this meeting will touch upon fundamental questions of the relations between our countries and of the situation in the Middle East. The situation in that region is very complicated now. One might say that it is more complicated today than it was yesterday.

The Soviet Union, as is known, is not against searches directed at solving the problems that divide the Arab world from Israel. We ourselves are working systematically to further the resolution of these problems. But if one country demonstratively goes off on a separate tack from the common Arab front and sacrifices the interests of the Arab states as a whole, first of all those that have suffered from Israeli aggression, then this is an entirely different matter. Can one approve of such actions? No.

Are the actions I have mentioned aimed at promoting the success of the Geneva conference? No. These actions are aimed at torpedoing this conference, possibly before it convenes. That is

<sup>210</sup> Presented to the seventh session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany by Political Bureau member Hager; excerpted from the partial English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (Berlin), XVII, 34 (December 13, 1977), p. 267.

<sup>211</sup> Introduced by House Majority leader Jim Wright (Dem.); text as published in *Near East Report* (Washington), XXI, 48 (November 30, 1977), p. 211.

<sup>212</sup> Made at a luncheon in honour of visiting Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria; *Pravda* (Moscow) November 30, 1977, p. 4. Partial English translation, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIX, 48 (December 28, 1977), pp. 1-2. Translation copyright 1977 by THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

the only way these actions can be described, no matter what yardstick one uses—if, of course, they are assessed objectively.

We have already consulted with some countries on questions relating to the tasks of the Geneva conference. We are consulting with some at present—and this includes the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. We are going to consult with still others. I would not like to draw any final conclusions at this time regarding the fate of the Geneva conference. However, today one can say that it is in a more difficult situation than before and that the difficulties have been multiplied, including those on the road to its convocation. We shall see how the talks and consultations now under way conclude.

I should like to emphasize that those who, whether close to the Middle East or far from it, take steps that create difficulties for the Geneva conference, or even on the road to its convocation, are assuming a grave responsibility.

The Soviet Union pursues a principled policy. It is not subject to any changes brought about by transient factors. It is a Leninist policy, a policy of peace and the defense of the peoples' legitimate rights. And if it is necessary once more to repeat in brief the essence of our policy on the Middle East problem, I can say: the complete liberation of the Arab lands occupied by Israel, the protection and safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, up to and including the creation of their own Palestinian state, and the guaranteeing to all peoples and states in that region of the opportunity to develop independently and freely....

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**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria (excerpt)<sup>213</sup>**

**Moscow, November 29, 1977**

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and A. A.

Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, have received A. H. Khaddam, member of the Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, who is in the Soviet Union on a friendly visit.

A. H. Khaddam handed L. I. Brezhnev a personal message from H. Assad, General Secretary of the ASRP and President of the SAR.

During the conversation, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding, an identity of views was noted on questions concerning the situation in the Middle East, the establishment of a just lasting peace in that region, and the further development of Soviet-Syrian relations....

The Soviet Union and Syria expressed a mutual resolve to work to achieve a comprehensive Middle East settlement in conditions excluding the possibility of separate deals, to which the leaders of certain Arab countries still cling, and with the full and equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization—the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. Should the Geneva conference be torpedoed, those who had a hand in this would bear a heavy responsibility....

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**Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing developments in the Middle East following the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel<sup>214</sup>**

**Washington, November 30, 1977**

A. In the last few days we have seen, I believe, an historic breakthrough in the search for a permanent lasting peace in the Middle East because of the true leadership qualities that have been exhibited by the courage of President Sadat and

<sup>213</sup> *Pravda* (Moscow), December 1, 1977, p. 1. Partial English translation, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIX, 48

(December 28, 1977), p. 2. Translation copyright 1977 by the CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

<sup>214</sup> Partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 2008 (December 19, 1977), pp. 879–884.

the reception of him in Israel by Prime Minister Begin.

This has been already a tremendous accomplishment. I think the importance of it is that there has been an initiation of direct person-to-person negotiations between Israel and the major power in the Mideast among the Arab nations who are Israel's neighbors. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan have a total population of about 12 million. Egypt has a population of 36 million and has by far the greatest military force. And the fact that this strongest Arab country and the nation of Israel are now conducting direct negotiations is a major accomplishment in itself.

Two of Israel's most cherished desires have already been met. One is this face-to-face negotiation possibility and the other one is a recognition by a major Arab leader that Israel has a right to exist. In fact, President Sadat said, "We welcome you in our midst."

The United States has been very pleased to see this reduction in distrust and a reduction in fear and a reduction in suspicion between the Arabs and the Israelis. We have played a close consultative role with both of these leaders. We have on several instances recently acted as intermediaries at their request. Both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have publicly expressed their reconfirmation that these exploratory talks are designed to lead toward a comprehensive settlement, including Israel and all her neighbors.

Sunday President Sadat called for a conference in Cairo. This is likely to be held around the 13th of December—about the middle of December. We will participate in that conference at a high level. Assistant Secretary Atherton will represent our nation.

We look on this as a very constructive step. The road toward peace has already led through Jerusalem, will now go to Cairo, and ultimately we believe to a comprehensive consultation at Geneva.

It's not an easy thing to bring about a comprehensive peace settlement. Immediate expectations have sometimes been exaggerated. The definition of real peace—I think we've made good progress on that already. The resolution of the Palestinian question still has not been decided. And the solution to the problem concerning borders and national security has also not been decided.

We have played, I think, a proper role. I have tried to convince, in the past, Prime Minister

Begin of the good intentions of President Sadat and vice versa. When there has been no progress being made, the United States has taken the initiative. Now that progress is being made, a proper role for the United States is to support that progress and to give the credit to the strong leadership that's already been exhibited by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and to let our nation be used as called upon to expedite the peace process.

I believe that this is a move that the whole world looks upon with great appreciation and, again, I want to express my congratulations and my appreciation to these two strong leaders for the tremendous progress already made and for their commitment to future progress.

*Q. What is your reaction to Secretary General Waldheim's suggestion for a post-Cairo, pre-Geneva Middle East Conference at the United Nations or on some neutral ground?*

*A.* As you know, Secretary General Waldheim has also agreed to send a high-level representative to the conference to be held in Cairo. I don't know yet what position our country will take toward a potential meeting at the United Nations. We've not received any invitation to it.

I noticed in the news this morning that Israel has said that they would not participate, but it's too early for us to decide whether or not we will go to any conference if one is actually held at the United Nations.

*Q. Egypt and Israel can legitimately deal with themselves, but can Egypt really represent all the other parties when they're not even at the conference, and the Palestinians who've never had a say in their own political destiny?*

*A.* I think that President Sadat in his private communications with me, and even in his public statements has said that he is trying as best he can to represent the Arab position concerning Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and also the resolution of the Palestinian question.

Obviously, the leaders in Syria—even Jordan, certainly the PLO—have not recognized that Egypt is speaking for them adequately. I think, though, that in his speech to the Knesset,<sup>215</sup> in his followup speech to the People's Assembly in Egypt,<sup>216</sup> that President Sadat has evoked very clearly the basic Arab position that I have un-

<sup>215</sup> Doc. 301 below.

<sup>216</sup> Doc. 310 below.

derstood in my private conversations with President Asad from Syria and with the King of Jordan, Hussein.

So I believe that this is an exploratory effort that does accurately represent the basic differences between Israel and all their neighbors, and the fact that Jordan and Syria have not been willing to participate I don't think has dampened President Sadat's commitment or enthusiasm at all. It is constructive, and I think what he discovers in his already completed discussions with Prime Minister Begin and those that might be taking place in Egypt in the middle of next month will certainly be conducive to pursuing the Arab cause.

I think it's constructive because for the first time the Arab position on those controversial issues has been spelled out very clearly for worldwide understanding, and I think the differences that have been faced by us and others for long years are now much more clearly understood by the public. The differences are still sharp. The resolution of those differences is going to be very difficult. I think that to the best of his ability President Sadat is speaking for the Arab world.

*Q. If the other Arabs refuse—continue to refuse to sit down with Israel—would the United States oppose it if Egypt and Israel somehow worked out some sort of separate agreement? Would that be a good thing, and what would our position be on that?*

A. We and Egypt and Israel have all taken the position publicly, and the same position privately among ourselves, that a separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel to the exclusion of the other parties is not desirable. This is predicated upon the very viable hope that a comprehensive settlement can be reached among all the parties involved. If at some later date it becomes obvious that Jordan does not want peace, or that Syria does not want peace, or that Lebanon does not want peace in a settlement with Israel, then an alternative might have to be pursued. But we've certainly not reached that point yet.

I think that the other Arab leaders do want peace with Israel. And I am certainly not even considering, and neither is Sadat nor Begin, any assumption that the possibilities for peace have narrowed down to just two nations.

*Q. There has been criticism of your earlier decision to bring the Soviet Union into the Middle East—the*

*peace negotiating process—and the Soviets have indeed refused to go to Cairo. Would you please explain to the American people why you think it's important that the Soviets be involved in these Middle East peace negotiations?*

A. The Soviets have been involved in the peace negotiations ever since 1973. The entire Geneva conference concept was established through the United Nations with the United States and with the Soviet Union as cochairmen. So this has been established now for at least 4 years. And this is a concept that has been adopted and approved by all the parties involved, including the United Nations, overwhelmingly, perhaps even unanimously.

In the past, I think it's accurate to say that the Soviets have not played a constructive role in many instances because they had espoused almost completely the more adamant Arab position. My own feeling is that in recent months the Soviets have moved toward a much more balanced position, as a prelude to the Geneva conference.

We have tried to spell out very clearly—certainly since I've been in office and I think my predecessors as well—the U.S. position. We disagree in some of those issues with the Soviet Union. We've not concealed those differences. We disagree in some instances because of the procedural items that are being discussed. But there is no division between us and the Soviet Union now that didn't exist before, and I would say that their positions have been much more compatible recently.

I wish that the Soviets had decided to go to Cairo. They've decided not to. But we'll make as much progress as we can, following the leadership of Sadat and Begin, to make real progress in Cairo with the Soviets not present. And my belief is that the desire of the whole world is so great for peace in the Middle East that the Soviets will follow along and take advantage of any constructive step toward peace.

The fact that we do have differences of opinion is well known, and I don't think this is an obstacle to eventual peace in the Middle East. But we did not bring the Soviets in. They have been in since the very initiation of a Geneva conference.

*Q. Do you think you can have peace in the Middle East without the Soviets involved?*

A. I think that we or the Soviets ought to play a constructive role. And I think both of us will.

We have been the nation then, and I think now, that is uniquely trusted by all the parties involved to act fairly and consistently concerning the Middle East questions. I don't believe that the Soviets occupy that position.

And I don't have any doubt that if the nations surrounding Israel can work out an individual peace settlement with Israel leading to peace treaties, that the Soviets will play a constructive role certainly at that point. It would be contrary to their own interest to be identified as an obstacle to peace. I don't think they are trying to be an obstacle to peace. Their perspective is just different from ours.

. . . . .

*Q. Is the U.S. Government taking any concrete steps with some of the other governments that have been reluctant—such as Syria, the PLO which is not a government, and the other countries—to bring them into this process that has been initiated by Israel and Egypt? And if so, what steps are we taking?*

*A.* Yes; not with the PLO. We have no contact with the PLO. But with Jordan and with Syria, with Lebanon, and in a supportive role with the Saudi Arabians and others, we have played, I think, an adequate role. At the time we discovered that President Sadat was going to make a proposal to go to Jerusalem, we immediately began to use whatever influence we had available to us to encourage the other nations not to condemn President Sadat. This particularly applied to Saudi Arabia, to Jordan, to the European countries, to the Soviet Union, and to Syria. In some instances, either they decided not to condemn him or our influence was successful.

We would like very much to keep any of the nations involved in the immediate Middle Eastern discussions from rejecting an ultimate peace settlement and withdrawing from the prospect of going to Geneva. This includes, of course, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat. They have not rejected the concept that there must be a comprehensive settlement.

In the meantime, we don't see anything wrong; in fact, we look with great favor on the bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt. In the meantime, we are trying to induce the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Jordanians, and—as I say again—in a supportive role, the Saudis and others, to support both the ongoing negotiations that will

continue from Jerusalem into Cairo and also to avoid any condemnation of Sadat that might disrupt his influence and put an obstacle to peace in the future.

That's about all we can do. We have no control over any nation in the Middle East. When we find the progress in the Middle East being stopped, we use all the initiative that we can. When we see progress being made by the parties themselves, we support them to move on their own.

I think it's much more important to have direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel than to have us acting as a constant dominant intermediary. I think this is a major step in the right direction. We hope later that Jordan and Syria and Lebanon will join in these discussions, either individually or as a comprehensive group dealing with Israel directly.

*Q. You used the word "induce." What inducements is the U.S. Government offering to Syria and the other?*

*A.* We are not offering them any payment of money or anything, but we primarily capitalize on their clear determination, their clear desire to have peace. There is no doubt in my mind at all that President Asad, who's been one of the most highly critical leaders of what Sadat did—there's no doubt in my mind that President Asad wants peace with Israel, and there is no doubt in my mind that King Hussein wants peace with Israel. And sometimes it's very difficult for them to communicate directly with Israel.

We act as an intermediary there. We meet with those leaders on both sides. Obviously, if there should be a breakthrough in the future, similar to what occurred between Egypt and Israel—let's say, for instance that if King Hussein said he would like to negotiate directly with Prime Minister Begin, we would support that enthusiastically and offer our good offices to encourage such an interchange. But we don't have any inclination or ability to dominate anyone nor to require them to take action contrary to what they think is in the best interests of their nation.



**Communiqué issued by the Council of the Mapam Party of Israel outlining its policy for peace and security<sup>217</sup>**

**December, 3, 1977**

a. The Council of the United Labour Party (Mapam) declares, at its twenty-seventh session, that the political impetus which began with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit continues. The President of Egypt is moving faster than Israel and is not allowing the initiative to slip from his hands, an initiative that still poses challenges to Israeli policy.

The Likud Government can no longer refrain from giving clear answers to these problems by being ambiguous and evasive in its statements. It is no longer possible to do what is required by simply repeating declared positions which do not contribute to breaking the dangerous political deadlock.

b. The Likud government adopted Security Council resolution 242 as a "political gain" despite the fact that it had once rejected it firmly to the point where it once withdrew from the government of national unity headed by Golda Meir.

These parties (the Likud members), when in opposition, had strongly opposed even the disengagement of forces agreements and the interim agreement—these agreements that had removed the threat of war and paved the way for a change in the region, as exemplified in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the convening of the Cairo conference.

c. What is wanted of the Likud government is that it should change its policy in a radical manner. Is it not possible to achieve peaceful settlement without having a clear policy based upon a major compromise regional solution on all fronts with secure and recognized frontiers for Israel and a solution to the Palestine problem.

d. The opposition of the Soviet Union to the process of direct negotiations begun in Cairo is harmful to the policy of peace. This matter becomes more serious with the background of the creation of a rejection front led by Libya and Iraq which aims to foil peace efforts in the region.

e. During negotiations with the Arab states, a comprehensive settlement must be sought. Israel is ready to hold negotiations for the signing of peace agreements with all Arab states collectively and with each state on its own. It will also be ready to permit any Palestinian party that recognizes the existence and sovereignty of the State of Israel to take part in the negotiations.

In spite of this, and as an interim arrangement, we will support any proposal that serves the cause of peace and gives appropriate expression to the national rights of the Palestinians provided Israel's security needs are guaranteed. Jordan, like the Palestinians, is to be considered an extremely important element in achieving a settlement.

f. An immediate halt should be called to the building of exhibitionist and provocative settlements by the Gush Emunim, which impede the path to peace. The provocative nature of this activity was shown in the construction of two army camps in Gafon and Beit Horon as sites for two new settlements.

g. The Council completely rejects any proposal being made to set up a "government of national unity", since this will be no more than a cover-up for the policy of the Begin government.

The duty of the opposition is to be an element that exposes, incites and deters, in order to confront the moves towards peace with sincerity.

h. Mapam, faithful to its own peace proposal, calls upon the masses of workers and upon the people as a whole to be alert in order to face the decisive decisions that are to come and not to allow the Likud government to waste the proper chance to advance speedily on the road to peace in our region. After these recent moves, the region will not revert to what it was in the past. Now, more than ever before, the decisive choice is between the possibility of peace and the threat of war.

<sup>217</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Al-Hamishmar* (Tel Aviv), December 4, 1977.

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**Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Vance discussing the Cairo conference and the roles of the US and the USSR in the search for peace<sup>218</sup>**

**Cairo, December 10, 1977**

*Secretary Vance:* I have had the pleasure this morning of meeting with President Sadat and exchanging views with respect to the forthcoming Cairo meetings and our joint search for a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East. I told President Sadat of the great admiration and respect which all of us have for the historic events which he set in motion with his courageous trip to Jerusalem. A new momentum has been given to the peace process by this bold initiative, and we in the United States shall do everything within our power to help maintain that momentum.

Our objective remains a comprehensive settlement. There are many things which have to be done to pave the way to an ultimate meeting at which a comprehensive settlement can be reached. The Geneva meetings will be the ultimate meeting at which that could be arrived at. The Cairo meetings will be a step on the way and will pave the ground here at these meetings toward the ultimate comprehensive proposal.

*Q. Do you have an indication that the Soviet Union is going to maintain its role as cosponsor of the peace talks?*

*A.* The Soviet Union has indicated that it will remain as a cochairman of the Geneva conference. It has indicated that it will not participate in the Cairo meetings. We had hoped that they would participate in these meetings because we believe that the Cairo meetings can and will perform a very constructive role in paving the way toward an ultimate Geneva conference.

*Q. What is the American role in the coming future steps, either in Cairo or in Geneva or in the final settlement? What are the American commitments?*

*A.* We will be playing a supportive role in the initiative which has been taken—the bold initiative by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.

*Q. You spoke twice of Geneva as the ultimate meeting at the end of this process that is being launched now. Does that mean that you now see Geneva as a place to ratify or confirm agreements reached previously and no longer the place where the agreements have to be worked out?*

*A.* What I meant by that was that, as both President Sadat and I have said, there's a great deal of work to be done to pave the way to Geneva so that Geneva can be fruitful and productive. That does not mean that there would be no substantive negotiations at Geneva.

*Q. How has the direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt changed the American role? In what ways, as you see the American role, has it changed and how has it changed?*

*A.* From the very first and for many years the United States has said that we believe that a settlement of the Middle East problem must be reached by negotiation between the parties themselves. We have always said that the United States wanted to do all in its power to facilitate such discussions. That remains our position.

We welcome direct discussions between the parties such as those that will be taking place between Egypt and Israel, and we will continue to do what we can to facilitate that process.

## 193

**Television interview statements by US National Security Advisor Brzezinski discussing the planned Cairo conference and the US role in the Middle East peace negotiations<sup>219</sup>**

**Washington, December 11, 1977**

*Mr. Clark:* Dr. Brzezinski, welcome to "Issues and Answers."

*When Middle East peace talks begin in Cairo this week between Israel and Egypt the United States will apparently be the only other participant and there is some question about just what our role will be. What do you think it will be? Will it be an active one with the United States trying to prod both parties into agreement?*

*A.* Well, I would say that the U.S. role remains

<sup>218</sup> Excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), no. 2010, (January, 1978), pp. 40–41. For President Sadat's statements at the same press conference see doc. 325 below.

<sup>219</sup> Interview conducted by Bob Clark and Ted Koppel for ABC's "Issues and Answers"; transcript supplied, on request, by the US embassy, Beirut.

what it has been throughout. That is to say of an engaged party that is deeply interested in promoting a settlement, that is a close friend of Israel, is a close friend of some of the Arabs involved. The parties concerned, the Israelis and the Arabs, want us to be involved, want us to help advance the process towards a settlement and that is what we will be doing in Cairo, that is what we have been doing prior to Cairo, that is what we will be doing after Cairo.

*Mr. Clark: President Sadat this past week has given the impression on two or three occasions that he thinks it is now up to the United States to pressure Israel into making the concessions that are necessary to a peace settlement. Will we do that, will we be working on Israel to make concessions such as giving up occupied territory?*

A. I don't think our role is that of pressuring parties. Our role is to help the parties understand the concerns of the others. Our role is to try to assure the parties that they will gain more through a compromise, through a settlement, than through continued conflict.

The fact that at one time or another a prominent leader may expect this or that from us doesn't alter the fundamental and continuing nature of the U.S. involvement in this problem, one which antedates, incidentally, this Administration.

*Mr. Koppel: Dr. Brzezinski, you have given the impression of a certain sense of continuity in American policy. But isn't it a fact in the past year the United States has been pushing very, very hard for a Geneva conference and that things were really taken out of U.S. hands for a few weeks? Possibly we are becoming re-engaged. How would you describe the changes that have taken place in policy over the past few weeks?*

A. Well, let me make two points about that. First of all it is true that our role has changed. It has changed because when we assumed office we felt that the accomplishments of the previous Administration in moving step by step towards some accommodation made it now possible to exploit opportunities that exist and continue to exist to move towards a more comprehensive settlement and this is what the President has done throughout the year, quite deliberately, to encourage the parties, to think and to talk about things they weren't prepared to discuss previously, to confront the real issues and to begin discussing them directly. I believe we have accomplished that last objective. We have actually encouraged

the parties to talk directly and both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have stated that. Secondly our objective has not been Geneva. Our objective has been movements towards a settlement. Geneva is a means to that objective. If that means can serve that objective well, it will be used. If that objective can be approached through other steps, those steps will be pursued. Ultimately we will need some mechanism for ratification, for the final negotiation, if agreements are made outside of Geneva and that instrument will be Geneva. But a lot can be accomplished prior to Geneva and I believe we again have an opportunity to move quite effectively towards a significant reduction of the differences that have divided the Arabs and the Israelis in the past.

*Mr. Koppel: Let me ask you to underscore that point if you would. You seem to be suggesting that Geneva now will be purely an environment for ratification. Would that be correct, that agreements very possibly will be reached elsewhere and that Geneva, rather than being the basis or locale for negotiation, will be the locale for ratifying agreements that have been reached in other places?*

A. No, I very deliberately gave myself the opportunity of playing the future, if you will, in two different ways. One way would be to negotiate out all of the difficult issues in Geneva. Another way would be to resolve some of them, if not all of them, outside of Geneva and resolve the remaining issues in Geneva, using Geneva also to ratify the progress made outside of Geneva.

Talking to some of your colleagues in the course of the last week I used the analogy of three concentric circles. The first circle right now involves the Israelis and the Egyptians talking together directly and the United States being there because they want us to be there. We think it is a useful dialogue, we are willing to be there, we are prepared to be helpful.

The second outer concentric circle involves the moderate Arabs. We hope to engage them in this process. We would like to see the moderate Palestinians and the Jordanians become engaged because the issue of the West Bank and Gaza is critically relevant and both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have emphasized that the issue goes beyond the purely bilateral one. And we would align the Saudis who are clearly on the sidelines but are very germane to back this wider dialogue. And then there is the outer concentric circle which involves the Soviet Union, which

involves the Syrians if they choose not to become engaged sooner, and that clearly is Geneva. And what would be accomplished in Geneva depends in great measure on what is and is not accomplished prior to Geneva. I cannot predict the future but I do feel quite confident that progress will be made. And it really doesn't matter too much whether it is made within this or that form, the ultimate step will involve Geneva in some fashion.

*Mr. Koppel: Isn't that a considerable departure, though, from previous American policy? I mean previous American policy of this Administration? It has until now always involved bringing the Russians into the process immediately, keeping them in the process. You are now talking about a three-stage process in which the Russians possibly would become involved in the third and final stage?*

A. Not at all. Our policy has been flexible and has been focused on the objective of getting the parties to negotiate. The President started very deliberately and shortly after the inaugural, to try to stimulate the parties to speak more openly about the central issues. He did that with the full knowledge that in the past they have not been able to do so, with the determination to stimulate them in so doing. We then tried to move them towards a negotiation of the basic principles. When it became clear in the course of the summer that not sufficient movement was being generated we concluded that therefore the alternative was to go to Geneva to try to organize a structure in Geneva in which both multilateral and bilateral talks could be held. This required us to resolve the issue of how to organize Geneva with the Soviets, with the co-chairman, in order also to commit themselves to maintain a moderate posture in Geneva, and this was the purpose of the initiatives taken in late summer and early fall. The events of the last few weeks have opened up the opportunity again of having more movement through the direct inter-course of the parties and we are perfectly willing to let that develop, run its course, engage others in it because we see it as a positive development. But I want to emphasize if Geneva was first of all never the end purpose but was a mechanism which we decided to apply in the late summer—that is to say after six or seven months of effort—to respond to the circumstances that had developed in the course of the summer. We now have different circumstances and we are quite flexible about using whatever opportunity or whatever instrument is available to advance all the parties to a com-

prehensive settlement.

*Mr. Clark: What makes you think, Dr. Brzezinski, the Soviets would be content to sit on the sidelines in the third phase of the third concentric circles and come in only when the Syrians come in?*

A. We are perfectly happy, we would be only too delighted if they want to come in sooner. Anyone who is prepared to participate in a process of negotiation based on accommodation and moderation, anyone who doesn't support the rejectionists and the extremists is welcome to participate earlier. We are not keeping the Soviets out. If they choose to come in early I am sure all of the parties will welcome them if they come in in the spirit of moderation and accommodation. If they choose to stay out, this is their decision, not ours.

*Mr. Clark: Isn't there a danger in this concept that the United States would line up with Egypt and perhaps Jordan and you would have the Soviet Union behind Syria and perhaps the hard-line countries on the other side and leading perhaps to that big power confrontation in the Middle East nobody has ever wanted?*

A. The big power confrontation in the Middle East is likely to occur as a by-product of a direct confrontation in the Middle East. If there are successful negotiations or progressively successful negotiations between the Israelis on the one hand and the Egyptians, the moderate Palestinians and the Jordanians on the other, then the chances of a confrontation in the Middle East which escalates into a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union are significantly reduced. This is what we are trying to achieve. Whether the Soviet Union chooses to engage itself in that peace-making process sooner or later is a Soviet decision. It is not our decision.

*Mr. Clark: If this three-phase concept should not work out and you end up with a separate peace agreement between Israel and Egypt would you regard that as a dangerous development that would increase a long-term risk of a new Middle East war?*

A. I don't want to hypothesize in regards to a development which is precluded by the parties directly concerned. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have repeatedly said—and I believe they are sincere; in fact I think I know they are sincere—that they do not wish a separate Israeli/Egyptian peace treaty.

*Mr. Clark: But Prime Minister Begin has said he would sign such a treaty.*

A. But they realize that this ought to be part of a larger effort in which some of the other issues, if not all of the issues, have to be dealt with.

Given the vulnerabilities of the Middle Eastern scene, given the interdependence, economic not to speak political—between the various Arab entities, one has to strike a proper balance between what is to be included and what can be excluded in the process of peacemaking and if there is progress between the Israelis and the Egyptians, if the Egyptians' initiative which was a courageous one by President Sadat, is reciprocated in substance and therefore if there is some additional movement in regard to the West Bank and Gaza, we will have a very viable and very constructive development.

*Mr. Koppel: Dr. Brzezinski, Philip Habib, the under Secretary of State, was just in Moscow, has met over the last couple of days with Secretary Vance in Brussels. I am curious: What is the Russian posture right now? We have seen press reports that they seem to be rather upset with the United States. Is that accurate?*

A. My impression is that the press reports are reasonably accurate; which I am sure you will find very reassuring. Yes, they are upset. I think they feel that developments that have taken place in recent weeks, from their standpoint, have not been productive. They are not happy about the Cairo conference. I assume they would have liked us not to take part in it. But we will manage some how, I hope, over time, to resolve the differences.

*Mr. Koppel: Now only two months ago the United States and the Soviet Union signed a joint statement<sup>220</sup> with regard to the Middle East. The Soviets, I gather, are unhappy in part because they feel we haven't lived up to that.*

*I am curious: What role have we foreseen for the Soviet Union in these Middle East negotiations? What contribution did you believe they could make?*

A. Are you talking, about the past or are you talking about the future?

*Mr. Koppel. I am talking about the past couple of months. When that declaration was signed what role did you think the Soviets were going to play? Clearly, they didn't play it.*

A. I thought I had already, in a way, answered

that when I said by late summer it seemed to us that about as much progress had been made outside of formal negotiations as was possible; through indirect contacts, through the kind of mediation that President Carter had so skillfully and courageously undertaken. That therefore the setting was ripe for a multinational conference in which all of the parties would sit down and engage in face-to-face negotiations.

*Mr. Koppel: I understand that but I was just wondering what role the Soviets were going to play.*

A. I will get to that. Now on the basis for such a multilateral face-to-face negotiation was Geneva. The Soviets under Geneva are co-chairmen. Therefore it was, we felt, in the collective interest of all of the participants to establish certain ground rules which would make certain that the co-chairmen approach these negotiations in a spirit of moderation and restraint and the only purpose of the joint statement was to eliminate the possibility that one of the co-chairmen in the course of the multilateral negotiations would adopt positions favoring extremist positions. That was all. What role would be played would, of course, depend on the decisions made by each superpower. Our hope was that the Soviet Union would use its influence constructively to restrain Syrians, to restrain the PLO, to encourage the more rigid parties into a somewhat more flexible and moderate position.

*Mr. Koppel: There have been some suggestions coming from the Egyptians themselves and President Sadat has hinted at it that one reason he made his dramatic gesture was because he was so upset about the fact that the United States had brought the Soviets so directly into the negotiating process. Have you found that to be correct?*

A. No, I haven't. In fact I think this is one of a number of speculative fictions that have recently abounded. Both Sadat and Begin have repeatedly stated that they see what they are doing as a necessary stage on the way to Geneva and there is no way of keeping the Soviets out of Geneva. President Sadat's primary concern, and he has stated this both publicly and privately in his correspondence with President Carter, was that the road to Geneva was becoming strewn with obstacles, that there were procedural pitfalls that couldn't be surmounted, that what was needed was a psychological breakthrough of historical proportions, and he decided to undertake such a

<sup>220</sup> Doc. 160 above.

breakthrough in order to open the road eventually to multilateral conferences. One of the consequences of what he has done is however the possibility of more limited accommodation with a smaller number of parties and we are not against that. We think it is useful.

*Mr. Koppel: Obviously though, Dr. Brzezinski, the world doesn't stand still as we go through these various phases and you have suggested on a couple of occasions now that we are in one of the less accommodating phases of our relationship with the Soviet Union. What does that bode for the Cairo conference? Are we committed to getting as much substance out of the Cairo conference as possible?*

A. Well, we would hope the Cairo conference would first of all push forward the Israeli/Egyptian relationship and try to set in motion a process in which these differences are not only narrowed but create a basis for dealing more constructively, effectively, with the other problems. And I have already mentioned the West Bank and Gaza as one which is clearly relevant and important.

Beyond that, of course, there is also the Golan. In addition to it there are a variety of security arrangements which would have to be part of any peace treaty.

I would like to emphasize that in all of this we are engaged in a long-term process and one of the first decisions we made in the course of this year was not to go for quick fixes, not to go for instant successes but to analyze the nature of the dilemmas we confront, in a number of key areas; in the Middle East, Southern Africa, SALT, nuclear proliferation, arms transfers, Panama and our relations with the third world, and try to set in motion processes which over three or four years of time will have really deep structural effects, enduring effects, effects which will create over time a somewhat different international system, a somewhat different set of international relationships.

We don't expect an instant resolution but we are setting in motion a process which we hope will pay off in two or three or hopefully a faster number of years.

**Speech by Israel delegate Ben Elissar to the opening session of the Cairo conference discussing peace in the Middle East<sup>221</sup>**

**Cairo, December 14, 1977**

Mr Chairman, yesterday my colleagues and I, the delegation of Israel, travelled from Jerusalem to Cairo. It was a unique experience. The flight was brief, but the journey of the spirit was infinite. Looking down from our aircraft, we saw a landscape embracing two ancient lands, two very old peoples, two civilizations, two historic neighbours, Egypt and Israel, names that are as old and as indestructible as the annals of mankind. From the dawn of history our countries have been neighbours. We have shared common experiences, engaged in mutual commerce and, at times, defended ourselves against common enemies. Indeed, there were times in the past when we were attached by deep alliances. Tragically, we have lately been at war. Now, after 30 years of conflict, we meet again, Egypt and Israel, this time to begin preparing the peace. We come to renew an age-long relationship that for too long was interrupted by the nightmare of my own people's exile from its land and by the political and military strife of the last decade since the rebirth of our independence. May God grant us all the wisdom to succeed in this great, humane and sacred venture for peace, for our own sakes, for the sake of our people and, above all, for the sake of the generations to come.

Mr Chairman, at this time and in this place, I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to express sincere appreciation to our hosts, the Arab republic of Egypt, for the invitation and hospitality accorded. We extend our thanks to the President, the Government and people of Egypt, for the manner in which we have been received and for the courtesies extended to us. The facilities placed at our disposal will, I feel sure, contribute in spirit and in substance to the purposes of the mission in which we are joined. People of goodwill everywhere hope and pray for the success of our talks.

Our deliberations have consequences that extend far beyond our two countries and our common

<sup>221</sup> Broadcast on Cairo radio and television in Arabic and Israel radio and television in Hebrew; English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5693/A/9-10; reprinted by permission.

region. We have to address ourselves to issues that have long awaited a table around which to sit and reason together. It is this that brings us to Cairo, to talk, to reason and to conduct a dialogue in frankness and in mutual confidence. If we wish to move from here toward peace, nobody else can do the job for us. We, the countries involved in this conflict, can resolve the problems that have to be resolved. If there is a lesson to be learned from our long dispute, it is that peace cannot be made by proxy. It is for this reason that we regret the absence in this city and from this table of all those who should be with us today—representatives of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and an appropriate delegation of Palestinian Arabs. I declare this because the goal of the Government of Israel is a comprehensive agreement and not a separate agreement. It is a real peace that we seek—peace with all our neighbours, to the east and the north. Our goal is now to begin to translate the principles established in Security Council Resolution 242 into all the necessary elements of a peace treaty, namely: Termination of the state of war forever; establishment of diplomatic relations; commerce; international co-operation; use of international waterways; mutual assistance in all fields of national activity. It is proper that these goals be achieved at a reconvened Geneva conference.

The initial building blocks of reconciliation have been laid. Let us resolve to cement them into a firm foundation. Let us resolve that the absence of certain states from these talks will not be permitted to frustrate our sacred common efforts for peace. It is an axiom of our times that the Arab-Israel conflict has lasted too long. Seen in its historical text, it has been a tragic and futile conflict. No future war can possibly change the permanent sovereign reality of our region. The Jewish State of Israel is an integral and permanent part of the regional political reality. Thirty years ago, after having liberated our country from foreign rule in a heroic struggle of the few against the many, our national independence was proclaimed. That act meant the reconstituting of our statehood in the Land of Israel, the land of our forefathers. After two millennia of persecution and ultimately, physical destruction, they were reunited with the Land of Israel and with everything that is precious, sacred and permanent in our national life. The rebirth of Israel was the highest expression of humane justice.

I believe that we share an intrinsic common sentiment rooted both in history and contemporary experiences. In recent times, both have had to struggle, fight and sacrifice for our freedom and independence. Since then, we have both fought to build a better life for our peoples. The eventual peace, co-operation and tranquillity of our ancient nations in our ancient region is as inevitable in the days to come as it was in the days of the past. The profound vision that we have a common destiny was articulated by a prophet whose name our two faiths cherish: It was Iasiah who said: [Ben Elissar quotes first in Hebrew, then gives the English translation] "In that day Israel will be the third with Egypt and Assyria. A blessing in the midst of the earth whom the Lord of Hosts has blessed, saying, blessed be Egypt, My people, and Assyria, the work of My hands, and Israel, My heritage."

Let us here renew the mutual pledge that was made in Jerusalem between the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Prime Minister of the State of Israel: No more bloodshed. This is the vision we have inherited from our common prophet. For years we have prayed for its realization. And let us remind ourselves, and the world, of the Jeffersonian principle: enemies in war—in peace, friends. We want peace and we shall be friends. Thank you.

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### **Speech by US delegate Atherton to the opening session of the Cairo conference discussing peace in the Middle East<sup>222</sup>**

**Cairo, December 14, 1977**

It is an honor to represent the United States on this historic occasion.

I would like first to extend congratulations to the Governments of both Egypt and Israel whose commitment to peace has made it possible for this meeting to convene. It is a particular pleasure to be sitting at this table today with friends from Egypt and Israel and with Gen. Siilasvuo, who is present to represent Secretary General Waldheim.

<sup>222</sup>*Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), no. 2010, (January, 1978), pp. 47–48.

In sending me here, President Carter made it clear that the U.S. Government sees the convening of this meeting in Cairo as a constructive step on the road to peace. We are ready to do whatever we can to facilitate, support, and encourage the negotiations here to prepare the way for the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference and the achievement of a comprehensive, just, and durable peace in the Middle East.

For nearly 30 years the Middle East conflict has reaped a terrible harvest of lives, resources, and energies of Arabs and Israelis alike. It is true that during this period there have been some steps forward: Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the convening of the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva in 1973<sup>223</sup> and the conclusion of three limited agreements<sup>224</sup> under the auspices of that conference, all testified to the increasing commitment by the parties to the search for a peaceful settlement.

Yet, in spite of this progress, the remaining psychological obstacles have imposed formidable barriers, as the attempt has been made this year to take the logical next step of opening negotiations for a final peace settlement at Geneva.

The momentous events of recent weeks have fundamentally altered that situation and have provided new hope that the objective of an overall settlement embodied in peace treaties can, in fact, be achieved. With one bold stroke President Sadat has broken through the barrier and imparted new momentum toward peace. With farsightedness and statesmanship, Prime Minister Begin has responded in a manner that makes it clear that Israel, for its part, does not intend to allow this unique opportunity to be lost. These two strong and creative leaders have brought about a sea change in attitudes both in Israel and in the Arab countries, and today solutions—a month ago considered unattainable—have been suddenly brought within the realm of possibility.

Today few nations in the world would challenge the proposition that these developments have created a unique opportunity for successful negotiations leading to peace in the Middle East. The idea of peace has captured the imagination and ignited the hopes of a war-weary region. The

government leaders who are charged with the responsibility, as well as the challenge, of negotiating can do so with the confidence that there is today an overwhelming public constituency in the region for peace.

All of us in this room would agree that we must not allow the momentum of these events to be lost. President Sadat has called this meeting to prepare for a reconvening of the Geneva conference, the objective of which remains the negotiation, among all the parties to the conflict, of a final peace settlement on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.

I must record my government's regret that others invited to this meeting have felt unable to accept the invitation to attend. Ultimately, I believe those absent will see that the process begun here is in their benefit. We are all agreed the door remains open for others to join at any time.

My government—indeed each of the governments represented here—has emphasized on numerous occasions that our objective is the negotiation of a comprehensive peace settlement. Central to my government's policy over the years is the concept that this peace can only be achieved through negotiations between the parties. Security Council Resolution 242 established the principles for those negotiations. Resolution 338, which made a convening of the conference in Geneva possible, established the process. We have always held the view that wherever and whenever the parties can start talking with one another, it is in the spirit of that mandate.

We see the discussions getting underway today in Cairo as an integral and contributory step toward a reconvening of the Geneva conference and the negotiation of a comprehensive peace. We do not agree that these proceedings are contradictory to the Geneva conference. As President Carter said: "The road towards peace has already led through Jerusalem, will now go to Cairo, and ultimately, we believe, to a comprehensive consultation at Geneva."<sup>225</sup>

In calling for this preparatory meeting, President Sadat has indicated two basic objectives: Making progress toward resolving the substantive problems and overcoming the remaining unresolved procedural obstacles to a Geneva conference. We believe these are realistic and obtainable goals and that valuable work can be done

<sup>223</sup> See docs. 216–218 and docs. 340–344 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>224</sup> Doc. 115 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine 1975*.

<sup>225</sup> Doc. 190 above.



here. We will do everything we can to help the two negotiating parties make progress. It is for them to define in the first instance the subject matter of these discussions, but we will remain available to offer counsel, suggestions, or any other assistance the parties may feel they need.

We are opening these talks at a unique moment. All of us here must not only hope we have reached a turning point in history but also must make our contribution to insure that it will indeed prove to be a lasting turning point. The leaders of our respective governments—and our peoples—are expecting us to achieve solid results at this meeting, and we should not fail them. As President Carter recently said: “We may be facing now the best opportunity for a permanent Middle East peace settlement in our lifetime. We must not let it slip by.”

In closing I hope you will permit me to indulge in a brief personal reflection. For many years I have labored, on behalf of my government and with countless colleagues—some of whom have given their lives in the effort—to help our Arab and Israeli friends find a breakthrough to peace. I have shared and, I think, have acquired some understanding of the agonies both sides experience as they face decisions fateful for the future of their peoples—and, indeed, for the world. It is a great personal satisfaction to be part of these talks which hold out so much hope that the long-sought breakthrough has been achieved. The negotiation of deeply rooted differences involving vital national interests is never a smooth or easy task, and we can expect moments of discouragement. These must and can be overcome, however, if the governments we serve, and we personally, keep before us the vision we all share today of a peaceful and prosperous Middle East. My government is fully dedicated to that vision.

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**Press conference statements by US President Carter discussing the visit of Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the US, the Cairo conference and the role of the USSR in the Middle East<sup>226</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1977

Q. *There are reports that Prime Minister Begin is bringing along some of his peace proposals to discuss with you. My question is, if the United States underwrites peace, will we have a say in terms of what real peace is; if it gives economic aid, psychological aid, security, and so forth?*

A. Our hope and our goal has been that the nations directly involved in the Middle Eastern crisis—the Middle Eastern disputes—would meet directly with one another and reach agreements that would encompass three basic questions. One is the definition of real peace, genuine peace, predictable peace, relationships among human beings that might transcend the incumbency of any particular leader. I think President Sadat has made a major stride already in the achievement of what is real peace.

The second one is the withdrawal of the Israelis from territory and, at the same time, the assurance that they would have secure borders.

And the third one, of course, is to resolve the Palestinian question. As I have said before, the direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel is a major step forward.

We are attending the Cairo conference and will offer our good services when it is needed. But the basic responsibility will be on the shoulders of the two nations directly involved.

As you know, U.N. observers are also there. Other countries were invited by President Sadat to attend—Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Soviet Union. They have not yet accepted that invitation. We are not trying to define the terms of peace. Anything that is acceptable to Israel and her neighbors will certainly be acceptable to us.

But we are always available, I hope, as a trusted intermediary on occasion to break a deadlock or add a supportive word or in a way to introduce

<sup>226</sup> Excerpted from the partial text, *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), no. 2010 (January, 1978), pp. 13–14.

one of those leaders to another and convince the opposite party that each leader is acting in good faith.

I have no idea what proposals, if any, Prime Minister Begin will bring to me tomorrow morning. But he and I will meet privately—just the two of us—for a while at his request, and I will listen to what his report might be, and we will be as constructive as we have been in the past.

*Q. Do you have any idea of what the outcome of the Cairo conference will be in terms of goals?*

A. I have hopes, but obviously I can't predict what will occur. We have always hoped that even when some of the nations choose not to participate that the nations who do negotiate could move a major step forward toward an ultimate comprehensive peace settlement.

Both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have stated publicly and repeatedly that they are not seeking strictly a bilateral or two-nation agreement. They recognize that an agreement in the Sinai without involving the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, could not be a permanent resolution of territorial differences. And if they ignore the Palestinian question this would still not result in permanent peace, and if the Palestinian question is not addressed, again, it would not be an adequate step toward permanent peace.

So I think, obviously, this is a good first step. I would hope that in Cairo itself, even if the other nations don't choose to attend, that Egypt and Israel can make a major stride toward a comprehensive peace that would at least address in definitive terms the questions that also involve Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese.

*Q. I take it from your description of the U.S. role in the Mideast that it is not your intention to endorse specific proposals; that is to say, if Mr. Begin or anyone else presents to you what they hope to do, that they would not be able to go back to a peace conference and say, "Jimmy Carter says that this is what he likes."*

A. That is a fairly good assessment. I stay in close touch with most of the Middle Eastern leaders, certainly President Sadat. We exchange communications several times a week. Cy Vance is returning from the Middle East tonight, and he will give me a very definitive analysis of the

attitude of all the Middle Eastern leaders involved, plus Saudi Arabia, one step removed geographically.

I think I know at least in general terms what would be acceptable to President Sadat, maybe not as a final conclusive agreement but as an interim step or major step, toward a final agreement. And if Prime Minister Begin's proposal, in my own personal judgment, is conducive to a step in the right direction and would be acceptable to President Sadat, then I would certainly privately tell him, "This is a very good step."

If it should be far short of what I think President Sadat could accept without very serious political consequences and serious disappointment in Egypt and the rest of the world, I would have no reticence about telling Prime Minister Begin privately, "I just don't think this goes far enough." But I would not be the ultimate judge of whether it would be acceptable to the Egyptians or not. That would be up to President Sadat.

*Q. Do you feel that the Soviet Union in recent months has been in any way helpful in trying to bring peace to the Middle East, and how do you regard U.S.-Soviet relations as we come to the end of this year?*

A. I think our relations with them are much better than they were shortly after I became President. I think they have gotten to know me and my attitudes; I think I have gotten to know them and their attitudes much better than before, on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a comprehensive test ban, the Indian Ocean, and many other items. We have had a very constructive relationship with the Soviet Union which I think is constantly improving. I think the Soviets have been much more constructive in the Middle East than they formerly had.

Obviously, they have not been as constructive as I would like to have seen. The Soviets, for instance, were invited to attend the Cairo conference, along with other nations. They were invited by President Sadat. They chose to decline the invitation. I wished that they had accepted. The Syrians have chosen to decline. I have no evidence that the Soviets have had to use their influence on the Syrians to prevent their attendance. I think this was a decision made by President Asad in Syria.

So I would say the Soviets have not been very constructive yet. They have not been nearly as

much of an obstacle as they apparently were in the past.

Our general relationships with the Soviets are very good, and my hope is that they will continue to cooperate in the future when we go past Cairo toward an ultimate Geneva conference. I was well pleased with the joint Soviet and American statement.<sup>227</sup> Although it is not a definitive solution, obviously, it has no obstacles in it which would prevent an ultimate resolution of the Middle East differences.

So I would say it is a mixed assessment. In general, though, they could have been much worse.

*Q. Your preference for a general or comprehensive settlement in the Middle East is quite understandable, one that could be endorsed by all the interested parties. But I wonder if you think, in light of what has happened since President Sadat's visit, since many people feel that Israel has no real worries about a one-time war, that if an agreement—formal or informal—even a real warming takes place between Israel and Egypt, that you could have de facto peace in the Middle East, perhaps not as neat and wrapped up as a treaty, that would be a major accomplishment in itself? And do you think that it may have to come to that as a result of President Asad's opposition to the talks and the Palestine Liberation Organization?*

A. Our immediate hope and goal is that any peace move made by Israel and Egypt would be acceptable to the moderate Arab leaders in the Middle East, certainly King Hussein in Jordan, certainly the Saudi Arabians. We have had good indications in my personal visits with President Asad that he wants to resolve the differences. Lebanon is heavily influenced, as you know, by Syrian presence there. The PLO have been completely negative. They have not been cooperative at all.

In spite of my own indirect invitation to them and the direct invitations by Sadat and by Asad, by King Hussein, by King Khalid in Saudi Arabia, the PLO have refused to make any move toward a peaceful attitude. They have completely rejected U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. They have refused to make a public acknowledgement that Israel has a right to exist, to exist in peace. So I think they have, themselves, removed the PLO from any immediate prospect of participation in a peace discussion.

But I certainly would not ascribe that sort of intransigence or negative attitude toward any of the other parties who have been mentioned as possible participants. We want to be sure that at least moderate Palestinians are included in the discussions. And this is an attitude that is mirrored not only by myself but also by Prime Minister Begin, President Sadat, and others. So I think they are all major steps, already having been taken, to delineate those who are immediately eager to conclude a step toward peace—those like President Asad who will wait awhile to see what does occur, see if the Golan Heights question can be resolved and so forth, and those who have, in effect, removed themselves from serious consideration like the PLO.

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**Statement by the Political Bureau of the Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) outlining conditions for a just peace in the Middle East<sup>228</sup>**

December, 19, 1977

It is natural that the people wish to know whether the Begin-Sadat-Carter talks will truly lead to the peace that is desired. It is clear now that, despite Begin's loud talk about peace, he has not changed his basic and inflexible position. His own proposal for "administrative autonomy", "the Arabs of Eretz-Israel" and "mutual settlement," is nothing more than a cover up for continued Israeli military and political hegemony and continued Israeli colonization throughout the West Bank and the Gaza strip. This constitutes continued indifference to the Palestinian Arab people and to their right to establish their independent state.

It has in fact been established that all attempts at settling the Middle East conflict through separate settlements that take no account of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people are vain attempts that cannot lead to peace and security.

The Palestinian Arab people, both inside and outside the occupied territories, have one sole national, representative, adopted and recognized body: the PLO.

<sup>227</sup> Doc. 160 above.

<sup>228</sup> Translated from the Hebrew text, *Zo Haderekh* (Tel Aviv), no. 51, December 21, 1977, p. 1.

All attempts that are being made to circumvent the Geneva peace conference, the Palestine problem and the PLO are simply attempts to ignore a basic factor without which there can be no joint or permanent peace.

It is known that the UN General Assembly resolved, on May 29, 1947, to create two states in the country, one Jewish and one Arab. The State of Israel came into being in accordance with that resolution. Experience has shown that because the Palestinian Arab people did not exercise their right to establish their independent state alongside the State of Israel, the peace that is desired has not come about.

Prime Minister Begin is holding talks with the leaders of the United States whose concern is with the strategic interests of American oil and armament executives and not with genuine peace in the Middle East. They exploit the Israeli-Arab conflict for their own personal ends. Had they truly wanted a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Palestine problem, they would have conducted negotiations on the basis of Soviet-American cooperation at the Geneva conference. Does not the Soviet Union, in all its statements and acts, support the establishment of a comprehensive, just and permanent peace in the Middle East, a peace that respects the national rights of peoples and nations, including Israel and the Palestinian Arab people?

The steps taken by Begin and Sadat do not, therefore, lead to a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East but rather to a separate and partial agreement which permits basic issues to remain unsolved. This, in essence, is the threat of war.

In these tumultuous days, we say the following to the people of Israel: A stable and comprehensive peace is impossible unless it is based upon justice for everyone, upon mutual respect for rights, withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside the sovereign state of Israel and a guarantee of the security of all states and of their territorial integrity through effective international security arrangements and safeguards.

**Press interview statements by President Brezhnev of the USSR affirming Soviet support for a Geneva conference and condemning President Sadat of Egypt's separate peace initiative<sup>229</sup>**

**Moscow, December 24, 1977**

*Q. What can you tell us about present developments in the Middle East?*

A. The Middle East question is an acute problem. Recently certain changes have taken place, unfortunately, of a negative nature. And this happened precisely at the time when it seemed that developments would turn in a positive direction—namely the convocation of the Geneva peace conference—when much effort has been made in this regard, among others the common efforts of the USSR and the USA as co-sponsors of the conference. Today the situation has become much more complicated.

The convening of the Geneva conference and a general solution to the Middle East problem have become more difficult.

The course of events in the Middle East during the recent past is known. In this regard I should like to stress the following: the Soviet Union was and remains a true supporter of an overall settlement for this part of the world with the participation of all interested parties—including the PLO—a solution that foresees the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the 1967 occupied Arab territories; the realisation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people—including its right to self-determination and the creation of its own state; the guaranteeing of its right to an independent existence and the security of all states that are partners to the conflict, including the Arab neighbour states of Israel as well as the state of Israel; an end to the state of war between the Arab countries concerned and Israel. Only if these basic

<sup>229</sup> *Pravda* (Moscow), December 24, 1977; translated from the partial German text as published in *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), February 25, 1978, D117–D118. The above document has been quoted from the number 4/78 of the review *EUROPA-ARCHIV* © VERLAG FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK GmbH, Bonn.

principles are realised will peace in the Middle East be lasting and not just an insecure truce.

In no way do we believe that the way of one-sided concessions vis-a-vis Israel and separate dealings with it—such as the famous negotiations led by Egyptian-Israeli personalities—would lead to such a goal. On the contrary, they are moving us away from this goal by creating a deep rift in the Arab world. This is the way to sabotage a true settlement and, most of all, to bury the Geneva conference even before it starts.

The exaggerated praise of the imaginary “virtues” of the so-called direct negotiations, that is Israeli negotiations with each one of the confrontation countries, is nothing but an attempt to make the Arabs unable to achieve their cause in unity and with the support of friendly countries for their just cause.

Therefore the USSR is an advocate for the convening of the Geneva conference, under conditions, however, that would not be used as a cover for separate agreements which are against the interests of the Arabs and against a just and durable peace. This is our position. It is fully and wholly supported by the Soviet people as well as by the peace-loving nations of the world.

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### **Joint “agreed declaration” by Israel and Egypt after talks in Ismailiya between Prime Minister Begin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt<sup>230</sup>**

**Ismailiya, December 26, 1977**

After my visit to Jerusalem a new spirit prevailed in the area, and we have agreed in Jerusalem and in Ismailia also to continue our efforts toward achieving a comprehensive settlement. We have agreed on raising the level of representation in the Cairo conference to the ministerial level, and we have agreed on two committees—a political committee and a military committee headed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Defence. The political committee will meet in Jerusalem, the military in Cairo. Those committees shall work in the context of the Cairo conference.

They will report to the plenary whenever they reach any decision.

On the question of withdrawal we have made progress. But on the Palestinian question, which we consider the core and crux of the problem here in this area, the Egyptian and Israeli delegations discussed the Palestinian problem. The position of Egypt is that on the West Bank and Gaza strip a Palestinian State should be established. The position of Israel is that Palestinian Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip should enjoy self-rule. Because we differed on this issue, we agreed to discuss it in the political committee of the Cairo preparatory conference.

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### **Joint press conference statements by Prime Minister Begin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt assessing their meeting in Ismailiya<sup>231</sup>**

**Ismailiya, December 26, 1977**

*Sadat:* In the name of God, let me seize this opportunity to express my gratitude for the efforts you have done to cover the historical moments here in Ismailiya. As you know, after my visit to Jerusalem on the 20th of November, a new spirit prevails in the area and we have agreed in Jerusalem and in Ismailiya also to continue our efforts towards achieving a comprehensive settlement.

We have agreed upon raising the level of the representation in the Cairo conference to ministerial level and as you have heard yesterday we have agreed upon two committees—a political committee and a military committee headed by ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defence. The military committee will convene in Cairo. The political committee will convene in Jerusalem.

Those committees shall work in the context of the Cairo conference, meaning that they will report to the plenary whenever they reach any decision. The question of the withdrawal we have made progress, but on the Palestinian question, which we consider the core and crux of the problem here in this area, the Egyptian and Israeli delegations here discussed the Palestinian problem.

<sup>230</sup> Read to the press by President Sadat in English; *Africa Diary* (New Delhi), XVIII, 8 (February 19–25, 1978), p. 8879.

<sup>231</sup> Interview conducted in English except where noted; transcript as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, December 27, 1977, pp. 4, 7.

The position of Egypt is that on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip a Palestinian state should be established. The position of Israel is that Palestinian Arabs in Judea, Samaria, the West Bank of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip should enjoy self rule.

We have agreed that because we have differed on the issue, the issue will be discussed in the political committee of the Cairo preparatory conference.

I hope I have given you some light upon our work and thank you again.

*Begin:* Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. I have come here a hopeful prime minister and I am leaving a happy man. The conference in Ismailiya has been successful. We will continue with the momentum of the peace-making process.

Now starts the phase of the most serious negotiations—how to establish peace between Egypt and Israel as part of a comprehensive settlement throughout the Middle East. These two days are very good days for Egypt, Israel and for peace.

May I express our gratitude to the president for his gracious hospitality he bestowed upon me, upon my friends and colleagues, the Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and the Defence Minister Ezer Weizman and our collaborators and advisers.

This is the second meeting between President Sadat and myself after the historic event of his breakthrough visit to Jerusalem.

Here, too, may I say, we spoke as friends. We want to establish real peace. There are problems to discuss and in these two committees, the chairmanship of which we will rotate between our respective ministers, those serious negotiations and talks will take place.

Now my friends and I will leave Ismailiya and Egypt with the faith that we contributed to the peace-making process and there is hope that, with God's help, President Sadat and I and our friends will establish peace.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

*Q. Mr. Begin: what are the advantages of two or three committees working in tandem rather than a cohesive peace forum and since you and President Sadat obviously coordinated these discussions, do you expect to meet soon and frequently?*

*Begin:* The committees will start with their work quite soon. In the first week of January they will work every day. We hope for good and concrete results. President Sadat and I also agreed during

our private talks, if necessary, from time to time we shall meet again.

*Q. Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat, would you say Egypt and Israel are about to achieve a peace treaty in a couple months?*

*Sadat:* We are working towards a comprehensive settlement. As I said before, we want to establish peace in the area. Without a comprehensive settlement we can't achieve peace.

*Begin:* I agree with the president.

*Q. [to Begin] What about the declaration of intention you were both to announce? And how do the proposals you submitted to President Carter differ from those you brought here?*

*Begin:* The statement made by the president is an agreed upon statement. So we don't need now an additional written declaration. We agreed to continue the efforts to establish a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 and to establish these committees. This is the basic agreement. This is the most important development at the Ismailiya conference.

Our colleagues and friends will continue with the efforts as the president and I explained. We have presented to President Sadat the proposals I took to President Carter. There were a few amendments not of decisive importance. And yesterday at the conference I presented all our proposals in detail. The president listened very attentively and now the committees may have counter-proposals by Egypt as is natural in the process of negotiating peace treaties.

*Q. Looking beyond a peace settlement, can you tell us something about long-term grand designs for peace? How to satisfy your people's expectations of a better life, of a renaissance in this Middle East cradle of civilization? Are you in favour of cooperation in science, education, agriculture, industry, trade and cultural exchanges between your two countries and eventually between Israel and the Arab world as a whole?*

*Sadat:* Well, the two committees will start, and as I said, will report to the plenary. Let me say this—we are working towards a comprehensive settlement in the area here and the nature of peace is on the agenda between both sides of the two committees, and all that you have mentioned will be discussed in the committees.

*Begin:* May I congratulate you, Mr. Carr, on the poetry you read to us and I think this is a very

good vision and when we establish peace, all those good things you put into your question will be put into realization.

*Q. Mr. President, is the gap on the Palestinians unbridgeable?*

*Sadat:* In as much as we shall be continuing in the Cairo conference to discuss whatever points of differences between us, we shall continue. As Prime Minister Begin has said, if need be we shall meet again. I don't think there is any gap that cannot be bridged between us.

*Q. President, do you agree that Egypt not only holds the key to peace in the Middle East, but also that no combination of Arab countries can wage war in the foreseeable future against Israel?*

*Sadat:* Well, maybe you have heard my speech. We were sincere in war and we are sincere for peace since my visit to Jerusalem last November. Let us sit together like civilized people and discuss whatever problem between us. Let us agree upon the fact that the October war should be the last war. We did not differ upon this at all. The continuation of our efforts will answer all this.

*Q. What about waging war without Egypt?*

*Sadat:* Well, we have here, for sure, in the Arab world, in this area here, the key to war and peace. In Egypt here, this is a fact, an historic fact. Well, I can't speak for anyone but I can say this.

*Q. Mr. President, can the West Bank Palestinian issue be solved without a role for the PLO?*

*Sadat:* There should be a solution for this problem. We have passed it to the political committee that we have agreed upon in the Cairo conference. For sure, we shall find a solution. Because, as I have said before, the Palestinian question is the crux of the whole problem. Maybe in the future, after the political committee works and the discussions start, a new situation will develop.

*Begin:* The organization called the PLO is bent on the destruction of Israel. It is written in their charter. They never changed their position. As I stated time and again, from our point of view everything is negotiable except the destruction of Israel. Therefore, this organization is no partner to our negotiations. Now as I read before I reached Ismailiya, the spokesman of this organization threatened the life of President Sadat—speaking about one bullet that may change the course of events. So now we have a situation, after Tripoli,

in which such threats are issued both against Israel and Egypt. We want to discuss the problem of the Palestinian Arabs with our Egyptian friends. We want to negotiate with the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and this we are going to do in the first week of January.

*Q. Is there any possibility that other Arab countries will join the conference? Will you keep King Hussein of Jordan informed?*

*Sadat:* For sure I will be informing King Hussein of all the developments that have taken place here in Ismailiya and let us hope that others will join yet in the next stage.

*Q. In view of the dramatic changes that have taken place, have you, Mr. President, changed your mind about delaying diplomatic relations for future generations?*

*Sadat:* As I have said before, the nature of peace is one of the important points that is on the agenda for the two committees and for the plenary session after that. Let me tell you this—it is now not more than 35 or 40 days since my visit to Jerusalem. Everything has changed. Everything has changed since that visit took place. I quite agree with those who say that the world after the Jerusalem visit is completely different to the world before the visit.

*Q. Seven years ago the U.S. and China started ping-pong diplomacy. Will you open the borders to allow sportsmen of both sides, even at this stage, and in that way to allow people to know each other and play together? The Egyptian football team—which I'm told is better than Israel's—could play the Israel team.*

*Sadat:* It is not yet ripe. But for sure we shall be continuing our discussions in our meetings. As you have heard, there will be a committee here and a committee there and gradually we shall be in a position to reach agreement upon all what you are proposing here.

*Begin:* Until the day the president agrees to exchange sportsmen on both sides, do something to strengthen our football team (laughter). (The questioner was philanthropist Abie Nathan.)

*Q. Mr. President, in view of the disagreement on the Palestinians, can an interim accord be reached between Egypt and Israel?*

*Sadat:* The differences should be overcome in the committees. It is a fact.

*Q. You are not seeking an alternative to peace?*

*Sadat:* As I have already stated before the

Knesset, this time we are not either for a disengagement agreement or a partial agreement—trying to reach some stages and then postponing other steps after that. No. This time we are for peace. Genuine peace. Comprehensive settlement.

*Begin:* May I add, Mrs Zemer, the president and I agreed that there is no alternative to peace.

*Sadat.* Right.

*Q.* How do you explain the abrupt change from years of enmity and distrust to friendliness and trust?

*Sadat:* It is not abrupt. It must have been in the subconscious of all of us and when I made my step, in my calculation, really, I knew my people would agree to it. But I never thought that they will go to this extent. It is a natural feeling and there is no fear at all. There will be no revival of anything that has happened in the past.

*Q.* Mr. President, Mr. Begin, have you reached the stage where mutual troop reductions in the Sinai are possible?

*Sadat:* Let us hope that in a few weeks we shall be in a position to report.

*Begin:* Yes, Yes. We hope so. When peace comes on, both countries, all countries, in the Middle East will be able to reduce their military forces and expenditure which is eating up our substance and rather devote our sources and resources to the liquidation of poverty, development of agriculture and industry. This is our common aim.

*Q.* I was asking about troop reduction at this stage.

*Begin:* We do hope for the possibility of reducing troops from all sides.

*Q.* On what moral grounds, Mr. Begin, are you denying the Palestinians, the West Bank and Gaza their right to self-determination? And you, Mr. President, on what moral grounds can you negotiate about the future of the Palestinians without a single Palestinian representative present?

*Begin:* One correction, my friend. I belong to the Palestinian people too. Because I am a Palestinian Jew and there are Palestinian Arabs. But, of course, we want to live in human dignity, in liberty, justice and equality of rights. Therefore, I brought the president a proposal of self-rule for the first time in the history of the Palestinian Arabs. Now we have established a political committee. We stated our positions clearly and the political committee will continue the discussion of this very serious problem.

*Sadat:* What we are discussing really is within the Arab strategy that was agreed upon in the Arab summit conference. But in the details I shall not negotiate for the Palestinians. So they should take their share. But in this Arab strategy, what I am doing really is that I am not speaking for myself but for this strategy in its principles. But I shall not put myself as a spokesman for them or speak for them. They should join in the next stage.

*Q.* Is Israel's demand for a military presence in the West Bank a major stumbling block?

*Sadat:* I do not want to reveal what we have already discussed in the proposals that have been made by Prime Minister Begin. He has shown his will to end the military government on the West Bank. But we differ upon the issue, as I have told you, of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. That means self-determination.

*Q.* Did you discuss the future of the Golan Heights?

*Sadat:* I cannot speak for Syria or the Golan Heights, as I told you, now we are concerned with the main principles in the Arab strategy. And whenever we reach agreement upon those points between us in the committees, in the political and military committees, after that everyone should negotiate for himself.

*Begin:* I do want to express the hope that President Assad will join our common effort. We want a comprehensive peace treaty. We want peace with all our neighbours to the south, to the north and to the east and when President Assad agrees to negotiate with us, we will be willing to negotiate with him. This is a problem of the northern border of Israel and the common border of Israel and Syria.

*Q.* I am an Egyptian journalist and I want to ask Mr. Begin in his language.

*Begin:* You want to speak to me in Hebrew? I understand Hebrew.

*Q.* (in Hebrew) Mr. Prime Minister, I want to ask you if the initiative of President Sadat brought about profound changes in your thinking and outlook, and also how you see the future of Israel and the Middle East after peace.

*Begin:* (in Hebrew) Firstly. I want to tell you, you speak better Hebrew than I do. (In English, addressing Sadat) I want you to know he speaks better Hebrew than I do (laughter). Congratulations. No, I want to answer. I thank you for your



question. (In Hebrew) I want to say that the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem was a visit of historic significance, for the whole Israeli people, for the whole Egyptian people, for all the peoples, and we appreciate it. Since the visit we have worked well on a peace plan, and I brought this peace plan before the president, and we explained it in detail yesterday in the joint meeting, when we were alone, and when the two delegations met.

The future of Israel after peace is achieved, as in the case of Egypt—I have no doubt, it will be glorious and that peace will be achieved between the peoples, the Middle East will develop, and as his majesty, the King of Morocco has said, it can become a sort of paradise on earth. This is the cradle of human civilization and from here came the tidings of peace and progress. Therefore, I was very happy to hear your question and that is my answer. Now I shall translate into English with a Hebrew accent. (Begin then translated his remarks in English).

*Q. Now that you have raised the level of the talks, how do you see the role of the U.S.? Will you be inviting Secretary of State Vance to take part in some of your talks and is there a role for the Soviet Union?*

*Sadat:* I foresee for the U.S. and the UN in the political committee (inaudible) but the military committee will be bilateral, as for the U.S., it will be in the political committee without the Soviet Union. We didn't exclude them. They excluded themselves. Well, we have no objection from our side.

*Q. Mr. President, will you call an Arab summit, and will the other parties be invited to the Cairo conference when the level is upgraded?*

*Sadat:* Until we reach in the committee agreement on the main issues and mainly the Palestinian issue, on which we have differed—until we reach this point, as it is part of our Arab strategy, I shall not be in a position to ask for an Arab summit meeting. But whenever we reach this, I think that after that, I shall be in a position to discuss with my Arab colleagues the possibility of a summit.

*Q. Do you feel that Mr. Begin's proposals contain sufficient concessions to have justified your trip to Jerusalem?*

*Sadat:* Well, we have agreed on certain points. We have made progress on the withdrawal. We have differed among us on certain points, namely

the Palestinian question. These proposals that have been made by Premier Begin will be put before the committee, political or military, and other counter-proposals will be submitted to these committees and until we reach them we think that the momentum that we have given to the peace process is continuing.

*Q. What do you think of Begin's proposals?*

*Sadat:* Well, as I have told you, we have points of difference and points of agreement.

*Q. Can you be more specific on what progress was made on Sinai? And does this mean foreign ministers exclusively in the Cairo conference?*

*Sadat:* I have stated before that in the political committee there will be the foreign ministers, and in the military committee there will be the defence ministers. For the first part that you have asked, I have heard the proposals Premier Begin told us about and we are preparing our counter-proposal in the military committee. But really what concerns us in this respect is a comprehensive settlement. This is not the Sinai that is the problem now, because as I told you, after peace, after a genuine peace in the area, regarding Sinai this is a side issue and, of course, in a comprehensive settlement it will be part of it. And as I told you, I prefer not to reveal anything, and leave the military committee to work on the details and discuss proposals and counter-proposals until we reach agreement.

*Q. Mr. President, what about the PLO? Don't you feel the Palestinians have the right to choose their representatives? What role do you think the PLO should play in the peace-making process?*

*Sadat:* I have stated before the Knesset that the Palestinians should be a part of this settlement because, as I said, the Palestinian question is the core of the whole problem. The PLO is now in the rejection camp. I sent them an invitation and they refused and excluded themselves. Well, I didn't exclude them. For the future, let us wait for what will develop.

*Q. Mr. President, is it still your position that Israel must withdraw from all occupied land, including East Jerusalem?*

*Sadat:* That's right.

*Q. When you speak of progress on the question of withdrawal, may I ask Mr. Begin how he interprets that progress?*

*Begin:* Well, Resolution 242 does not commit Israel to total withdrawal, and therefore this matter is a matter for negotiation, to establish those secure and recognized boundaries which are mentioned in the second paragraph of Resolution 242. And this is the crux of our problem—to negotiate the conditions of peace in order to establish peace throughout the Middle East. This is what we are going to do in the next few weeks and months.

*Q. Will Syria eventually join the talks, and what would be the effect?*

*Sadat:* I can't answer this. You should ask President Assad. I can't speak for him, as I told you. Whenever they find it convenient for them to join, we shall welcome them.

*Q. Will the Cairo conference reconvene simultaneously with the two ministerial committees? Or alternately?*

*Sadat:* It has always been my position that without good preparation, Geneva will be a failure. I said this during my visit last April in the U.S. I made my first proposal for a working group under Vance to start contacting all the parties concerned and a meeting to be prepared before Geneva.

*Q. But what about simultaneous meetings of the two committees?*

*Sadat:* They will be working in the context of the Cairo conference, and as I said, they will report to the plenary.

*Q. Does this mean the Cairo conference will continue on the foreign minister level, that Mr. Vance and Mr. Waldheim will come here?*

*Sadat:* Let us hope so. But for sure, we shall not go back. We are going forward.

*Q. But the political committee is meeting in Jerusalem. Does this mean that Mr. Vance and Mr. Waldheim will also be in Jerusalem?*

*Sadat:* Well, we shall leave this to them.

*Q. Mr. Begin, do you accept the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force and are you going to apply it to a comprehensive settlement?*

*Begin:* Yes, we are for a comprehensive settlement and I accept the principle established under law attesting that there mustn't be any acquisition of territory in the wake of a war of aggression. The war of the Six Days was a war of legitimate self-defence, and the president told me

yesterday, yes, he does remember the slogans issued in those days to throw the Israelis into the sea, and so we defended ourselves in accordance with international law and practice. Thank you.

## 201

### Statement by Prime Minister Begin of Israel on his return to Israel from talks in Egypt<sup>232</sup>

Ben Gurion airport, December 26, 1977

Ladies and gentlemen, citizens of Israel, if, as I requested, you prayed for our success, your prayers were heard. The meeting at Ismailia between the Egyptian delegation and the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister and myself, the meeting was crowned with success.

Yesterday, immediately after our arrival in Ismailia, I held a personal talk with President Sadat, and within a few minutes we agreed to set up two committees, one political, the other military. We thus lent added momentum to the peacemaking process in the Middle East. We agreed that the two committees would be chaired by the foreign ministers of the two countries and the defense ministers of the two countries.

We agreed that one committee—the political committee—would sit in Jerusalem, and the military committee in Cairo. That is a just division. We also agreed that the chairmanship of the committees would be on a rotating basis. In Cairo, in the first week of the discussions, General Gamasy, whom we respect as a courageous soldier, will lead off, and after a week, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, whom Egypt respects as a courageous soldier, will take over.

In Jerusalem, the political committee will be chaired first by the Foreign Minister, and after a week the new Foreign Minister of Egypt will take over as chairman.

These committees will start working in mid-January, probably on Jan. 14 or 15. We have set no date for the conclusion of their work, but it may be expected that they will work for between two and three months. We hope they will bring us an agreement. If there is an agreement it will serve as the basis for the peace treaties.

<sup>232</sup> English translation as published in *Near East Report* (Washington), XXI, 52 (December 28, 1977), p. 227.

There was a proposal that we issue a joint declaration, and we discussed that proposal. Many things were agreed upon, but what was not agreed upon, as regards content and formulations, had to do with the Palestinian Arabs. An Egyptian formulation, which we could not accept, was presented to us, and we put forth our own formulation, and the Egyptians could not accept it.

For several hours we discussed how to find a joint formulation, and last night between 10 and 10:30 p.m. we had not yet attained the agreed and joint formulation. We therefore decided to put off the session until this morning, out of the assumption that, after the night, following further thought, we would, as regards this matter, too, find a formulation acceptable to both sides.

But it emerged that the differences of opinion on this matter are fundamental, as everyone knows. The Egyptians propose establishing a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We unreservedly reject such a proposal, and not just us. The United States of America also unreservedly rejects the idea of establishing a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and other factors also reject its establishment. And the Egyptians did not accept our proposal that the solution be found in self-rule, or, in its . . . Greek version, administrative autonomy.

Well, when you don't find a joint formulation, you must look for the accepted path, on the basis of the precedents in the international conferences. To wit: each side will determine its stand, according to its content and its own terminology.

And following consultation by the Israeli delegation, we agreed that we would present such a formulation to President Sadat, and he accepted it without hesitation, on the spot. Thus did we overcome that point past which it was, ostensibly, impossible to move, and we proposed the following formulation, which expressed the stands of the two sides:

"The Egyptian and the Israeli delegations discussed the Palestinian problem. The Egyptian position is that in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip a Palestinian state should be established. The Israeli position is that the Palestinian Arabs residing in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district should enjoy self-rule, and this issue will be discussed in the political committee."

At the press conference,<sup>233</sup> which you no doubt

watched, President Sadat read out both parts and both formulations of this statement, as they were accepted.

We may now sum up that the momentum is continuing. In an other three weeks or so, serious negotiations will open in two working committees, one in Cairo and one in Jerusalem, at ministerial level, and these committees will submit their conclusions and their recommendations. Hence I was able to say, at the press conference in Ismailia, "I have come a hopeful Prime Minister and I am leaving a happy man." There is a basis for this feeling.

Ladies and gentlemen, only a few months ago this entire development would have seemed to me utterly fantastic: the meeting in Jerusalem and in Ismailia between President Sadat and myself, between the foreign ministers, between the defense ministers, in a very friendly, warm atmosphere of hospitality, of understanding, with mutual assurance that we would continue to see each other and together seek a way to establish peace.

Of course there are differences, no one will ignore them. But the mutual desire is to overcome them, bridge them, and reach peace. And there is indeed good hope that, God willing, we shall attain that peace quickly.

## 202

### **Speech by Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany praising President Sadat of Egypt's peace initiative and outlining the conditions the European Community feels necessary for a Middle East peace settlement<sup>234</sup> (excerpts)**

**Cairo, December 27, 1977**

Mr. President, honourable Mrs. Sadat, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen!

Our visit comes at a time of intensive endeavour for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which you, Mr. President, have taken an initiating and determining part. You have already demonstrated in the past that you spare no effort

<sup>234</sup> Made after a dinner given by President Sadat on the occasion of the Chancellor's official visit to Egypt; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 1 (January 3, 1978), pp. 4-6.

<sup>233</sup> Doc. 200 above.

in order to re-establish peace in this area, and you now show that you are following this goal not only with your own intellectual keenness but also with great personal courage.

Yesterday and the day before you met briefly, and for the second time, the Israeli head of government, who himself, like you, Mr. President, is struggling to build bridges. Further negotiations will follow in order to overcome the difficult problems that have hindered peace in the Middle East for the past 30 years. It is very plain that all this will only be possible through intensive negotiations. These negotiations will require much patience, as well as creative imagination and they will eventually also include the representatives of the rest of the people in the conflict.

Mr. President, you have, with statesmanlike vision, taken a path that can lead to a definitive solution to the long and interminable conflict for all the people of this region.

Your historical decision to bring the Arab cause directly before the parliament and government of Israel and to defend it internationally has impressed us all deeply. Your visit to Israel has given new hope that efforts to find a solution of the 30-year old Middle East conflict will succeed and spare the world another war.

With you, I hope that the strong impulse set in motion by your unprecedented initiative will find the necessary response and lead to an overall peace settlement. We Germans, together with our European partners, are of the opinion that any negotiated solution has, in the first place, to be brought about by those that are party to the conflict. But we Germans and Europeans have a direct interest in the peace settlement being agreed to by all the parties, and therefore in it being lasting. This direct self-interest entitles us to make basic propositions in this respect.

You know, Mr. President, that the nine states of the European Community have repeatedly spoken about the Middle East conflict—you have just mentioned it in your dinner speech—the last time on June 29 and November 22 this year. I should today once more like to cite the principles that, according to our interpretation, should lay the basis for any peaceful solution. These are as follows:

- No acquisition of territory by force.
- Israel must end its territorial occupation which it has maintained since the 1967 conflict.

- The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each state in the region, including Israel, and its right to live within secure and recognized boundaries, is to be respected.

- The legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be borne in mind in the creation of a just and lasting peace.

The German Federal Republic has always defended the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, a right that we Germans believe is very important and that we claim for ourselves.

My government supports all steps that bring peace nearer. It is ready to work jointly with its European partners for the creation of favourable conditions for bringing about and guaranteeing a peace settlement.

This peace has not yet been achieved. Your initiative, Mr. President, has not only found agreement in the Arab world. It is only too understandable that new ideas concerning a peace settlement, the thinking of the, until now, unthinkable and the breaking of taboos, will be met by opposition and cause tension.

Nevertheless I am of the firm hope that this opposition can finally be overcome in the interests of peace. For, according to our understanding, the most important parties in the Arab world agree in substance with what you expressed in Jerusalem.

## 203

### **Press interview statements by US President Carter reiterating his desire to see a West Bank entity tied to Jordan.<sup>235</sup>**

**Washington, December 28, 1977**

*Q. Mr. President, I know we will all want to get back to just how you plan to go about getting the energy policy. But while we are on foreign policy. I would like to ask you about the Middle East. President Sadat, I think everyone agrees, made a spectacular gesture that opened up a whole new era here. Do you feel that the Israelis have as yet made a comparable gesture? Have they been flexible in your view?*

<sup>235</sup> Interview conducted by Barbara Walters of ABC, R. McNeil of PBS, Tom Brokaw of NBC, and Bob Schieffer of CBS; partial text supplied, on request, by the US embassy, Beirut.

A. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have been bold and courageous. We have been dealing with the Mideast question as a nation for decades, in a leadership role at least within the last two Administrations. We see the complexity of the questions and the obstacles to progress. When I first became President, we spelled out the basic issues, withdrawal from occupied territories, secure borders, the establishment of real peace, the recognition of Israel's right to be there and dealing with the Palestinian question.

We are now in a role of supporter. We encourage them to continue with their fruitful negotiations. We try to resolve difficulties to give advice and counsel when we are requested to do it. This is a better role for us. In the past, we have been in the unenviable position and sometimes unpleasant position, sometimes nonproductive position as mediator among parties who wouldn't even speak to each other. So I think that the progress that has been made in the last month and a half has been remarkable and has been much greater than I had anticipated. And I know Sadat and Begin well and personally and favorably.

If any two leaders on earth have the strength and the determination and the courage to make progress toward peace in the most difficult region that I have ever known, it is Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat. There is no reason for us to be discouraged about it. We will help in every way we can to let their progress be fruitful. I think that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin could have reached a fairly quick solution of just the Egyptian-Israeli problem in the Sinai region. But this is not what they want.

They both want to resolve the other questions, what is real peace, will Israel be recognized as a permanent neighbor to the countries that surround them. Can the Palestinian question, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip be addressed successfully. Knowing how difficult these questions are, I have nothing but congratulations for them on what they have achieved so far.

Q. You are going to see King Hussein of Jordan. President Sadat said in an interview that was broadcast on public television last night that King Hussein had told him he was fully behind his efforts in public; until now, King Hussein's opinion has been relatively mysterious. Do you have any information that would make you agree with Mr. Sadat and are you going to discuss that with

King Hussein and urge him to support the Sadat initiative when you see him?

A. I don't intend to put any pressure on King Hussein, I couldn't if I wanted to, to immediately begin to negotiate with Israel and Egypt as a partner. If he wants to do it, we would certainly welcome that. What I will try to learn, however, is what role Jordan is willing to play in the resolution of the Palestinian-West Bank problem, at what point he thinks it would be advisable for him to enter the negotiations personally as a government leader, and what we can do to get him to give his open support and encouragement to both Begin and Sadat as a struggle to resolve the differences between them.

I think King Hussein has, indeed in his private discussions with Secretary Vance and in his personal communications to me, shown a very positive attitude and in his travels around the Middle East to visit with other leaders, some who don't encourage the talks like President Assad, those who are very hopeful for progress, like those in Saudi Arabia, I think he has shown a constructive attitude already. But it helps me to understand on a current basis, the remaining problems and in what way they can be brought in to achieve a comprehensive peace.

I think they all trust our country, our motives are good. We have never misled them. We have been honest and as a person, as a country that carries messages from one to another, and I think that this puts us in a position to exert legitimate influence. But what we have always hoped for is direct negotiations or discussions, communications among the leaders involved with our offering good offices when we are requested to do it.

Q. Mr. President, the chief stumbling block right now does seem to be what we might call the right of return of the Palestinians to the West Bank and the Gaza. You have in the past come out against an independent nation per se in the West Bank, but you have always talked about the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and you have been in favor of some kind of an entity, although people are still obscure about what that means, an entity perhaps linked to Jordan.

Would you, in light of the development, now clarify your views for us today, tell us if they have changed and if they have not, is it because the United States has decided to be neutral on this subject?

A. Well, you have described my position very

well. We do favor a homeland or an entity wherein the Palestinians can live in peace. I think Prime Minister Begin has taken a long step forward in offering to President Sadat and indirectly to the Palestinians, self-rule

President Sadat so far is insisting that the so-called Palestinian entity be an independent nation. My own preference is that they not be an independent nation but be tied in some way with the surrounding countries, making a choice, for instance, between Israel and Jordan.

President Sadat has not yet agreed to that position of ours. Prime Minister Begin has offered that the citizens who live in the West Bank area or the Gaza Strip be given an option to be either Israeli citizens or Jordanian citizens, to actually run for the Knesset as candidates and to vote in the elections, both national Israeli and Jordan or local elections in the occupied territories once they are released.

But we don't have any real choice. I have expressed an opinion, but if Israel should negotiate with the surrounding countries a different solution, we would certainly support it.

But my own personal opinion is that permanent peace can best be maintained if there is not a fairly radical, new independent nation in the heart of the Middle Eastern area.

*Q. In view of the deadlock now, however, have you tried to convince either side of your opinion? You have had conversations with both.*

*A. I have expressed this opinion to President Assad, to King Hussein, to President Sadat, to Crown Prince Fahad, and also to Prime Minister Begin, and privately, and of course they have heard my statements publicly.*

Our preference is not to have an independent nation there, but we are perfectly willing to accept any reasonable solution that the parties themselves might evolve.

*Q. If I could just get back to the question I asked you, I take it that you would not pass judgment in public at least at this point on whether the Israelis had been flexible enough in the negotiations so far. Do you think that the position that they put forward—Mr. Begin said today that there would always be Israeli troops on the West Bank and that all who wanted peace will have to know that. Is that a realistic negotiating position?*

*A. Yes. It certainly is a realistic negotiating position.*

*Q. Would Sadat ever accept that?*

*A. I don't know. There is a great deal of flexibility there; the number of military outposts; the length of time when this interim solution might be in effect. I think Prime Minister Begin said it would be reassessed at the end of five years.*

The degree of participation of the governments of Israel and Jordan in a possible administrative arrangement, all these questions could add a tone of progress or a possibility for resolution of what seems to be insurmountable obstacles.

So I think that Prime Minister Begin has already shown a great deal of flexibility. Obviously President Sadat and King Hussein and others would have to accept (or reject) whatever proposal is put forward.

But the length of time when the interim agreement would be in effect would be negotiable and the exact relationship between the new self-rule government as far as its autonomy is concerned, its dependence or subservience to the Jordanians or Israelis, all of these things are still to be negotiated. I think there is enough flexibility at this point.

*Q. Could I just ask one follow-up on that? Has either Egypt or Israel, or both, asked the United States formally yet to provide guarantees for any agreement that is made?*

*A. In my private conversations with some of them, they have expressed to me that if a guarantee arrangement between ourselves and Israel should be worked out, that it would be acceptable to the Arab leaders. But we have never discussed this between ourselves and Israel in any definitive form.*

My preference would be that our involvement would be minimized after an agreement has been reached. But if it became a matter of having the negotiations break down completely, our having some limited role as mutually accepted among those parties involved, then we would consider that very, very favorably.

## 204

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of PLO Executive Chairman Arafat**<sup>236</sup>

Belgrade, December 28, 1977

At the invitation of the President of the Federal Executive Council, Veselin Djuranović, the President of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization Yasir Arafat, at the head of a delegation of the PLO, made a friendly working visit to Yugoslavia on 27 and 28 December, 1977.

The President of the SFRY Josip Broz Tito received the President of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, who acquainted him with the PLO's viewpoints on the latest development in the situation in the Middle East in the light of existing initiatives, and with the position and activities of the PLO. On this occasion Yasir Arafat conveyed to President Tito the PLO's gratitude and respect for the support and assistance Yugoslavia is extending to the Palestinian people in their just struggle for the realization of their legitimate and national rights.

In the talks between the President of the Federal Executive Council, Veselin Djuranović and the President of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasir Arafat, which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendly openness and complete understanding, an exhaustive exchange of views was made on the current international situation, and particularly in connection with the course of events in the Middle East. Examining the crisis in the Middle East, the two sides conjointly observed that there can be no settlement of this crisis, nor a lasting peace in the Middle East without Israel's withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories and other Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, and recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian People, including the right to return and found an independent state.

A just settlement of the crisis can be achieved only through the PLO's equal participation as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people whose problem constitutes the core of the Middle East crisis.

The Yugoslav side expressed concern over the development of the situation in the Middle East. In relation to this both sides emphasized that any settlement to the detriment of the national rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab countries can only lead to a prolongation of the crisis in the Middle East and engender new tensions in this region, which would threaten peace and security in the world.

Yugoslavia will continue to give its support to the just Arab cause. In this sense it will continue with further support and assistance to the liberation struggle of the Palestinian nation to realize its legitimate national rights.

## 205

**Speech by Prime Minister Begin of Israel to the Knesset presenting his plan for self-rule in the occupied West Bank and Gaza**<sup>237</sup>

Jerusalem, December 28, 1977

Mr. Speaker. Members of the Knesset.

On the establishment of peace we shall propose to grant administrative self-rule to the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District on the basis of the following principles:

(Mr. Begin then read out the plan for self-rule for Judea, Samaria and Gaza.)

1. The administration of the military government in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be abolished.

2. In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district administrative autonomy of the residents, by and for them, will be established.

3. The residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will elect an Administrative Council composed of 11 members. The Administrative Council will operate in accordance with the principles laid down in this paper.

4. Any resident 18 years old or over, without distinction of citizenship, including stateless residents, is entitled to vote in the elections to the Administrative Council.

5. Any resident whose name is included in the

<sup>236</sup> English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXIX, 666 (January 5, 1978), p. 19.

<sup>237</sup> English translation as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, December 29, 1977, p. 4.

list of candidates for the Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years old or over, is eligible to be elected to the council.

6. The Administrative Council will be elected by general, direct, personal, equal, and secret ballot.

7. The period of office of the Administrative Council will be four years from the day of its election.

8. The Administrative Council will sit in Bethlehem.

9. All the administrative affairs relating to the Arab residents of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the direction and within the competence of the Administrative Council.

10. The Administrative Council will operate the following departments: education; religious affairs; finance; transportation; construction and housing; industry, commerce, and tourism; agriculture; health; labour and social welfare; rehabilitation of refugees; and the department for the administration of justice and the supervision of the local police forces. It will also promulgate regulations relating to the operation of these departments.

11. Security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities.

12. The Administrative Council will elect its own chairman.

13. The first session of the Administrative Council will be convened 30 days after the publication of the election results.

14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of citizenship, including stateless residents, will be granted free choice of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship.

15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with the citizenship law of the state.

16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote for, and be elected to, the Knesset in accordance with the election law.

17. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who are citizens of Jordan or who, in accordance with the right of free option, become citizens of Jordan, will elect and be eligible for election to

the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in accordance with the election law of that country.

18. Questions arising from the vote to the Jordanian Parliament by residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be clarified in negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

19. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the Administrative Council to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; and to determine which legislation will continue in force, which will be abolished, and what will be the competence of the Administrative Council to promulgate regulations. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.

20. Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, who, in accordance with the free option granted them, become Israeli citizens, will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel.

21. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the Administrative Council to determine norms of immigration to the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. The committee will determine the norms whereby Arab refugees residing outside Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be permitted to immigrate to these areas in reasonable numbers. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.

22. Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

23. The Administrative Council will appoint one of its members to represent the council before the government of Israel for deliberation on matters of common interest, and one of its members to represent the council before the government of Jordan for deliberation on matters of common interest.

24. Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open.



25. With regard to the administration of the holy places of the three religions in Jerusalem, a special proposal will be drawn up and submitted that will include the guarantee of freedom of access to members of all faiths to the shrines holy to them.

26. These principles will be subject to review after a five-year period.

Mr. Speaker, I must now explain paragraph 11 of this plan and also Paragraph 24. In Paragraph 11 of our plan we stated that security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities. Without this paragraph the plan for administrative self-rule is meaningless. I wish to state from the Knesset rostrum that it obviously includes the stationing of Israel army forces in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It is quite out of the question—if we had been asked to withdraw our army forces from Judea, Samaria and Gaza—to allow these areas to be dominated by the murderers' organization known as the PLO—“*Ashraf*” in Hebrew translation. This is the vilest organization of murderers in history, with the exception of the Nazi armed organizations. A few days ago it also boasted of the murder of Hamdi el-Kadi, the deputy director of the education office in Ramallah, and today it threatens to solve the problems of the Middle East by one bullet to be dispatched to the heart of Egyptian President Sadat, as its predecessors did in the Al-Aksa Mosque against King Abdullah—with one bullet. No wonder the Egyptian government announced that if one such bullet is fired Egypt will reply with a million bullets.

We want to say that this organization will not be permitted, under any conditions, to dominate Judea, Samaria and Gaza. If we did withdraw our forces, that is what would happen. And therefore let it be known that anyone who wants an agreement with us should be good enough to accept our statement that the Israel Defence Forces will be stationed in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; and there will also be other security arrangements so that we shall give all the residents—Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel—security of life, that is, security for all.

In paragraph 24 we stated:

Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of

the agreement of the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open.

We explained this to U.S. President Carter and to Egyptian President Sadat. We have a right and a claim of sovereignty to these areas of the Land of Israel. This is our country, and it belongs by right to the Jewish people. We want agreement and peace. We know that there are at least two other claims of sovereignty over these areas. If there is a mutual will to achieve an agreement and bring about peace, what is the way? If these conflicting claims are upheld and if there is no solution to the conflict between them, there can be no agreement between the parties. And for this reason, to facilitate agreement and to make peace, there is only one way: to decide, by agreement, that the question of sovereignty remains open; and to deal with the people, the nations—for the Palestinian Arabs, administrative self-rule; and for the Palestinian Jews, real security. This is the fairness contained in the proposal, and thus it has also been received abroad.

With this plan, as well as with principles which I shall now explain, for the settlement of relations between Israel and Egypt to be laid down in a peace treaty between these two countries, I went to the United States to visit President Carter and to inform him of both parts of our peace plan. The second part—namely, the principles for the settlement of the relations between Egypt and Israel in the context of a peace treaty—are:

Demilitarization—The Egyptian army shall not cross the Gidi-Mitla line. Between the Suez Canal and this line the agreement for the thinning out of forces shall remain in force.

Jewish settlements shall remain in place. These settlements will be linked with Israel's administration and courts. They will be protected by an Israeli force—and I repeat this sentence for a reason well known to all the members of the House—they will be protected by an Israeli force.

A transition period of a number of years, during which IDF forces will be stationed on a defensive line in central Sinai, and airfields and early-warning installations will be maintained, until the withdrawal of our forces to the international boundary.

Guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, which will be recognized by both countries in a special declaration as an international

waterway which must be open to all passage of all ships under any flag; either by a UN force which cannot be withdrawn except with the agreement of both countries and by unanimous decision of the Security Council, or by joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols.

With the two parts of this peace plan I came to the President of the United States, Mr. Carter. I had a personal *tete-a-tete* with him. Both during that talk and in the talks between the Israeli and American delegations, he expressed a favourable assessment of the plan. On Saturday evening, at the second meeting, the President of the United States said that this plan was a fair basis for peace negotiations. A favourable view of our plan was also expressed by Vice-President Mondale; Secretary of State Vance; the president's adviser on national security, Prof. Brzezinski; as well as by the well-known, distinguished and influential Senators Jackson, Case, Javits, Stone and our dear friend—to whom, Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the entire Knesset of Israel I today extend best wishes for a full and speedy recovery—Senator Humphrey. In addition, a favourable assessment of this plan was expressed by former U.S. president Gerald Ford, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, and the spokesman of the American Jewish community, Rabbi Dr. Schindler. All of them stated that the basis of the plan was its fairness.

From America, en route home, I stopped over in London, and I presented our two-part peace plan to the prime minister of Britain and the British foreign secretary. Both Mr. Callaghan and Dr. Owen expressed their favourable assessment of our peace plan, and Mr. Callaghan told our attorney-general that this was a very constructive plan. I also conveyed the plan to the special envoy of the president of the French Republic, Giscard d'Estaing, namely Francois Poncet.

While I was in the U.S., I asked the secretary of state to contact President Sadat and to inform him, on my behalf, that I would like to meet with him—whether in Cairo or in a neutral place, or, should he so desire, in Ismailiya. I mentioned a meeting in Ismailiya because we spoke of such a possibility with President Sadat when he visited Jerusalem.

The president of Egypt informed me, via the secretary of state, that he was choosing Ismailiya as the site of our meeting. I agreed. Thus, a few days after the conclusion of my mission in the U.S. and Britain, the meeting in Ismailiya took place.

Mr. Speaker, that was a successful meeting. Its success came with its opening. We held a personal talk, President Sadat and myself; and within the first five minutes of that talk, the decisive result was attained: continuation of the negotiations between the two countries for the signing of a peace treaty—as was decided, instead of the expression “peace agreement,” in the meeting between the two delegations in Ismailiya.

These negotiations will be conducted at a high level. The committees will be: political, to sit in Jerusalem, and military, which will sit in Cairo. The chairmen of the committees will be the foreign ministers and the defence ministers of Egypt and Israel. The chairmanship of the committees will rotate. Our foreign minister will begin at the sessions of the committee in Jerusalem. The Egyptian defence minister will begin at the sessions of the military committee in Cairo. At the end of a week, the chairmen will rotate. The political committee will deal with the civilian settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and the subject—which is a moral one, it may be termed an Arab-Jewish one—of the Palestinian Arabs. The military committee will deal with all the military questions connected with the peace treaty for the Sinai Peninsula.

Thus Mr. Speaker, for the first time in 30 years, in the very near future—in about another two weeks—direct, face-to-face negotiations will commence between authorized representatives—ministers of Israel—and Egypt's authorized representatives, its foreign and defence ministers. No third person will serve as chairman of these committees, as was the custom in all the meetings between ourselves and the Arab states; but the ministers themselves will conduct the sessions and rotate as chairmen. These will be fundamental, detailed, political, security negotiations for the attainment and signing of peace treaties.

And because this is happening for the first time since the establishment of our state, for the first time after five wars, for the first time after the declaration from various directions that Israel must be liquidated—we must welcome this shift in itself. And let us hope and wish that during the weeks or months during which the committees will sit, they will reach agreement—and if there is an agreement it will serve as a basis for the peace treaty which, in this case, will be signed by authorized representatives of Israel and Egypt.

It may be said that at the Ismailiya meeting the

two sides also agreed on a joint declaration. But its publication was prevented because the two delegations did not arrive at an agreed and joint formula for the problem which we term—and justly so—the question of the Palestinian Arabs, while the Egyptians call it, in their terminology—and it is their right to use their terminology—the question of the Palestinian people. We tried, we made an effort, to arrive at a joint formula; but it emerged that we could not accept one or another wording—whether proposed to the Egyptian delegation by us, or whether proposed to the Israeli delegation by the Egyptians. On Sunday, between 10 and 10:30 p.m., we therefore postponed the meeting until Monday morning, on the assumption that, with an effort by both sides, a way out would be found. And, indeed, it was found.

By way of agreement on a joint formula, in accordance with precedents in international conferences, we proposed—and our proposal was accepted—that each side would assert its position and employ its own terminology. Hence, the statement on the question of the Palestinian Arabs, as read out by the President of Egypt to our joint press conference, was made up of two sections, namely:

The position of Egypt is that a Palestinian state should be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The position of Israel is that the Palestinian Arabs residing in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district should enjoy self-rule.

Because of the difference over this issue, publication was prevented of the declaration whose contents had been completely agreed upon. We did not deem it proper to press for publication of a joint statement if the Egyptian side said that under these conditions it could not sign it. But I must note that the content itself was agreed upon by the two delegations together. (Interjection by Knesset Member Aharon Yadlin, of the Alignment: What is left of the contents?) If it was not published, why do so from the Knesset rostrum? (Interjection by Knesset Member Yadlin: How can settlements be defended by an Israeli force if the IDF withdraws to the international border?) That belongs to the debate—and I have learned, especially from committee proceedings—that if someone says he does not understand, he means he does not agree—particularly someone as intelligent as yourself.

Mr. Speaker, with the conclusion of the meeting

at Ismailiya, we have done our part; we have given our share. Henceforth, the other side has the floor. For the sake of peace, for the sake of a peace treaty, we have assumed great responsibility and taken many risks. Yes, indeed. And already during these days, since my return from the U.S., a hard and painful debate has been under way between my best friends and myself. From the Knesset rostrum, too, I shall state, as I told them, that if it is my lot to conduct such a debate, I shall willingly accept the decree. They are my friends. We went a long way together, in difficult days and in good days. I love them, and regard them—and shall continue to regard them—with affection. But there is no escape. You must accept responsibility with that degree of civic courage without which there can be no political decisions. To me it is clear that we are on the right path to facilitate negotiations for, and the signing of, a peace treaty. After examining all the other ways, as they have often been mentioned in Knesset debates, I no longer have the slightest doubt that the only way to make negotiations for the signing of a peace treaty possible is the one that is proposed by the government. Therefore, should it be necessary to face a debate on this matter with dear, even beloved, friends, we shall do so. But it is a fact that the responsibility is great and the risks exist. Therefore I reiterate: In Ismailiya, in the wake of the visits to Washington and London, we, the government of Israel, did our part, we made our contribution; and it is now the turn of the other side. If the followers of routine thinking in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry assume that they will succeed in getting international pressure exerted on us, so that we will accept their positions which are unacceptable to us, and that we agree to them—they are wrong. Even if pressure were to be exerted on us, Mr. Speaker, it would be of no benefit to anyone, because we are used to pressure and the refusal to yield to it.

But I am convinced that no international pressure will be exerted on the State of Israel. It is inconceivable. The persons who praised our peace plan as fair, as constructive, as a breakthrough, are very serious persons. They know its full contents, except for certain amendments—which we have also transmitted to our friends the Americans—which do not alter the substance of the plan. This is the plan I made known to President Carter and President Sadat. And they cannot, by invita-

tion of the conventional thinkers of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, change their minds within the space of a few weeks. We have today massive moral support throughout the U.S.: in the administration; in both Houses of Congress—and the House majority leader, Mr. Wright, told me that he praises and approves this peace plan; in American public opinion; and last, but not least, among the American Jewish community.

Therefore the conventional thinkers in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry are making a great mistake if they are under the illusion that if we do not accept their antiquated formulae, which are totally divorced from reality, then international pressure will be exerted on us. It will not. And we shall continue on our path, to bring peace to the people of Israel, to establish peace in the Middle East. For that is my aspiration—not from May and June 1977, but ever since November and December

1947, from the days in which—after a break in the relations of peace between the Palestinian Arabs and the Palestinian Jews—the first bullet, directed by an Arab hand into a Jewish heart, was fired, and from the days in which I appealed to the Palestinian Arabs from the underground, and called upon them: do not shed Jewish blood, let us build the country together, so that it may be a glorious land for the two peoples. But the bloodshed continued and there were five bloody wars—to which we want to put an end by establishing peace and signing peace treaties. This is our heart's desire. And I am certain, Mr. Speaker, that I can express the view of the entire house—with the exception, perhaps, of one faction—if I say: This is the heart's desire of the entire Jewish people—to bring peace to the land, having liberated the land.

# Arab World



**Message to the Palestinian people from PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on the twelfth anniversary of the Palestine revolution (excerpts)<sup>1</sup>**

January, 1, 1977

What about the dangerous colonialist plan and what are its present aims?

What do those who have planned the conspiracy want? How are we to confront this damaging scheme? How are we to resist these forces of Zionism and imperialism and their schemes?

We must confront this scheme in all its aspects and consequences and on all fronts, through careful logic and meticulous analysis and through comprehensive study of it as a whole. Rather than losing ourselves in unrealistic and vague speculation, we must establish the facts with the utmost precision and patience, firmness and revolutionary conviction.

An example is Kissinger's comment to a friendly leader after the outcome of the 1974 Rabat conference, which had undermined the basis of his carefully laid plan to gain control of the area and liquidate the Palestine revolution. His statement was extremely significant: he said that Rabat had upset all his plans and calculations. As a result, he had first to strike at the heart of Arab steadfastness, notably the allies of the Ramadan war—Egypt, Syria and the Palestine revolution. Next he had to break the oil weapon as an effective factor in the Arab nation's battle in defence of its civilization, which is under attack by Zionism and imperialism. We have to concede that Kissinger's counter-attack has had considerable success.

We must therefore stress the importance of our achievements at the Riyadh and Cairo conferences—

stopping the bloodshed in Lebanon, putting an end to the fighting between us and Syria, restoring Egyptian-Syrian relations, and thus restoring Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian cohesion as the basis of the Arab-Zionist struggle, and progress towards making oil an effective weapon in the present confrontation.

In these few lines we have traced the broad outlines of the situation in our area and of the major conspiracy that threatens us. We bear in mind an essential and fundamental point, which is that the US imperialist-Zionist conspiracy has not ended. On the contrary, we must remember that it will become even more ferocious in the coming stage. But it will assume new forms and will increasingly concentrate on the Palestine revolution as a basic factor and essential element in the current conflict in the area, and on the forces underlying that revolution. For the Palestine revolution is the vital element in the confrontation now raging with such remorseless ferocity.

This is why the imperialist and Zionist forces in their heinous plan for the area have concentrated on the liquidation of the Palestine revolution as the most recalcitrant factor. If the forces of imperialism do not succeed in liquidating the revolution, they will do their best to trim its claws, hoping that once it is tamed, deprived of all of its arms and ammunition, and stripped of the vital spirit of vigorous struggle that is so disconcerting to the dreams of the Zionists and imperialists, it will then fit into the context of the changes world imperialist circles are planning for the area.

In the light of this comprehensive picture of the situation facing us, the heroes of our revolution have immense responsibilities, responsibilities that we must prepare ourselves to shoulder, for in this we are recording for the benefit of history our claim to the trust which successive generations of our people have borne with such vigilance, under-

<sup>1</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), January 1, 1977.

standing, resoluteness and pride—the trust of the struggle and the honour of the revolution, and the responsibility for the struggle and the destiny of our people and our revolutionaries.

## 207

**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of King Hussain of Jordan (excerpts)<sup>2</sup>**

Aswan, January 15, 1977

In response to the invitation of President Muhammad Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt, His Majesty King Hussain Bin Talal of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan paid an official visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt from Muharram 23–25 1397 A.H. (January 13–15, 1977).

The two leaders discussed the situation in the Arab homeland after the summit conference in Cairo and recent developments in the Middle East problem, and expressed their firm belief that the impetus provided by the glorious October War should be exploited and that the united Arab advance should be maintained with a view to achieving a just and permanent peace in the area, based on full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, in particular its right to establish its independent political entity. In view of the present objective circumstances and the cohesion of the Arab front in spite of efforts to undermine it, as well as the international support given to Arab rights now that it has been revealed to world public opinion how intransigent Israel is and how she is impeding the efforts to achieve peace in the area—the two leaders hold that we must ensure that 1977 should be the year of a just peace in which Israel will submit to the will of the international community which condemns the seizure of territory by force and rejects all the results and consequences of occupation.

The two leaders agreed on the importance of Jordan's playing an effective role in Arab moves as a confrontation country and of its participation as such in the Geneva conference.

His Majesty King Hussain stressed that the people and government of Jordan would welcome the establishment of the closest relations with the Palestinian state that is to be established in realization of the hopes of the Palestinian people and as the culmination of its struggle on such basis as may be decided through the free choice of the two peoples, in the light of their common goals and destiny and their complete identity of interests and sentiments.

## 208

**Press interview statements by King Hussain of Jordan discussing his country's role in efforts to reach a Middle East settlement<sup>3</sup>**

Mid-January, 1977

*Q. What does Your Majesty think of the Egyptian initiatives President Sadat is undertaking with a view to convening the Geneva conference to reach a just peace in the Middle East?*

*A. President Sadat is undertaking his initiatives from a feeling of real responsibility vis-à-vis the Arab nation and its struggle. We therefore support him and Egypt for these initiatives at the international level which are aimed at exerting pressures on hostile forces, winning friends in the world, opening the door to just solutions of our common problem and establishing a just and permanent peace. Egypt bears the heaviest burden of Arab sacrifices in the battle of confrontation with expansionist aggression and is also, under the leadership of her courageous president, bearing the greatest burden of the Arab political action which supports our common struggle in all fields.*

*Q. The Rabat summit conference adopted a historic resolution<sup>4</sup> to the effect that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians. On the basis of this resolution, the PLO is entitled to participate in the Geneva conference*

<sup>2</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 16, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> Translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 15, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine* 1974.



*proposed for March to solve the Middle East problem. What do you think is the best way for the PLO to participate in the conference?*

A. Jordan's view of Arab representation at any peace talks is based on our belief in the necessity of such unified action on the part of the Arab confrontation countries as will serve the common Arab cause and ensure unity of efforts, organization, participation and national responsibility. As regards Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference, if it meets, we adhere to the resolutions of the Rabat summit. In any case, we give utmost support to Arab coordination, a unified attitude and agreement on strategy and action, on the basis of the requirements of the present stage and in the service of common Arab interests.

*Q. What is Jordan's role as regards steps that are at present being taken towards union between Cairo and Damascus and between Damascus and Amman? Is there any chance of some kind of coordination between Jordan and Egypt?*

A. We welcome every constructive step towards unity taken at the Arab level and aimed at combining efforts and resources and strengthening Arab forces. The steps that are being taken towards unity between Amman and Damascus are part of an escalating trend towards the building of a federal structure that will serve the Arab nation, its cause, its struggle and its aspirations to unity. Similarly every step towards unity taken by Cairo and Damascus helps to strengthen the joint Arab struggle and to achieve the Arabs' greatest aspiration, which is unity. It is a pioneering move on behalf of the Arab nation, and we give it the strongest support. We are also very eager to develop fraternal bilateral relations between Jordan and her great and beloved sister Egypt. We have always had the highest esteem for the national role of Egypt and her special responsibility, and for the vanguard role of President Sadat, may God preserve him; and we shall make every effort to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood and to establish permanent dialogue and contacts with a view to coordination.

*Q. What does Your Majesty think of the establishment of a Palestinian government, and the form it should take? What do you think of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the relations of such a state with neighbouring countries, especially Jordan?*

A. We support the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, including its right to establish its independent national entity on such Palestinian territory as is liberated from occupation. The principal task that faces the Arabs today is that of bringing about Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territory, including the territory of our beloved Palestine which has been groaning under Israeli occupation for decades.

We do not for a moment doubt that the close historical and national ties between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples demand that there should be the closest fraternal links between Jordan and any entity that is established in the territory evacuated by the Israeli occupation. This is natural, as well as being our joint duty and our undeniable destiny.

*Q. From the Arab point of view, what is the meaning of the secure borders demanded by Israel?*

A. "Secure borders" is a slogan employed by Israel to impede the peace process and to ensure that she continues to occupy Arab territories. Secure borders means secure for both sides. Thus occupied territories cannot constitute secure borders.

Security is essentially a psychological state which can only arise in a state of peace based on justice and as the result of a really just settlement which includes guarantees of permanence. Therefore secure borders must be based on justice and peace, not on expansion.

*Q. To what extent is Jordan committed to the Rabat conference resolutions?*

A. We are totally committed to the resolutions of the Rabat summit. We have declared this on every occasion and have acted, and are continuing to act, on this basis.

*Q. What was the aim of the recent meeting of the support and confrontation countries in Riyadh? And how do you see the present and future of Arab support?*

A. All the Arab countries have a fundamental national duty, which is to support the Arab confrontation countries that are fighting the battle of steadfastness and resistance to expansionist aggression on behalf of the Arab nation. This national duty requires that the Arab countries should participate in the joint effort, each according to its abilities and resources. This is a national duty required of all.

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**Declaration by the Lebanese Front announcing decisions on its policy towards the Lebanese crisis and the Palestinian presence in Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>5</sup>**

Sayyidat al-Bir, January 23, 1977

Aware as we are of our responsibility, and in the light of our determination to face up to it fully and to continue to do so until such time as what we and you desire is achieved;

And in expression of your wishes, we, the leaders of the Lebanese Front, Camille Chamoun, Sulayman Franjeh, Pierre Gemayyel and Abbot Sharbil Qassis, and a number of our comrades in struggle, called for the holding of a private meeting in the monastery of Sayyidat al-Bir. In the course of this meeting, which lasted three days (January 21 to 23, 1977), we reviewed the past, present and future of the Lebanese people, and took such decisions as were dictated to us by our national sentiments and our commitment to our responsibilities. We decided to postpone the publication of some of these decisions to a later date, until they have been adopted by the national conference that is to be held in the near future; it was decided to make public the remainder herewith:

II. The Front also decided:

1. To maintain all it has so far achieved in the way of establishments, accomplishments and institutions and resolved to make every effort to develop them.

2. To liberate all occupied Lebanese territories and subsequently to make every effort to ensure that the Palestinians residing in Lebanon are distributed among the member states of the Arab League, each according to its capacity to absorb them.

3. To assist displaced Lebanese to return to their homes.

4. To make sure that all Lebanese retain their Lebanese identity, to encourage overseas Lebanese to take part in the political life of Lebanon, and

to make every effort to check the present emigration from Lebanon.

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**Memorandum by the Lebanese Front stating its position on the Syrian and Palestinian roles in the Lebanese crisis<sup>6</sup>**

Beirut, early February, 1977

*a. The Syrian Initiative*

While according the Syrian initiative, which led to the end of the fighting in Lebanon, its proper place in the context of the friendship between the two countries, the Lebanese Front hopes that this friendship, on which this initiative was based, will continue to follow its normal course and play a role in maintaining Lebanon's independence and strengthening the values of her free and open society, and that both will have a positive effect on building peace and progress in the Middle East. And while Lebanon confidently anticipates the restoration of her sovereignty over all her territories, and is profoundly concerned for her social values, she sincerely hopes that nothing will occur to turn this new manifestation of Lebanese-Syrian friendship from the course of sincere fraternal feelings.

*b. The Arab Countries*

It was the Syrian initiative, which was made necessary by the Palestinians' war against Lebanon, and this Palestinian war in particular, that led to the establishment of the Arab Deterrent Force.

The Lebanese Front which, at that time, was ready to welcome any move likely to put an end to the aggressive war against Lebanon, recalls that for sixteen months the Arab League stood idly by as a mere spectator of the Lebanese calamity before displaying any real concern. All the same, the Front could not but welcome this deterrent force. Its welcome would perhaps have been warmer had this force been both Arab and Western, and thus had a better balance. However, in

<sup>5</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Amal* (Beirut), January 25, 1977.

<sup>6</sup> Presented to President Elias Sarkis of Lebanon and to Arab and foreign leaders; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Beirut) May 1977, p. 69.

the light of its attitude to other considerations, the Front believes that the reservations it is expressing at this juncture would have been different had the Deterrent Force been differently composed, with Western as well as Arab forces. For what the Front had in mind at the time, and what it still has in mind, is not a force that would stop the fighting, but one capable of eliminating the causes of the fighting.

It is clear that this Arab Deterrent Force, the duties allotted to it being what they are, could well be the fifty-eighth ceasefire formula reached in Lebanon in the last two years. Why, then, the Front asked, would not this formula be just as ineffective as its fifty-seven predecessors, each of which was rejected or was not respected or became invalid, in most cases within an hour of their being agreed on. While thanking the Arab kings and heads of state for their generous initiative, the Lebanese Front believes that it is its duty to be open and frank and express the reservations it feels vis-à-vis those who are responsible for the activities of the Deterrent Force. For it believes that the good intentions expressed by the Riyadh summit have been impaired on their way to implementation in Lebanon with undesirable results.

The Front wishes to express the wish, indeed the hope, that the relations between the new Lebanon and the Arab countries may be on an honourable basis of equality and sincere co-operation, so that the image that Lebanon is seeking to achieve may not be disturbed, undermined or invalidated and that no taint or blemish may be allowed to distort its distinctive identity.

### c. *The Palestinians*

But for the Palestinians, but for their illusory ambitions in Lebanon, but for their arrogance, but for this war which they perpetrated because of this arrogance, and but for their tendency to go along with and ally themselves with international communist trends, there would have been no need for intervention, Arab or otherwise.

But inasmuch as there has been intervention, and as the long-term aim—if they really mean what they say—is to put an end to this intervention, and then to prevent a return to war so as to prevent a new intervention which, this time, could be on a wider scale and could lead to incalculable consequences, the only option open is the following three-point plan for saving the situation:

(i) Responsibility for the Palestinian cause, which is the prime cause of the Arabs, and is Palestinian only in name, should be taken from the Palestinians and handed over to the Arab Joint Defence Council. The aim of this is to remove this cause from the sphere of personal whims and individual temperaments and of the bargaining that has made the cause a pliant instrument in the hands of communists, terrorists and others.

(ii) All the Palestinians in Lebanon should be distributed among the member states of the Arab League, each according to its capacity for absorption.

(iii) A uniform system of residence regulations should be drawn up to be applied to Palestinians wherever they live in the Arab countries.

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### **Joint communiqué issued following talks between Presidents Asad of Syria and Sarkis of Lebanon (excerpt)<sup>7</sup>**

**Damascus, February 2, 1977**

The two Presidents reviewed the stage that has been reached in the advance towards peace in Lebanon and the effective role played by the Arab Deterrent Forces in conformity with the resolutions of the six-power summit conference in Riyadh and the Arab summit conference in Cairo. They expressed their satisfaction at the progress achieved in the operation of restoring security and stability in Lebanon and at the measures taken to secure the proper implementation of the Cairo agreement with the PLO.

The two Presidents affirmed their absolute faith in the Arab role of Lebanon and in the unity of her territory, her people and her official institutions.

The two Presidents devoted the attention it deserves to the state of security in South Lebanon, studied the implications of its deterioration, and agreed that a united attitude should be adopted with a view to restoring stability and confidence in that area.

<sup>7</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 3, 1977.

President Hafiz Asad expressed his unshakable faith in the future of Lebanon and in its role at the Arab and world levels in spite of the grievous trials that have befallen it. He also stressed his confidence that the guidance and efforts of His Excellency President Elias Sarkis would lead to Lebanon's recovery from its tribulations, the unity of its people in efforts to achieve common goals and their agreement on the means to be employed for the achievement of these goals, within the framework of the unity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.

His Excellency President Sarkis expressed his appreciation and that of Lebanon for the moves made and the measures taken by the Syrian Arab Republic, under the leadership of President Hafiz Asad, to protect Lebanon from the dangers that threaten her and to assist her to ensure security, to restore life to normal and to maintain her independence, sovereignty and unity.

The two Presidents stressed the importance of coordination between their countries as regards everything related to their interests. They concentrated in particular on the need to consolidate Arab solidarity, so that future diplomatic moves at this important stage in our history may be confronted in a manner calculated to safeguard the interests of the two countries and to reach a just solution to the Palestine problem.

The two Presidents entrusted their aides with the task of drawing up a joint plan of action to be taken in the light of the need for coordination between the two countries.

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### **Press conference statements by President Asad of Syria discussing the role to be played by Europe and the US in the Middle East conflict<sup>8</sup>**

**Damascus, February 9, 1977**

*Q. [On President Asad's talks with Mr. Genscher and the role of West Germany and Europe in solving*

<sup>8</sup> Made at a joint press conference with Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany; interview conducted by the German press corps accompanying Mr. Genscher; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 10, 1977. For Mr. Genscher's statements see doc. 53 above.

*the Middle East crisis].*

*A.* It has given me great pleasure to meet Mr. Genscher, the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of West Germany. Our talks were wide-ranging, and our view-points coincided on the numerous matters under discussion. We discussed the Middle East problem, certain international matters and other questions that can be listed under the heading of international détente. We also discussed bilateral relations and the need to develop them. As I said, we were in agreement, and our viewpoints were identical. This visit by Mr. Genscher, on which he has been accompanied by a large delegation of highly-placed West German businessmen, and also by a sizable delegation from the press, will certainly help to promote relations between the two countries.

We agreed that we shall make every effort to develop relations and to promote cooperation in all fields between Syria and West Germany.

*Q. Mr. President, you mentioned extensive agreement on the Middle East conflict. As you know, West Germany supports Israel's right to exist. Did you agree on this?*

*A.* We agreed that peace in this area is dependent on Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories she occupied in 1967 and her recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

*Q. Mr. President, do you attach special importance to the role of West Germany and that of Europe in the settlement of the Middle East conflict?*

*A.* Ever since the October war, we in Syria have thought that Europe should play a fundamental role in solving the Middle East problem.

*Q. Mr. President, do you envisage West Germany participating in the Geneva conference?*

*A.* As I said, we should like West Germany and Europe to play a role in solving the Middle East problem. How Europe is to play this role requires discussion.

We should welcome, indeed we are anxious that Europe should be represented at the Geneva conference alongside the two great powers.

*Q. Mr. President, what role do you think the US could play in solving the Middle East conflict? President Sadat has declared that the US alone is capable of participating in the solution of this problem. Do you agree? And how do you appraise the Soviet role vis-à-vis the solution of the Middle East conflict?*

A. Resolution 338 and the subsequent measures stipulate that the Geneva conference should meet under UN auspices and with the two great powers as co-chairmen. Therefore, both the UN and the two great powers have roles to play.

*Q. Mr. President, what specific practical steps do you think West Germany could take towards contributing to the solution of the Middle East conflict? Was this question discussed?*

A. I think that Mr. Genscher has already answered this question, when he said that the European Community will make efforts to create an atmosphere favourable to progress towards a just peace and to the achievement of such a peace.

*Q. Mr. President, do you expect 1977 to be the year of peace in the Middle East?*

A. No, I do not. It may be that 1977 will witness the start of a move towards peace, but I do not anticipate that it will be the year of peace.

*Q. What about 1978?*

A. The important thing is that intensified efforts are being made by quarters in the world that are directly or indirectly interested in peace. These efforts may prove successful.

But I do not think that it is practical to say exactly when peace will be achieved—whether in 1977 or 1978. For I do not believe that anyone can say that peace will be achieved in 1977 or in 1978, and if he does, he will probably be wrong.

However, for the benefit of European public opinion, I want to make it clear that the elements that we say are positive, as regards the achievement of peace at the present stage, exist on the Arab side only. We cannot see that there are any positive elements on the Israeli side.

Israel is still holding on to the occupied territories. She is still building settlements in the territories she occupied in 1967. She has still not recognized the rights of the Palestinian Arab people or the PLO. She still insists that Jerusalem should remain unified as the capital of Israel. She still wants to impose on the world the delusion of "secure borders", to convince the world that such secure borders are essential and that they mean that part of the territory of others must be annexed to the territory controlled by Israel. Even as regards the West Bank, she wants part of it to be ceded, and this part to remain under her

military control.

I cannot say that there is any positive element on the Israeli side: the Israeli expansionist mentality remains unchanged.

However, we must make every possible effort to achieve peace. But the peace we are talking of is one that does not involve any injustice. It is a peace through which the people of Palestine will recover its legitimate national rights, under which all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 will be recovered.

*Q. Dr. Waldheim, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has said that there are factors favourable to the solving of the Middle East conflict, and that if these factors are not exploited, there will be a new war with disastrous consequences. Do you agree with this view?*

A. I too have said that there are favourable factors, but I added that they have been created by the Arab side only. So there is no contradiction between what I said and what Dr. Waldheim said.

*Q. There is another area of conflict in South Lebanon, and Israel is demanding the withdrawal of your forces from the Nabatiya area. Do you agree to this demand?*

A. This is another example of the Israeli mentality which, as I said just now, has not changed.

The questioner said that the problem was in South Lebanon. What has Israel to do with South Lebanon?

The Arab Deterrent Forces are placed at the disposal of the President of the Lebanese Republic. Lebanon is an independent state which is a member of the United Nations and of the Arab League, and the President of this state can deploy these forces wherever he likes in his country, with a view to achieving security in Lebanon.

What has Israel to do with this, and how can she impose herself and her views on the internal affairs of an independent state that is a member of the United Nations?

The Arab forces in Lebanon, whether or not they are Syrian, went there to help to establish security in Lebanon. They went there some months ago, and everyone knows, and the whole world knows, that the task of these forces is to achieve security in Lebanon. They did not go there to fight Israel. Were it a question of fighting Israel, that could be done from the Golan or other Arab areas. There would be no need to go to Lebanon.

**Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the European countries' role in an eventual reconvening of the Geneva conference<sup>9</sup>**

Cairo, February 12, 1977

*Q. Would you welcome West German participation in the Geneva conference?*

A. I welcome the idea, and I discussed it with the West German Chancellor, Herr Helmut Schmidt, during my visit to Germany. I welcome the idea of participation by Germany, and also by France and Britain. But I think that West Germany's role is based on two points:

1. Coordinating all efforts that are being made so that they may lead to the convening of the Geneva conference this year.

2. West Germany should be associated with the matter of guarantees. I discussed the question of guarantees with the West German Chancellor, Herr Schmidt. They are prepared to participate in these guarantees. I also discussed it with my friend Genscher. Herr Schmidt told me that West Germany is prepared to contribute to the guarantees as long as it is not expected to send troops.

*Q. What is your view of the meeting of the Palestine National Council in Cairo in March?<sup>10</sup>*

A. They are going to decide their position for the coming period, and they are entitled to do so, in view of the fact that this is the year of the solution and the year of the Geneva conference. The Palestinians should reach unanimity and take decisions on all problems. We are expecting them to do so.

*Q. What role can the USSR play? How can the Russians participate?*

A. The USSR is co-chairman of the Geneva conference with the United States, so they do have a part to play at Geneva. Geneva is the only

place to achieve peace, because all the parties, including Israel, will participate in the conference.

*Q. From his statements, it seems that Kurt Waldheim is pessimistic as to whether the Geneva conference will meet. Do you share his pessimism?*

A. Optimism is second nature to me. Waldheim may have met with difficulties in Israel, but he has met no problems in Cairo or the Arab countries.

*Q. Waldheim declared in Cairo that Israel has refused to participate in the Geneva conference if the PLO takes part. Do you think that Waldheim has failed in his task, and that the chances of the Geneva conference meeting are deadlocked?*

A. The Geneva conference cannot meet without the Palestinians, because the Palestine problem is the very heart and essence of the Middle East crisis. It is not a problem of the Golan or Sinai. If we really want peace the Palestinians must participate in the Geneva conference. Israel is creating difficulties to prevent their participating. Let us wait until we have finished our consultations with our colleagues, Genscher, and then Cyrus Vance, and later the French Foreign Minister, then we in the Arab world are going to meet to see what comes next.

*Q. The Syrian president, Hafiz Asad, made a statement during an interview with a Kuwaiti newspaper to the effect that if the Geneva conference fails, the Arabs will unsheath their weapons and join in liberating their territories. Does Your Excellency agree with this?*

A. As I said before, we in Egypt initiated the peace process immediately after the October War—in November 1973—and we shall make every effort to ensure that the move towards peace continues. But if, in spite of our efforts and those of Western Europe—West Germany, France and Britain, Israel chooses another course—if Israel rejects all this, the only course open will be the liberation of the territories, which is a legitimate right. But I am still optimistic that 1977 is going to be the year of the peaceful solution.

<sup>9</sup> Made on the arrival of Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cairo for talks with President Sadat; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 13, 1977. For Mr. Genscher's statements at the press conference see doc. 56 above.

<sup>10</sup> See docs. 227 to 232 below.

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**Statement by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi denying reports that contacts have taken place between PLO officials and representatives of Israeli Zionist parties<sup>11</sup>**

**Beirut, February 15, 1977**

In the last few days there have been reports of alleged Palestinian-Israeli meetings, and a certain newspaper has published what it called the "map" of the settlement desired by the Palestinians.

We wish to affirm in the strongest terms that these reports are completely untrue. The only representative of the PLO in Vienna is Mr. Ghazi Husain. He is still engaged in opening the PLO office there and has so far taken part in no political consultations. It is not true that the PLO asked Chancellor Kreisky to mediate in any way, and the discussions with him dealt only with moves to improve the attitude of the international socialist parties to the cause of the people of Palestine and its just struggle.

Nor has the PLO any representative in Paris except Mr. Izz al-Din al-Qalaq, who has never made any contacts with Israeli Zionist parties. This is in conformity with the line of the PLO and the resolutions of the National Council and the Executive Committee of the PLO.

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**Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing his talks with US Secretary of State Vance<sup>12</sup>**

**Cairo, February 17, 1977**

*Q. Mr. President, you have said on numerous occasions that it is for the next generation of Egyptians to make a real peace with Israel in terms of trade and exchange of people, civilians and ideas. Do you believe that if the current initiatives are successful in securing*

*Israeli withdrawal to '67 boundaries, or close to the '67 boundaries, and providing guarantees for the establishment of a Palestinian entity that Egypt, after that accord, would be willing to enter into what the Israelis call a real peace, trade, and exchange of people and ideas with that nation, including diplomatic relations?*

*A. Let me say this in the first hand.*

I didn't say at all that we are going to postpone peace. What I said and I say now—and I have already discussed with Secretary Vance—we are now for establishing permanent peace in the area, in a peace agreement in which the state of belligerency is ended after 28 years and the borders are defined, guarantees are given, the withdrawal of Israel, the creation of a Palestinian state.

I never said that peace would be postponed for the next generation. But I said this—when I was asked what about the diplomatic relations or open borders or so, I said, well, you can't start this like this, and you can't write it in a peace agreement. It has never occurred before. Or is it some sort of imposing conditions from the side of Israel? This is the old theory of Ben Gurion, to impose peace on the Arabs.

Well, peace cannot be imposed at all. Peace can be negotiated.

*Q. Mr. President, are you saying that at the end of this process, if it is satisfactory to you, that Egypt would be willing to engage in trade and exchange of ideas with the State of Israel?*

*A. It is a matter of pure sovereignty, my dear. Why should you plant this misunderstanding like the Israelis are planting already? It is a matter of sovereignty.*

*Q. You mentioned that Mr. Arafat and Mr. Fahmy this morning discussed possible changes to the Palestinian charter. Would you expect—the Arab side expect the changes to that charter—that if the Palestinians considered some changes to the charter, there should also be more concessions from the Western side, from the United States perhaps; and if so, what form should those concessions take?*

*A. Regarding the Palestinians, it is a matter for them to decide. But I must tell you this, as I told Secretary Vance also, that without the help of the United States in every step and every stage, we can't establish peace in the area here. Someone may be furious against me, but it is a fact. I have said before that 99 percent of the cards of this game is in the hands of the United States. So*

<sup>11</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), February 15, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXVI, 1968 (March 14, 1977), pp. 211–214. For statements by US Secretary of State Vance at the press conference see doc. 62 above.

we seek the help of the United States in every stage and in every form.

*Q. Do those stages include talks between the United States and the Palestinians, in your view? Is that one of the things that you told Vance—that the United States ought to modify its stance against talking with the PLO?*

*A.* I didn't tell Secretary Vance anything like this. We have discussed the whole problem, but I didn't tell him what you have already referred to.

*Q. If and when the Geneva conference is reconvened, do you favour the PLO going as a separate delegation? And if and when there is a final peace settlement, must there be a separate Palestinian state?*

*A.* I have already stated my position on this. The Palestinian question is the core of the whole problem. Very well. They should participate if you want to reach permanent peace like we are trying now.

And I say that an official and declared link should take place between this Palestinian state and Jordan, even before Geneva starts.

*Q. Mr. President, what is Egypt prepared to contribute to the peace process? Israel you ask to withdraw. What is Egypt prepared to give?*

*A.* I gave Secretary Vance my view on this. Egypt is ready 100 percent for peace.

*Q. Could you be a little more concrete? What sort of concessions is Egypt prepared to give for peace?*

*A.* What are we going to say in Geneva if we are going to discuss here, now, such a thing like this?

*Q. You are saying here that Israel should withdraw. You are saying that before Geneva. What is Egypt prepared to contribute to peace?*

*A.* Egypt is ready for everything. If Israel really wants peace, Egypt is ready for everything.

*Q. Mr. President, as I understood you a moment ago, you said that an official and declared link should take place between the Palestinian state and Jordan even before a Geneva conference. Could you explain more fully what kind of link, and how it would be established?*

*A.* We should leave this for the parties concerned, to the Palestinians and King Hussain; but I have in my mind some sort of confederation or so.

*Q. If the dispute over Palestinian representation at Geneva is not resolved in the next several weeks or months, would Egypt be prepared to renew negotiations with*

*Israel for another disengagement in the Sinai or on any other negotiations?*

*A.* I have stated before that the step-by-step has ended, and we are now for permanent peace and global solutions.

*Q. (Inaudible) links between a Palestinian state and even before the Geneva conference what in your judgement should be the relationship of the Palestine Liberation Organization to that Palestinian state?*

*A.* You know, according to the decision that we have already taken in the Arab summit in Rabat, we have given all the responsibility to the PLO.<sup>13</sup> So the PLO will be negotiating this with King Hussain about the relation between themselves and whatever question may be raised in this field.

Let me tell you this please—it appears that you are repeating the question—I must tell you something before the end of this conference. I seize this opportunity to send my deepest thanks to President Carter for sending a distinguished personality, Secretary Vance, I have enjoyed, really immensely, the talks with him. He was honest, straightforward, and I like to deal with him, and I hope that we shall continue the peace process that we have started already together, the United States and Egypt.

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### **Press conference statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat denying reports that PLO officials have been in secret contact with the Israeli government (excerpts)<sup>14</sup>**

**Kuwait, February 20, 1977**

I want to give warning that the aim of the campaign in which the international media are now engaged is to impugn the integrity of the Palestine revolution, so that when the conspiracy against it bears fruit and the revolution is assassinated, no one will stand by it. That is the intention, and I lay upon you this revolutionary responsibility. I am sure that none of you thinks of

<sup>13</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine, 1974* and Appendix A below.

<sup>14</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), February 22, 1977, p. 3.



attacking the revolution or of assisting in any future attacks on it. It is preposterous that the world press should report that we have made contacts with the enemy. Ask me: I am not independent, and I cannot make contacts without referring to our brothers in the Arab area. I defy anyone to say that there has been any attempt at contacts between us and the Zionist entity and the Israeli government. What did happen was that in the speech I made at the United Nations I mentioned a Jewish freedom fighter, and sent him my greetings. He was the man who was imprisoned for twenty-six years hard labour, and I sent him my greetings, along with Archbishop Capucci and Sheikh Abu Tair.

When I call for a democratic Palestinian state, I am committed to it in practice, not only as a slogan. I therefore intend to contact all Jews who believe in the Palestinian state. I sent some letters to the members of the Jewish group called Neturei Karta, who do not believe in the state of Israel. They number twelve thousand; they live in Jerusalem and say that they are for us and for the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state. One of them said, "I am with Fatah, and support the revolution," and I felt bound to send him my greetings. I am not prejudiced against Judaism, only against Zionism, and I shall never be opposed to Judaism; if I were I would not be a true Muslim or a true Christian.

You know that these contacts we are making—and we have something else to tell you: that we are directing the operation of returning Arab Jews from Israel to the Arab area. As a result of our efforts 450 families have returned to Morocco, seven families have returned to Iraq, three to Libya and one to Sudan—All of these are part of the struggle in which we are engaged, through which we contact Jewish elements who do not believe in Zionism. And there are certain Jews in the occupied areas who write on their houses, "We are Jews but not Zionists."

And now I am hearing stories to the effect that I have asked President Felix [Houphouët-Boigny] of the Ivory Coast to mediate with the Israeli state. You know that I have relations with the African countries; I was the only Arab to be a guest of honour at the African summit in Uganda, and you know that the revolution has provided the African countries with a great deal of technical aid and with cadres.

[In reply to a question on the role played recently by Dr. Isam Sartawi and Mr. Hasib Sabbagh, Abu Ammar said:]

Al-Sartawi is active in the re-emigration from Israel, and he is performing a duty that many would not like to perform. Mr. Hasib Sabbagh has also been slandered; throughout the troubles in Lebanon he was trying to stop the fighting so as to make peace between us and Lebanese quarters. This man has absolutely no relations with Israel and it is an injustice that anything should be said against him. It is also shameful that anything should be said against Abu Lutf, the PLO official, to the effect that he has attended meetings with them [the Israelis]. Certain mistakes may have been made in practice, but sound principles must be encouraged.

I do not want to show too many of the cards held by the Palestinians, but just look at the results. Israel has lost five thousand Arab Jews who have returned to their countries. This number is equal to Israel's total losses in the last war. Is not this a splendid success in a silent war? I am with the Arab Jew, who is treated as a third-class citizen in Israel—63 per cent of the population is represented by only two ministers. When I call for the secular state I say that we must win these people over as good citizens.

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**Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Algeria of PLO official spokesman Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar<sup>15</sup>**

**Algiers, February 21, 1977**

Brother Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, member of the Executive Committee and official spokesman of the PLO, paid a visit to the Popular Democratic Republic of Algeria on the 19th and 20th of February, 1977, where he was received by President Houari Boumedienne, President of the Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, in the presence of brother Faruq Yunis, "Abu Hassan," PLO representative in Algeria.

<sup>15</sup> Text as published in *Wafa* (Beirut), February 22, 1977, p.2.

Brother Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar carried a letter to President Boumedienne from brother Abu Ammar, Chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee and commander-in-chief of the forces of the Palestine revolution. He also explained to him the position of the Palestine revolution regarding latest developments in the Palestine cause and the Middle East, on the Arab and international levels and in the light of various international moves and activities. He also gave him a detailed account of the circumstances through which the Palestine revolution is passing at the present time.

Brother Abu Mayzar was also received at the central headquarters of the Algerian National Liberation Front Party by brother Muhammad Sharif Musaidiya. At that meeting, there took place an exchange of viewpoints regarding the various circumstances surrounding the Arab problem in general and the Palestine problem in particular, in an atmosphere of brotherhood and a spirit of national struggle. Also present at the meeting were brothers Jallul Malaika, member of the Central Office in charge of liberation movements, Muhammad Qassuri, member of the Central Office in charge of foreign relations and brother Faruq Yunis, "Abu Hassan", PLO's representative in Algeria.

The viewpoints of the Algerian and Palestinian sides were in total accord, thus affirming the deep national links between the two peoples and the two revolutions, the Algerian and the Palestinian.

The two sides expressed their conviction that the problem of Palestine is the crux of the so-called Middle East conflict, and that the achievement of peace in the Middle East is conditional upon the fulfilment of all the fixed and national rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland, Palestine, as specified in UN General Assembly resolution 3236,<sup>16</sup> chiefly their right to return and to self-determination as well as their right to sovereignty and independence on their national soil.

The two sides affirmed their position of rejecting Security Council resolution 242, which obliterates the fixed national rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland, Palestine, and emphasized that this resolution does not represent either a workable or a just or an acceptable basis for the solution of the Palestine problem, which is the

very essence of the Arab-Zionist conflict in the Middle East.

The two sides further affirmed that national responsibility at the popular and official levels in all Arab countries, and especially in the confrontation states, dictates that the Palestinian revolution be protected and defended, be granted the right to act and move and be supported and granted material, military, political and informational aid in order that it may escalate its struggle and accomplish its just objectives.

The two sides call upon all Arab officials to shoulder their national and historic responsibilities. They call upon the Arab nation to escalate its struggle in order to protect the gains achieved by the Palestinian revolution. They also call upon it, at this critical and decisive point in time, to be more alert and cautious and to struggle harder to foil all imperialist and Zionist schemes being made against the revolution and its achievements and against the Arab liberation movement.

The Algerian side affirms its fixed and decisive position of support and aid for the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, wherever it may be.

The two sides assert their commitment to the Arab character of Jerusalem. They believe that its liberation is a national Arab and Islamic responsibility and a right which cannot be compromised.

The Algerian and Palestinian sides condemn the grave violations carried out by isolationist forces in South Lebanon with the help of the Zionist enemy. They assert that it is necessary to put an end to these grave violations and declare their adherence to the rights and the gains of the Palestinian revolution on the Lebanese scene, in the framework of the Cairo agreement and its annexes. They affirm their concern for the independence, Arab character and unity of the land and people of Lebanon. They also declare their rejection of any unilateral amendment or abrogation of the Cairo agreement and its annexes.

The two sides strongly condemn US policy so far which is based upon support for the Zionist enemy, its occupation, its violations and its policies of expansionism and racism. They strongly condemn continued US denial of the existence of the Palestinian people and their firm national rights.

<sup>16</sup> Doc. 22 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

The two sides affirm their determination to confront all Zionist and imperialist schemes that seek to circumvent the achievements of the Arab liberation movement and the gains and accomplishments of the Palestinian revolution, especially at the Rabat<sup>17</sup> and Cairo<sup>18</sup> summits and at the UN.

The Algerian and Palestinian sides condemn the aggressive and racist alliance between Tel Aviv, Pretoria and Salisbury. They affirm their absolute support for all national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America and they strongly endorse Afro-Arab solidarity.

The Palestinian side expresses its appreciation for the principled and firm stand adopted by the revolution, people, party, government and president of the Popular Democratic Republic of Algeria in support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leadership and of the just struggle of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian side salutes the role played by Algeria in the Arab and international liberation movement.

The two sides agreed to continue consultations between them in order to further their policies and efforts in a manner that would entrench Arab solidarity on the basis of support for the Palestinian revolution and of continued Arab struggle to liberate the occupied Arab territories and to recover all of the fixed national rights of the Palestinian people, chiefly their right to return and to build their independent state on their national soil, in accordance with the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits.

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### **Joint communiqué issued by the summit conference attended by Presidents Sadat of Egypt, Asad of Syria and Numairi of Sudan (excerpts)<sup>19</sup>**

**Khartoum, February 28, 1977**

. . . . .

The Presidents discussed the efforts currently being made to ensure the meeting of a peace

conference within the framework of the United Nations. They insisted on participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was recognized by the resolutions of the Rabat summit<sup>20</sup> and accepted by the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in view of the fact that the Palestine problem is the crux of the conflict.

The Presidents agreed that the peace conference must be convened as soon as possible. They pointed out the dangers inherent in a continuation of the present deadlock, which is the result of Israel's obstinate persistence in occupying Arab territories and ignoring the rights of the people of Palestine. With this end in view the Presidents call on the US and the USSR, as co-chairmen of the Geneva peace conference, and in light of their responsibility for the maintenance of world peace, to take a resolute stand vis-à-vis the Israeli manoeuvres aimed at impeding progress towards peace in this part of the world.

The three Presidents also stress the importance of the role of the Security Council in achieving a just and permanent peace in the area, and call on the Council to face up to its responsibilities as defined by the United Nations Charter.

In this connection the Presidents greet and express their respect and esteem for the steadfast Arab people of the Arab territories. They condemn all manifestations of the policy of repression, terrorism and oppression practised by Israel against the indigent Arab inhabitants, the aim of which policy is to weaken their steadfastness and heroic resistance. They also condemn the policy of establishing settlements and of effecting geographical and demographic changes in the occupied territories and the city of Jerusalem, and the policy of defiling and desecrating the holy places and of impeding the performance of religious rites, which disclose Israel's refusal to abide by the resolutions of the United Nations and provide proof of her hostile intentions against the Arab nation.

The Presidents discussed in detail the present Arab situation and the challenges that confront it, and expressed the following views.

(i) The need to strengthen and consolidate the Arab solidarity that emerged during the Ramadan

<sup>17</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A below.

<sup>18</sup> See doc. 314 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>19</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 1, 1977.

<sup>20</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A below.

War of Liberation, so that it may be a weapon in the hands of the Arab nation for the confrontation of its enemies and the defence of its rights.

(ii) The importance of continuing to implement the resolutions of the seventh Arab summit conference held in Rabat and of adhering to them in spirit and in letter, for it is these resolutions that laid the foundations of this solidarity and defined its goals.

(iii) Arab military, economic and political resources must be mobilized for the battle against the Zionist enemy and for the Arab nation's battle for development and progress, in response to the wish of the masses of the Arab nation for the mobilization of their human and material resources for liberation and development and in the light of the fact that the strategic security of the Arab nation is a collective Arab responsibility. This requires that all the Arab states without exception should bear their fair share of the burden and direct a sufficient quantity of their resources to the joint national effort and to the problem of development and of the economic integration of the Arab countries.

Also discussed was the situation in Lebanon in the light of the Syrian initiative and of the resolutions of the Riyadh<sup>21</sup> and Cairo<sup>22</sup> summits, which represent a new manifestation of Arab solidarity directed towards a specific goal. The three Presidents reaffirmed their support for the legitimate authorities in Lebanon, for the constructive role that is being performed by the Arab Deterrent Forces, and for the sincere efforts that are being made to surmount Lebanon's ordeal and to maintain her unique character and the unity of her territory and people and to restore her security and stability. With this end in view the three Presidents renew their call to the world, and to the Arab countries in particular, to provide Lebanon with material aid.

**Press conference statements by President Asad of Syria and President Sadat of Egypt discussing their position on efforts to reach a Middle East settlement<sup>23</sup>**

**Cairo, February 28, 1977**

*Q. [A question on the Presidents' appraisal of the new American administration.]*

*President Asad:* I think that we should not anticipate events. What we want is known to the world—to the Americans and others. President Sadat has declared this. The US is a great power, with the responsibilities that that entails. As I said in a previous statement, Secretary Vance left a positive impression, but he did not leave a sufficiently clear picture for me to use it as a basis for taking decisions. Vance came to reconnoitre, to discover the truth, and during the discussions he seemed to be logical and serious, as a representative of the American administration seeking a solution.

Our aim is the evacuation of all the territory occupied in 1967. We may go to war for as little as a single inch and we shall not relinquish a single inch. President Sadat has affirmed the same thing.

Certainly there are positive indications in the new American administration, the first being their early moves to solve the problem and their attitude on oil in the Gulf of Suez, and on the concussion bomb. Although it is not to be assumed that the US will give Israel everything she asks for, in view of the fact that there was a promise made previously the new attitude of refusal can be taken as a positive indication.

As I said, on behalf of us both, there are indisputable facts that allow us to take a final decision as regards appraising the situation. We must take action and insist on our rights, and our self-confidence, which is a natural outcome of the October War, will give us positive results.

*Q. [A question on the obstacles raised by Israel to the convening of the Geneva conference].*

*President Sadat:* As President Hafiz Asad said, what is essential is that we should have a clear

<sup>21</sup> Doc. 267 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>22</sup> Doc. 314 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>23</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 1, 1977.

view and be determined to achieve our goal. I can state with assurance that when Waldheim visited the Middle East, he encountered no difficulties on the Arab side; all the difficulties came from Israel. Moreover, Israel has started launching what they call trial balloons, the first being her claim that the step-by-step method is the best way to solve the problem at the present juncture.

From our point of view, as President Hafiz Asad and I agreed at the Riyadh conference, the solution must be a comprehensive one; the step-by-step method is finished once and for all. The second thing Israel is trying to play about with is Palestinian representation. The third thing is the game that is being played over the Israeli elections. It may be that the new elections will lead to nothing and that they will ask for a third and fourth election.

As President Hafiz Asad said, we know what we want and, as I have said previously, before the October victory, we had exported disunity and all the problems that beset us to Israeli society, and we are now living in a normal and quiet stage in which we know what we want.

This is a summary of what we see as Israel's attempts to set obstacles in the way of the Geneva conference. Without this conference, with the attendance of all parties, there cannot be a comprehensive settlement. This is not compatible with Israeli policy and Israeli methods.

*Q. [On the possibility of reaching compromise or flexible solutions to the problem of the Palestinians attending the Geneva conference].*

*President Asad:* Israel's insistence that the PLO should not attend is no more than an excuse she offers to the world for refusing to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. This means that her refusal to agree to the Palestinians' attending is not merely a matter of form, but derives from her denial of the rights of the Palestinians. Were it merely a matter of form, the Arabs or the Israelis would be able to find a way out of the problem that would be acceptable to the Arabs and the Palestinians and their desire for peace.

But we are not inflexible. We speak with open minds. As it happens, I have spoken to people who have visited the area and said to them, let us not bother about the format of the Geneva conference. What is your view—as the parties involved—of how the Palestinians' demand for their rights should be met? In fact I found that

it was the content, rather than the form that was rejected.

We are no longer living in the pre-1973 delusions; we can rely on our strength, which is based on the increasing solidarity between Syria and Egypt, the importance of which throughout history both President Sadat and I have mentioned. We have always held our heads high and been victorious through this solidarity; we are making efforts on behalf of peace, but we are making just as strenuous efforts in preparing for war.

*Q. [On President Sadat's statements about a rapprochement between the Palestinians and Jordan, and whether this has any connection with Palestinian representation at Geneva].*

*President Sadat:* Just as we made all preparations at all levels for the October War, so we must be prepared for the battle of peace, with the same open mind, and according to the same importance.

One of the issues Israel wants to play about with is the disagreement between the Palestinians and Jordan. It is our duty to liquidate such disagreements; this is why I proposed the establishment of such a relationship, and reached an understanding on it with President Asad and the Palestinians, making it clear that this was Egypt's opinion, so as not to embarrass anyone. Of course we want to have a united front at the Geneva conference.

The cause of the 1948 disaster was the fact that there were eleven Arab countries with eleven armies and eleven policies. Now there must be a single front against Israel, and this is why I made my proposal.

*Q. [On the attitude of the two great powers to the Geneva conference].*

*President Asad:* We do not think that the two great powers disagree now, or have disagreed in the past, about reconvening the Geneva conference, for they have both stressed that the conference must be convened.

*Q. [On the attitude to South Lebanon and Israeli threats to it].*

*President Asad:* By the decision of the Arab summit, the Deterrent Forces are at the disposal of the President of Lebanon, and if he thinks that he should send them to the South, he will do so. This does not concern Syria, but

rather Lebanon and the President of Lebanon. I think that Israel is merely trying to get what she can. To the best of my knowledge no Israeli troops have entered the area.

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**Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi stating the PLO's position as regards the Geneva conference, international guarantees and contacts with the US, Israel and Jordan (excerpts)<sup>24</sup>**

Cairo, late February, 1977

*Q. The Middle East area is at present witnessing diplomatic moves accompanied by a wide-scale Arab information campaign led by President Sadat, and many statements have been made about the Palestine state and guarantees. What is the position of the resistance?*

A. Palestinian moves are always based on the resolutions of the National Council and the resolutions adopted by the Central Council in the form of recommendations submitted to the Executive Committee, which, in turn, decides on the methods to be followed in these moves.

We do in fact have a resolution in our programme of interim political action to the effect that we are prepared to establish an independent national authority on every inch of territory that is liberated. This is part of the PLO's interim programme. The PLO officials had to frame this resolution in the form of specific programmes that could be adopted not only by Arab, but also by international forces. As we know, the Algiers conference defined the interim goals of the Arabs.<sup>25</sup> It stated that there were interim goals—the liberation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967, the liberation of Jerusalem, refusal to accept any situation that prejudices its Arab character, and the recovery of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, as defined by the PLO in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of this people.

Then as I said, came the Political Programme

and the seventh summit conference in Rabat,<sup>26</sup> which detailed the issues of the independent state and of the sole legal representative, which had been adopted by our National Council and to which no one objected. These interim goals had to be formulated and made acceptable to the world, and the summit conference endorsed them clause by clause without raising any objection.

The Ten Point Programme<sup>27</sup> was endorsed in full by all the Palestinian forces. It had to be drafted and it was in fact drafted in a form acceptable to the world and to the peoples that support the Palestinian cause in accordance with the UN decisions. In the report submitted by the Committee of Twenty the General Assembly stated that the Palestinians have two basic rights: the right to return and the right to self-determination, sovereignty and independence. The right to return consists of two stages—the return of those who left their homes in 1967, and the return of those who left their country between 1948 and 1967. So that these national rights may be realized and the Palestinian people may exercise its rights, the following is necessary:

Firstly; This [the right to return] is one right, while they also have the right to self-determination and national independence. Thus we must start with the first stage which is the return of those who left their homes in 1967. The General Assembly accepted recommendations, endorsed by ninety states, requesting the Security Council to call on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip without impairing the existing institutions, and to dismantle all the settlements; while the Security Council was asked to draw up a time-table for this Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories to take place by June 1977 at the latest.

Secondly: The United Nations should assume the responsibility for administering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Thirdly: In cooperation with the Arab League, the United Nations could hand over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Fourthly: Once the independent Palestinian entity is established, the United Nations, along with the other parties concerned in the area, and

<sup>24</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), February 26, 1977.

<sup>25</sup> Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>26</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A below.

<sup>27</sup> Doc. 246 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

the PLO, should implement the above rights of the Palestinian people and ensure the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the area. These are what we have stated as being our minimum rights, and no Palestinian force will oppose this, for this is the interpretation of our minimum goal. The Secretary-General has been requested to submit the report to the Security Council.

Now we come to the question of the establishment of the Palestinian state and guarantees. Who needs guarantees, the Palestinian people or the Israelis? Israel, the aggressor, which occupied not only the territories of the Palestinian state but also the territories of the Arab states? That we should be asked to provide guarantees—this in fact is a device to cover up the reality of Israel's expansionist intentions. It is we who require guarantees of non-aggression against us.

*Q. In an interview published some days ago, President Sadat said that it is Israel that should provide guarantees of non-expansion, but she is opposed to giving such guarantees. Have these demands been submitted, for example, to Louis de Guiringaud, the French foreign minister, or to Waldheim in the course of international meetings or contacts? For if there is the intention to establish a Palestinian state there must be international guarantees for its establishment.*

*A.* As for guarantees, there must be advance guarantees for the establishment of a Palestinian state and a real guarantee of non-aggression against it. The United States should also provide these guarantees.

*Q. Should these guarantees be provided before or after the establishment of the state?*

*A.* What we say is that first the state should be established and that there should be no aggression against it.

*Q. Many views have been put forward as regards the attitude of the PLO to the convening of the Geneva conference. What is the truth about these views, and what is the PLO's attitude towards the efforts being made by the United States?*

*A.* The Geneva conference is an Arab, not a Palestinian choice. The Palestinian choice is the United Nations, but by virtue of our coordination with the Arab countries, there are many things on which we agree with them and other things on which we disagree. Therefore, our choice is the

United Nations. We prefer that this problem be solved through both the General Assembly and the Security Council because we see that there are many complications and that the Security Council's attitude is based on resolution 242. We have defined our attitude to Geneva, we have said that we reject resolutions 242 and 338 and that we are not prepared to attend the Geneva conference on the basis of these resolutions. The reason for this is that resolution 242 regards our problem as a problem of refugees and not as a political problem.

Who are the refugees? No one knows. Are they Palestinians, Arabs or Jews? This is one aspect. We therefore also say to those who ask for recognized frontiers for Israel that we refuse to accord recognition to secure and recognized frontiers for Israel. This is the National Council's position. Afterwards we clearly informed Waldheim of our position, which is as follows:

1. The PLO should be invited.
2. We should attend as an independent delegation.
3. We should attend the conference from the start.
4. We should participate in all its activities without exception.
5. Palestine should be a separate item on the agenda.
6. If we accept the invitation it will be on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236.<sup>28</sup> The National Council decides upon this.
7. The great powers must provide fundamental guarantees for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territories from which Israel withdraws.

8. We believe that the United States is going through the motions, not really taking action. We do not expect anything from this operation, because it is an American manoeuvre. The proof of this lies in the fact that the United States is constantly supplying Israel with arms, which upsets the balance of forces in Israel's favour.

. . . . .

*Q. Does the USSR support the PLO's position?*

*A.* Yes, though we differ with it on specific points.

<sup>28</sup> Doc. 22 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

*Q. But so far the declared attitude of the USSR has been one of support for the Geneva conference and it has not suggested any alternative?*

*A. The USSR says that it is in favour of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and that it favours Palestinian national rights. So we are in agreement with the USSR at this stage, as an interim measure. Of course the USSR accepts resolution 242 and we are at variance with it on this matter.*

*Q. What chance is there of a change in the US attitude to recognition of the PLO, especially now that there have been reports of American-Palestinian contacts and also of Palestinian-Israeli contacts?*

*A. As regards the American-Palestinian contacts, of course the political office is responsible for all the PLO's political contacts. Of course there is a head of the organization and a head of the political office and they have full responsibility. There have been no political contacts with the US. There have been public meetings with members of the US Senate, and there has been an exchange of views on various matters. These are the only contacts that have been carried out with the United States.*

*As for the Israelis, we have a project for helping non-Zionist Jewish societies in Europe to secure the return to their countries of large numbers of emigrants to Israel. We have adopted this project to help these societies secure the return of many of these emigrants. We have succeeded in securing the return of 4500 families from Israel to Morocco.*

*Q. Is it true that you met with an Israeli in Morocco?*

*A. No, it is not true. No Palestinian emissary of the PLO has met with any Zionist Israeli, and I repeat this. Let it be quite clear that the PLO Executive Committee will never take any measure and never send anyone to meet even Kreisky except Faruq al-Qaddumi, the head of the Political Department, who met Kreisky in his capacity as delegate of the Socialist International. The other contacts were made outside the framework of the PLO. There were other contacts in Paris but they were the result of individual initiatives; neither the PLO nor its representatives had anything whatsoever to do with those contacts. And the PLO and Fatah have published denials of such contacts.*

*Q. As regards the US, would you refuse if attempts were made to make contacts with you?*

*A. I am ready to meet the Secretary of State publicly and openly.*

*Q. I want to ask a question about the reports of mediation between the PLO and Israel. For example, the advisor of the President of the Ivory Coast, who visited Cairo recently, said that his President was commissioned by the PLO to meet Yitzhak Rabin in Geneva. He said that if the Palestinians asked for this there would be no reason for you to be angry. This could create many problems. Then there was Kreisky's meeting with a Palestinian emissary after which all the radio stations of the world broadcast that he had received from the PLO an important document containing concessions, a change in the Palestinian attitude and a map. On the basis of this Chancellor Kreisky decided to fly to Israel to meet the Israeli leaders. There is also the Afro-Arab summit which is expected to concentrate on you alone, inasmuch as the Africans on the one hand and the Arabs on the other will ask for certain concessions to be made. What is the truth of all this?*

*A. In the first place, we certainly have links with many African leaders. It is our policy to have good relations with all the friendly African countries. Letters have been exchanged between these leaders and Mr. Yasir Arafat, but we explicitly state that the reports of such mediation are untrue.*

*When the press mentioned Kreisky it absolutely denied that he was engaged in mediation. He himself also said that he was not an intermediary and that the contacts with him had been made solely to improve the Socialist International's position on the Palestine problem.*

*During our interview with him he said that the problem is a world problem. I usually meet him in the presence of the Egyptian ambassador, for I make a point of ensuring that everything that is said between us is perfectly clear—also because it is not only a Palestinian problem, but also an Arab one—so that there may be no difference in our positions.*

*We in the PLO believe that this is indeed a world problem, not only an Arab one, so that all the various ideologies and trends of political thought in the world should contribute to finding a humane solution especially as they are all interlocked. Can the Socialist International provide a humane solution? Can communism solve this problem? Can capitalism or the non-aligned countries? Thus in fact there is competition among*



the different ideological trends in the world to provide a humane solution for this chronic problem which has lasted more than half a century.

Issam Sartawi certainly did not give Kreisky any document, nor did he speak on behalf of the PLO. All he did was to hand over a letter containing views. He was not acting in an official capacity and the letter was written on the notepaper of a hotel in Vienna.

It was certainly not a document; it was a letter from Issam Sartawi which he gave to Kreisky, and he did not ask him in the letter to go to Israel.

*Q. What do you think of the European Common Market's statement?*

A. The Common Market countries should have adopted a better attitude, but unfortunately Mondale visited Europe and exerted pressure on West Germany and Britain—especially Britain, the head of the European community—so that they would not issue any statement which might constitute a slight advance as regards the problem of Palestine and the Arab problem. It was not what we had expected. However, there was, to a certain extent, a step forward.

*Q. What is the PLO's attitude to the establishment of relations with Jordan?*

A. As far as our attitude is concerned, we have to take into account the fact of our people's presence in Jordan, so that we must have links with the Jordanian people, and all means of access must be open to us, to make these links firm and strong. And we must be close to the West Bank. We say frankly and clearly: there must be links with Jordan.

Moreover, the Palestine problem is an Arab problem. Kissinger told President Tito: We do not want to make the Palestine problem an international problem—and by exploiting it through his notorious policy Kissinger succeeded in making the conflict in the area a conflict among Arabs.

As regards confederation with Jordan, we say that there must be links between Jordan and the West Bank, with Jordanians being treated on the same basis as Palestinians as regards all rights and obligations. But there must be an independent Palestine state with an independent parliament, an independent government, an independent army and independent diplomatic representation.

I want to stress a fundamental issue, which is that the most important issue as far as we are concerned is Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, from Sinai and the Golan. After that we can think about future steps.

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**Statements by Foreign and Defence Minister Butros of Lebanon to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees discussing current efforts to resolve the Lebanese crisis (excerpts)<sup>29</sup>**

Beirut, March 1, 1977

The six-country Arab summit conference held in Riyadh from October 16–18 1976, on the initiative of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait, and the expanded Arab summit held in Cairo on October 25 and 26, 1976, reinforced the collective Arab role and helped to settle affairs in Lebanon in a manner calculated to maintain her security, integrity, independence and sovereignty and to protect the national goals of the Palestinian people, as represented by the PLO.

February 2, 1977 witnessed a further development in our foreign initiatives when H.E. President Elias Sarkis visited his brother General Hafiz Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic. This visit provided us with a new opportunity to express our profound gratitude for the positive initiative taken by our nearest neighbour to restore security to Lebanon and to maintain her integrity. As you know, the meeting of the two Presidents reaffirmed the special historical links that exist between the two countries and reinforced fraternal cooperation between them. This will safeguard their interests, help restore stability to the area, and assist in the attainment of a just solution of the Palestinian problem. Thanks to the immense prestige enjoyed by His Excellency the President, and thanks to the many contacts we have made, this visit was followed by consecutive visits by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim,

<sup>29</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 2, 1977.

French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance<sup>30</sup> and, finally, Ambassador Mikhail Stenko, Head of the Middle East Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

You are aware of what South Lebanon is at present suffering at the security and political levels, and of the painful incidents that are now taking place there. These are closely linked to the Middle East crisis and its ramifications, not to mention their interconnection with the numerous causes which led to the tragedy that befell Lebanon. For the South today is clearly the stage for all the domestic, Arab and international conflicts that are being fought out in the territory of Lebanon.

The moves of the Arab Deterrent Forces in certain areas have recently aroused a spirit of aggression on the part of Israel, the reaction to which has led to a crisis almost too grave to be dealt with by diplomatic means. However, at the orders of His Excellency the President, and in coordination with the diplomatic moves of Arab and friendly states, we have made every effort to contain the crisis and to refute Israel's unfounded allegations, and we have thereby succeeded in relieving the tension. However, I regret to say that we have not succeeded in bringing the situation in that area under control. We have therefore been strengthening our diplomatic contacts at all levels, Arab and international, and in all fields, and we have been consulting with all Lebanese parties with a view to reaching solutions that will put an end to the present situation and to preventing future complications, which, as you are aware could be extensive and very grave.

I am fully aware of the interrelation between the Middle East crisis and all that has befallen Lebanon. This increases our determination to set out on the road leading to a just and honourable solution of this crisis. But it does not prevent our making every effort in the Lebanese arena to find the solutions that will help us to surmount our recent tribulations and restore Lebanon to normal; for I am convinced that we must not allow the solving of the Lebanese crisis to be conditional on a final solution of the Middle East crisis.

<sup>30</sup> See doc. 64 above.

**Letter from Mufti Hassan Khalid of Lebanon to the Islamic community on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday (excerpt)<sup>31</sup>**

Beirut, March 1, 1977

The national dialogue, which we hope will be carried on frankly and honestly among all political quarters and not among confessional quarters, either traditional or new, must be based on the assumption that all Lebanese belong to Lebanon and that Lebanon belongs to all Lebanese, and that no one has designs on its territory except Israel. It must be accepted that our Palestinian brothers are awaiting the day when they return to their country. Thus there is no need for anyone to manufacture incidents or situations, now that their return has become both an Arab and an international responsibility.

Muslims,

Thanks to the devoted Arab leaders, the peace efforts are now taking rapid steps forward. On this auspicious occasion of the Prophet's birthday, we express the fervent hope that we may see peace firmly established throughout the whole of Lebanon, especially in the South, whose problems have grown daily more acute due to Israel and those she employs to strike at the unity of Lebanon and to render her more troubled and disturbed.

**Speech by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat at the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference (excerpts)<sup>32</sup>**

Cairo, March 8, 1977

Brothers,

By meeting today at this high level and at this important and historical stage, we are affirming to the whole world that what brings us together is something stronger than all the vain attempts that have been made to separate us. We are

<sup>31</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), March 2, 1977.

<sup>32</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), March 8, 1977, p. 2.

demonstrating that our will is stronger than that of colonialism and Zionism, and providing practical proof that history always goes forward, smashing in its advance all conspiracies aimed at causing disunity and all obsolete policies that oppose its march.

We meet today in a common struggle against all kinds of colonialism, old and new, against racist and settler colonialism of all types and against all the methods, overt and covert, which it employs. We struggle to liberate such of our lands as have not yet been liberated, to firmly establish the independence of such of our countries as have achieved independence, and to liberate mankind from racist ideologies and the odious discriminatory practices embodied in the unholy alliance of Pretoria, Salisbury and Tel Aviv.

Your Majesties and Excellencies,

The battle of development is the battle of our times against all kinds of monopoly, injustice and enslavement that have dominated our countries for so many years, and against economic and social coercion and the plundering by colonialism of our national wealth. It is a battle for the development of the resources of our peoples within the framework of cooperation and for the building of a better future for us and for the generations to come. In this we are inspired by a common faith and a genuine commitment to spread the message of a peace based on justice and the elimination of the policy of aggressive wars and of trading in the blood of the peoples of the world.

Therefore, addressing you as a committed Arab revolutionary, I say: All of you can bear witness that our Palestinian people both inside and outside the occupied nation, who has taken up arms and embraced armed struggle as the road to liberation, has always desired and called for peace. Therefore we have always supported every serious, considered and constructive attempt to reach a just political solution that is not at the expense of our people and its national rights.

All of you can bear witness that for the last three years the PLO has made every possible effort, in cooperation with its Arab and African brothers and its friends throughout the world, to reach an honourable solution that will ensure such a just peace in this area.

The resolutions of the United Nations, especially the more recent ones adopted by the General

Assembly in 1974, 1975 and 1976<sup>33</sup>—which were adopted with your support and thanks to your unambiguous stand on the side of right and justice, and that of all peoples who love justice, peace and freedom—these resolutions bear witness that it is Israel that is opposed to justice and peace, because it is a bridgehead for colonialism, imperialism and monopolies, and acts as their policeman in the area.

Today the Zionists are still pursuing their aggressive policy in the occupied territory. They are continuing to Judaize vast areas, to destroy the Muslim and Christian holy places and to hunt down the inhabitants and cast them into prisons in which thousands of them are now confined.

In South Lebanon the Zionists continue their flagrant and unconcealed aggression against Lebanese villages and the Palestinian camps, shelling and destroying them, employing local pretexts in an attempt to conceal the brutal crimes and aggressions they commit daily in their effort to drive out the peaceable inhabitants, to create a state of grave tension in the area and to impede the advance towards peace in beloved Lebanon.

Our attitude to each other derives from our national geographical and historical obligation to do our duty to each other, those of us who are rich, whether Africans or Arabs, supporting those who are poor, whether Africans or Arabs, those of us who have means aiding those who are needy. It is not a question of generosity or bounty; it is a duty in the performance of which we are prompted by cultural, human and fraternal considerations. If we do not perform it we shall be enabling the forces of colonialism, Zionism and international monopolies to return to our lands, and we shall live to regret it.

Here I must refer to something that is absolutely essential, something which I am sure you who are attending this historic conference are well aware of. I refer to your national obligation to assist all liberation movements in our countries to expel colonialism, Zionism, exploitation, racialism and persecution from our lands once and for all, bearing in mind the military, political and economic cooperation that used to link Zionist to

<sup>33</sup> See the relevant years of *International Documents on Palestine*.

Portuguese colonialism and still links it to the remaining strongholds of settler colonialism in our lands.

I must also stress that this national and human commitment must expand to cover all liberation movements in the world.

The eyes of our people are upon us today as we meet here in Cairo, the beacon of the Arabs and of Africa, and we profoundly hope that, thanks to your efforts, these peoples' aspirations to welfare, progress and unity may be realised.

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### **Speech by President Asad of Syria at the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference (excerpts)<sup>34</sup>**

**Cairo, March 8, 1977**

If we examine the problems common to Africa and the Arab homeland we find that the chief problem, which constitutes the greatest threat to our areas, is one that has no parallel in the whole world. By this I mean the problem of settler colonialism, which derives from the same origins in both Africa and the Arab area: Herzl, the founder of Zionism, took as his model the double-dyed colonialist Rhodes and, as is well known, asked him for advice and wanted to act in concert with him.

Thus the racist Zionist regime that is established in the territory of Arab Palestine is the auxiliary of the racist regimes in southern Africa, and all these regimes embody a single concept, deriving from a belief in racial superiority. In this theory there is no room at all for the values of morality, justice and equality; it is based on denying the rights of the people concerned—indeed, on denying their very existence. Just as the two racist regimes in southern Africa deny the peoples of Zimbabwe and South Africa and Namibia—who constitute the overwhelming majority of the populations of these two countries—their right to self-determination and to enjoy freedom and independence like the other peoples of the world, so Israel

denies the Palestinian Arab people its right to its homeland, after having expelled it and occupied its land.

And just as the two racist regimes in southern Africa also constitute a danger to the neighbouring countries and a constant threat to their security, progress and stability, so Israel constitutes a danger to the Arab countries adjacent to Palestine and has designs on their territory, part of which she occupied in 1967 and refuses to evacuate.

The policies and attitudes of these regimes have created in the Middle East and Southern Africa an explosive situation which not only threatens security and peace in those areas but constitutes a real danger to world peace and security.

As far as we are concerned, we in Syria have an unambiguous attitude which we have repeatedly stated. We are trying to establish in our area a just and permanent peace which will put an end to aggression and terminate the tragedies that have resulted from this aggression. The way to this peace is perfectly clear and its components are well known—Israel must evacuate all the Arab territories she occupied in 1967 and concede the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

Israel talks of peace but continues to commit aggressions against peace, refusing to face up to its real requirements and impeding all efforts made to that end. Indeed, she is trying to create new factors and occasions for maintaining the present situation unchanged; there can be no doubt that she is preparing for new aggression and further expansion, and deliberately seeking a new armed clash.

In this connection I wish again to stress our appreciation of the honourable attitudes adopted by the African countries in supporting our just cause and condemning Zionist racialism and Israel's aggression, now that these countries have realized how false are Israel's claims to desire peace, and they have become aware of the good intentions of the Arab countries and their readiness to implement United Nations resolutions.

<sup>34</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), March 8, 1977.

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**Statement by a responsible source in the Palestinian delegation attending the First Afro-Arab Summit conference commenting on the meeting between King Hussain of Jordan and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>35</sup>**

Cairo, March 9, 1977

Yesterday's meeting between King Hussein and Abu Ammar, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Palestine revolution, took place within the framework of national relations with a view to coordinating Arab efforts at this conference. Also discussed at the meeting were relations between Jordan and the PLO on the basis of the resolutions of the Rabat summit and the joint national responsibility to strengthen the steadfastness of our people in the occupied homeland and to confront the challenges to the Arab nation at this stage.

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**Press interview statements by Secretary-General George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine discussing its position on the Palestine National Council and other Palestinian issues<sup>36</sup>**

Cairo, March 11, 1977

*Q. Arafat has agreed to attend the Geneva conference and to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. He has thus, in fact, agreed to the proposal of the Arab regimes that peace should be made with Israel. As you have always rejected this solution, could you say if there is now a major rift between the Popular Front and the PLO?*

A. We hope that this separation between us and the PLO will not be final. For our part we shall make every effort to overcome it. We believe

that the proposal to solve the Middle East problem by establishing a Palestinian state is a danger to our struggle and is liable to frustrate our attempts to achieve our goals.

When we said "no" to this solution, we realized how profound was the responsibility laid upon us by our rejection of plans to liquidate our cause. For the proposed Palestinian state referred to only twenty per cent of Palestinian territory, and would solve the problems of only one million Palestinians out of a total of three and a half million. The only solution for our people is that they should return to all their land in Palestine, not only in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

*Q. And if this solution is difficult to realize?*

A. It is better for us to fight for a real solution than to deceive ourselves and the world. In two years, five years, the world may come to realize that this solution was a fraud and a delusion, for the proposed Palestinian state will not halt our march towards the achievement of the goals of our struggle.

*Q. What exactly do you mean by revolution?*

A. Organized armed struggle for Palestine and in particular in Palestine.

*Q. Meaning the state of Israel?*

A. Our people have been distributed against their will in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and they of course have the right to engage in struggle activities across these countries' boundaries with Israel. Our armed struggle is a struggle inside Palestine and across the borders of Palestine.

The half million Palestinians in Lebanon have the right to cross the borders of Lebanon into the occupied territories to pursue their struggle against the entity that has usurped their land. The million Palestinians in the East Bank of Jordan have the same right; it is their duty to cross the border into the occupied territories where the Zionist enemy has established his institutions on our usurped territory.

*Q. What is your solution, and how are you going to reconcile it with the viewpoint of the PLO, if a split is to be avoided? And what do you expect of Fatah in particular?*

A. As I said, the split will not take place. The Palestinian state proposal may not be accepted. Therefore, it is better that we should wait than

<sup>35</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), March 9, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> Interview granted to *Stem* (Hamburg); excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Thawra al-Mustamirra* (Beirut), no. 8 (March 12, 1977), p. 11.

that we should talk of a split between us and the PLO.

In the event of the PLO playing an effective part in the proposed solution, the only source of action open to us, I regret to say, will be final separation from the PLO.

*Q. Will you attend the meeting of the Palestine National Council in Cairo in two weeks time?*

A. Of course we shall. We are still part of the PLO; we have only left the Executive Committee because it is responsible for the policy of retreat, and we are opposed to this policy. As for the National Council, which will put the Executive Committee to the test, we are planning to express our views as forcibly as possible.

*Q. Perhaps one of the results of the meeting will be that the Council is expanded. Do you think that this could force Abu Ammar to do less bargaining?*

A. We have made our views on this matter quite clear, and have explained that we are opposed to any expansion of the National Council because the new members would be persons who approved of the capitulationist solutions, and it is difficult, if not impossible, for the Palestinian people to accept this. We believe that there are reactionary Arab pressures behind this expansion.

*Q. If the PLO's policy on the Geneva conference is treasonable, do you regard Arafat's meeting with King Hussain as equally treasonable?*

A. Yes, yes. Do you know the history of our people's struggle? Do you know how the struggle of our masses has been attacked for twenty, thirty, seventy years? Our people know perfectly well that the Hashimite regime was deliberately established to strike at the movement of the Palestinian masses and, of course, the Jordanian masses.

*Q. What is your idea of the Palestinian state, taking into account the Jews and Zionists, and assuming that there is no state of Israel? On what basis do you want your state to be built? What kind of state would it be?*

A. A democratic state of course, in which all Palestinians, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, will be citizens with equal rights in a democratic society. Naturally, as far as we are concerned, this state will be on the basis of a democratic socialist society; then why all this bloodshed?

Why are we fighting the Jews and why are they fighting us? Why do we not all of us adopt common progressive ideas and live together in real peace? Why not? But as long as the Zionists insist on having their fascist racialist state there will never be peace. If the Jews want to live like human beings we must offer them the hand of friendship and live together. Further, we hope that in a few years we shall be fighting side by side with the progressive Jews until we achieve our aim of liberating our country.

*Q. In what circumstances can you see yourself playing a role in any conference? What are your conditions for sitting down at a conference?*

A. This could be possible when there is a search for a just peaceful solution for the Palestinian people and when the meeting in Geneva is supported by sufficient real strength to make this just solution possible. We are prepared to go to a conference when the question of the Palestinian people, the land and our rights to self-determination, rights such as are enjoyed by the American people, for example, are not subject for negotiation. When we feel that such a conference will listen to us, we shall be prepared to go to it. (We shall only go if the negotiations concern the whole of Palestine rather than parts of it).

*Q. During the last thirty years large numbers of Jews have immigrated to Palestine; there are new rights that have made these Jews feel that it has become their country?*

A. Yes, let us regard it as our joint country and solve its problems together. We shall not say to the Jews that it was formerly our country so that they must leave; we shall say to them: Our problem and yours have special characteristics, so let us seek a solution so that we may live together.

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**Speech by President Sadat of Egypt at the opening of the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council (excerpts)<sup>37</sup>**

Cairo, March 12, 1977

I now want to repeat something that Egypt has declared many times already: That all the steps taken by Israel to change the geographical and demographic character of the occupied territories, including the building of settlements and settling them with Jews brought from outside the country and the measures aimed at Judaizing Jerusalem—all these measures are utterly invalid, and cannot create rights or establish obligations. What is built on something invalid is itself invalid. The whole of the international community unanimously agrees with us in decisively condemning [these measures]. This is an indication that they are acts of piracy and lawlessness.

If the enemy thinks that by such irresponsible conduct he can overawe and terrorize the Palestinian people, he is deluding himself; he is letting himself be seduced by a waking dream, for the history of this people tells us that coercion has only made them more insistent on their rights and more determined to resist and deter aggression, whatever the cost in sacrifices. Although this proud people has been the object of a series of conspiracies because of their situation in the heart of the Arab nation, never for a moment has their energy been impaired, their fighting spirit weakened, their courage broken or their will subdued. They have remained ever faithful to their revolution and loyal to their national responsibilities.

I take this opportunity to send, on behalf of every member of the Arab people of Egypt, our sincerest and most heart-felt greetings to our steadfast brothers in the occupied Arab territory who reject occupation, its logic, its philosophy and all its consequences and who insist on their right to life, freedom and honour.

Brothers,

The present historic turning point in our struggle

requires that we be fully aware of the gravity of our responsibility and prepared to take decisions without delay or hesitation. For the destiny of peoples is not decided by striking attitudes or repeating empty slogans, but by energetic action which misses no opportunity, leaves no avenue unexplored and deals with all events on the basis of action rather than reaction. We have never known a people to achieve its national goals and aspirations through a negative attitude and waiting to see what time will bring forth, or by forbearing to adopt positions, however difficult, that demand courage and self-denial from all concerned.

The Palestinian people is not being asked to relinquish its rights or to make concessions. It has proved to the whole world its sincere desire for peace and its determination to be a positive and constructive force in this strategic area. It has sacrificed much and been deprived of much that makes life worth living, and has lived under harsher material and psychological conditions than any other people has been subjected to in modern history.

It is no longer a secret that Israel is the party that obstinately rejects and fears peace and places obstacles in its way, and every day makes new conditions that render the achievement of peace in the area difficult if not impossible. It is intolerable that Israel, the aggressor which expelled the people of Palestine from their homes by terrorism and at gunpoint, should try to exclude them from the peace efforts, as if they were an alien element trying to insert itself into the equation. This is an inversion of the state of affairs that we cannot accept or tolerate.

The Palestinian people must take their own decisions on everything related to their destiny and their cause. No one can exercise tutelage over them or impose his will on them. For if a decision does not derive from free will it lacks its most important constituent. We here in Egypt insist that the Palestinian will should remain free and independent, free of every restriction or interference. We also insist on respect for the decisions deriving from this will, first and foremost of which is the choice of the PLO as the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative and defender of their rights and interests.

The unanimous decision of the Rabat summit was final; there can be no going back on it and nothing can be allowed to impair it. We cannot

<sup>37</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 13, 1977.

agree to its being diminished in any way; rather, what is required by the struggle of the Palestinian people is that we reinforce this decision and make its meeting a constant element in day-to-day international dealings. For to support the PLO is to strengthen the whole of the Arab front, while to weaken it, its prestige and its ability to take action is to do the gravest harm to our one cause.

Hence Egypt's call for the greatest possible support for the PLO at the Cairo and Riyad conferences in the last quarter of last year. This will ever remain Egypt's position. We shall remain loyal to the people of Palestine and its right to self-determination and to choose its own course unimpeded.

This, brothers, leads me to mention your highest duty at the present stage. Your duty to take action by all available means to recover the soil of Palestine, sooner rather than later. For delay in reaching this goal means whether we like it or not, perpetuating the occupation, enabling it to put down deeper roots and giving Israel the chance to create a new situation in the occupied territory, regardless of the international community's condemnation of these actions on her part. Moreover, the situation of our brothers in the West Bank and Gaza demands that we not rest for a single moment from our efforts to deliver them as soon as possible from the clutches of the occupation, whose oppressive and aggressive nature are so well known to us.

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### **Statement issued by the office of the Chairman of the Palestine National Council at the end of its thirteenth session<sup>38</sup>**

**Cairo, March 20, 1977**

The thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council—the session of the martyr Kamal Junblat—met at the headquarters of the Arab League in Cairo from March 12 to 21, 1977. This session was held at a time when attention was focused on the Palestine Liberation Organization and

its National Council. Thirty-four months had passed since its last session, months which witnessed crucial events, the gravest of which was the outbreak of the crisis in Lebanon two years ago. The meeting of the Council in an expanded form, comprising all organizations, institutions, groupings, and leading figures, thus embodying the national unity of the people of Palestine, was a true expression of this people's cohesion with its revolution, of the revolution's steadfastness in the face of trials and tribulations and of its firm adherence to democracy as the way to the victory of the revolution and to the building of our people's future.

In an atmosphere characterized by that democracy, to which the Palestine Liberation Organization is committed, and by the unity of all groups and sectors of our people, the Council studied all aspects of the present situation of the cause of Palestine in the Arab homeland. Much time was devoted to appraising the events that have taken place in the recent past and to exploring and analyzing the facts of the present stage, with a view to renewing the Palestinian programme of action for this stage and to proposing plans for the future. In appraising recent events, the Council took note of the important achievements of the Palestinian revolution in resisting the racist Zionist occupation of the occupied territories. It also noted our political struggle in the international arena and our great people's uprising against Zionist occupation, an uprising which still continues after more than two years, and which reached new levels in the Day of the Land uprising in March 1976. The Council also appraised the major achievements reflected in the Palestine speech at the United Nations in 1974 and the political moves made by the Palestine Liberation Organization at the United Nations. The Council took note of the close links and the dialectical relationship between the self-sacrifice of our people in its uprising and our achievements in the political struggle.

Having reviewed all aspects of the present situation, the National Council decided that Palestinian action has reached a stage of maturity. The Palestine Liberation Organization is placing the emphasis on Palestinian armed struggle and the proclamation of Palestinian national identity as a means to achieving its goals, and is making decisions for the future; on the Arab level it is

<sup>38</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), March 21, 1977, p. 8.



mobilizing the resources of the Arab nation to end the nightmare of the occupation of Arab territories; on the international level, the world has come to recognize the right of the people of Palestine to establish its national state on the soil of its homeland, for the revolution has already secured world recognition of our people's existence.

In conclusion, the National Council defined the Palestine Liberation Organization's programme of political action in the Arab arena and at the international level. Having concluded its deliberations, the Palestine National Council wishes to draw the world's attention to the great danger that threatens the security and safety of the Arab area, and hence the security and peace of the whole world, as a result of the Zionist entity's continued occupation of Palestine, Sinai and the Golan, and its relentless oppression of the people of Palestine. At the same time, the Council affirms the determination of the people of Palestine to exercise its natural and legitimate right to continue its struggle by all means against the racist Zionist entity, in self-defence and to liberate Palestine and to achieve peace based on justice in the area.

The National Council assures the world that the Palestine problem is the crux of the Arab-Zionist conflict and that, inasmuch as Security Council resolution 242 does not deal with the issues of Palestine and ignores the inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine to its homeland, it hereby affirms that the Palestine Liberation Organization refuses to have anything to do with this resolution. It calls on the international community to deal with the issue of Palestine on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 which stipulates that all Palestinians should return to their homes and possessions and insists on their rights to self-determination and national sovereignty and to build an independent national state on the soil of their homeland. The National Council also affirms its adherence to the strategic goal of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is the liberation of Palestine from racist Zionist occupation, to make it the homeland of the people of Palestine where they may establish a democratic Palestinian state in which all citizens live without discrimination as regards religion, colour or sex in an atmosphere of toleration, peace and fraternity. For this goal derives from geographical and historical facts, and is the

expression of the right of the people of Palestine to its homeland. It is also the proper solution of one aspect of the consequences of both the decline of European settler colonialism, and the Jewish problem in Europe. The National Council affirms that, when it talks of the Palestine of tomorrow, it intends that this shall include, as it has announced at the United Nations, all Jews who are prepared to live with us in peace and without discrimination in the land of Palestine and who abandon their Zionist racist affiliations. The Council also affirms that it draws a distinction between racism and Zionism on the one hand and the right of every Jew to a decent life in his homeland on the other, and the Palestine Liberation Organization will collaborate with the Arab countries in deciding what methods are to be adopted to enforce this right in the case of Jews in the Arab homeland who want to return to their countries. However, bearing in mind the day-to-day activities of the Zionist entity which are the embodiment of the concept of aggression, the Council declares to our people, our nation and the world, that before a just peace can be attained in the area, there will be a long period of conflict during which the only option will be struggle to liberate the Arab territories. The Palestine National Council affirms that the way to attain this goal is through the reconstruction and strengthening of the bonds of unity in the Palestinian arena, the escalation of armed struggle, resistance to the occupation by our people, and the mobilization of Arab resources through a unified Arab position. In this context, the Council also stresses the importance of the links with the Arab confrontation countries and the supporting countries. At the international level, further political struggle is called for in order to isolate the racist Zionist entity, in co-operation with the countries of the Third World, the Islamic countries and the socialist countries.

**Political statement of the thirteenth session  
of the Palestine National Council<sup>39</sup>**

**Cairo, March 20, 1977**

The Palestine National Council, meeting in its thirteenth session, the "Martyr Kamal Junblat Session", in the light of the Palestinian National Charter and the resolutions of previous National Councils, and from its concern for the political victories and gains achieved by the PLO on the Arab and international levels since its twelfth session, and after studying and discussing the latest developments in the Palestine problem and all aspects of the activities of the Palestine revolution under the leadership of the PLO in the occupied territories, and at the Arab and international levels, as well as the Arab and international situation, and in affirmation of the importance of supporting Palestinian national struggle and of achieving its goals in all fields, Arab and international;

(i) The Palestine National Council affirms that the Palestine problem is the crux and basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and condemns Security Council resolution 242<sup>40</sup> which ignores the Palestinian people and its inalienable right to its homeland. The National Council confirms its rejection of this resolution and its refusal to deal on its basis at the Arab and international levels.

(ii) The National Council affirms the PLO's determination to continue all forms of political and mass struggle to secure the non-negotiable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

(iii) The Palestine National Council affirms that all forms of military, political and mass struggle in the occupied territories is the central element in its programmes for struggle. For this reason the PLO is making every effort to escalate armed struggle and all other forms of struggle associated with it in the occupied territories, and to provide every material and moral support to the masses of our people in the occupied territory, with a view to escalating its struggle and to reinforcing its steadfastness so that it may dislodge and liquidate the occupation.

(iv) The Palestine National Council confirms the PLO's rejection of all American capitulationist settlements and all liquidationist projects, and the PLO's determination to devote itself to thwarting any settlement made at the expense of the inalienable national rights of our people. The Council calls on the Arab nation to assume its national responsibilities and to mobilize all its resources for the confrontation of these imperialist-Zionist schemes.

(v) The Palestine National Council stresses the importance of national unity, both military and political, between all sections of the Palestine revolution, within the framework of the PLO. This is an essential condition for victory. National unity at all levels must therefore be firmly entrenched on the principle of commitment to these resolutions and on the drafting of a programme to ensure its implementation.

(vi) The Palestine National Council stresses its concern for the right of the Palestine revolution to its presence in Lebanese territory within the framework of the Cairo agreement<sup>41</sup> and its annexes concluded between the PLO and the Lebanese authorities. It also affirms its insistence on their implementation in spirit and letter, including the application of their provisions on the revolution's returning its arms and on the security of the camps, and rejects any unilateral interpretation of the agreement and its annexes by any quarter, with due respect for the sovereignty and security of Lebanon.

(vii) The Palestine National Council salutes the heroic people of Lebanon and affirms the PLO's concern for the unity of its territory and people, its security, independence, sovereignty and Arab character. The National Council notes with pride this heroic people's support for the PLO, which is struggling for our people's recovery of its rights to its homeland and to return to it. It strongly affirms the need to strengthen and consolidate the cohesion between all Lebanese nationalist forces and the Palestine revolution.

(viii) The Palestine National Council stresses the need to strengthen the Arab Front for Participation in the Palestine Revolution and to consolidate cohesion with all nationalist Arab forces participating in the revolution in all parts of the Arab homeland. It also stresses the need

<sup>39</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), March 21, 1977. The Council approved the statement by a vote of 194 for and 13 against (the delegates of the PFLP).

<sup>40</sup> Doc. 268 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>41</sup> See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the agreement.

to escalate the joint Arab struggle as a means to ensure better support for the Palestine revolution in its confrontation of the schemes of imperialism and Zionism.

(ix) The Palestine National Council resolves to reinforce struggle and Arab solidarity on the basis of struggle against imperialism and Zionism to act to liberate all the occupied territories and to commit itself to support for the revolution in recovering the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, without peace or recognition.

(x) The National Council affirms the right of the PLO to exercise its responsibilities to the struggle at the Arab level with a view to liberating the occupied Arab territories.

(xi) The Palestine National Council resolves to continue the struggle to recover the national rights of our people, first and foremost, its right to return and self-determination, and to establish its independent national state on the soil of its homeland.

(xii) The Palestine National Council stresses the importance of reinforcing cooperation and solidarity with the socialist countries, the non-aligned countries and the Islamic and African countries, and with all national liberation movements in the world.

(xiii) The Palestine National Council salutes all states and forces that have opposed both Zionism as a form of racism and its aggressive activities.

(xiv) The Palestine National Council stresses the importance of relations and coordination with democratic and progressive Jewish forces, inside and outside the occupied homeland, that are struggling against the theory and practice of Zionism, and calls on all states and forces that love freedom, justice and peace in the world to cut off all forms of aid to and cooperation with the racist Zionist regime, to refuse to have any contacts with it and to condemn it.

(xv) Taking into account what has been achieved at the Arab and international levels since its twelfth session, and having carefully considered the political report submitted by the Executive Committee, the Palestine National Council resolves the following:

(a) The affirmation of its insistence on the PLO's right to independent and equal participation in all international conferences, meetings and efforts related to the Palestine problem and to

the Arab-Zionist conflict with the aim of realizing our non-negotiable national rights as acknowledged by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, in particular by resolution 3236.

(b) The Palestine National Council declares that any settlement or agreement concluded in the absence of the Palestinian people and which infringes its rights is null and void.

Long live the Palestine revolution.

Long live Palestinian national unity among all sections of the Palestine revolution.

Eternal glory to our martyrs.

Revolution until victory.

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### **Resolution on occupied homeland affairs adopted by the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council (excerpts)<sup>42</sup>**

**Cairo, March 20, 1977**

(1) The Palestine National Council, meeting in the session of the martyr Kamal Junblat, affirms the unity of destiny and struggle of our people throughout Palestine and outside it. It salutes with pride the heroic struggles of our people in the occupied homeland, its combat capability and continuing steadfastness in spite of all the conspiracies and activities of Zionism and imperialism, particularly US imperialism, and of Arab reaction. It holds in the highest esteem this people's heroic mass uprisings over recent years, which are an expression of our people's unshakable rejection of Zionist occupation and its resolute attachment to its lands, its national rights and its culture under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and its programme. The Council also praises the Palestinian people's resistance to the conspiracies to create an alternative leadership and its determination to thwart all attempts to impair its national rights to national independence and to independent action.

The Council salutes the struggles and steadfastness of our freedom fighters in the prisons of the Israeli occupation, who are being submitted to the most odious forms of coercion, torture and persecution which are incompatible with human

<sup>42</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), March 23, 1977, p. 3.

rights and international law. The Council also draws attention to the fascist nature of the racist Zionist movement.

(ii) The Palestine National Council praises the close cohesion in struggle of the Palestinian masses in the whole of the occupied homeland, a struggle which has been magnificently exemplified in the battles in defence of the land and in the struggle against settlement, the confiscation of land, repressive measures, inhumane collective punishments, banishment, the violation of holy places, the policy of suppressing national culture, and [other such measures].

The political and material support which our people in the occupied homeland gave the revolution during the Lebanese crisis, is the best possible evidence of the unity and cohesion of our people, of the depth of its commitment to the aims of this revolution and of its determination to protect it.

(iii) With a view to reinforcing and escalating the national struggle of our people in the occupied homeland, and to consolidating the unity of these national forces, sectors and institutions, the Council stresses the importance of supporting the Palestine National Front in the occupied homeland and all the national groups and forces participating in it.

(iv) With a view to supporting and giving concrete form to the United Nations resolution to the effect that Zionism is a racist movement, the Council stresses the importance of supporting progressive and democratic forces which oppose Zionism and defend the national rights of our people in occupied Palestine.

(v) Action should be taken to ensure that the Arab countries agree to the repatriation of Jewish citizens who emigrated to occupied Palestine, and to support Arab activities in support of this goal.

(vi) The Council stresses the extreme political, moral and social importance of the problem of the Palestinian freedom fighters confined in the prisons of the occupation.

(vii) The Council stresses the importance of supporting the struggle of the Palestinian working class in the occupied territories and of helping it, through trade unions, cooperative, (*sic*) and economic projects so as to improve its living conditions and prevent emigration, and so that it may fulfil its leading role in the struggle against Zionist occupation.

(viii) The Council stresses the importance of

full support for all nationalist institutions in the occupied homeland.

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### **Military programme adopted by the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council<sup>43</sup>**

**Cairo, March 20, 1977**

1. The unification of the military forces of all contingents of the Palestine revolution, including Palestinian armed struggle, the militia and the Palestine Liberation Army, in a unified force to be known as the Army and Armed Forces of the Palestine Revolution, and to constitute the military establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

2. The Army and Armed Forces of the Palestine Revolution shall consist of:

(a) Regular forces, which will make up the Palestine National Liberation Army, to which all regular forces shall be attached.

(b) Irregular forces.

(c) The militias, including the youth organizations, the Ashbal and the Zahrat.

3. The Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee shall be the Supreme Commander of the Army and Armed Forces of the Palestine Revolution, and shall also hold the position of commander-in-chief until that post is filled.

4. A supreme military council shall be formed under the leadership of the supreme commander. Its members shall include the commanders of the military organizations, the commander-in-chief, and the commanders of the regular forces, the irregular forces and the militias. This council shall draft the laws and regulations for the organization of the Army and the Armed Forces, the appointment of commanders and establishment of military formations. It shall also draft the plans, programmes and budget for the organization, strengthening and development of the Army and the Armed Forces.

5. The Palestine National Fund shall meet the expenses of this army in conformity with the laws

<sup>43</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), March 23, 1977, p. 3.

drawn up by the supreme military council, and the organizations shall pay their dues to the National Fund for an interim period until financial unification is achieved.

6. All Palestinian soldiers not serving in the Army and the Armed Forces will be reserves whom the command may call up whenever necessary.

7. National service shall be compulsory for all Palestinians in all Arab countries. They will serve in the Palestinian Army and Armed Forces according to arrangements to be worked out in co-ordination with the Arab host countries.

8. Reconsideration of the military agreements between the Palestine Liberation Organization and those Arab countries in which units of the Palestine Liberation Army are stationed, with a view to concluding new agreements enabling the political leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization to control and command this army.

9. The Council stresses the need to escalate armed struggle in the occupied areas and to call on the Arab confrontation countries to open their fronts to the forces of the Palestine revolutionary forces, so that they may operate against the Zionist enemy, and to guarantee the revolutionary forces' right to be present and operate in these countries.

10. The Council stresses the rights of the Palestine resistance to retain all its arms in Lebanon and its absolute right to defend our people's camps.

11. The chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, who is the commander-in-chief of the Army and the Armed Forces of the Palestine revolution, shall be requested to implement the above, in cooperation with the supreme military council, as soon as possible.

## 232

### **Memorandum by the Front of Palestinian Forces for the Rejection of Capitulationist Solutions to the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council<sup>44</sup>**

**Late March 20, 1977**

The Front of Palestinian Forces for the Rejection of Capitulationist Solutions, in submitting its

appraisal of the foregoing period to the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council, wishes to stress the following:

1. Out of concern for a united Palestinian stand and determined to struggle to establish a united Palestinian national front—a concern and a determination which we have demonstrated throughout the stage we have just passed, during which our revolution had to confront a vicious conspiracy aimed against its very existence. . .

Therefore, the fact that the Front of Palestinian Forces for the Rejection of Capitulationist Solutions was formed as a body independent of the PLO does not mean that it has left the PLO and/or its legislative base and mass institutions. From our point of view its formation represents one form of struggle to rectify the political and organizational course followed by the leadership of the PLO. We have made clear in our proposal that we regard this course as incompatible with the Palestinian Charter and the resolutions and programmes adopted by the National Council at its successive sessions. We do not for a moment hesitate to declare our full readiness to unify the instruments of the revolution and, along with all sections of the resistance, to agree to the closest national unity if political and organizational programmes that ensure the continuation of the revolution and resistance to the settlement conspiracy are adopted.

2. The Front of Palestinian Forces for the Rejection of Capitulationist Solutions has played an effective part in the struggle of our masses. Along with all sections of the resistance, it has made the sacrifices and lost the martyrs demanded of it by the enemy conspiracies and the needs of our revolution's advance. We therefore wish to reaffirm that we still have absolute confidence that our revolution is capable of continuing and that success in liberating the whole of the soil of Palestine is inevitable; our faith in this has never been, and never will be shaken. We are also sure that any programmes that do not serve and are not based on this fact will be capitulationist and liquidationist.

3. The Front of Forces for the Rejection of Capitulationist Solutions is determined to deal with the problems of our revolution on the basis of a sound and clear view of events, a view that defines the course that our masses must follow in

<sup>44</sup> Translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Thawra al-Mustamirra* (Beirut), 4, (March 9, 1977), p. 16.

their struggle and prescribes their course of revolutionary action within the framework of interim tasks closely linked to our strategic goals, without obscurity or vagueness. These tasks derive from the realities of the situation in which our masses are living and which our bases and fighters have to sustain in their daily life. They are tasks which take into account the experience of past stages of Palestinian national action and lessons that we must learn.

—The historical Palestinian and Arab attitude of absolute rejection of the Zionist presence and determined rejection of recognition, peace and negotiations with the Zionist entity.

—Adherence to the Palestine National Charter and the political programmes—“The Programme of National Unity”<sup>45</sup> approved by the Palestine National Council at its eleventh session and the resolutions it adopted at its previous sessions, which insist on Palestinian armed struggle to liberate all the soil of the homeland for the Palestinian people.

—The fact that there can no longer be any doubt as to the nature of the settlement that is being proposed for the area and what it involves in the way of waiving and prejudicing the rights of the national revolution, thereby invalidating all theorizing to the effect that it is possible to reach a national settlement which would enable the Palestinian people to achieve a national gain in the form of a “national authority”.

The savage and bloody attack that is being unleashed by imperialism and its allies, the Zionists, the reactionaries and the capitulationists, against the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese nationalist movement and all the forces of revolutionary liberation in the Arab homeland, to pave the way for the settlement conspiracy and to complete its arrangements, so that its full implementation may be ensured.

—The terrible pressures exerted by Arab and world forces to compel the PLO to make concessions that will turn the Palestinian revolution aside from its liberationist goals and deprive it of its progressive content.

In the light of these considerations the Rejection Front believes that the tasks on which struggle should be based at the present stage in particular, are the following:

1. That the Palestinian revolution should clearly and unambiguously declare that it has withdrawn from the settlement game, now that it has become clear that, given the present balance of forces, it can only be a settlement that serves imperialist-reactionary-Zionist interests. On this basis the revolution must determine once and for all its attitude to the Geneva conference or any other conference that constitutes the framework for delusive proposals, such as a Palestinian state, a government in exile, suspect American contacts and European and other mediation between the PLO and Israeli leaders.

2. That the PLO should renew its commitment to continued Palestinian armed struggle and political and mass struggle to establish a Palestinian state in all the land of Palestine. This should follow the course of a people's war of liberation, since all revolutionary experiences throughout the world have proved that this is valid and necessary and that its victory is inevitable. For the continued pursuit of armed struggle, and the other forms of struggle related to it, is the only course that can change the balance of forces in favour of the Palestinian revolution. It alone can create the objective conditions, at the local and international levels, that will enable our revolution to endure and continue. This alone can enable it to establish its revolutionary authority in any part of Palestine that is liberated by escalating armed struggle on all confrontation frontiers and on all battle fronts, as a step towards total liberation.

3. Escalation of armed struggle and all forms of struggle against the Zionist enemy in the occupied territory. Our masses everywhere, and especially in the occupied territory, have proved that they are the ones most concerned for the revolution, having embraced it in the most difficult circumstances and defended it with all that is most dear to them.

By their series of magnificent uprisings in the occupied territory, our people have proved that attempts to isolate them from the body of their revolution can never succeed, and that any effort to exhaust the revolution in battles outside their real field of battle in the occupied territory is futile. Similarly, the struggle of our people in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Galilee in the last few years of the revolution, has proved that the million and a half people in the occupied territory in fact constitute the material of revolu-

<sup>45</sup> Doc. 223 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

tion, the kindling of which is one of the fundamental tasks of the Palestinian revolution.

#### 4. *Jordan*

Our revolution and the leadership of the PLO should reaffirm their commitment to the resolutions of the National Council, including those of its latest session—the twelfth<sup>46</sup>—which stress the subservience of the Jordanian regime and the historical role of conspirator against the Palestinian cause it has played throughout the course of Palestinian national action up to the present.

The PLO should maintain its attitude to the Jordanian regime and make every effort to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian national front to topple the Hashimite throne and to establish a democratic nationalist regime that is in harmony with the Palestine revolution.

The establishment of a firm liberated base in Jordanian territory will provide a rallying point for the Arab liberation movement in general and the Palestinian liberation movement in particular, and will be instrumental in setting up a revolutionary authority in any part of Palestine that is liberated by armed struggle.

5. The events that have taken place in the Lebanese arena have proved that the Palestinian and the Lebanese fighting man are fused in the closest possible historical cohesion. It has also been established beyond any shadow of a doubt that the conspiracy directed against the cohesion of the two peoples cannot be halted by humouring the instruments selected and prepared to launch it. Therefore efforts to consolidate cohesion with the masses and the Lebanese nationalist movement with a view to establishing a Lebanese-Palestinian national front that will resist the settlement projects and attempts to cut the Palestinian revolution down to size, and support for Lebanese and social struggle, must be the main item in any revolutionary programme at this stage.

. . . . .

7. Revolutionary action and the drawing up of joint programmes in collaboration with the various sections of the Arab liberation movement.

A savage attack such as that which confronts us at this stage requires the highest degree of co-ordination and the drawing up of joint programmes

by the Palestine national liberation movement and the Arab liberation movement. The attack that confronts the Arab masses employs the method of dealing with the sections of the Arab liberation movement one by one so as to liquidate the movement more easily. Therefore action to confront the attack throughout the Arab homeland will disunite the forces of the adversary and make the confrontation continuous and broad-based. The error into which the resistance movement fell in this field, when the leadership of the resistance established relations with the regimes and shunned the movement of the masses, must not be repeated.

However, these programmes must be in accord with the nature of the stage through which the Arab national liberation movement is passing. Inasmuch as the primary goal of imperialism is to extend its influence and safeguard its interests, the Arab liberation movement must establish a progressive Arab front by drawing up programmes of action directed against these interests, aimed at smashing imperialist influence, liquidating the Zionist entity and putting an end to Arab reaction.

8. Establishing the closest relations with the Arab regimes that reject settlement by establishing an Arab fighting front comprising the Arab liberation movement and the rejection regimes, to resist the settlement and to go on fighting for the liberation of Palestine.

9. Strengthening the alliances between the world liberation movement and the socialist camp by: stressing the importance of their role in resisting imperialism; this means that, in the coming stage they will be of particular importance in the world confrontation between the oppressed peoples and imperialism; and by escalating their efforts to ignite the crisis of the capitalist system, thereby helping to create more mature objective conditions for the revolution of the working class in the capitalist countries.

#### 10. *Organization*

Struggle to ensure that as far as its organization is concerned, the PLO develops from its present form to that of a national front in which relations between contingents are governed by the laws of equality. Such a national front can only be established on the basis of a political programme agreed on by all and ensuring that the forces of the revolution repel the conspiracies and continue on the course of armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

<sup>46</sup> See docs. 246, 247 and 248 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

## 233

**Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt describing the objectives of his forthcoming trip to Europe and the US and hoping for an early resumption of the Geneva peace conference<sup>47</sup>**

Cairo, late March, 1977

*Q. Exactly what results do you expect from your visits to West Germany and Paris?*

A. In the first place I am starting my visit by going from here to Bonn, where I shall meet President Scheel and Chancellor Schmidt, as well as Mr. Genscher. Then I shall go on to France to meet President Giscard d'Estaing, and from France I shall go on to the US. Very well. I have two important points to discuss with my friends in Germany and France. The first is bilateral relations between Germany and France on the one hand and Egypt on the other with a view to rectifying the economic course upon which we have in fact embarked, as you know. Our colleagues in the Arab world have given us aid in this field and I shall ask for aid and technology from France and Germany, in the context of bilateral relations.

Moreover, I shall discuss the Middle East problem, and in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict, in addition to the role of Germany, France and the European Community as a whole, both at this stage before the Geneva conference and at the second stage after it. My discussions with these two countries will be on what aid we can get from Germany and France and the European Community as a whole.

In the US I want first and foremost to get to know President Carter, for I have not met him and I do not know him. I have only read the small book he published, some of his meetings with the press, and so on. But I very much want to get to know him personally.

After that we shall certainly discuss the basic problem, which is the Arab-Israeli conflict and the reconvening of the Geneva conference for a comprehensive solution and a permanent peace

in the area.

There will also be other discussions on bilateral relations, mutual understanding and the generous aid given by President Carter during our economic difficulties, when he allocated about 500 million dollars as aid, then the aid we have received from the US.

I shall also discuss the same problem of our economy with him and his aides in the US, and with the various international agencies there.

*Q. Mr. President, in this connection would you also comment on Mr. Brezhnev's recent statement?<sup>48</sup>*

A. Yes. I regard Mr. Brezhnev's recent statements as really very positive, though we do have some comments to make on certain details. I have instructed the foreign minister to get in touch with the USSR to seek clarification of these points. The foreign minister met the Soviet ambassador yesterday, I think, or the day before yesterday, and the process is still going on.

*Q. Would you tell us what points you think are not clear?*

A. Yes. Brezhnev's statement included the words: "Secure borders". These two words have been interpreted by the Israeli side in a way we do not accept. We have our own interpretation. And so on—this is just one example. That is why we are making contacts with the USSR, to prepare for the Geneva conference.

*Q. Mr. President, in what field do you expect to push the Middle East peace process towards the reconvening of the Geneva conference? And are you not overestimating the role of the resources of the Common Market countries, and Germany and France in particular?*

A. I am not asking from Germany and France and the Common Market countries anything that is beyond their capacity. What I say is that we should get their help in two stages. The first stage will be before the convening of the Geneva conference. This means that we need their help to persuade Israel to abandon all her old arrogant policies, and to come and sit down with the Palestinians at Geneva to establish a permanent peace in the Middle East. To this end we need the help of Germany, France and Western Europe in

<sup>47</sup> Interview conducted by a group of West German journalists; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March 29, 1977.

<sup>48</sup> Doc. 75 above.



persuading the Israelis. The second stage will come when we start the Geneva conference and come to the stage of guarantees. We need our friends in the Common Market only to take their share in the guarantees and to reassure Israel. But at the same time we shall ask for the same guarantees for ourselves.

*Q. Mr. President, you have called for the establishment of a government-in-exile and for the establishment of organic relations between the Palestinians and Jordan before the Geneva conference is convened. So far neither of these problems has been settled; no detailed picture of them has been drawn and no decision on them has been reached. Do you still think that a government-in-exile and the establishment of organic relations before the Geneva conference would be a helpful factor in the negotiations?*

A. Certainly. I certainly think that they would be a great help. This is not the first time I have called for them. I called for them before the October war, a year before the October war. If the Palestinians had established their provisional government before the October war I am sure that the whole world would have recognized it on October 6, and I told them so quite frankly. I still believe the same thing—that they should start establishing their provisional government. But they have their own views on the matter and go their own way.

As regards the link between the new state of Palestine and Jordan, I insist that a public declaration in the name of the two sides ought to be issued before the Geneva conference. This is where we disagree. As you know, I met with the Palestine National Council for two hours and a half and today before you came I had with me Yasir Arafat and I met with him for an hour. We and they still disagree. As a matter of principle they do not disagree. On principle they agree that a specific relationship or a specific link should be created between. [*sic*]. They argue that this should only take place after the establishment of the Palestinian state. I argue, and still hold the view, that this link should be established before the Geneva conference, because Israel can create difficulties and mine the road leading to the solution in Geneva.

*Q. Mr. President, would reaching a solution and announcing a link between the two mean the formation of a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to go to Geneva?*

A. I really cannot say. This will have to be decided by Jordan and the Palestinians. But in fact I have discussed this matter in the Arab world, with President Asad and King Hussein, when they visited me in Aswan recently. We have the same view, which is that there should be along with us a Palestinian delegation to speak in their name so that we do not have to bear the responsibility of speaking on their behalf.

*Q. Could you envisage the peace talks taking place in two stages or rather at two conferences? At the first stage there would not be an independent Palestinian delegation, but a delegation of the confrontation countries—Egypt, Syria and Jordan, to prepare the way for the convening of the final and fundamental conference at which the Palestinians would be represented?*

A. As I told you at the start, the Palestine issue is the core of the whole problem. We shall meet in Geneva to establish peace, a permanent peace in the area. How can we achieve this without the Palestinians, who are the core of the whole problem, not Sinai or the Golan Heights? But as I told you I think—and let me repeat—that if some kind of dialogue between the US and the Palestinians is initiated, it will be possible to solve many problems.

*Q. There is also the problem of your disagreements about the basis of the Geneva conference. You insist that resolution 242 should constitute its basis, while the Palestinians want the implementation of the latest resolution adopted by the General Assembly?*

A. Yes. You should not blame the Palestinians. As I told you, they are deprived of everything, even human rights. Therefore, just as we have extremists here, so they have extremists in Israel too.

Even at the official level there are extremists in Israel. We shall have to find a way.

*Q. Is it possible to find a way within the framework of resolution 242, by suppressing the part on the refugees and replacing it with a declaration?*

A. As a matter of fact the Palestine problem is no longer known as a problem of refugees. It is a political movement and recognized as such. But there is a contradiction. We have accepted resolution 242 as the basis for a solution, and Jordan has also accepted it and, as I told you, I think it will be possible to find some means.

## 234

**Remarks by President Sadat of Egypt at a banquet given in his honour on the occasion of his visit to the USA (excerpts)<sup>49</sup>**

Washington, April 4, 1977

I came here looking forward to meeting you and to working closely with you on matters of mutual interest.

I am happy to state that my first meeting with you this morning has fulfilled my expectations. I found you to be a man of courage and vision who listens only to the voice of his conscience. Your determination to pursue what is right is paralysed by your readiness to accept varying viewpoints and differences in opinion. Your understanding of the complex problems of our time is profound. Above and beyond all this is the fact that your principal commitment is to the cause of peace and the international brotherhood of man.

. . . . .

Mr. President,

Your recent statement<sup>50</sup> about the right of the Palestinians to their national home was welcomed by all Arabs. It was seen as a positive sign for it is the first time since 1947 that a US President has expressed his conviction regarding the necessity of a homeland for the Palestinians where they can establish their independent state. You will agree with me that the Palestinians, who have shown moderation and a great sense of responsibility, are entitled to be heard by you and by the American people. Their leadership has submitted their credentials as part of the peace-making process. Conducting a dialogue with them would give them peace of mind and encourage them to show increased moderation.

As soon as the Palestine problem is solved, the road to peace will become open and accessible. Israeli forces must withdraw from all occupied Arab territories. This would inevitably result in an ending of the state of war. We are, as I have stated repeatedly, prepared to discuss any formula that is proposed in order to guarantee the preservation of peace in the region.

It is we whose security has been threatened

constantly in the past quarter of a century. Accordingly, we shall have absolutely no objections to the adoption of measures calculated to protect international frontiers and to make renewed war unlikely. We welcome your participation in proposing such guarantees.

Mr. President,

You are proposing a new image for the United States. The effect of this goes beyond the borders of your own country. A revival of idealism and morality is not merely a mental exercise, but a living policy which affects the course of events in many regions of the world. We are perfectly happy to cooperate with you in restoring the emphasis on the rule of law as an arbiter among nations. Legitimacy must replace force as a criterion of right and wrong. We must not measure nations by their capability but rather by the values they believe in.

## 235

**Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the issues involved in arriving at a Middle East settlement<sup>51</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1977

*Q. [On US responsibility to support the establishment of a Palestinian state].*

*A.* I discussed the peace process with President Carter. You will recall that we started working together in November 1973. The fact is, there can be no peace without the Palestinians... They are the basis... Not by the step-by-step policy, but by a comprehensive solution for permanent peace in the area. We must therefore see to it that the Palestinians participate along with us. We discussed this matter, and I also mentioned it in my speeches.

As I always do, I urged that a dialogue be established between the US and the Palestinians, as this would make it easier for all parties to the conflict to reach a peaceful settlement. What I anticipate is that President Carter—especially since he has declared that the Palestinians have the right to a homeland—what I anticipate is that this matter will be of the greatest importance

<sup>49</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 5, 1977.

<sup>50</sup> Doc. 73 above.

<sup>51</sup> Interview made after a meeting with President Carter. Excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 7, 1977.

when Carter starts to formulate his policy, especially when he meets with the other Arab leaders.

*Q. [On President Carter's statements on the Middle East problem, relative to frontiers, normal relations and the Palestinian homeland].*

*A.* We discussed this. Even before I came here I gave my views on this point. Sovereignty is indivisible, and we cannot have two borders—each country has one border. As regards the other subjects, we shall be in close contact. I agreed with President Carter on some points and we disagreed on others; this is only natural. What is important is that I have full confidence in President Carter, and in this connection I want to express my appreciation of the real help that was given us in our economic difficulties and for the understanding I found during the talks. I want to say that we certainly disagreed on some points, but this does not mean that we shall not go on, and I stress that I am proud to have President Carter as a friend, a dear friend.

*Q. [On his statements on starting a dialogue between the US and the Palestinians, and whether he had brought with him a written or verbal message from Yasir Arafat to the US Administration].*

*A.* I have not brought with me any message, written or unwritten. But I did meet Yasir Arafat two days before I started my trip and before we had an Arab summit conference in Riyadh and another in Cairo. Then there was the Afro-Arab conference, and at all these meetings I met my colleagues, the Arab heads of state, and Yasir Arafat. I have been urging the establishment of a dialogue between the US and the PLO since we entered the peace-making phase in 1973, and not just since the election of President Carter. As I said before, there can be no peace in the area without the Palestinians.

The Palestine problem is the crux of the problem. You have published in the press reports of my insistence that there should be a declaration of an official and clearly defined relationship between the new Palestinian state and Jordan, so that we may move towards peace along the right path.

*Q. [If he felt that the US.... [word missing] the Palestinians].?*

*A.* What I have felt is that President Carter and his Administration are according the greatest

importance and priority to the solving of the Middle East problem and the convening of the Geneva conference this year. This will automatically mean finding a way to ensure that the Palestinians participate, because if they do not we shall not get peace.

*Q. Why does President Sadat not agree to Israeli journalists visiting Egypt and Egyptian journalists visiting Israel?*

*A.* I have been asked this before. Part of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a psychological conflict. After 19 years [*sic*] of hatred, war and bitterness, the situation is not favourable. We must advance gradually. When the state of war is ended by a peace agreement signed by all of us at Geneva we shall look into this matter.

*Q. [On the establishment of normal relations with Israel].?*

*A.* Do not ask me to include in the peace agreement the condition that I am to trade with Israel.... in a bad economic situation like ours... Everything will return to normal in due course. We shall give Israel any guarantees she asks for from any quarter she wants them—we are not opposed to this. Once the state of war is ended we shall give the Palestinians their independent state on the West Bank and the Gaza strip and the corridor between them, and things will start to run a normal course.

## 236

### **Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the Carter Administration's position on the Middle East and the proposals for a negotiated settlement<sup>52</sup>**

**Washington, April 7, 1977**

I can say that my talks with President Carter were completely successful. This does not mean that there are no differences between us. But when I say that the success was complete, this reinforces my view that I should always be optimistic.

<sup>52</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 8, 1977.

*Q. [On the American government's attitude to the Palestinians].*

*A.* As soon as I heard President Carter's statement on the Palestinian homeland<sup>53</sup> I felt that he had a new idea and a new concept of this problem, as a statesman who had put his finger on the nub of the problem.

*Q. Do you feel more confident after your talks with the American president on the Palestine problem?*

*A.* Yes, I feel satisfied.

*Q. Did you ask to buy planes from America? And will you get them? Do you think that the American reply will be positive?*

*A.* I raised the matter twice, once during the expanded talks between the two sides, and once during my individual discussions with President Carter after the dinner. A member of Congress asked me why we wanted arms, and I said: "We are going to work for peace this year, 1977, and I would rather concentrate on this subject than on that of buying arms. But this does not prevent me from putting the whole matter to President Carter. The US has a moral obligation as regards the security of Egypt. We started the peace together, and I want to renew the impetus on this issue and to concentrate on the fundamental problem, which is peace.

*Q. When you talked of peace you said that it would be achieved in coming generations. Could the Geneva conference conclude a single deal comprising a comprehensive solution?*

*A.* I have never said that peace will be postponed to coming generations. I said that my theory is that peace lies in the conclusion of a peace agreement reconciling all the parties and ending the state of war that has lasted 30 years, with Israel being given all the guarantees she wants, even to the extent of the conclusion of a defence treaty between her and the US. Also resolution 242 must be implemented along with all the obligations that the two sides have to meet, the Palestine problem must be solved, and after that we shall arrive at a final peace. When I was asked about the establishment of diplomatic relations or open frontiers I said I cannot do that now after 30 years of continuous wars, hatred and bitterness. It is quite unreasonable to expect us to do this,

and it means imposing conditions on us. When you say that peace means commercial relations, I say that Israel's economy is collapsing, and that it would mean imposing peace on the Arabs, as Ben-Gurion used to advocate. I am in favour of a complete peace, a permanent peace. For example, the Arab boycott of Israel will end when Israel signs the peace, Israeli ships will be allowed to pass [through the Suez Canal] and there will be no reason for restrictions or taking abnormal measures. But we cannot accept other measures such as relations and opening frontiers; that means imposing conditions on us.

*Q. President Carter said that the peace process may last two, four or eight years. Do you agree?*

*A.* No, I do not. I told President Carter that we must not lose a moment, we must hasten to conclude a peace agreement. Certainly Israel is trying to gain time. In 1956 Israel withdrew in two months. I have now given them six rather than two months, and we must not lose time. We must spend the time from now until the Geneva conference in preparing for it, with US help. I have to acknowledge with gratitude this US help, for without it we might negotiate for the next ten years at the Geneva conference without reaching a solution.

Once Israel withdraws to the 1967 frontiers, the state of war is ended and guarantees have been provided, Israel will be able to do what she wants within her frontiers, but she will not be able to demand new territories. That we reject and do not accept.

*Q. Did you make any progress with President Carter as regards agreeing on a specific formula for Palestinian representation?*

*A.* This matter was the subject of exhaustive discussion. I told him that without the Palestinians there can be no peace. But before I started on my journey here I met Yasir Arafat and we discussed this question at length. You may have heard my suggestion that some kind of link should be established between Jordan and Palestine, and that this should be done before the Geneva conference. We also discussed several alternatives to such a link, but I cannot say anything more now, for the matter must be kept secret and confidential until we reach agreement.

*Q. Did Mr. Arafat agree to your suggestion for a link between Jordan and the Palestinian state?*

<sup>53</sup> Doc. 73 above.

A. After the 1974 agreement when King Hussein visited me in Alexandria, we issued a statement containing this proposal. But the Palestinians attacked it, and after the Rabat conference we gave the Palestinians the full responsibility. During my comprehensive talks with Yasir Arafat he agreed with me on principle, though there were some marginal points on which we disagreed. I want relations established between Jordan and the Palestinian state before Geneva and I am determined that this link should be announced before the Geneva conference.

A Palestinian delegation headed by Khalid al-Fahum, the president of the National Council, has visited Amman and a dialogue with King Hussein is now in progress.

*Q. [On the question of demilitarized zones].*

A. We discussed this and I told President Carter that these areas must be set up on both sides.

It would be difficult to enforce this on the West Bank because of its restricted area, but minor adjustments could be made so as to reunite the divided villages. But this would have to be on a mutual basis. The demilitarized areas would have to be on both sides in Sinai and the Golan.

*Q. Do you think, Mr. President, that the Soviets will put obstacles in the way of the success of the Geneva conference?*

A. Believe me, I want to restore normal relations with the USSR.

*Q. What do the Soviets want in the Middle East?*

A. They want access to the so-called warm waters. This started in the time of the Tsars and they are still carrying on the same policy.

. . . . .

*Q. Your Excellency mentioned your talks with Yasir Arafat. What is the attitude of the other Arab countries to relations between Jordan and the PLO?*

A. In fact, I informed President Asad before announcing this, and at my meeting with King Hussein in Aswan, I also informed Saudi Arabia. Naturally I did not include Qadhafi in this, because he never agrees to anything.

*Q. What do you mean by minor adjustments? Within the limits of 30 miles, for example?*

A. Certainly not. What I mean is that there are certain villages that are divided, with parts in the Israeli sector and parts in the Arab sector.

On a joint basis these villages could be reunited. This is what we call insignificant adjustments. This is not a new expression; they have been using it since 1967.

*Q. Do you feel that the US has said one thing to Israel and something else to you?*

A. Not at all. I do not think so. Carter is a man of principles. He has such a gentle disposition that you have to believe him.

*Q. The general impression is that time is working against Israel, especially as Arab money and Arab oil are increasing.*

A. There is a theory to the effect that Israel is sending up trial balloons as regards withdrawal by steps and a solution taking eight years. This is Israeli propaganda. Israel is completely mistaken because there has never been such a situation as this in the area since the establishment of Israel. A unified Arab attitude has emerged and a readiness to bear arms to an extent never witnessed before.

*Q. What is the positive position reached by the Palestine National Council that you told President Carter about?*

A. The Israeli embassy has been distributing statements about the National Council. There are many things being distributed by the embassy, especially about establishing peace after eight years, and I think that the White House has denied this. The Palestine National Council, which has concluded its meetings in Cairo, was very flexible, and so I said to them in Europe, let us be frank with the Palestinians. In the first place they have agreed to sit down at Geneva, with a view to finding a solution. This reflects a flexible attitude. We must remember what Mrs. Meir said—that history has nothing at all to say about the existence of the word Palestine. She was a teacher in Milwaukee, here in America, and an extremist, and of course she knew that what she was saying was untrue.

*Q. You seem to have been optimistic during these talks, Mr. President. What will your attitude be if all these efforts fail?*

A. I am by nature optimistic, and in dealing with a situation like this I have to find other means. It is not easy for me to say this but I cannot cross the bridge before I reach it.

The peace process must be carried out all at once, in order to help President Carter. I found

him understanding and determined, and we shall get results when the time is ripe in spite of the difficulties that face us and that must be eliminated if we are to achieve peace. I told President Carter this.

*Q. Do you expect a new war Mr. President?*

*A.* War is not all that easy. To prepare for the 1973 war we had to work for three years. I have now put all the contacts that have been made before the Security Council; but then, the US has vetoed fourteen out of fifteen Security Council resolutions. I am still determined to go on with the peace process. But if it does not succeed, we will still be capable of confronting any situation which arises.

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#### **Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat commenting on his visit to the USSR<sup>54</sup>**

**Moscow, April 7, 1977**

Our visit to the USSR and our talks on a number of important issues have been fruitful and successful. I was particularly impressed by my meeting with the Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev. This meeting was evidence of the great and constant interest of the Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in a just solution of the Palestine problem, and this provides us with an immense incentive in our struggle for liberation.

During the meeting Leonid Brezhnev affirmed the USSR's unswerving support for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis and for the safeguarding of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including its right to establish its independent state.

Leonid Brezhnev clearly and precisely stated these principles in the important speech<sup>55</sup> he recently made to the sixteenth conference of the Soviet trade unions.

This was a historic meeting and its consequences will certainly have a positive effect in the future.

The Arabs, and the Palestinians in particular, value and will never forget the USSR's aid and support to them in economic, military and other fields. We are proud of our deep-rooted friendship with the USSR, and we shall make every effort to strengthen and develop it.

During the last few days the Middle East has been the scene of acts of sabotage and intrigue on the part of the forces of imperialism, reaction and Zionism, which sow discord between the Arabs and plunder their national resources, in particular their oil. I regret to say that US circles have been able to achieve certain successes in the area. However, the Palestine resistance movement is absolutely determined to continue the struggle and to remain the vanguard of the Arab national liberation movement and the front line of the anti-imperialist front. This is why hostile forces are still making unceasing efforts to liquidate the Palestine revolution, with the result that the sections of the Palestine resistance in South Lebanon have once more become the target of a ferocious attack by the forces of reaction supported by Israel. In these difficult circumstances the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council was held in Cairo. This meeting demonstrated the deep-rooted unity of all the sections of the Palestine resistance. Among its most important resolutions were the decisions to unite the military forces of the Palestine revolution under a unified command,<sup>56</sup> to stress the importance of cooperation with the socialist countries,<sup>57</sup> and to affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to struggle for the establishment of an independent state on the basis of the United Nations resolutions, including resolution 3236.<sup>57</sup> Those who took part in the session also affirmed the inalienable rights of the PLO to participate in all meetings for the discussion of questions related to the Palestine problem, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Any solution of the Palestine problem reached behind the backs of the Palestinians and without their participation is invalid. The results of the deliberations of the session will have an important influence on the Palestinian Arab struggle and will consolidate the unity of its ranks in the framework of the Arab liberation struggle.

<sup>54</sup> Granted to Tass; translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), April 8, 1977, p. 8.

<sup>55</sup> Doc. 75 above.

<sup>56</sup> Doc. 231 above.

<sup>57</sup> Doc. 229 above.

Our visit to the USSR took place on the sixtieth anniversary of the October Revolution. In this connection I wish to stress the great and magnificent achievements of the USSR in the last sixty years, which prove the greatness of the October Revolution and of the people who brought it about. I also want to wish the Soviet people and its leaders progress, prosperity and every success in all they do.

## 238

**Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia discussing the chances for Middle East peace<sup>58</sup>**

Mid-April, 1977

*Q. There is a concentrated media campaign in the US, which has recently spread to Western Europe, to the effect that you are going to Washington in June to make a deal with US President Jimmy Carter on the Middle East problem. What is your reply to this?*

*A. Saudi Arabia's support for the efforts that are being made to achieve a just solution of the Middle East problem so as to restore peace to the area, are based on its moral attitude, on the justice of the cause, and on the Arab countries' desire for peace. We have no intention of bargaining or making deals on this matter. This is not our way, nor is it in our character.*

*Q. Saudi Arabia is so eager for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem that King Khalid told the Washington Post that "Saudi Arabia is prepared to recognize Israel within the 1967 frontiers". What happens if Israel continues obstinately to refuse to withdraw to the 1967 frontiers? What happens if President Carter tells you that the PLO does not accept resolutions 242 and 338 which oblige Israel to return to her pre-1967 war frontiers, so that it cannot agree to attend the Geneva conference?*

*A. I cannot remember King Khalid saying anything of the kind. In any case, your question suggests that moderation has become extremism and impulsiveness, which is a contradiction in terms. The Arabs have shown that they are fully*

*prepared for a just peace. I do not think that the PLO rejects the Geneva conference as the framework for a settlement. The PLO is less interested in the framework of a settlement than in its content, which must take into consideration the cause of the Palestinian people as the crux of the Middle East problem. There can be no peace in the area without a just solution of this problem on the basis of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, rather than on the basis of their being refugees, as resolution 242 says. This resolution has been overtaken by events and if Israel does not admit this fact, of which the world is now fully aware, that shows that she is continuing in her obstinacy and does not seriously want peace.*

*Q. Israel's view of a Middle East settlement is based on two principles. The first is the importance of the American Jewish community and its ability to make the Middle East crisis an American domestic problem rather than one of external diplomacy. The second is Israel's military capability, which enables her to impose on the area the kind of settlement she wants. What will the situation be if Israel continues to insist on the kind of settlement that is acceptable to her?*

*A. If Israel maintains her attitude of obstinate rejection of a just peace in the area, the result will be that the settlement will be frozen. That would lead to obvious dangers the extent of which it would not be easy to foresee. Freezing the settlement would once again plunge the area into the state of no war and no peace which prevailed before October 1973, and this would certainly lead to the possibility of another war. This development would oblige the Arab countries to reappraise their attitudes. But I firmly believe that President Carter, the American government and the American people are fully aware of the dimensions of the Middle East crisis, and that there will certainly be positive attitudes and efforts.*

*Q. Do you think that President Carter wants or is able to adopt a harder line against Israel than his predecessors? He will need great courage and flexibility if he is to take the decisions that will lead to a real Middle East peace that is acceptable to the Jewish community and thus to the Israeli leaders.*

*A. I am confident that the justice of the cause and the resources and international political weight of the US, together with the principles and morality that derive from the heritage of the*

<sup>58</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hawadith* (Beirut), 1066 (April 15, 1977), p. 19.

American people, will place the US government headed by President Jimmy Carter, in a situation in which they will be able to reach the desired peaceful solution.

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**Speech by President Asad of Syria at a banquet given in his honour on the occasion of his visit to the USSR (excerpts)<sup>59</sup>**

Moscow, April 18, 1977

We believe that today's world increasingly appreciates and understands the facts of this situation, and one of the most important of these facts is that a just peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East without Israel's total withdrawal from the Arab territories she occupied in 1967, and without her fully conceding the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, the most important of which is its right to self-determination.

We also believe that the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and of its effects on the issue of world peace, requires that it should be the object of concern to all who are intent on establishing peace and justice in our area and throughout the world.

The USSR, by virtue of its principles and traditions of support for the causes of peoples resisting colonialism, and by virtue of the close relations linking it with us and with other Arab countries, has opposed Israeli aggression against the Arab nation and called for the elimination of its consequences. It has assisted the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people and supported its right to self-determination. It has devoted its attention to the grave situation resulting from Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and disregard of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The USSR, as a great power and as a permanent member of the Security Council, has worked for the establishment of a just peace in our area and has persistently stressed the need for the Geneva conference to be convened at an early date, attended by all the parties concerned,

to ensure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

The visit we are now making has given us an opportunity for consultations in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, on the reinforcement of efforts to put an end to aggression, occupation and eviction in our area and to end tragedies and wars there. I have no doubt that the results of these consultations will have positive repercussions on the movement towards a just peace in the Middle East.

My friends,

In speaking of the situation in our area, I feel compelled to mention the tragedy our sister country Lebanon has been experiencing for two years, which have been marked by shocking fighting and terrible destruction. We could not stand idly by in the face of this bloody tragedy, for we in Syria are bound to Lebanon by innumerable ties, inasmuch as throughout history until the recent past we were one country, and we are still one people, even though we are two independent sovereign states.

Our attitude derives from our concern for the well-being of the Palestinian revolution and our determination that it should be kept out of local quarrels, so that it may conserve its energies for the struggle against the Israeli occupier. It was clear that the decisive step along the road leading to these noble goals was that the fighting should cease. We therefore concentrated all our efforts on achieving this step and did all in our power to put an end to the internecine strife that was of benefit to the enemies of Lebanon, the Palestinian revolution and the Arab nation. We are happy that, in spite of all the difficulties we have had to face and in spite of all the obstacles that have been placed in our way, we have succeeded in stopping the bloodshed, thereby helping to save Lebanon from fragmentation and partition, and saving the Palestinian resistance from a conspiracy that was being implemented against it and against the Arab nation.

In coming to this country we have been prompted by our confidence in cooperation with the USSR

<sup>59</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), April 19, 1977.



which supports the cause of peoples and works unrelentingly for peace and justice. Those best appreciate the true value of peace who have suffered from aggression, occupation and destruction, just as your people has suffered from Nazi aggression and our people has suffered from Zionist aggression. When you and we call for peace we want a just and comprehensive peace, because we believe that the issue of peace is indivisible, and that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of one party enjoying tranquility while the other party suffers from injustice. We are confident that through solidarity and action by all available ways and means we shall be able to achieve peace.

We have started our talks today in an atmosphere of sincere amity and of confidence that we shall succeed in strengthening our friendship, and in achieving closer cooperation and expanding its horizons; and that our visit will give new strength to our friendship and cooperation.

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**Statement by representatives of the Druze community in Lebanon stating their position vis-à-vis the Palestine revolution (excerpts)<sup>60</sup>**

**Khaldeh, April 30, 1977**

In this critical period of the history of Lebanon, following events which have caused such calamity and destruction, the representatives of the Druze community met in the house of the Emir Majid Arslan to discuss the present situation and the future of Lebanon. The meeting was held in an atmosphere of agreement and unanimity which can only benefit a country to the establishment of which and to the expansion of whose area the Druzes contributed so much.

This is the identity of the Lebanon we want, a Lebanon that is Arab in aspect, in form and in history. It is one of a group of Arab countries, and in that community it should play an effective vanguard role deriving from its cultural history a strength that enables it to assist in achieving Arab unanimity.

<sup>60</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), May 1, 1977.

The Druzes, who uphold the rights of the Palestinians and their restoration, call on their Palestinian brothers to cleanse their struggle of every blemish and to strike a balance between their determination to achieve their goals, and the sovereignty of Lebanon and respect for its institutions.

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**Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi discussing Palestinian diplomacy and the prospects of a peace settlement<sup>61</sup>**

**May, 1977**

*Q. As regards the attitudes of the European countries, it is to be observed that many of them regard the change in their policies as being made in harmony with resolution 242.<sup>62</sup> What is our reply to that resolution and the fact that the European countries have come closer to the Palestinian understanding of it?*

*A. In our contacts with the European countries we have had a fundamental aim. We still reject resolution 242. We have done our best to inspire misgivings about this resolution in circles that have supported it.*

*Today many of the European countries have started to think that resolution 242 has been shelved, and many of them, from Sweden to Britain, have started to say that this resolution is inadequate.*

*Thus the statement issued by the European Community on November 6 goes beyond the resolution, because it refers to national rights, which are not mentioned in the resolution. There was also the attempt of the non-aligned countries to amend resolution 242 in the Security Council in January 1976.<sup>63</sup> The proposed amendment was approved by all the members, except the US, which used the veto to stop the Council adopting it, on the basis of the protocols attached to the Sinai agreement, one of which stipulates that the US*

<sup>61</sup> Interview granted to *Sh'un Filastiniyya*; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Sh'un Filastiniyya* (Beirut), 68, (June 1977), p. 44ff.

<sup>62</sup> Doc. 268 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

<sup>63</sup> Doc. 15 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

shall oppose in the Security Council any amendment of this resolution.

. . . . .

*Q. Then is it possible to sidetrack the institution that derived from resolution 242—I mean the Geneva Conference?*

*A.* I must point out that the Geneva Conference is an Arab choice for the solution of the Middle East crisis. We in the PLO have proposed another choice: the United Nations. At the United Nations all the parties to the conflict are present. And we are not prepared to attend the Geneva Conference on the basis of resolution 242... From our conviction that it would be difficult to change the basis of the Geneva Conference, we have said that we are in favour of the other option, the United Nations and the Security Council...

. . . . .

*Q. But there are major contradictions between the Israeli and Arab solutions...*

*A.* We believe that there is an interim solution with peace and a permanent solution with peace. The permanent peace can only be achieved by the building of a democratic Palestinian state in which Muslims, Christians and Jews coexist on a basis of equality. The permanent peace is in the building of this democratic state—this is the long-term goal. The interim peace lies in the establishment of a Palestinian state in part of our territory, and there will certainly be one of these two peaces in the area. But the Israeli authorities are trying to make the Arabs forget the pre-1967 territories, and to make out that the 1967 war was the start of the conflict. We reject this theory outright, and say that the problem applies from Jaffa to the river—for all these territories are occupied. Tel Aviv is in dispute, Jaffa is in dispute.

Our theory on the problem of peace is as follows: An interim peace based on withdrawal and the building of an independent state, and a permanent peace based on the building of the democratic state of Palestine.

. . . . .

*Q. Does that mean that there is a possibility of achieving an interim peace under the auspices of the Geneva Conference?*

*A.* We have stated that our presence at the Geneva Conference depends on the following

considerations:

1) That the PLO should be invited. 2) That the PLO should attend the Geneva Conference from the start. 3) That the PLO should participate in all the activities of the Conference. 4) That Palestine should be an independent item on the agenda. 5) If we accept the invitation we shall not do so on the basis of resolutions 242 or 338. We shall only accept it on the basis of resolution 3236.<sup>64</sup> That is to say, we reject secure and recognized frontiers for Israel. 6) We refuse to attend the Geneva Conference as witnesses to a spurious Arab-Israeli settlement. 7) Israel and the United States have no serious intention of establishing a just and permanent peace in the area.

This is our attitude to the Geneva Conference. It is quite clear and we have informed Waldheim of it. Moreover, the world's confidence in resolution 242 has been shaken, and in January the Security Council rejected the British delegate's proposal that confidence in this resolution should be restored.

. . . . .

*Q. What is the PLO's attitude to Carter's statements<sup>65</sup> on "defensible frontiers" and a homeland for the refugees?*

*A.* These statements require interpretation. We fear that the word "homeland" means merely a refuge for the Palestinian refugees, the settlement proposals once more. For this position to be a positive step, a few words need to be added to make Carter's statements positive. Instead of "homeland" we must say "national homeland," the words "the Palestinian people" must be used instead of "the Palestinian refugees," and instead of saying that the Arab countries must attend to this problem, the statements should refer to "Palestine" or "their homes."

If these additions are made to the statement we can consider it positive. But I fear the expression "a homeland for the Palestinians" is a step backwards. The Saunders document said that a solution in the Middle East was impossible without the Palestinians. Saunders stood up for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people—that is, he recognized the existence of a Palestinian people. But now there is a retreat, with the use of the word "refugees."

<sup>64</sup> Doc. 22 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>65</sup> Docs. 67 and 73 above.

*Q. There are in fact three attitudes in the Palestinian arena to our political strategy. 1) Direct understanding with America. 2) The alliance with our international friends and especially the USSR. 3) The Palestinian-Arab alliance. What is your view of these attitudes?*

*A.* In fact these issues are interlocking, and Palestinian diplomacy takes up all these questions, interlocking as they are, and puts them forward in the service of specific goals.

There are also some people who want the Geneva conference to be rejected in advance. What we say is that Palestinian diplomacy cannot adopt an attitude opposed to the National Charter or the resolutions of the National Councils. In the light of the Charter and these resolutions, which guide our diplomatic and political action, we can make the following points:

There are resolutions calling for the strengthening of Arab solidarity. There are also resolutions calling for the strengthening of solidarity with the nonaligned countries, the socialist countries and the Islamic countries. There are resolutions calling for the development of the Euro-Arab dialogue, and for the promotion of our relations with international organizations.

We want the world to recognize our national rights and we are ready to deal with all governments or states regardless of their social systems.

This is not surprising; Vietnam did it before we did. What is important is that our national rights should be supported and espoused and that there should be action on their behalf. We are in favour of an Arab front on the widest scale, because we want Arab solidarity in the service of the Arab cause.

As regards contacts with the United States, we in the Political Bureau are like Palestinian diplomatic representatives. We stress that this contact must be at a high level. Certainly US recognition of our interim rights is a step forward. But this will not alter our unchanging position, which is a matter of principle, of hostility to imperialism. Vietnam has declared her readiness to establish diplomatic, political and cultural relations with all countries regardless of their social systems, including the United States. But this does not mean that there has been a change in [Vietnam's] anti-imperialist attitude, which condemns the United States for all its activities.

When we had the idea of establishing relations with the European countries we knew that France

was supplying Israel with Mirages, and certainly the change in the French attitude is extremely important to us. We must do all we can to transform the positive factors working in favour of the enemy into negative factors—I mean we must first neutralize the friends of our enemies and then make them our friends.

But is it possible that American policy should change and come to support our national goals? We say that, for the present at least, this is impossible. Therefore American policy must be isolated from the international community, so that we may get it into a position where it can only submit to the decision and attitudes of the international community in support of our rights.

Total isolation of Israel and isolation of American policy these are our goals. As for contacts, we have no instructions either from the National Council or from the Executive Committee to make such contacts, and in such cases there must be clear and explicit instructions.

*Q. Palestinian-Jordanian contacts are being made. What is the political significance of these contacts at the present stage?*

*A.* Let me start by clarifying an extremely important point. The PLO has made great achievements in the field of ensuring independent Palestinian decision. Of course this does not mean that we are not influenced by a variety of factors. But ultimately, the Palestinian decision is independent. We take into account Arab circumstances, and Arab and international developments, and developments in the Palestinian arena. On this basis we build Palestinian policy within the framework of the national, Arab and international situations.

Relations with Jordan are an extremely important question, and they must be examined in some detail. From a political point of view we say that there must be relations with Jordan, and that they must be strengthened, because Jordan is our people, and we support unity both as a slogan and as a fact. . . . But our goal of establishing a Palestinian state in part of our territory is part of an acknowledged strategy to ensure the survival of the Palestinian identity. If we cannot fully achieve our goals at this stage we must leave the Palestinian banner, which enjoys the support of international legality, in the hands of coming

generations to lead them to the liberation of the rest of our territory. This issue must continue to be part of the Arab and international situation, and there are Palestinians in the occupied territory who must not be absorbed in the Israeli situation; they have the right to self-determination. Therefore the Palestinian banner must continue to bind them to their people. And the Palestinian state will define its attitudes to all the neighbouring entities.

Certainly, good relations with Jordan are necessary, because Jordan is our strategic depth, and we cannot establish an independent Palestinian state without there being good relations between us and Jordan.

There is also a problem related to the struggle. Our people in the interior want us to come closer to their positions. A revolution that has no base close to the theatre of operations is a revolution in exile and will eventually come to an end. The closer we get to the area of operations and build first political, and then military bases, the closer we shall be to our revolutionary truth. The revolution must grow amongst the masses, and the great majority of our masses are in Jordan. We must put an end to all regionalist trends inside Jordan. Our people scored a real achievement when, through the Rabat summit,<sup>66</sup> they succeeded in affirming their acquired rights in Palestine and Jordan approved it. This is a positive point. And what we must say is that in the future the Jordanian will enjoy the same acquired rights and be entitled to bear both a Palestinian and a Jordanian passport, for our people is one.

There is another point. The implementation of the Rabat resolutions is something that concerns Jordan, we need practical and material application of these resolutions.

On the question of defining our relations, and what form they should take, before the West Bank is liberated, we are in agreement with Jordan—we have discussed the matter with King Hussain in person—that it is far too early. First we must take the land and after that draw up the formula, because we do not want to allow Israel and the US to create disputes between the Arabs.

The future of the land is an Arab affair that concerns us alone. We insist on the relationship. A million Palestinians live in Jordan. This is a

relationship. The Palestinian state will have to establish relations with Jordan, although official Jordanian policy may differ. To be frank, we disagree with many of the Arab regimes. But the differences must be solved through various kinds of dialogue.

*Q. What is your appraisal of Yasir Arafat's recent visit to Moscow?<sup>67</sup> And what is new in the friendship between the Palestinian revolution and the USSR?*

A. The following points can be made about the Moscow visit: 1. The visit was made after the bloody incidents in Lebanon. This stresses the strength of the Palestinian revolution and the strength of the relations that link it to the socialist camp as a number of friendly forces supporting the Palestinian revolution and Palestinian goals.

2. It was the first visit to Moscow by an Arab leader since the events in Lebanon and since all the talk there has been about a rift between certain Arabs and Moscow. It paved the way for further Arab visits. This is extremely important, because it strengthens the Arab progressive and nationalist front against Israel.

3. The delegation was given official treatment, and Yasser Arafat was received as a head of state. He had meetings with Comrade Brezhnev during which they dealt with all sorts of matters, though concentrating on the strengthening of Soviet-Palestinian relations and on Soviet support for our march, and their readiness to provide aid and support at the international level, to ensure that we participate in all international conferences for the discussion of the Palestine problem. Arab-Soviet relations were also discussed.

This visit had a special political character and took place at a high level of Soviet-Palestinian relations.

*Q. Is there anything new as regards the implementation of the Cairo agreement<sup>68</sup> in Lebanon, after the relative calm there, especially in the South?*

A. We are committed to the implementation of the Cairo agreement in letter and spirit. To talk of the unilateral implementation of the agreement is in itself an exaggeration. We have implemented

<sup>67</sup> See doc. 237 above.

<sup>66</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A below.

<sup>68</sup> See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the agreement.

a large proportion of the agreement and there remains the part that the other side is preventing us from implementing through its operations in the South.

Moreover, that part of the Cairo agreement that still has to be implemented requires the existence of a Lebanese army to coordinate with, because the agreement stipulates coordination with the army. Certainly the formation of the Lebanese army under the command of President Sarkis will help to solve the remaining routine points as regards the implementation of the agreement. At the Riyadh conference I myself told President Sarkis that we did not accept a unilateral interpretation. Hence President Sadat's proposal for the setting up of the four-member committee for these problems.

We have expressed readiness to implement the agreement in theory and we have implemented it in practice. The broadcasts have been stopped, the heavy armaments have been withdrawn, displays of armed force have been ended. We have expressed complete readiness to cooperate with President Sarkis. The other side is exaggerating, because it has not implemented anything provided for by the Riyadh agreement and the resolutions of the Cairo summit.

We have sought dialogues with the Lebanese Front with a view to putting an end to all misgivings and fears, because what we want is that Lebanon should be independent with full sovereignty over its territory. We want to be an element of stability and security, because that will help us to concentrate all our efforts on the occupied territories.

The PLO is making every possible effort to ensure a secure and independent Lebanon as rapidly as possible, and to promote the rebuilding of the Lebanese army, as this will help to implement the remaining routine measures of the Cairo agreement. Furthermore, national conciliation will be a fundamental element in setting Lebanon on the road to stability and security, so that life may return to normal.

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**Statements to the press by President Asad of Syria discussing his forthcoming talks with US President Carter<sup>69</sup>**

Geneva, May 8, 1977

Now that we have arrived in world-famous and scenic Geneva, I have the pleasure of sending my greetings to the government of Geneva, to the federal government, to President Furgler and to the friendly Swiss people.

I have come to Geneva to meet President Jimmy Carter as agreed between us. During this meeting we shall discuss the situation in the Middle East and the present or possible future chances of achieving a just peace. Peace is urgently needed by humanity throughout the world, and even more urgently by this area because of its special characteristics, which I need not discuss at the moment; nor need I say what peace can mean to our area and to the world in general.

We in Syria and the Arab homeland are determined to achieve peace, because peace puts an end to oppression, brings back the evicted to their homes, eliminates killing and destruction and provides ample opportunities for building a progressive life. Our determination to work for a just peace means that we are determined to provide the elements of such a peace. These, briefly, are the liberation of the territory occupied by Israel in 1967, and the affirmation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people. Peace is the hope of the peoples of the world, and thus it must be just, so that there is no feeling of injustice. Such a peace must also be firmly based so as to endure and be permanent. I hope that my meeting with President Jimmy Carter will produce results and that we may give a powerful new impetus to the movement towards peace which is so important to us and to the whole world.

I welcome you and thank you in advance for your efforts to cover the Geneva meeting between me and President Carter. You know that our time is not unlimited, but within the limits of time available to us we welcome your questions.

<sup>69</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), May 9, 1977.

*Q. Mr. President, do you favour, an early convening of the Geneva conference, or do you think there should be full and comprehensive preparations for it?*

A. We are working to ensure that the Geneva conference be convened. But it would be useful if it were convened with clear ideas, that is, its success should be assured.

*Q. Mr. President, what do you think about secure borders? Are you prepared to relinquish any part of the 1967 borders?*

A. All that secure borders means is that all rights should be restored. Of course we have no intention of relinquishing a single inch of our occupied territories.

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### **Press conference statement by President Asad of Syria calling for close cooperation between Syria and the US to achieve a just Middle East settlement<sup>70</sup>**

Geneva, May 9, 1977

Before I read my short written statement I want to thank President Jimmy Carter for his warm words and for the unremitting efforts he has been making since he became President of the United States,

Regardless of the difficulties which, we realize, beset the road of action for peace, difficulties which have certainly always existed, and still exist, and which will require enormous efforts if they are to be overcome, regardless of all this, we should recall the series of statements and efforts made by President Carter which have created an atmosphere of optimism as regards solving the Middle East problem.

As I said at Geneva Airport yesterday, the goal towards which both President Carter and we in our part of the world are working, is peace. This is a noble goal for which every man should strive in every part of the world.

Just as we insist on moral principles in dealings between the peoples and countries of the world so we are determined to make every effort to

embody and achieve justice as we seek for and find solutions to the problems of peoples, particularly complex problems such as we are concerned with today.

Let me also say that the more those of us who are concerned with the solution of complex problems, and first and foremost the Middle East problem, the more we all agree to insist on moral values, the easier it will be for us to find the appropriate means of solving these problems, however complicated. Although it is never desirable to anticipate events, I would like to say that our meeting, although it is still in its first moments, provides grounds for optimism. This does not mean that the problem can now be solved without difficulties, nor does it mean that there is a magic wand that will solve it for us.

You know that as a result of contacts between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States, it was agreed that President Jimmy Carter and I should meet here in Geneva today. This is our first personal meeting. In a few minutes we shall start our talks in this hotel. Of course we shall discuss the principal issue that concerns us all—the search for ways of moving towards a just peace in the Middle East. We shall also discuss bilateral relations between our two countries, and here again I thank President Carter for coming to Geneva for this meeting.

We in Syria want to strengthen our relations with the United States on a basis of equality, respect and action for the benefit of our peoples and in the service of justice and peace in our area and in the world.

As regards the question of a just peace in the Middle East, our view, which we have always stated, is that there is in our area a dangerous situation that threatens international peace and security. This situation has arisen from the continued occupation of the Arab territories forcibly occupied by Israel in 1967 and her continued refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

It is indisputable that this continued occupation and the continued dispersal of a whole people can only mean the continuation of a dangerous situation that threatens a renewal of the wars and tragedies that have afflicted our area for nearly thirty years.

We in Syria have repeatedly declared our determination to make the sincerest efforts to

<sup>70</sup> Made at a joint press conference with President Carter; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), May 10, 1977. For President Carter's statement see doc. 91 above.

ensure that our area enjoys the just peace it so gravely needs. Such a peace will not only ensure the interests of our area, but also the general interests of all the people of the world.

We welcome all sincere efforts that will help to achieve a just peace, and we believe that the efforts the US can make in this field are of primary importance.

As you also know, President Carter has initiated a series of talks with a number of Arab leaders with a view to acquainting himself directly with the facts so as to formulate the US position and form a clear picture of the Middle East crisis, so that the United States' great influence may be employed to help in reaching a solution based on justice for the present conflict in the Middle East.

My meeting today with President Carter lies within this framework, and I hope that our talks may bring the chances of peace closer, focus attention on the justice of our cause and prepare the way for the reconvening of the Geneva conference with clear ideas of what has to be done, now that all are agreed that it is the proper framework for ensuring that the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East are implemented.

We shall be staying in Switzerland for three days during which I shall visit Bern at the invitation of President Furgler, who was good enough to come to Geneva today. I paid him a courtesy visit this morning. We are very happy to be in Geneva.

Finally, I thank President Jimmy Carter and I hope that our efforts may be successful. Thank you.

## 244

### **Television interview statements by President Asad of Syria reviewing his talks with US President Carter<sup>71</sup>**

**Geneva, May 9, 1977**

*Q. Mr. President, did you obtain an idea of US intentions as regards a settlement?*

A. My impression was that the US is at present investigating the possibilities which are now

available, or the possibilities that the US and other parties could make available, to achieve a just solution of the problem.

*Q. Was this a disappointment to you, as you had said that you hoped to find out what was going on in the mind of the US?*

A. No, I was not disappointed. What I saw, felt and learned was within the limits of what I had anticipated.

*Q. Did you and President Carter agree on specific points as regards a possible settlement in the Middle East?*

A. In general we had what can be called a wide-ranging discussion, although certain specific points were touched upon. We discussed the settlement in general, and we discussed the question of frontiers. We discussed the Palestine problem and what conditions must be met if peace is to be achieved. Our discussions covered a great deal of territory. As I said, I received the impression that President Carter is examining the possibilities of a just solution. I also believe that the American side obtained the impression that we in Syria and the Arab world are serious in our attempts to achieve a just peace.

*Q. Your Excellency, we understand that the USSR has informed the US that PLO leader Yasir Arafat expressed readiness to accept the existence of Israel if she accepts a homeland for the Palestinians. We know that you met Yasir Arafat on Saturday. Did he inform you that he was ready to do this?*

A. I read something to this effect in news reports today, but I have no information on the subject and Yasir Arafat did not tell me anything of the kind. I assume that if Arafat has anything of this kind to tell us he will soon do so.

*Q. Did you bring any message from Yasir Arafat to President Carter?*

A. No.

*Q. Do you believe, Mr. President, that it is still possible to convene the Geneva Conference this year?*

A. There is a possibility; all the parties think so and the US thinks so.

*Q. What will have to happen before you go to Geneva for the conference?*

A. Ideas will have to be clarified before the Geneva conference can be held.

<sup>71</sup> Interview conducted by Walter Cronkite for CBS; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), May 11, 1977.

*Q. President Carter intends to send Secretary Vance to draw up a plan. Did he give you any idea of when he is going to do so?*

A. There are certain contacts that President Carter wants to make, and it seems that Secretary Vance's visit to the Middle East will take place in the near future. But we did not discuss a specific date for the visit.

*Q. Mr. President, the Minister of Information, Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, said—and I think I am quoting him correctly—: We anticipate that President Carter will exert sufficient pressure on Israel for her to make a just peace. Did you receive any assurance from President Carter that he would exert pressure on Israel?*

A. In fact we did not mention the exertion of pressure on Israel or on any party. Today we discussed certain aspects, and on a previous occasion we discussed contacts made with regard to the US assuming a policy commensurate with its responsibility as a great power and a permanent member of the Security Council. It is a question of adopting such a policy, not of exerting pressure.

*Q. Does Your Excellency feel that in its dealings with the Middle East problem, the US is now taking the unbiased view that the Arab countries have asked for in the past?*

A. It seems to me today that the US is seeking the facts and searching for the right way to achieve a just solution of the problem.

*Q. Is this to be seen as a kind of neutrality?*

A. The fact of the matter is that the Arabs want the US to adopt a neutral, objective and positive attitude.

*Q. Do you feel now, that you have met President Carter, that you can expect the US to do this?*

A. The atmosphere of the talks suggested this, but the word neutrality is not to be understood as meaning that the US should be a spectator. What I mean by neutrality is seeking the facts and adopting a just position, and, as I said, a position that expresses the responsibility of the US and its readiness to assist in reaching a solution.

*Q. It seems to me, Mr. President, that you are trying to avoid admitting that you feel that the attitude of the US is one of neutrality.*

A. I said that it appeared to me from today's talks that the US is moving in this direction. Of course things will have to take concrete shape

through the adoption of policies, and it is no good anticipating events.

*Q. Mr. President, how did you get on with President Carter, or rather, how do you see him as a man?*

A. He is a good and intelligent man; one feels that he is favourably disposed and that he talks objectively.

*Q. Do you feel that things are now stable in Lebanon?*

A. The situation in Lebanon is good and has been stable for a long time, since the entry of the [Arab Deterrent] Forces, apart from some clashes that have taken place in a restricted area on the Israeli frontier, and even there things are now going well—although Syrian forces have not entered the area, they have to some extent helped in establishing security there.

*Q. Have you any idea how long the Deterrent Forces will stay in Lebanon?*

A. That depends on the wishes of the legitimate Lebanese authorities. As we have stated repeatedly, we hope that they may be able to dispense with our help as soon as possible. But it depends on how long they will need to set up a Lebanese force capable of establishing security, and this depends on many factors, most of them related to Lebanon and her legitimate authorities. I do not want to give an inaccurate estimate on this matter, but it seems to me that this will take more than a year.

## 245

### **Press statement issued by Saudi Arabia following talks between US President Carter and Crown Prince Fahd (excerpts)<sup>72</sup>**

**May 27, 1977**

During his visit to Washington, Prince Fahd Bin Abdel Aziz, Saudi Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister, and the delegation that accompanied him, held talks with US President Jimmy Carter and senior American officials. These talks reflected the affection and friendship that link the two countries.

During the talks which concentrated on the Middle East problem, Prince Fahd expressed his view on this subject and assured the President

<sup>72</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), May 28, 1977.



that Saudi Arabia feels that there is a better chance than ever before of achieving a just peace in the area, that the problem of the Palestinian people is the crux of the Middle East conflict, and that the restoration to this people of its legitimate rights and its right to establish its homeland on its territory is the best and soundest way to peace and to the restoration of security and stability in the area.

President Carter clearly showed that he understood the Arab point of view on the Middle East problem and stressed that his meeting with Prince Fahd had been of great value in the field of the US search for the best course to follow in its efforts to solve this problem.

. . . . .

The US President also emphasized that the US was aware of Saudi Arabia's defence requirements for the maintenance of its safety and security, and discussed with Prince Fahd the US role in cooperating with Saudi Arabia to meet its defence requirements.

## 246

### **Statement by the Lebanese Front declaring the Cairo agreement between the Lebanese government and the PLO null and void<sup>73</sup>**

Beirut, May 27, 1977

On the evening of May 27, 1977, all members of the Lebanese Front met in the home and under the chairmanship of President Camille Chamoun. Having discussed certain issues that had arisen, the meeting considered developments that have taken place in the field of implementation of the Cairo agreement,<sup>74</sup> paying particular attention to the fact that eight years have passed since it was concluded, four years have passed since the Melkart agreement was published and eight months have passed since the resolutions adopted by the summit conference in Riyadh<sup>75</sup> and Cairo.<sup>76</sup> The meeting also decided that the failure by the Pal-

estinian side to honour these agreements was one of the fundamental causes of the disaster that befell Lebanon, and is likely to be the cause of further similar disasters.

In the light of recent developments that have taken place in this connection, and of possible future developments, and after discussion and debate, the Front resolves:

1. That the Palestinian presence in Lebanese territory has never been a right of the Palestinians in Lebanon; it was a form of assistance granted them by Lebanon following the disaster that befell them in 1948.

2. That the Cairo agreement and its annexes were intended to regulate the Palestinian presence in Lebanese territory, and all of them recognize Lebanon's sovereign over every inch of her territory and every person residing therein.

3. In view of the Palestinians' failure to implement the provisions of these agreements, the Cairo agreement and its annexes are to be regarded as abrogated and invalid.

4. The Front therefore regards the Palestinian presence in Lebanese territory as unlawful.

After the failure of the quadripartite committee, the Lebanese government should call on the Arab League Council to meet with a view to taking decisive action as regards the unlawful Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and should regard the Palestine problem as an Arab, rather than a Lebanese problem, and all the Arab states should bear their share of this presence, each according to its resources, its duties and its capacity for absorption.

## 247

### **Press conference statement by President Sadat of Egypt stating his position on the Cairo agreement and the Palestinian presence in Lebanon<sup>77</sup>**

Tenth of Ramadan City, May 29, 1977

. . . . .

*Q. [On the Lebanese Front's demand that the Palestinians should be expelled from Lebanon and that the Cairo agreement be regarded as abrogated].*

<sup>73</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 28, 1977.

<sup>74</sup> See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the Cairo agreement.

<sup>75</sup> Doc. 267 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>76</sup> Doc. 314 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>77</sup> Translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), May 30, 1977. See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the Cairo agreement.

A. I was certainly sorry and sad to hear of this... I do not want to make things worse by pouring oil on the fire, but I repeat: If it is a matter of Lebanon's sovereignty, we are all in favour of Lebanon's sovereignty, and if it is a matter of non-interference by the Palestinians in the internal politics of any Arab country, we are also in favour of this. But if it is a question of prejudicing the Palestinian presence—No. They are guests in Lebanon, here, in Syria, in Kuwait, everywhere. And here let me say that we cannot accept the prejudicing of the Palestinians' presence as we have heard today, and we can never permit it.

We support Lebanon's sovereignty and non-interference by the Palestinians in the affairs of Lebanon or any Arab country, but more than that we cannot accept and we can never permit. It may be that I am speaking rather excitedly, but I don't want to pour oil on the fire, for I am concerned for everyone in Lebanon. . . . We want to settle the problem with them, all of us, and to settle the problem as a single family. We want to see Lebanon restored to its former character that once was known throughout the world.

## 248

### **Statement issued by the Central Political Council of the Lebanese Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces in reply to the statement of the Lebanese Front on the abrogation of the Cairo agreement (excerpts)<sup>78</sup>**

Beirut, May 31, 1977

Having studied, in the course of its regular meeting, the dangerous statement issued by the Lebanese Front<sup>79</sup> to the effect that its authors no longer intend to abide by the provisions of the Cairo agreement concluded between the Lebanese state and the PLO, the Central Political Council of the Lebanese Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces has reached the following conclusions:

(i) The statement of the Lebanese Front provides incontrovertible proof of the truth of what the Lebanese Nationalist Movement has always

held—that the goal of the war . . . was to evict the Palestinians from Lebanon and distribute them among the Arab and other countries. The latest statement by the Lebanese Front is quite explicit as to this.

(ii) It is absurd to imagine that the Lebanese adopted this attitude in reaction to the alleged failure to implement the Cairo agreement. In fact the Palestine resistance has implemented the basic provisions of the agreement it concluded with the Lebanese authorities in 1969, and has adhered in letter to the Riyadh and Cairo resolutions on stopping the fighting, withdrawing armed elements and evacuating all the positions it was forced by the war to occupy. It has returned all the regular and volunteer forces that entered Lebanon after the outbreak of the incidents, along with their arms and equipment, to their original positions outside Lebanon; and it has agreed to all the measures of the security plan implemented by the Deterrent Forces, never exceeding the limits of the rights granted it by the Cairo agreement. . . .

(iii) If there have been shortcomings as regards full implementation of the Cairo agreement, they have not come from the Palestinian side. . . . For only on the basis of a Lebanese solution that restores proper Lebanese-Lebanese relations, through the restoration of the political, administrative unity of Lebanon and strict observance of the laws of peaceful democratic development rather than civil war, can Palestinian-Lebanese relations be regulated, enforced and developed and the confidence necessary for the solution of its problems be ensured.

(iv) It is thus clear that what the Lebanese Front is really fighting for is not, as it has long claimed, the implementation of the Cairo agreement, but rather the abrogation of that agreement. The implementation of this design would require, among other things, the total elimination of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It also falls in with all the schemes aimed at excluding the Palestinians from the resolution of the conflict and eliminating their existence in the area, with a view to removing the main obstacle to the plans for capitulationist solutions of the Arab-Zionist conflict and attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem.

(vi) [*sic*] The above facts mean that all Lebanese and Arab forces interested in the survival of Lebanon as a unified Arab country for all its inhabitants

<sup>78</sup> Excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), June 1, 1977.

<sup>79</sup> Doc. 246 above.

and in frustrating the Zionist plan directed against the whole Arab area, must decide how to face this grave turning point in the Lebanese crisis, in the light of their national responsibility in this field, and firmly resist this flagrant blackmail in the name of the implementation of the Cairo agreement. It is not a question of whether the Cairo agreement is or is not implemented. It is a question of the national, Lebanese and Arab considerations that must form the basis of the attitude towards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

Is this attitude to be based on the desire to maintain the unity and the Arab character of Lebanon, on the national commitment to the Palestinian cause and a desire to enable the forces that are in joint confrontation of Israel and her ally, imperialism, to steadfastly resist the proposed capitulationist solutions? Or is it to be based on the determination to . . . liquidate the Palestine problem, and to disunite the forces of Arab confrontation, so as to deal with them one at a time and to strike at its positions one after the other?

Ever since it assumed its full responsibility in the conflict now in progress in the territory of Lebanon, the nationalist movement has chosen the nationalist and all-Arab viewpoint as the basis for its attitude of firm support for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It has defended this presence because to do so is to defend the unity and the Arab character of Lebanon, the Palestinian cause and the common destiny of the Arab people.

The Central Political Council of the Nationalist and Progressive Parties and Forces in Lebanon, in stating these facts, calls on all Lebanese and Arab forces . . . to act in the light of their national responsibility in this field.

249

**Press interview statements by President Asad of Syria discussing the possible terms of an eventual Middle East settlement<sup>80</sup>**

**Damascus, June 14, 1977**

*Q. Will you recognize Israel if she withdraws from the Arab territories occupied in 1967?*

A. We shall implement the United Nations resolutions and meet all their stipulations. The United Nations resolutions stipulate Israel's withdrawal from the territories she occupied in 1967, the rights of the Palestinian people and the ending of the state of war.

Ending the state of war means passing from a state of war to a state of peace.

In raising other issues that have nothing to do with the requirements of peace, Israel is trying to obstruct the road to peace.

Recognition, for example, is something pertaining to the sovereignty of every state in the world. There is no international law, convention or custom that requires one state to recognize another. Many instances can be adduced to show that this is a fact of international life. Take for example the situation that existed between the United States and the USSR after World War I, and the situation that existed for many years, and still exists partially, between the United States and China. And there are other examples.

But all international laws, conventions and customs require that every state that has occupied the territory of others should withdraw from those territories. The occupation of the territory of others and the usurpation of their rights constitutes aggression against this territory and these rights. But failure to recognize others does not mean that you have in any way usurped their rights.

The same thing applies to the commercial and economic cooperation that is being demanded. These are matters pertaining to sovereignty; they also have to do with the interests of the peoples concerned. There are many countries in the world which, although there is no state of war between them, nevertheless do not cooperate with each other in commercial, economic or other fields.

<sup>80</sup> Granted to the press corps accompanying Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark on his visit to Syria; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 15, 1977.

In any case, we must seek the sort of peace that means ending the state of war, that is to say, ending operations of armed conflict. As for the other matters, there are circumstances and conditions attached to them.

*Q. Would Your Excellency explain and define what withdrawal means in your view. Does it mean return to the lines prior to June 5, 1967? What conditions are attached to withdrawal—for example, guarantees, or a United Nations presence or the demilitarization of the area?*

*A.* As I said just now, withdrawal from all the territories Israel occupied in 1967. That is to say, a return to the situation that existed on 4 June 1967.

As regards guarantees, there could be restricted demilitarized zones on both sides and there could be a United Nations presence on both sides in restricted areas. There could also be guarantees from the United Nations organizations.

We believe that the principal guarantee is that the feeling of injustice should be eliminated so that each party may feel that it has recovered its full rights.

*Q. Your Excellency, you recently visited Moscow and as we know, also had a successful meeting with President Carter. What role do you think the two super-powers could play in the efforts to reach a just solution? And to what extent do you anticipate that Europe will play a role?*

*A.* As you know, the two super-powers are co-chairmen of the Geneva conference by virtue of United Nations resolutions, and in this capacity they will play an essential role in promoting the Middle East peace process.

As regards Europe, since 1973 we have been stressing that it should play a role in the peace process. Because of what it represents and because of its status in international and United Nations organizations, Europe can and should play an effective role in the peace process. We have stressed this in our talks with many European officials we have met, and we mentioned it today during the meeting with Mr. Andersen, the Danish Foreign Minister.

*Q. Do you think that the role played by Europe so far has not been satisfactory from your point of view? And what do you want—a new resolution from the nine European states affirming the European position?*

*A.* Of course I am not in a position to advise the officials of the European countries on what they should do. But what I mean to say is that Europe's responsibility and Europe's interests require and make it possible that the European attitude should be more effective. In other words, Europe's words could be transformed into actions.

Europe is influential in many fields of life, and for this reason it can be effective in the achievement of peace. As you know, we in the Arab world are linked to the European countries by relations of cooperation and friendship, and it is not too much to say that it is Europe that suffers most from the events that are taking place in this area. It suffers more than the other international groupings.

*Q. Would Your Excellency explain to us how you see the ultimate solution of the Palestine problem? Does it lie in the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or in a more extensive area? And how do you see the relations of the Palestinian state with the neighbouring countries, in particular Jordan and Syria?*

*A.* This depends first and foremost on the PLO, which is the quarter competent before all others to discuss this matter.

However, we may say that the Palestine problem consists of two parts: one, the part related to the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As has been proposed, a Palestinian state could be established in this territory; but such a state would not be big enough for all the Palestinians, and this brings us to the other part of the Palestine problem—the problem of the refugees.

These Palestinians have the right, by virtue of United Nations resolutions, to return to the land from which they were evicted in 1948.

Here let me recall the attitude of Denmark at the United Nations when the admission of Israel as a member of the organization was being discussed. On that occasion Denmark did not vote for the establishment of the state of Israel as it is now constituted, as can be seen in the minutes of the United Nations, and doubtless also in the archives of the Danish Foreign Ministry. Denmark was basically in favour of the partition resolution. This means that she already realized that what remains of Palestinian territory—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—was not sufficient for the whole of the Palestinian Arab people.

I say this because I know that the people of Denmark are impartial and want to know the facts. That is why I have recalled this point.

*Q. Recently elections were held in Israel which led to a change of prime ministers. Do you think that this change will have an effect on the peace efforts?*

A. All the leaders of Israel are inspired by a spirit of expansionism, but some of them do try to learn from what has happened in the last thirty years or so, and to understand the movement of history, if only to a limited extent, while others make no such attempt. The Likud also belongs to the second group.

*Q. What are the consequences of the Lebanese civil war? Are the presence of the Deterrent Force and the Syrian initiative going to affect the prospects of reaching a solution in the Middle East, or will they postpone the convening of the Geneva conference?*

A. The consequences of the Lebanese civil war are many killed, many wounded and much destruction. These are tragic facts.

However, what is satisfactory is that we have now succeeded in putting a stop to this tragedy that could have gone on much longer and led to much more killing and destruction and worse results for the future of Lebanon.

Things are now going satisfactorily in Lebanon, and this makes us happy.

I cannot see that there is any important connection between the situation in Lebanon at present and the postponement or otherwise of the Geneva conference.

*Q. Does Your Excellency still hope that the Geneva conference will meet in 1977?*

A. We hope that the Geneva conference will meet in 1977. This is the general Arab view and also the Soviet and the US view.

We in Syria and the Arab homeland shall continue to make serious and sincere efforts to achieve a just peace in the area, whatever the circumstances.

The Arabs are optimistic and the leaders of the great powers are optimistic, but as far as Israel is concerned, and insofar as the move towards peace depends on Israel, there is no ground for optimism.

*Q. No doubt you have all heard the statements of the Israeli authorities, and especially the recent ones. In*

*the light of these statements, what sort of peace does Israel want?*

A. The sort of peace that Israel wants in present circumstances is that we should go to Geneva and sign documents authorizing the occupation of the West Bank and the other Arab territories.

But I repeat that peace continues to be the goal we try to achieve by all ways and means, and we believe that the whole world should work for peace; because peace is a world affair that concerns all peoples, and we do not think that any country has the right to destroy world peace.

## 250

### **Memorandum by the Lebanese National Movement Central Political Council analyzing the causes of the Lebanese crisis and presenting its plan to counter them (excerpts)<sup>81</sup>**

Beirut, June 28, 1977

1. *The Facts of the Present Lebanese Situation: The confessionalist partition scheme is the principal source of danger to Lebanon.*

Since the war broke out more than two years ago the National Movement has made a point of focusing attention on the principal danger to the future of Lebanon—the project for partition on confessional lines whose sponsors sparked off this war and are still pursuing the course of aggravating and complicating the Lebanese crisis with a view to achieving their objectives.

The evidence is today so irrefutable that there can no longer be any doubt of the existence of this project and of the fact that it is intended to achieve an integrated series of interlocking objectives which are to be realized by the following means:

1. Stripping Lebanon of its Arab character and effectively cutting it off from the Arab world.

2. Rejection of the Arab nationalist cause and total withdrawal from the sphere of the common national destiny of the Arab countries by putting an end to the Lebanese-Israeli contradiction and opening the first breach of its kind in the ramparts

<sup>81</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, IPS Archives.

of the Arab confrontation of the Zionist enemy.

3. The liquidation of Palestinian presence in Lebanon, as a link in the imperialist-Zionist scheme aimed at completely liquidating the Palestine cause.

4. Turning Lebanon into a confessionalist and racist entity by dismantling Lebanese unity and reconstituting it in such a way as to ensure the sovereignty of a confessional minority over the Lebanese people as a whole and so as to maintain many of the factors to present *de facto* partition, as well as calling for decentralization and the fabrication of cultural plurality.

5. Sweeping away the constituents of Lebanese democratic development and subjecting the country to a fascist regime that will perpetuate the confessional subjugation of the overwhelming majority of the people and protect the controlling economic, social and cultural privileges in the interests of the oppression of the toiling Lebanese masses.

This project for confessional partition, which the National Movement regards as the reason for the outbreak of the war and the source of the further complication of the Lebanese crisis, is not a project of unknown political identity or a conspiracy of obscure origins. It is to be attributed to forces which definitely exist, with a clearly defined identity, which have no hesitation in publishing their objectives and announcing their schemes. It is no longer possible to disguise who is active at this level, for the declared attitudes and persistent practices on the part of the "Lebanese Front" conclusively prove that this is the quarter that is responsible for the plan and is striving to ensure its eventual realization in full. The events that have taken place since the adoption of the resolutions of the Riyad and Cairo summits have revealed the Lebanese Front's plan to keep the crisis going until it can achieve its goals at the expense not only of Lebanon and the Lebanese but also of the whole Arab nation.

(a) The Lebanese Front sparked off the fighting in the South, thereby rendering imperative the measures decided on by the Riyad and Cairo conferences to stop the fighting; and initiating the most dangerous phase in the history of the war through the undisguised coordination of its forces with those of Israel. This reveals the Front's conspiracy against the Arab character of the South, its isolationist intention of having dealings with

Israel as an ally, and its determination to effect demographic changes in the whole of the map of Lebanon, not to mention its intention to abrogate the section of the Cairo agreement related to the right of the Palestine resistance to exist and operate in the South.

5. The Lebanese Front has restricted its campaign of political demands to one aspect only of the Lebanese crisis—the aspect related to the implementation of the Cairo agreement.<sup>82</sup> In this field fabrications have been so obvious as to disclose the truth about the isolationist intentions of the Front as regards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. After seven months of repeated demands for the implementation of the Cairo agreement, although its main provisions had already been implemented, the Lebanese Front has disclosed its real attitude in this field: it is refusing to deal with the question of Lebanese-Palestinian relations within the framework of a Lebanese solution and of the agreements concluded by the Lebanese authorities and the PLO, has declared that it does not recognize the legality of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and is calling for its elimination.

(e) The dangers of this confessional partition plan are increased when we realize how profound are the links between it and current developments at the level of the Arab-Zionist conflict. If the Likud's control of the reins of government in Israel provides a basis for the unprecedented escalation of Israeli inflexibility as regards the future of the occupied territories and the rights of the Palestinian people, this same control involves even graver prospects as regards the Lebanese crisis. It is not difficult to predict increasing Israeli interference in the South—and then in the Lebanese situation as a whole—and escalating Israeli support for the plan to turn Lebanon into a confessional and racist entity in the context of the comprehensive Zionist plan in this field: a plan to eliminate the Arab national identity of countries of the Arab East and to implant confessional entities throughout the Arab area.

<sup>82</sup> See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine* for an alleged text of the agreement.

## *II. The Lebanese National Movement's Line for the Confrontation of the Confessional Partition Plan.*

Throughout the Lebanese crisis, the Lebanese National Movement's political line has always centred on the following principal trends:

1. The confrontation of the confessional partition plan, which we have already outlined, is the sole option open to Lebanese nationalists and democrats. This is a national and essentially democratic confrontation with Arab dimensions on which the national destiny of Lebanon depends—her unity, her Arab character and her democratic development. It also has close links with the common national destiny of the Arab world.

## *III. The Need for Joint National Confrontation of the Confessional Partition Plan.*

2. The second step to be taken at this level is related to the role of the Arab forces which have been entrusted with the task of implementing the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits in the Lebanese arena. In the view of the National Movement this role can be of real help to the Lebanese in closing the file of the civil war once and for all, if it recognizes a basic fact: that the confrontation of the confessional partition plan is the primary task of those Lebanese forces that believe in the unity and Arab character of Lebanon and are concerned for her democratic development. Therefore, the more Arab efforts depend on the activity of these Lebanese forces and strive to enable them to give expression to their true weight, the greater will be their contribution to providing an atmosphere conducive to the reaching of a political settlement that will save Lebanon from the dangers of partition and the calamities implied by confessionalist dreams, so that the Arab area may remain proof against the Zionist scheme aimed at fragmenting it, dismembering its national entities and eliminating its Arab national identity.

## *IV. The Bases of the Required Coordination among National Sectors.*

## *V. Establishing the Arab Character and the National Independence of Lebanon.*

This requires:

1. Affirmation of the Arab character of the land and the people of Lebanon and insistence on her national independence.

2. Commitment by Lebanon at the official level and by all Lebanese to the duties required of them in the light of their Arab affiliation, and first and foremost the duty of joint Arab confrontation of the Zionist enemy.

3. Closing the bridges that are now open between certain areas on the southern frontier and Israel.

4. Liquidation of the centres of cooperation with Israel in certain areas on the southern frontier.

5. Revision of the laws on the Arab boycott of Israel and on crimes related to spying for and having dealings with the enemy, and reactivation of these laws in the appropriate courts.

6. The assumption by the Lebanese army, under the control of the legitimate authorities, of the responsibility for maintaining the security and integrity of the southern frontier.

## *VI. Strengthening Lebanese-Palestinian Relations*

This requires:

Recognition of the right of the Palestine resistance to engage in activity in the Lebanese arena, and ensuring that nothing is done to prejudice the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, so that the resistance may continue to perform its duty of participating in the defence of Lebanon against the Zionist enemy, and so as to meet the necessary conditions for the strengthening and rectification of Lebanese-Palestinian relations.

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## **Statement by PLO official spokesman Abdul Muhsin Abu Mayzar analyzing US Middle East policy and means of countering it<sup>83</sup>**

Beirut, June 28, 1977

The new American arms deal with Israel comes after Menahem Begin's formation of his government, the programme of which includes an official

<sup>83</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 28, 1977, p. 4.

understanding to continue and expand settlement in the occupied West Bank and the occupied Arab territories,<sup>84</sup> and after frankly aggressive statements by him.

This deal confirms the PLO's view that America's Middle East policy is based on support for Zionist aggression, and encouragement to the Zionist colonialists to continue their occupation of Arab territories and to continue to ignore the national rights of the Palestinian people. The new US arms deal is also a practical affirmation that the US is pursuing the same aggressive policy as Israel. Similarly the Carter administration's statement on the Middle East is essentially no more than a new expression of the United States determination that the settlement of the Arab-Zionist conflict should fall within the framework of US and Zionist interests in the area, and this can only mean surrender. The PLO which, as a result of its long experience, has never believed that US policy is impartial, or that America has any intention of putting an end to the injustice from which the people of Palestine and the Arab nation have suffered for thirty years, sees this as new American encouragement of Israel to continue her aggression against the Arabs and to ignore the national rights of our people. The PLO believes that the story the US is trying to spread to the effect that she wants a just peace, is no more than camouflage intended to disguise the truth about her policy in the Arab area, a policy aimed at completely exhausting the Arab spirit and identity, and gaining time for her tool, Israel. This will enable Israel to pursue her aggressive policy based on ignoring the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and to continue with her policy of shackling the Arab area and closing the door to its movement for development and progress.

While warning the Arab nation at both the official and popular levels against the US policy that will be pursued henceforth, the PLO calls on the Arab rulers to confront this policy with more resolute and serious attitudes. It calls for the construction of a unified Arab position on the issue of liberation and return so as to repel the Zionist invasion, and on the Palestinian people's building of its independent national state on the soil of its homeland.

To this end, all hesitation must stop; an internal

front must be set up with the assumption that the battle will continue, as well as an Arab front based on Arab solidarity against imperialist schemes; and a revolutionary attitude, one which does not confuse the Arab's enemies with their friends, must be established.

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### **Statement by a responsible source in the PLO commenting on the EEC declaration on the Palestine problem (excerpt)<sup>85</sup>**

**Beirut, July 3, 1977**

The indirect condemnation of the statements of the Likud leaders and the policy of the government of Israel, followed by the unambiguous statement that security in the Middle East area cannot be ensured through forcible occupation, could constitute the basis of an objective European attitude of confrontation of Zionist blackmail and of exposing the Zionist warmongers, the enemies of justice and peace.

Inasmuch as it mentions the need to establish a homeland for the Palestinian people, the statement as a whole is a step forward in the attitude of the EEC towards support for Palestinian Arab rights.

We hope that the countries of the Community will translate this attitude into active confrontation of Israeli occupation and of the Israeli injustice to which our people in the occupied homeland are subjected.

<sup>85</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), July 3, 1977, p. 10. The EEC declaration is included as doc. 120 above.

<sup>84</sup> See doc. 115 above.



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**Statement by Prime Minister Salim Hoss of Lebanon to the Chamber of Deputies discussing a Lebanese political settlement and the application of the Cairo agreement (excerpts)<sup>86</sup>**

Beirut, July 21, 1977

. . . . .

We regard the implementation of the Cairo agreement as an issue in itself, and we also regard political détente as being an issue in itself. Neither of these problems must be a condition for the solution of the other: we believe that action must be taken to solve both at once. We are confident that the solution of one of them will help to solve the other keeping in mind that we are determined to implement the Cairo agreement in letter and in spirit.

We have reached a stage where almost everything depends on détente, and détente can only be achieved through political harmony.

The establishment of harmony depends entirely on the will and the wishes of us Lebanese. Nothing must be allowed to prevent its achievement, nor must its achievement be allowed to depend on any other matter, especially if such a matter is involved with factors beyond our control.

. . . . .

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**Statement by an official spokesman of Jordan commenting on procedural suggestions made by Prime Minister Begin of Israel<sup>87</sup>**

Beirut, July 21, 1977

The statements made by the Israeli Prime Minister in the United States do not constitute a peace proposal; they are merely an attempt to avoid reaching a real peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. For these statements ignore the two central problems on which a just and permanent peace depend: the problem of the

rights of the Palestinian people, and that of ending the occupation of the Arab territories occupied through aggression in June 1967.

The procedural suggestions put forward by the Israeli Prime Minister contained nothing new. There has been no departure from the known Israeli policy of trying to cover up Israel's obstinacy and rigidity as regards the real problems of peace with proposals involving matters of form only, and with verbal formulas that ignore the world consensus on the need for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and for the Palestinian people's recovery of its legitimate rights and the exercise of its right to self-determination in its land, within the framework of the United Nations resolutions, so as to ensure the achievement of a just and peaceful settlement destined to be of lasting benefit to the peoples of the area and the whole world.

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**Communiqué issued by the Command of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon on the implementation of the first stage of the detailed plan for the application of the Cairo agreement<sup>88</sup>**

Beirut, July 30, 1977

The Deterrent Forces have today completed the first stage of the detailed plan for the implementation of the Cairo agreement that was approved at the Chtaura meeting on July 25, 1977.

The plan has been implemented one hundred per cent in the parts of Lebanon specified in the interim programme. The Deterrent Forces have taken up positions in the localities allocated to them around the camps, and patrols have been circulating in the new areas allotted to our forces.

All sections of the PLO have implemented what was required of them in accordance with the interim programme for the implementation of the Cairo agreement which was approved at Chtaura.

The Joint Committees entrusted with the task of supervising the implementation have started on their tasks in the five Governorates to make sure that the implementation is proceeding as it should and to prepare for the subsequent stages.

<sup>86</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 22, 1977.

<sup>87</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai* (Amman), July 22, 1977.

<sup>88</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), July 31, 1977.

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**Television interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the possibilities of a peace settlement with Israel and reiterating that a Palestinian state should be linked to Jordan (excerpts)<sup>89</sup>**

Cairo, late July, 1977

*Q. When the Israeli Prime Minister says that he wishes the Egyptian people well after twenty-nine years of war, do you believe him? Do you believe that he wishes you well?*

*A. We must certainly welcome this move. As I said before, it may be that seventy per cent of our conflict—the Arab-Israeli conflict—is psychological and thirty per cent material. This is a very encouraging move on Begin's part in light of this whole history which he has written himself in his own hand. He will find us quite prepared to achieve and build peace here in this area.*

*Q. Mr. President, you are reported as speaking about the nature of the peace in two ways. First, you are reported as saying that even if Jesus Christ and the Prophet Muhammad rose from the dead, they would not be able to persuade the Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian, that they should have open frontiers, free trade, tourism and diplomatic relations with Israel. You are also reported as saying that this might be possible in five years. Can this be achieved in five years?*

*A. This is really what I wanted to say to your people and to public opinion throughout the world. After twenty-nine years of violence, hatred and bitterness, and four wars, you cannot just come along and say: open frontiers, diplomatic relations, economic exchanges, and so on. For these things lie within the field of sovereignty, in the field of our sovereignty, and as I said, we cannot ignore the psychological factor in the problem, which constitutes seventy per cent of it. So I said, Yes, it is possible, five years after peace has been achieved by ending the state of war, adherence to the provisions of resolution 242, providing the Palestinians with a national home*

and giving Israel any guarantees she asks for from anybody they agree to. I think that after that, and after both the Israeli and the Arab sides have carried out the provisions of resolution 242, which is the mainstay of the peace process to which we are now trying to give impetus—I think that after that peace will prevail. We must allow both sides time. I would say, yes, in five years, more or less.

*Q. Does that mean that, if it is a question of signing an agreement to end the state of war, you want to sign that agreement—with the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, let us say—and at the same time declare: you and I now agree to help our peoples to surmount the psychological aspect of the problem, which constitutes seventy per cent of it, in the next five years by drawing up a time-table for air travel between the two countries and opening the frontier to commerce? Could you agree to start on this?*

*A. No. You see, you are reverting to the question of Israeli terms being imposed on us. As I said, after twenty-nine years of war, when the psychological aspect makes up seventy per cent of the problem, how can you start anything at all? Peace will automatically prevail after the signing of the peace agreement. At the same time peripheral problems, like the boycott, and all such problems, will automatically come to an end on their own. For after the signing of this agreement, and the implementation of the provisions of resolution 242, all that will come to an end. The trying out of the first part that I mentioned, and the attempt by each of us to convince his people, will require a certain amount of time. Let us say that a start should be made with air travel, or some such thing. It is Israel's longstanding arrogance that wants to impose terms on us. As I said, this is purely a question of sovereignty.*

*Q. To what extent do you think it is not a question of arrogance? If things get as far as the signing of a peace agreement ending the state of war, after which each of you, let us say, went back to his country to help his people to overcome this psychological state that has arisen in the last thirty years, would you regard this as acceptable?*

*A. You are absolutely right. Without going into details, I agree with you entirely. That would be the right and logical thing to do, after all the moves in the conflict that I have told you about, and the psychological aspect of the conflict.*

<sup>89</sup> Interview conducted by CBS. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 1, 1977.

*Q. Would trade with Israel some time in the future be advantageous to Egypt? Could your country benefit from it in any way?*

A. I do not think so. I think that both of us are in a very bad economic situation, so what can they do for me? Each of us is seeking aid for our economies from other countries, such as the United States.

*Q. Perhaps you could help each other in the field of technology?*

A. I do not think so. We have technology. We get it from Europe. We can get it from the US, and anywhere else. But, as I said, they may well be in a much worse economic situation than I am. This would not be practical, even if it were put into force.

*Q. It has now been said that the Palestinians must have a homeland, but President Carter said recently that it must not be an independent state. Is this acceptable to you, and do you think that it is acceptable to the Palestinians?*

A. It is certainly not acceptable to the Palestinians or to me. However, the statement that the Palestinians must have a homeland is in itself an extremely encouraging sign. But in fact I said, when I was negotiating with King Hussein and with Yasir Arafat a few days ago, I said that there must be a link between the new Palestinian state and Jordan. This link should be declared officially and agreed on by the two parties before the Geneva conference is convened.

*Q. Why should there be a link between the Palestinians and Jordan?*

A. This is something absolutely natural, for many reasons. In the first place, Jordan should be the gateway to the new Palestinian state. In the second place, we want you in the United States, and people everywhere in the world, to be confident that this Palestinian state will do nothing against anyone.

*Q. Does that mean that someone will be controlling the Palestinians?*

A. I did not say that at all. This can only be done by their own free will. They and King Hussein will choose the sort of link that is to be established between them—a federation, a confederation or a united Arab state, as is the case between us, Libya and Syria. I cannot say.

What I can say is that we can all rest assured that this new Palestinian state will not be a threat to anyone, and I think that this invalidates Israel's arguments.

*Q. The Israeli argument is that the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank would put Israel in mortal danger. Mr. President, you have talked to the Jordanians, who feel the same thing. If you were a Jordanian, what would you prefer to have on the frontier—Israel or the Palestinians?*

A. You can rest assured that I should rather have the Palestinians there.

*Q. In spite of the bitterness that resulted from the 1970 war between the Palestinians and the Jordanian army?*

A. Yes. Yes, I should prefer a Palestinian state. And remember that, as you know the Palestinians attacked me after the first and second disengagement agreements. But I have never faltered in my ideas, because I really am seeking peace, a permanent peace and without solving the Palestinian problem we cannot achieve peace in the area.

*Q. I know, Mr. President, that you are still being attacked by certain Palestinian circles, and that you are in agreement with President Carter on the establishment of some kind of Palestinian homeland linked to Jordan, while this idea is rejected by the PLO. Also, the most extremist Palestinians have threatened to assassinate any Arab leader who signs a peace agreement with Israel. It does not seem, Mr. President, that there is such agreement between you and the Palestinians.*

A. Not at all, not at all, on the contrary. I must tell you, they have attacked me violently, as you so rightly said; there are also rejectionists in the Palestine liberation front. They are still attacking me. But as I told you, I want to clarify a very important point. When I discussed the question of the link with Jordan with President Carter, it was not the first time I had raised the point; I first raised it in 1974, two or three years before Carter's election.

That was the meaning of the joint statement I issued with King Hussein after we met in Alexandria, here in Egypt, before the Rabat conference. And now in 1977 I repeat what I myself have been saying then, and I do not hesitate, because it is in the interests of peace. Therefore, there was no agreement between me and President Carter—I

said this even before Carter was a candidate for the presidency. But I must tell you, that the disagreement between me and Yasir Arafat is, in principle, on the following lines. He agrees with my view that there must be a link; we disagree only on the timing. He thinks that this link should be established only after the establishment of the Palestinian state, while I insist that it should take place before the Geneva conference is convened. This is the only disagreement between me and the Palestinians, and when I say the Palestinians I mean Yasir Arafat.

Until a few days ago he still agreed with me in principle and disagreed on the timing, while I insisted on this point, as I still do.

*Q. May I say that there is another fundamental disagreement between you and Yasir Arafat, and that this disagreement has been made clear in the last few days by his statements to the effect that the West Bank of the Jordan will be liberated by force of arms and not through negotiations.*

A. I want to set all this aside, for if you tell me that Yasir Arafat said that, I can produce for you many statements by Israeli leaders that look even more extremist than that. On one occasion, indeed, Mrs. Meir, the former Israeli Prime Minister, went so far as to say that the word Palestine had no place at all in history. I said at the time that she should never have been allowed to teach in Milwaukee—she was a teacher there. So let us ignore all these extremist statements and try to concentrate on essentials.

*Q. Mr. Begin says that he took with him to Washington a complete peace plan. Do you also have a complete peace plan?*

A. Yes, I have submitted it to the whole world. I do have a peace plan. I have not only informed Carter of it, I have submitted it to the whole world, and I defined my position two days ago when I said that the statement of the nine European Common Market countries could be a very sound basis for the negotiations in Geneva. I have also made a precise statement of my strategy for peace.

When I read today that Begin is going to put the same thing before Carter, and the maps—believe me—this is something very encouraging, for I never thought that Israel would submit a peace strategy. Ever since Ben Gurion's time they have always answered that there was no need for them to define their borders—that it was up to the

Israeli army or the armed forces to define them. Therefore, this is in itself an encouraging sign. Whatever this peace strategy or peace plan, or whatever it is, contains, it is in itself an encouraging sign.

*Q. Do you think that the Israeli Prime Minister Begin has maps to show to the Americans?*

A. That is what I heard today. I only know what I have read today in the press to the effect that he actually has maps.

*Q. Do you think it is significant that the Israelis should for the first time have drawn up maps within the framework of their concept of peace?*

A. From what I read two days ago, there were no maps, but today I read in the Israeli newspapers that there are maps—that he is taking with him a full plan to submit to Carter and that he will ask Carter not to let the Arabs know anything about it. This is good. Very good.

*Q. Will he ask Carter not to inform you?*

A. The Arabs should be told nothing about this plan—this is what I read today. According to the papers coming from Israel and the agency reports, and as I said, this is in itself a very encouraging sign—for there had been absolutely no specific plan on the Israeli side.

*Q. Recently, there have been proposals as regards what might happen to the West Bank other than annexation to Israel. Do you think that it might be possible, for example, for Israel to give up her political control of the West Bank by granting autonomy to the seven hundred thousand Arabs who live there, while at the same time maintaining an Israeli military presence in the West Bank?*

A. No one will accept that.

*Q. With a view to reaching some kind of agreement, could you accept the existence of Jewish colonists in the West Bank?*

A. No one will accept that. We cannot use the territory occupied in 1967 as a hostage, or in any other way, to allow any party to achieve strategic gains, or any such thing, as the Israelis say. I therefore say that whatever guarantees they require or whatever the form they agree to, we shall have no objections. Even if it is a question of their concluding a military treaty with the US, we shall not object.

*Q. You used to urge the Palestinians to assume a new entity?*

*A. This is true.*

*Q. A government in exile perhaps?*

*A. I do not know. I was in favour of it four or five years ago, even before I said so and even before the October War. But obviously their attitude up to now has been such as to make it impossible for them to do so. I shall leave it to them, but I still urge them to do this.*

*Q. But there is not much time. If you and the Israeli Prime Minister are going to discuss holding talks in Geneva in October, you will only have between ten and twelve weeks, which is an extremely short time. Can you see any way of including the Palestinians at the start of the reconvened Geneva conference?*

*A. In the first place, let me be frank with you. Without a solution of the Palestine problem, which is the crux of the whole problem in this part of the world, we shall certainly never be able to achieve peace in this area. Let me tell you this—whoever is in power in Israel whether Mr. Begin, Mrs. Meir, the Labour Party, the Likud bloc, whoever it is—if they want to achieve peace in this area, I have two pieces of advice to give them:*

*The first, is that we call on both sides, the Arabs and the Israelis to put their confidence in Carter, for their confidence is wavering in spite of the special relationship and so on. The second thing is that the Palestinians must be with us because we are seeking a permanent peace. This is in the interests of all, not only of the Arabs. It is also in the interests of the Israelis that there should be peace in the area. If they are prepared for this, the problem of the representation of the Palestinians can be solved through a dialogue between the US, the Israelis and the Palestinians. This is actually what I did during my visit to the US in April—I urged Carter to do this. For the only party that can perform this task is the US. If there is a dialogue between them and the Palestinians, who have been deprived even of human rights, as I told you, I think that this matter can be settled on the basis of Israel's really intending to obtain and establish peace. I cannot see any difficulties.*

*will come here for talks on a specific date for the convening of the Geneva conference?*

*A. I hope so, I certainly hope so, and at the same time I hope to get something more important than the American viewpoint, because President Carter has in fact met all the Arab leaders and he is now meeting Begin, and I think that he could form some kind of a framework and put it on paper. I also have been eager that the working group, chaired by Vance, should start preparing for Geneva, for without proper preparation the Geneva conference is doomed to failure.*

*Q. Who will be in the working group, Mr. President?*

*A. I have asked that Vance should chair the group in the State Department and that it should make contacts with all the parties concerned, including the USSR. I do not rule out the USSR, as people say, and as Brezhnev said in his message to me.*

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### **Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad) discussing relations between Syria and the Palestine resistance<sup>90</sup>**

**Beirut, early August, 1977**

*Q. This cannot be regarded as something normal and natural. It is a surprising change of attitude as regards both Syrian-Palestinian relations and the area as a whole. It is a real development.*

*A. There is a new situation, but there is nothing surprising about it; it is quite normal. It was the disagreement with Syria that was surprising and abnormal. Agreement with her is natural. In the past we have disagreed with Syria on many issues. We had our views on Syrian intervention, and we had our position. But because of the circumstances attendant on the Palestine problem, and on the area as a whole at this historic stage, not to mention our history, we have surmounted this problem. We cannot ignore our common history and our common destiny. Syria and the*

<sup>90</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Dawli* (Paris), August 6, 1977.

*Q. Are you hoping that Secretary of State Vance*

Palestine problem are linked by history and destiny.

Moreover, our political views now correspond on many matters and issues related to the settlement in the Middle East. Now, since the Chtaura agreement, we anticipate closer cohesion with Syria, which will be in the interests of the Palestine problem, of Lebanon and of Syria herself.

In any case, whatever differences there were in the past, from now on we intend to devote ourselves exclusively to our cause and not become bogged down in the details of the Lebanese situation. That would make us incapable of confronting the new Israeli policy, which is led by a man notorious for his extremism, and who, it seems, intends to end his life as an even greater extremist.

*Q. Then the agreement with Syria amounts to more than a local security solution, involving as it does an understanding of a more comprehensive solution for the area, in the event of either war or peace?*

*A.* The fact that a peaceful settlement has become more difficult because of Israel's new policy was one of the elements that speeded up the Syrian-Palestinian rapprochement. The implementation of the Cairo agreement was a first step on the road to preparing for the confrontation of Israeli extremism, and thus for the liberation of the Arab and Palestinian territories. In fact it is part of a new line of action pursued by both Syria and the resistance. When its implementation is completed there will be moves in the Arab arena to confront Israeli extremism and to ensure the minimum preparation for war required by the quest for a settlement. There must also be real and profound Arab solidarity—Arab money must be employed on behalf of military action, while Arab blood will be shed for the cause. Money as against blood.

**Memorandum from mayors of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to US Secretary of State Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR emphasizing that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people<sup>91</sup>**

**Early August, 1977**

To the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States, and Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the USSR;

We, members of the Palestinian people of the occupied areas, wish to make clear the following:

1. Any solution of the Middle East conflict that ignores the Palestine problem and the rights and wishes of the Palestinian people will be a temporary solution that bears within itself the seeds of its own failure. For the Palestine problem and the rights of the Palestinian people are the basis and the cause of the struggle in the Middle East, and any solution that disregards them will be invalid and incomplete.

2. The Palestinian people is an indivisible unit however far apart the geographical location in which its members live. The Palestinians have affirmed, both here in the homeland, and in the countries in which they have taken refuge, that their sole legitimate representative, wherever they may be, is the PLO under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Therefore any attempts to ignore the PLO are futile, worthless, and a threat to peace, and make its achievement more remote rather than bringing it nearer.

3. We call on world public opinion and the government of the United States to make every effort to exert their influence on that government's ally Israel, which depends on US aid for its existence so as to ensure that Israel withdraw from all the occupied territories.

4. The Palestinian Arab people is fully entitled to its independent, fully sovereign state. Any attempt to force links between this state and any other state, Arab or otherwise, before the establishment of our independent Palestinian state, is an infringement of the rights of our people, which is

<sup>91</sup> Translated from the Arabic text as printed in *Wafa* (Beirut), August 11, 1977, p. 6.

fully capable of establishing relations, entirely in accordance with its own free will, with whom-ever it may wish, after the establishment of its state.

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**Communiqué issued by the PLO Executive Committee stressing that the Palestine question is central to the Middle East conflict and reaffirming the right of the PLO to participate in all efforts concerning the Palestine question and the Middle East conflict<sup>92</sup>**

Beirut, August 1, 1977

The present stage is witnessing extensive political activity centering on the Palestine question, which is the principal issue of the Arab nation on both the Arab and the international levels.

In the course of its sessions on July 31 and August 1, 1977, the Executive Committee of the PLO studied all aspects of the situation in which the Palestine problem finds itself at this stage.

The Executive Committee wishes to address the following to our people inside and outside the occupied homeland, to all regions of the Arab nation, and to all the peoples of the world:

(i) The Arab problem in general, and the Palestine cause in particular, are at this stage the object of a ferocious attack by American imperialism and Zionism. This attack takes the form of schemes and projects aimed at imposing capitulationist settlements in the Arab area at the expense of our people and our just cause. Attempts are also being made to sidetrack the Arab liberation movement and its goals and to destroy the gains and achievements realized by the Palestinian people and the Arab nation at the national and international levels. First and foremost of these achievements is the affirmation of the right of our people to return, to self-determination and to build its independent state on the soil of its homeland under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. These gains and achievements have been affirmed by the Arab summit conferences, strengthened by international recognition and consolidated

through immense sacrifices.

(ii) The basis of the Palestinian struggle, which enjoys extensive support at the Arab and international levels, has always been the search for a just peace based on the recognition that the Palestine cause is the crux of the conflict in the area, and that the solution of this problem in conformity with the national aspirations of our people is the only way to achieve such a peace.

Events in the area, especially during the last few years, have shown that a just peace cannot be achieved in isolation from the people of Palestine, represented by the PLO, and that to ignore this fact can only deadlock the situation in the area, which poses a grave threat to the security of the area and to world peace.

(iii) The Executive Committee, which is entrusted with the resolutions of the Palestine National Council, affirms that it will not stand idly by in the face of any attempt to sidetrack the issue of our full independence in our national territory of the homeland. It will steadfastly resist all conspiracies aimed at impugning the fact that the PLO represents the Palestinian people, inasmuch as it is the vanguard of its struggle and its conflict.

In the light of the above the Executive Committee affirms the right of the PLO to represent our people on a basis of independence and equality in all international and Arab conferences and efforts related to the Palestine problem and the Middle East.

(iv) The Executive Committee of the PLO is totally committed to the unity of the Arab position. It realizes the necessity of coordination among the various parties with a view to achieving the closest cohesion on the basis of the goals of Palestinian and Arab struggle.

The Executive Committee calls attention to the danger of the attempts to fragment the Arab cause and to impose an "Israeli" peace on the area.

(v) The PLO calls the attention of the whole world to the ever-increasing danger posed by the racist policy of Zionism, which has entered on a new stage with the selection of Menahem Begin as Prime Minister, by the continued pursuit of the policy of annexation, settlement and expansion in the occupied Arab territories and by the escalation of acts of repression and terrorism against our people and freedom fighters. The PLO holds the international forces that support Israel and provide her with financial, military and political support,

<sup>92</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 2, 1977, p. 1.

responsible for the explosion that is likely to take place in the area as a result of the above.

It affirms the intention of the people of Palestine to continue its struggle and to escalate its armed combat, and calls for support from all forces that love freedom, justice and peace.

At this critical stage the PLO also calls on the masses of the Arab nation to exercise greater vigilance and caution and to support the struggle of our people who are fighting the most difficult and ferocious battle inside and outside the occupied homeland.

It also calls on all allied and friendly forces to support our people and its just cause in this grave and crucial conflict against the conspiracies and the forces of imperialism and Zionism, which are trying to destroy our people and to liquidate its just and human cause.

In the light of its national responsibilities, the Executive Committee calls for a high-level Arab meeting to discuss the present situation and to achieve a unified Arab position.

Revolution until victory.

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### **Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing his talks with US Secretary of State Vance and plans for reconvening the Geneva conference<sup>93</sup>**

**Alexandria, August 2, 1977**

We reviewed the problem thoroughly with the American Secretary of State. I want to point out that we are passing through an important and decisive stage, for I believe that in the last twenty-five years, there has never been such a favourable opportunity for making peace as this. We may disagree on some issues but we are both seeking a peace based on justice. I hope that we shall continue to have frequent contacts in the future. I asked [Mr. Vance] to form the working group that I proposed for April so that preparations for the Geneva conference may be fruitful and effective in achieving a peaceful solution in the area.

<sup>93</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 3, 1977. On the same occasion US Secretary of State Vance expressed the hope that the Geneva conference would be convened in the fall.

I want to express my thanks and gratitude to President Carter and the American people for sending Mr. Vance to me to help solve this important problem in our area. We hope to meet many times in the future.

In my view what we should try to do at present is to prepare for the Geneva conference, for without proper preparation I am afraid the Geneva conference will come to nothing, and there would be no point in convening it.

## 261

### **Press interview statements by Foreign Secretary Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia stressing the importance of talks between the US and the Palestinians<sup>94</sup>**

**Taif, August 9, 1977**

*Q. Have you encouraged the Palestine Liberation Organization to change its covenant or to accept 242 and to give up its declared goal of destroying and dismantling the Jewish state?*

*A. We have not tried to change any of the positions of the Palestinian Liberation movement. What we think is important at this moment is that there be contacts—and this is shared by all the Arab countries—that there be contacts between the United States and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. We think that these contacts are essential because the United States is acting as an honest broker, and since the Palestinian problem is at the core of the issue that there must be such contacts. The only people who can talk for the Palestinians are the Palestinians themselves.*

*Q. How do you expect to see those US-PLO contacts coming about?*

*A. By direct contacts.*

*Q. Yes, but I was referring to the US commitment not to talk directly to the PLO, made in the Sinai II agreement?*

<sup>94</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), LXXVII, 1944 (September 12, 1977), pp. 339–340. For statements by US Secretary Vance on the same occasion see doc. 136 above.

<sup>95</sup> Doc. 148 in *International Documents on Palestine, 1975*.



A. As to how these talks can be initiated or as to the mechanics, that is something we'll have to see.

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**Communiqué issued by the command of the Arab Deterrent Forces in Lebanon on the implementation of the second stage of the programme for the implementation of the Cairo agreement (excerpt)<sup>96</sup>**

Cairo, late July, 1977

As of August 15, 1977, the Arab Deterrent Forces will, as announced, take practical measures to ensure that the first and second stages of the schedule are properly implemented, and will raid any illegal position, office or arms store inside or outside the camps.

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**Speech by Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Junblat to a party rally concerning relations with the Palestine resistance (excerpt)<sup>97</sup>**

Aley, August 14, 1977

At the same time, we affirm that our alliance with the Palestine resistance is a fateful one that can never be abandoned. It is a popular alliance foreordained by the struggle against a group of unreasonable forces that want to coerce the free will of those who have refused to accept the untenable solutions offered them.

The Palestine resistance is today passing through the most critical stage of its struggle to decide the destiny of the Palestinian people, and it so happens that this destiny is identical with that of the free Arab people of Lebanon. The best proof of this

is the fact that Aley has been the scene of their common steadfastness, common struggle and common sacrifice. This predestined alliance in struggle will continue... \* It is the true prelude to reaching a just and honourable solution... \*

The solution will not be reached at the negotiating table. We have had enough bargaining and and made enough concessions to Israeli militarism. The West created Israel to protect its interests, and will never abandon her unless the alliance between the Arab peoples is expanded and unless these peoples are baptized with blood and fire as has happened in Lebanon.

This fateful alliance in the Lebanese arena by no means prevents the reaching of a balanced and reasonable solution through the play of politics and democracy.

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**Press interview statements by Foreign and Defence Minister Butros of Lebanon denying that a date has been set for the implementation of the Cairo agreement in South Lebanon (excerpts)<sup>98</sup>**

Beirut, August 16, 1977

*Q. It has been reported that the third stage of the implementation of the Chtaura agreement will start in the South in two or three days. Has it started, or when is it going to start?*

*A. Certain sections of the press have given definite dates for the implementation of the Cairo agreement in the South on the basis of the Chtaura agreement. But the dates that have been given and published bear no relation to the facts, because implementation in the South depends on certain conditions being met and certain plans being made. This planning is in progress, but no official has fixed a date for the start of implementation in the South, though all of us are determined that it shall be as soon as possible.*

<sup>96</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 11, 1977.

<sup>97</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), August 15, 1977.

\* Passage omitted in the original.

<sup>98</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Beirut), August 17, 1977. See doc. 449 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969* for an alleged text of the Cairo agreement.

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**Statement by a Syrian official spokesman concerning the enforcement of Israeli laws and regulations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip<sup>99</sup>**

Damascus, August 16, 1977

It goes without saying that, in spite of its ineffective attempts to disguise its real intentions, the Zionist entity is trying to consolidate the occupation and to enforce a policy of expansion. Its real aim is to impede efforts to achieve a just peace in the area.

Yesterday, only a few days after the visit of the American Secretary of State to the area, this entity took a further step when its Prime Minister, Menahem Begin, announced that Israeli laws and regulations are to be enforced in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The government of the Syrian Arab Republic can only see this new Israeli step as an attempt to perpetuate the occupation and as a prelude to announcing the final annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Syrian government also sees this step as proof of Israel's utter contempt for the peace efforts, another challenge to the international community and the resolutions of the United Nations and an arrogant and wanton attempt to impose the policy of the *fait accompli*.

The Syrian Arab Republic calls on all states and organizations throughout the world to condemn the Zionist entity, to reject these measures, and to intervene to put an end to them, to check Israel's continuing defiance of international law and agreements and of the resolutions of the United Nations, and to halt her attempts to impede the achievement of a just peace in the area.

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**Statement by PLO official spokesman Abdul Muhsin Abu Mayzar presenting the position of the PLO Executive Committee with regard to proposals put forward by US Secretary of State Vance<sup>100</sup>**

Beirut, August 18, 1977

During its meetings the Executive Committee of the PLO studied the current situation and the diplomatic, political and military moves that have recently been made at all levels, including the tour of the American Secretary of State Mr. Cyrus Vance. The situation as a whole was fully appraised in the light of the information received by the Executive Committee in the course of its meetings and from the reports of its delegations, at the Arab and international levels.

The Executive Committee has come to the conclusion that the aims of Vance's tour and proposals are the following:

1. To deny the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

2. To attempt to sidetrack and disregard the Rabat resolutions,<sup>101</sup> as a step on the road to the liquidation of the Palestine problem.

3. To disregard the General Assembly resolutions on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, in particular General Assembly resolution 3236.<sup>102</sup>

4. To attempt to impose on the Arab area an imperialist-Israeli solution which would perpetuate Zionist usurpation of the national rights of our people and to subjugate the will of the Arab nation.

The Executive Committee of the PLO believes that the present stage calls for a firmer Arab attitude and resolute resistance to imperialist-Zionist schemes and projects. It also calls for greater vigilance and awareness, and an ability to distinguish between the camp of our enemies and that of our friends, led by the friendly USSR.

The Executive Committee also affirms its unwavering position, embodied in the resolutions of

<sup>100</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 18, 1977, p. 1. For statement by Secretary Vance during his tour see docs. 134 and 136 above.

<sup>101</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A below.

<sup>102</sup> Doc. 22 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>99</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 17, 1977.

the National Council, as regards the rejection of resolution 242 which excludes the national rights of the Palestinian people. The Executive Committee also regards the expansionist moves of Zionism, in the form of annexation, and the establishment of settlements in Palestine and the occupied Arab areas, as being an extension of Israeli aggression. In condemning these aggressive measures we call on the Arab nation, world public opinion, and our honourable friends, to resolutely resist aggressive Zionist plans directed against our people and the Arab nation. The Committee is confident that the steadfastness of our people in the occupied homeland and the struggle of our revolutionaries will frustrate all these aggressive imperialist-Zionist schemes.

## 267

### **Communiqué issued by the PLO Central Council stating its position on recent developments in the area, particularly the visit by US Secretary of State Vance<sup>103</sup>**

**Damascus, August 25, 1977**

The Central Council held its regular meeting in Damascus on August 25. Abu Ammar, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Palestinian revolution, attended. The Council heard and evaluated reports on the efforts of the Executive Committee as regards all matters related to the Palestine problem in all fields.

It also passed in review all recent developments at the Arab and international levels, including the visit of US Secretary of State Vance and the proposals he brought with him<sup>104</sup>, which are inimical to the inalienable national rights of our people. Also reviewed were the Zionist measures that accompanied and followed his visit, such as annexation of the occupied areas and continued pursuit of the policy of dispossession and settlement, in defiance of international public opinion and the whole Arab nation. The Council resolved:

1. To condemn all American and Zionist ma-

noeuvres aimed at sidetracking our people's right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of its independent state on the soil of its homeland, and to the independent and equal representation of our people under the leadership of the PLO. On this basis the Council declares its rejection of all attempts to impair the resolutions of the Palestine National Council or to impugn the Arab position, as stated in the resolutions of the Rabat and Cairo summits, as regards the rights and representation of our people and the Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause.

2. To reaffirm the resolutions taken by the Palestine National Council at its last session on the basis of the Fifteen Point Programme,<sup>105</sup> especially as regards resolution 242, which ignores the national rights of our people and deals with the problem as one of refugees; and to insist on the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on the Palestine problem, in particular resolution 3236, as the basis of the Palestinian position and political activity.

The Central Council calls on the Arab nation, at the official and popular levels, to face up to its national responsibility and resist the conspiracies that hostile forces are concocting against our nation, and to abandon hesitation for determined confrontation of these schemes aimed at the destruction of the Arab liberation movement and the liquidation of the Palestine problem. The Council affirms in the most emphatic terms that the cause of our people is the crux of the conflict in the area. It warns against being beguiled by the promises of the forces of imperialism and Zionism, and stresses that it is impossible to achieve a just and permanent peace except on the basis of the realization of the national rights of our people.

3. The Council has discussed the situation in occupied Palestine, and while warning remiss and suspect elements against being drawn into the schemes of the Zionist enemy, it highly appreciates the heroic role played in the struggle by the masses of our people and the national leadership in Galilee, the Triangle, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the way they have rallied round the PLO. The Council stressed the importance of continuing and escalating armed and mass struggle against Zionist occupation.

<sup>103</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 27, 1977, p. 7. The statement was also published in Damascus on August 27 by the Central Council Chairman, Khalid Fahum.

<sup>104</sup> Docs. 134 and 136 above.

<sup>105</sup> Doc. 229 above.

4. The Council considered the present situation in South Lebanon and the dangers posed by the continued acts of aggression and escalation to the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East, and to the Palestinian revolution. While stressing the importance of continuing to implement the Cairo and Chtaura agreements in cooperation with the legitimate Lebanese authorities and the Arab forces, in their efforts to restore peace, it stresses the need for all Arab forces to shoulder their responsibilities vis-à-vis the plan of Israel and her allies, which is a threat to the Arab position as a whole.

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**Memorandum from the government of Egypt to the Arab governments calling for confrontation of Israeli measures in the occupied territories (excerpt)<sup>106</sup>**

Cairo, August 29, 1977

In recent weeks the Israeli government has embarked on a series of illegal measures in circumstances that leave no room for doubt that its intention is to change the demographic and geographic structure of the occupied territory and to alter its legal status, as part of its known plan to annex this territory or part of it, within the framework of its expansionist intentions. The Israeli leaders are unable to conceal these intentions although they have done their best to obscure and disguise them, and to deceive and mislead world public opinion in the hope that it may gradually become accustomed to Israel's moves in this direction, in spite of the fact that these moves are in flagrant contravention of the principles and provisions of international law, and of Israel's commitments. The Israeli leaders hope thus to gradually bring the world to look with indifference and finally to assent to and accept this Israeli plan.

In calling attention to the dangers of these recent Israeli measures, Egypt also regards them as a grave escalation of Israel's challenge to aggression against Arab rights. This is true both of the measures themselves, their extent and their effects,

and of the circumstances surrounding them and the framework within which they were planned. This calls for the adoption of a resolute collective Arab stance capable of deterring such conduct and neutralizing all its effects and consequences. The escalation of Israeli aggression must be faced with a corresponding escalation of Arab confrontation.

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**Communiqué issued by the PLO office in Moscow following the visit to the USSR of a Palestinian delegation headed by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat<sup>107</sup>**

Moscow, August 31, 1977

The talks between the Palestinian delegation that went to Moscow on August 29, 1977, headed by Mr. Yasir Arafat, and the Soviet comrades, ended on August 31, 1977. The talks were fruitful and important.

The two parties reviewed their positions, which were in strong and unambiguous agreement on the issue of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people and its right to return, to self-determination and to build its independent state.

Mr. Yasir Arafat passed in review the latest developments in the Arab area, in particular as regards the Palestine problem, in relation to the Zionist-American imperialist plan to disregard the Palestinians and their sole legitimate representative, the leadership of the PLO, in the talks on a peaceful settlement. He also mentioned the attempt to exclude the USSR from any coming solution, so that the Americans and their agents, the Zionists, may be able to reach a solution that is in line with their schemes. The Palestinian delegation also explained its attitude to resolutions 242 and 3236.

The talks ended in an atmosphere of complete frankness and full mutual understanding on all the points raised by the two parties.

The talks lasted two days; on the first there was a five-and-one half hour meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

<sup>106</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 30, 1977.

<sup>107</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 31, 1977, p. 1. For the joint communiqué issued on the visit see doc. 141 above.

A further meeting took place in the headquarters of the Executive Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on August 30, 1977. The Soviet side was headed by Comrade Zakharov, First Deputy Head of the Foreign Relations Section of the Executive Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. This meeting, which was held in an atmosphere of friendship, fraternity and full understanding, lasted three hours. On the same day Mr. Yasir Arafat met the Palestinian students who are studying in the USSR. He described to them the most important developments in the field of the Palestine problem, and explained the objectives of Vance's visit and the Zionist-American conspiracy aimed at escalating the Arab conflict, Arabizing the war and exploiting Arab differences in the interests of American imperialism and its partner in conspiracy, Begin.

On August 31, 1977, Mr. Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian delegation left Moscow for Damascus.

## 270

### **Communiqué issued by the Arab Deterrent Forces concerning the implementation of the third stage of the programme for the enforcement of the Cairo agreement<sup>108</sup>**

Beirut, August, 31, 1977

To work out the final details of the third stage of the Chtaura resolutions, a Lebanese-Palestinian meeting was held today at the headquarters of the Arab Deterrent Forces, attended by the Commander of the Deterrent Force, Major Sami al-Khatib, Colonel Butrus Yunis, representing the Command of the Lebanese Army, and Mr. Abu Iyyad, representing the PLO.

During the meeting the positive outcome of Mr. Abu Iyyad's talks in Damascus was discussed and the final details of the implementation plan were agreed on. It was also agreed that the date of "Y day", when the implementation is to start, would be fixed at a subsequent meeting when the material preparations for the implementation, and the necessary contacts, had been completed.

## 271

### **Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad) commenting on the implementation of the Chtaura agreement in Lebanon and criticizing President Sadat's proposal for a meeting in the US of a working group of foreign ministers to prepare for the Geneva conference<sup>109</sup>**

Late August, 1977

*Q. What phases of the Chtaura agreement have been implemented so far and what is preventing the implementation of the third phase concerning the South?*

*A.* The Chtaura agreement consists of three phases. We have successfully implemented the first and second stages dealing with our camps from south of Zahrani to Beirut and Burj al-Barajna. The joint committee on the camps and the interior met three days ago and read the reports of the Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian joint committees. According to these committees' reports the rate of implementation had been excellent and no obstacles had come up during the implementation of the two preceding stages.

As regards the third stage, there is really no obstacle, but there are certain matters connected with the legitimate Lebanese authorities that have to be settled. Among them is the matter of preparing the climate for the entry of the Lebanese army into all the areas so that it will not meet with any obstacle. For this climate to be ensured there must be political contacts among all the parties. I think that all the difficulties that formerly existed have been overcome and it is now up to His Excellency President Elias Sarkis to give orders to forces of the Lebanese army to go in, so that the third stage may be completed.

As far as we are concerned, there is absolutely no obstacle. On the contrary, we are waiting for the army to go in so that we may pull the carpet out from under the feet of those who are trying to blackmail us in the South, and so that we may put an end to Israel's attempts to occupy the South on the pretext of a Palestinian armed presence.

At the beginning of this week there will be good news.

<sup>108</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 1, 1977.

<sup>109</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), August 29, 1977.

*Q. At the beginning of this week?*

*A.* At the beginning of next week. In any case, it is up to the legitimate Lebanese authorities.

*Q. Some quarters are demanding that the Palestinians should be distributed among the Arab countries—that no Palestinian who was not in Lebanon in 1948 should be allowed to stay here.*

*A.* In the first place, in principle, the Palestinians are distributed among all the Arab countries. Some discussions on this matter are taking place. For example, there are more than thirty thousand Palestinians in Kuwait, a country with a population of 800,000. There are about 250,000 Palestinians in Saudi Arabia, and I do not need to mention Syria, where there are about 400,000. The same applies to Jordan where Palestinians make up more than seventy-five percent of the population. If we want to enumerate the rest of the Arab countries we find that there is not a single Arab country in which there is not a high proportion of Palestinians.

In principle, we do not insist on the Palestinians who have come since 1948 staying here. But in fact those who have come since 1948 only amount to 5 percent (five per thousand) and those came after the Cairo agreement. The Cairo agreement defines their activities and their tasks. The number of Palestinians in Lebanon has also been exaggerated. Some people maintain that there are 500,000, some 600,000, but the figure is much less than that because a huge percentage of the Palestinians left Lebanon during, before and after the Lebanese war. For as everyone knows, the Palestinian has to look for a job to support his family, or else he is a pupil at school. So from this point of view there is no problem.

In this context it must be stressed that we regard ourselves as guests in Lebanon and we suffered from the tragedies and miseries of the Lebanese war just as much as our Lebanese brothers did. And we must certainly learn a lesson from that war.

Instead of devoting our attention exclusively to the Palestinians who are in Lebanon we should dress our wounds and seek common ground so that we may all come together and so that all quarters in Lebanon may help the Palestinians to return to their country, which is their hope and their aspiration.

The Palestinian, as a Palestinian first and foremost, and as an Arab can never accept any substitute for Palestine and in spite of all the obstructions we have had to face when we have

raised or asked to turn over a new leaf, we have still repeated that we are guests. We are prepared to protect our existence, but within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and the agreements that have been concluded, and we do not want any excesses that could upset this balance—the balance between our presence and the implementation of the agreements.

*Q. Israeli interference in the South was one of the reasons why the situation there exploded. How can we eliminate the causes of this explosion?*

*A.* I think that for the legitimate authorities to take over all civil and military institutions in the South will be the first step towards stopping that interference, the aim of which is to dismember or partition South Lebanon for the achievement of objectives of which Israel has long dreamed. The same thing will also put a stop to the activities of certain quarters whom Israel has induced to have dealings with her and make them abandon the course which is so immoral by Arab standards. For we hate to see any Lebanese, whatever his views, stretching out his hand to cooperate with the Zionist enemy. And we must help the legitimate authorities to take over in the South in a manner consistent with the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and with the exercise of that sovereignty in all fields.

*Q. What about the proposed working group and Syria's attitude to it?*

*A.* We have been informed of the Syrian attitude from the speech by President Hafiz Asad and from his press conferences; also from our recent meetings with him.

There is no doubt about Syria's attitude to the working group, which had previously been proposed by Israel and Kissinger. As for the American solution for a settlement, which excludes both the USSR and the Palestinians and gives the Arabs only some of their rights—Syria has never divided Arab rights because she regards them as indivisible. Therefore if the settlement does not cover the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria will reject it, as we know from the attitude of President Hafiz Asad. In this connection, I should like to stress once more that we are faced with the choice of surrender, surrender through the settlement that is being proposed, or of continuing our armed struggle—so that we have no choice at all. We are against Arab concessions and we are against the

US settlement, and we were misunderstood when we proposed an interim solution. We proposed a Palestinian state, but they want recognition or peace with Israel, and some people have understood that the state was an end in itself. But we say No; when we proposed the state as an interim settlement we did not mean that we wanted a state at any price. Therefore we will have nothing to do with resolution 242 or its amendment, we do not want to and we cannot, for the resolutions of the National Council are quite clear on this. Nor is the Geneva conference in itself a Palestinian aim, nor has it ever been. The principal aim is that our people should recover its national rights and that it should enjoy the right to self-determination like other peoples. This is why the Palestinian and Syrian attitudes are so close, and also why we met recently with President Hafiz Asad. That meeting was followed by the agreement reached in Chtaura. For the unification of Palestinian and Syrian attitudes is the beginning of a move towards a firm Arab stand in the confrontation of Arab concessions.

I do not want to discuss the current Arab collapse in several areas. I believe that if we complete the implementation of the Chtaura agreement there will be a joint move towards a firm Arab attitude capable of holding out against obdurate Israeli pressures sponsored by the US.

*Q. The aim of the proposed working group is to prevent the USSR from expressing its views on solving the Middle East crisis. What is your opinion on the exclusion of the USSR?*

*A.* Of course I agree: The aim of the working group is to exclude the USSR and also the PLO. In my opinion there can be no just settlement in the area if the Palestinians are not a party to it, and this is where the role of the Arab position comes in as a basic principle. Is the PLO to be excluded or are we to be firm and all stand in one trench—the PLO and Syria, and presumably Egypt and the other Arab countries. If we want a just peace we must be as prepared for war as we are for peace, for only the strong can make peace and war. Therefore I do not think that the USSR would lose anything by being excluded from the settlement; it is we who would lose. What is regrettable is that we have given the US more than it deserves, and that we are expected to give it more than it deserves. We are also expected to give up our friends so that we may confront our

enemy at the negotiating table without any real weapons, having deprived ourselves of the weapons of our friends. We have practically deprived ourselves of the oil weapon and we have deprived ourselves of the weapon of the frozen funds, and if this happens we shall have deprived ourselves of the greatest and strongest weapon, the weapon of war. What will be left us with which to negotiate with Israel? Why should Israel withdraw—I say quite honestly that if this happens we will not get even the humiliating and uncompromising Israeli settlement, if we have lost all these weapons. For there is no reason why an Israeli leader should agree to withdraw if we Arabs are in such a state of weakness and disunity, with no real Arab solidarity. I mean to say, that our relations with the great powers must be balanced, that the relations between the confrontation countries and the so-called supporting countries should be on a good and sound basis so that there is a balance between those that offer their blood and those that offer their money.

If we are not in such a position it is difficult to imagine a settlement in the area being reached, and this is why I stress that we need the USSR in war and peace.

*Q. From what you have said it would appear that Syria supplies the resistance with strategic support.*

*A.* In the recent meetings with President Asad and with the Syrian authorities, the main subject of discussion was the future—I mean the future of the strategic relations between us and Syria—the dispersal of the cloud of strained relations and marginal differences, so that we might turn over a new leaf and restore the situation to normal. And I think that to a great extent it has returned to normal. All the relations previously under discussion are now on the agenda for discussion with our Syrian brothers, but it is proposed that these relations should be stronger and closer than before. For now it is a question of a common destiny, and this is a situation we must confront with a unified attitude, with Syrians and Palestinians agreeing in their decisions.

*Q. What is the conference of Arab foreign ministers expected to do now that Vance has succeeded in his task of smashing Arab solidarity?*

*A.* In fact Arab solidarity was smashed in Kissinger's time; Vance found the ground already prepared for him, so that all he had to do was to

follow the course set by Kissinger. What is happening at present on the Egyptian-Libyan border, and on the Algerian-Moroccan border, and the other cases of strained Arab relations, are the result of the policies of Kissinger, of the US Administration whose policy is governed by this line of action, the aim being to subject the whole area to the US line. Therefore I cannot say what the Arab foreign ministers can be expected to do—you know what the situation is. All the same, I should like to hope that this meeting will study a unified Arab attitude to the US settlement, and that we Arabs may be realistic in our relations with the USSR, and act in the light of national rather than ideological considerations. I say this because nationalism requires that we adopt a unified position. But if you ask me if I am optimistic about this meeting, my answer is, I have hope, but I am not optimistic.

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**Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat pointing out the importance of his visit to the USSR<sup>110</sup>**

**Late August, 1977**

The USSR is a sincere and well-trying friend of the Arab peoples and always supports their just cause. This has been confirmed by the outcome of my current visit to Moscow and the talks I have had with Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the USSR.

The talks with Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, were very frank, friendly and successful.

My present visit to the USSR is also important because it has taken place during a period of the greatest danger for the issue of peace in the Middle East.

This period has been marked by a new escalation in Israeli aggression against South Lebanon, and also by Tel Aviv's decision to impose its full sovereignty on all the territory of occupied Palestine.

Israel has also announced the establishment of three new settlements in the occupied territories

and that Israeli law is now in force in the territories West of the River Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. This step can only be described as an attempt to realize Tel Aviv's intention not to return the West Bank of the Jordan to the Arabs and not to recognize the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs and the PLO.

The situation in the Middle East has been further complicated by the visit of Cyrus Vance to the Middle East. The aim of this visit was to be the speeding up of moves towards the Geneva Middle East peace conference. But subsequent activities have not confirmed Vance's statement.

The American Secretary of State tried to completely disregard the Palestine problem which, as everyone knows, is the cornerstone of any solution of the Middle East problem.

The other reason why Vance returned to Washington empty-handed is that his visit was planned from the start as an American manoeuvre aimed at impeding and even sabotaging the Geneva conference on the Middle East.

Vance's mission to the Middle East has shown that the US has not relinquished its plans to make the Geneva conference as meaningless as possible, if it proves impossible to sabotage it. This is proved by the efforts that are being made to exclude the USSR from participation in the settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The Arab peoples and the people of Palestine greatly respect Leonid Brezhnev, not only as a zealous campaigner for peace but also as the first statesman to call for recognition of and respect for the national rights of the people of Palestine. Leonid Brezhnev defends the USSR's firm attitude at all meetings at the highest level.

The Middle East problem can only be definitively and permanently solved through participation by the USSR, the loyal friend of the Arabs and all the peoples of the developing countries. If we want to eliminate the danger of war in the Middle East, we must follow the only right course—the convening of the Geneva Middle East peace conference at an early date, with representatives of the PLO attending it on equal footing with others.

Dark clouds are once more gathering over the Middle East, but I hope that they may be dispersed. This is ensured by the firm support given the just cause of the Arabs by all peace-loving circles in world public opinion, the USSR and the socialist countries.

<sup>110</sup> Made to Tass; translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 31, 1977, p. 3.



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**Speech by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria to the sixty-eighth session of the Arab League Council (excerpts)<sup>111</sup>**

**Cairo, September 3, 1977**

Doubtless all of you have been following the enemy's policy and the statements of its leaders, but I think it may be as well to repeat some of these statements.

On June 18, 1977, Begin was asked if the occupied territories were negotiable. He replied, What occupied territories? If you mean the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, they are liberated territories and all of them are an integral part of Israeli territory.

He also said: There is no need to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, because your country belongs to you entirely and you cannot say that you are annexing it. He added that his government will not call the West Bank and the Gaza Strip occupied areas, but liberated areas.

In another statement Begin said: I am a Palestinian, and Palestine is part of Israel.

On August 13, 1977 the Israeli Cabinet decided to give the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the social rights enjoyed by Israelis. It also decided to allow the establishment of settlements there and in Sinai and the Golan.

Moreover, the Israelis have told the US Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, the following:

1. That they reject the idea of a Palestinian entity even in the form proposed by the Americans, of a demilitarized entity open to Israel and with relations with Jordan.

2. That they unequivocally reject any role of the PLO, even if it were to recognize Israel.

3. That Israel could give the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the right to choose between obtaining Israeli nationality or continuing in their present situation under Israeli sovereignty, with Israeli laws as regards social affairs applying to them.

These are the facts about Israeli policy, and I do not think that any one of us believes that it is just a manoeuvre to obtain as much as possible.

If any one doubts that the Israelis are being honest with themselves, let him recall that the recent Israeli measures were taken after the US Secretary of State's visit to Israel and in spite of the fact that America had informed Israel that it would not agree to such measures.

One of the most important factors in the crisis that faces the Arab nation is the fact that the military equilibrium has been disturbed. The reasons for this are:

1. The amount and kind of American arms that have reached Israel since the October War.

2. The inability of the confrontation countries to meet their minimum requirements, for lack of sources or funds or both.

3. Arab dissensions and the fact that large numbers of the armed forces of the Arab countries are deployed to deal with Arab situations and to confront marginal quarrels, which situation has, in one way or another, affected the moral and material combat-preparedness of these forces.

In this complicated situation we should have gone on with political action in the form of mobilizing world public opinion against the enemy and winning friends for our cause, either through our bilateral contacts or within the framework of international conferences and organizations. Also, for many reasons, we should have discussed the political efforts that are being made in the context of reaching a just and permanent peace—efforts which have had no positive consequences because of Israel's refusal to abide by the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations both on the crux of the matter, which is Palestine, and on the other occupied Arab territories.

Through political contacts we have all of us come to the conclusion that although the Arabs want peace they reject surrender, because any peace concluded on a basis of neglect for the rights of the people of Palestine or Arab territory and allowing the aggressor to enjoy his gains, is surrender, which can never take place, even if the conflict lasts hundreds of years.

The gravest aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict lies in the attempts that are being made in various directions to defuse the highly charged psychological atmosphere of hostility towards the aggressor. These attempts are being made in the hope of arriving at a situation in which the aggressed party agrees to have dealings with the aggressor under the auspices of aggression, so that the ag-

<sup>111</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), September 4, 1977.

gressor may achieve his aims. We draw attention to the danger of these attempts and to the effects they could have on the advance of the Arab nation towards the achievement of its goals.

While talking of political action, the Arab situation and peripheral disputes, mention must be made of Lebanon. For the events that have taken place in that country which is so dear to all of us, obviously formed part of what has happened to the Arab nation. There can be no doubt that the Arab nation has proved capable of surmounting the acute crisis it faced in the Lebanese arena. This is a clear indication of our ability to overcome trials and crises.

I now want to place on record our satisfaction at the general situation in Lebanon at present, where the fighting has stopped and the Arab Deterrent Force has things under control. And there can be no doubt of the response of our Palestinian and Lebanese brothers to the initiative put forward by President Hafiz Asad for the implementation of the Cairo agreement. That initiative culminated in the Chtaura agreement, which comprised a time-table for the implementation of the Cairo agreement. Implementation has in fact started, which gives us firm ground for hope that the situation in Lebanon will continue to improve at the rapid rate that has already restored the country's prosperity, in spite of the situation in the South, which Israel is trying to exploit, bombarding Palestinian and Lebanese positions there. Our Palestinian brothers have assured us of their desire for the rapid implementation of the Cairo agreement in the South, and the Lebanese government, so we have learned, has taken measures to assert its authority there. I must also mention that we believe that the Lebanese Front and all Lebanese forces sincerely want the agreement to be implemented in the South as quickly as possible, so that the door may be closed in the face of the Israeli enemy, for they are afraid of the South being swallowed up by Israel.

Mr. President, honourable members,

The government of the Syrian Arab Republic, realizing the gravity of the present stage and the extent to which it requires unity of action and of attitude on the part of all of us, if we are to confront the enemy who has designs on our very existence as a nation and a homeland, has studied this situation fully, and we submit the following proposals to this Council:

## I. IN THE ARAB FIELD: A DRAFT RESOLUTION—

In view of the extreme importance of Arab solidarity and a united Arab attitude in order to confront the various dangers and challenges that confront the Arab nation at this stage, the Council resolves:

1. To make every effort to ensure full and strict adherence to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in particular the Algiers and Rabat conferences.

2. To make every effort to resolve present differences by peaceful means and through direct negotiations.

3. To avoid peripheral conflicts and disputes which lead to efforts being wasted and energies being dissipated, and to concentrate efforts against the real enemy, Zionism.

4. To call a meeting of the Arab Defence Council to study the military situation and to decide what organization, preparation and equipment are required to confront it.

5. To call a meeting of the Arab Economic Council to lay the foundations of Arab economic coordination and integration.

6. To call for an Arab summit conference to meet next month to evaluate the present situation in the light of developments since the Rabat summit conference and to take measures and decisions calculated to put an end to the present state of inertia and decline, to reinforce Arab solidarity, to consolidate the capacity for steadfastness and resistance and to decide on all steps to be taken to achieve the goals of the Arabs, as decided at the Algiers and Rabat conferences.

## II. IN THE FIELD OF CONFRONTING ISRAELI POLICY

1. To confront Israeli policy in the field of political action, in particular the recent measures related to annexation and the establishment of settlements, the Council resolves to adopt the following draft resolution, which shall first be submitted to the conferences of the non-aligned countries and the Islamic countries at their emergency sessions in New York:

### *Draft Resolution*

The emergency meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries and the Islamic countries, meeting from September 26–27 1977;

In the light of the dangerously explosive situa-

tion prevailing in the Middle East as a result of Israel's attempts to hinder peace efforts and her continuing aggression against Arab territories through her refusal to enforce the principles adopted by the United Nations, the conferences of the non-aligned countries and the Islamic conference, with the aim of establishing a just and permanent peace in the area, and also as a result of her continued pursuit of her policy of settlement, Judaization and annexation, as reflected in the recent Israeli measures relative to the enforcement of Israeli law on the Arab population and the establishment of new settlements in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, in preparation for their annexation to Israel;

And in affirmation of the links of common destiny between the non-aligned countries and the Islamic conference and their role in promoting the world movement of common struggle for a world ruled by justice, peace and law;

The meeting reaffirms the resolutions of the summit conferences and conferences of foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries, and the Islamic conference on the problem of Palestine and the Middle East, and stresses that a just and permanent peace is only possible if the following principles are realized:

1. Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including the city of Jerusalem.

2. The full recovery by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights, including its right to self-determination and to establish its independent state in Palestine;

2. Strongly condemns the recent Israeli measures relative to the enforcement of Israeli law on the Arab population and the establishment of new settlements in the occupied Palestinian Arab territories, declares that these measures are a grave infringement of international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in time of war and a real threat to the efforts to establish a just and permanent peace in the Middle East involving the gravest consequences for world peace and security, and demands that all measures taken in this connection be rescinded.

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**Statement by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat commenting on the statement by the US State Department that Palestinians must be involved in a peace settlement<sup>112</sup>**

Beirut, September 13, 1977

There has been a statement by the official spokesman for the US State Department concerning the importance of the Palestinian role and the futility of any settlement unless the Palestine problem is settled and the Palestinians take part in the peace process as a condition of its success. This is a positive step which stresses the objective fact that the Palestine problem is the crux of the Middle East conflict, and which underlines the soundness of the PLO's attitude as affirmed by the Palestine National Council.

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**Statement issued by the PLO Central Council condemning Israeli attacks on South Lebanon and commenting on the US State Department statement on Palestinian participation in a peace settlement<sup>113</sup>**

Damascus, September 19, 1977

At its meeting on September 19, 1977, the Central Council of the PLO studied exhaustively the grave situation in South Lebanon resulting from Israel's acts of escalation and military aggression carried out under cover of isolationist forces.

The Council heard Mr. Abu Ammar's military report on the Israeli military operation and its objectives, and on the savage shelling by artillery, rockets, tanks and planes of villages in the south and positions of the Palestinian revolution, which the Israeli authorities have frankly admitted and which has been officially reported by the Lebanese authorities and the various observers in the area. This Israeli attack, coming at a time when the General Assembly is about

<sup>112</sup> Made to *Wafa*, translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 13, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>113</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 20, 1977, p. 8.

to meet, was an attempt to create new facts to undermine the Arab attitude in general and the Palestinian people in particular. The attack came at a time when the advance towards peace in Lebanon had begun to be successful especially after the agreement concluded in Chtaura among the Lebanese authorities, the Palestinian revolution and the Arab Deterrent Forces. All were awaiting the implementation of the third stage of the agreement so that the Lebanese army should enter the South, particularly the areas where the fighting is now taking place. These activities are the prelude to a wide-scale explosion which the Israeli-isolationist alliance is seeking to bring about in the hope of sabotaging the advance towards peace in Lebanon and the Arab position as a whole.

This situation, which is a threat to the Arab nation and in particular to the confrontation countries and the Arab role in Lebanon, requires that an initiative be taken quickly to confront the aggression. It also requires immediate and comprehensive support for the Palestinian revolution, which is confronting the Israeli war machine with relatively limited resources. The Council also passed in review the contacts with Arab quarters made by the Executive Committee and the other delegations. It stressed the need to intensify and to continue these contacts with a view to achieving greater Arab solidarity and a more united Arab attitude, and greater coordination so as to safeguard the rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. The Council also passed in review the recent visit of our delegation to the friendly USSR and appraised this visit, its fruitful outcome and the statement<sup>114</sup> issued affirming the USSR's firm support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians, in particular the right to return and build their independent national state. The statement also mentioned the USSR's continuing support for the cause of our people in all fields. The Council also reviewed the new move mentioned in the recent statement<sup>115</sup> by the US Department of State, which recognizes that the Palestinian people are the essential element in any solution of the Middle East problem and the crux of the conflict in the area.

The Council observed, however, that the statement makes no mention of the national rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to

return, to self-determination and to establish its independent state under the leadership of the the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Council reviewed the situation inside the occupied territories and the steadfast stand of our people in the face of all Zionist conspiracies embodied in annexation, settlement, Judaization and terrorism, arrests and oppression and coercion of every kind. The Council salutes the heroic stand of our people in the face of all these conspiracies and of this odious Israeli terrorism.

Our people both inside and outside the occupied homeland have closed ranks in the face of all these conspiracies so that they may escalate all forms of struggle, military, political and popular, and have rallied round the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of our people.

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**Press interview statement by Maronite Patriarch Khuraysh of Lebanon calling for the Palestinians to reduce displays of armed strength<sup>116</sup>**

**Late September, 1977**

I think that the situation has changed, that the atmosphere has improved, and that men's minds are better disposed. But there are many people who say that the agreement between the conflicting parties should be reached quietly, without pressure or intimidation. Of course we must not forget that a large number of Lebanese still feel that the situation is dangerous and are frankly asking how, when the Palestinians have such vast quantities of arms and such large numbers of armed men, we can reach an agreement; how our minds can be at rest and how the necessary atmosphere of freedom can be assured.

For my part, I believe that there is no need for all these arms, armed men and massing of forces, either in Beirut or in the South, and I have told the Palestinian authorities so for the sake of Lebanon and their own cause. I have told them that they will lose nothing by giving up this display

<sup>114</sup> Doc. 141 above.

<sup>115</sup> Doc. 147 above.

<sup>116</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar al-Arabi wal-Dawli* (Paris), 22 (October 1, 1977), p. 2.

of armed strength, and that the real loss would be if they lost the support of Lebanon, and especially that of the Maronites. So let them choose. And I am sure that I do not need anyone to testify to my sympathy for the Palestinian cause.

. . . . .

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**Statement by the Cabinet of Jordan praising the joint US-USSR declaration on the Middle East<sup>117</sup>**

**Amman, October 2, 1977**

The Jordanian government regards the Soviet-American statement<sup>118</sup> as a positive and constructive development in the field of efforts to reach a permanent and just solution of the Middle East crisis. Not only is it the culmination of the sincere efforts of the government of the US in cooperation with the government of the USSR; it is also an embodiment of international will as expressed by the resolutions adopted by the various UN bodies, including the General Assembly.

The government, observing the balanced nature of the statement as regards the principles of a peaceful settlement it sets out, and in particular the right of the Palestinian people to recover their legitimate rights, affirms that it is a sound step forward that can constitute the basis for positive moves towards peace negotiations in Geneva. It hopes that all the parties concerned will respond to this statement in the light of their vital interest in a just and permanent peace and from their concern for world peace, which the international community is striving to maintain and reinforce.

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**Statement by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi commenting on the joint US-USSR declaration on the Middle East<sup>119</sup>**

**New York, October 2, 1977**

The Soviet-American joint statement<sup>120</sup> may be regarded as a positive step along the road towards a just solution of the Middle East problem in that it affirms the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the need for its representatives to participate in the peace talks.

What is meant by the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is those rights that have been conceded and affirmed by the United Nations, especially its right to establish its independent state, to return to its homeland and to self-determination under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative.

We regard this statement as a contribution to the international efforts to ensure that the Security Council adopts a new resolution that will constitute a sound basis for ensuring the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

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**Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee stating its position in light of the joint US-USSR declaration on the Middle East and the American-Israeli working paper<sup>121</sup>**

**Beirut, October 21, 1977**

At its meeting on October 21, 1977, the Executive Committee of the PLO studied the latest developments at the Arab and international levels as regards the Palestinian problem, the political and diplomatic moves made at the start of the 32nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the contacts made and the positions adopted by the parties concerned in connection with the Middle East crisis.

The Executive Committee also studied the indications of a more positive attitude towards the

<sup>117</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai* (Amman), October 3, 1977.

<sup>118</sup> Doc. 160 above.

<sup>119</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 2, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>120</sup> Doc. 160 above.

<sup>121</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 22, 1977, p. 3.

cause of the Palestinian people, its representation and its national rights, contained in the Soviet-American joint statement.<sup>122</sup> In addition, the Executive Committee discussed the contents of the recently published American-Israeli working paper,<sup>123</sup> which is a new attempt to obliterate the inalienable rights of our people, a unilateral attempt to sidetrack the Soviet-American joint statement, and yet one more effort to fragment the Arab problem and our national rights.

In the light of the information and reports it has received on the various Arab and international moves, the Executive Committee of the PLO declares that its position which derives from its firm principles, is as follows:

1. The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and expresses its national will at all international conferences and meetings.

2. The only way to achieve a just peace in the area is for the Zionist occupation of all the occupied territories to come to an end, and for the Palestinian people to recover its inalienable national rights, first and foremost its right to return, to self-determination and to establish its independent state on the soil of its homeland.

3. Any international conference on the Middle East crisis not based on the issue of the Palestine problem and the rights of the Palestinian people is doomed to failure in the face of the will, steadfastness and resolution of our people and the Arab masses.

4. The Executive Committee salutes the admirable vigilance, the profound national commitment and the continuing struggle of the masses of the Palestinian people in the occupied homeland. The memoranda of the municipalities and of patriotic bodies and personalities are a true expression of this national commitment, and have dealt a mortal blow to the Israeli Zionist projects aimed at impairing the unity of our people.

The Executive Committee of the PLO affirms that the unity and solidarity of our people are the foundation and safeguard of the recovery of our people's national rights and of its achievement of sovereignty and national independence in the territory of Palestine.

The Executive Committee believes that the successive sessions of the United Nations, the

attitude of the various countries and the Soviet-American joint statement provide a clear indication of the urgent need to find a sound political and legal basis for dealing with the Middle East crisis, with due regard to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to participate from the start on an equal footing with all parties concerned.

In light of the facts of the present situation and of probable developments, the Executive Committee will make extensive Arab and international contacts with a view to putting forward the official Palestinian position, achieving Arab solidarity based on the resolutions of the Arab summit, and ensuring that all allied and friendly forces support the just rights of the Palestinians and the Arabs.

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### **Press interview statements by President Bakr of Iraq discussing the outcome of the eleventh national conference of the Baath Party and the party's position on the Middle East crisis<sup>124</sup>**

**Late October, 1977**

*Q. Could you give us an idea of the most important resolutions adopted by the conference [the eleventh national conference of the Baath Party]?*

A. The conference dealt with two major aspects—the last stage and the coming stage. Probably the most important of its resolutions as regards the first aspect was the precise scientific analysis of the most important events and developments in the last stage. This is important, because it eliminates confusion, unites viewpoints and enables those engaged in the struggle to draw profitable conclusions. As regards the coming stage, probably the most important of the conference's resolutions were the following:

—Unremitting efforts to build the progressive Arab front.

—The confrontation of manifestations of deterioration and collapse in the current Arab position.

<sup>122</sup> Doc. 160 above.

<sup>123</sup> Doc. 164 above.

<sup>124</sup> Interview granted to *al-Watan al-Arabi* (Paris), excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 28, 1977.

--The stepping up of the struggle against the proposed capitulationist settlements and for unified action in all fields, political, economic and cultural.

—Encouragement of Arab mass action and support for Arab popular organizations.

In expression of the above the conference drew up for the party a revolutionary and realistic strategy which takes into account the experience of the past, current Arab circumstances and the variables of the international situation.

*Q. How did the Conference see the nature of the coming stage?*

A. To be able to define the characteristics of the coming stage we must first turn our attention to the facts of the present situation and define the variables that might arise in the Arab homeland under the influence of, or through contact with, the international centers of power. If the Arab struggle has been faced with, and is still faced with, a hostile imperialist and reactionary tide, and widescale attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and to rearrange the situation in the Arab area in conformity with the schemes and interests of imperialism and reaction, we must assume that the coming stage will be characterized by the expansion and escalation of the struggle between the Arab revolutionary movement and the colonialist-Zionist alliance. We must adopt new and effective methods that are fully commensurate with the scale and gravity of the challenges. We must also, in a rigorously objective and scientific manner, take advantage of every opportunity offered for breaking the blockade it is desired to impose on the Arab revolutionary movement. In light of the above, the coming stage will certainly be characterized by intensified activity in all fields, ideological, political and economic, by wide-scale mass struggle and by a serious rising to the level of fateful and historic responsibilities with the aim of tipping the balance of the struggle in favour of the Arab revolutionary movement.

*Q. Did the national conference adopt a new attitude as regards the projects for a settlement?*

A. The party's attitude to a settlement is based on inflexible principles which have been given expression on every possible occasion. In this it has been in harmony with the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict did not begin on June 5, 1967 but with the start of the Zionist usurpation of

Palestine, so that the settlement program is bound to lead to recognition of the old usurpation in return for the relinquishment of the new. The attitude is incompatible with national rights and with the logic of Arab struggle. In the last few years experience has proven the falseness of claims that it is possible to reach a settlement that does not gravely prejudice Arab rights and the future of the Arab nation. To talk of a settlement that does not involve substantial and humiliating concessions is no longer convincing from the practical point of view. And the settlement that is now being put forward, and which most of the parties concerned are heading for, involves grave neglect of Arab rights; it amounts to yielding to US and Zionist strategy and a humiliating surrender in the face of Zionist ambitions. In the light of this, the struggle against the proposed settlements is no longer a matter of individual judgement but an expression of a national duty. All these developments have given practical illustration to what the party and the revolution in Iraq have been warning against—that to accept any concession, on whatever justification, will lead to a second concession and then a third and so on, until the Arab nation is brought to its knees before the colonialist-Zionist alliance. Events support our point of view and our position.

*Q. Is there a possibility of providing what is needed to revive the eastern front?*

A. The Iraqi army is always ready to fight the battle of liberation—this requires no affirmation or proof, for our army is the army of Arabism and the issues related to the destiny of Arabism. But we cannot permit the Iraqi army to be used as a pawn in the settlement manoeuvres.

When any Arab party really wants to fight the battle of liberation and embarks on the struggle to meet its requirements, it will find the Iraqi army at its side, ever prepared. This is what happened in the October fighting.

**Press interview statements by Shaikh Zayid of the United Arab Emirates deploring Arab disunity and discussing the use of oil as a political weapon<sup>125</sup>**

Abu Dhabi, November 2, 1977

*Q. Some people think that the American situation is worse than it was three months ago and that the reason for this is Zionist pressure.*

*A.* The Arab situation is the worst. Israel is establishing settlements and the Arabs are waiting for peace. The policy of America or of any other country is like a pair of scales—it cannot be balanced unless the weight on either side is equal. But what is Arab pressure? If the Arabs were united the situation would be different. But the Arabs have demolished the wall that protected them with their own hands, and the wolves have made their way in. One hand cannot clap. We have always said that Arab solidarity is essential; I have spoken in the press and at meetings of the kings and heads of State and sent messages expressing our beliefs and our most heartfelt sentiments. I believe that the Arabs will never be strong, and their friends will never stand by them, unless they unite and join forces, because that is the group that can punish and reward. But what is happening is that the others confront us and defy us as a group, while we confront them as individuals without defying them, so that we can do nothing to influence their attitudes; for if I do not deal with them they deal with others and dispense with me.

Without Arab solidarity and cohesion we shall never be able to stand up to our enemies, and our friends will never respect us.

*Q. You seem to be talking about the oil question and the question of its use as a weapon?*

*A.* In the October War I rejected a proposal for reducing production, as that would have meant penalizing all parties, whereas a distinction had to be made between those who supported the enemy and those who did not. I therefore proposed a total embargo on oil supplies to the countries that supported the enemy and assistance to those who opposed the aggression, while nothing

should be done to injure those who adopted a neutral position—they should be given the chance to get to know our area and our real situation and to understand Arab rights. As for those who support the unjust aggressor who is occupying my land and killing my people—it is my right and my duty to defend myself with all available weapons. This is what both the large and small countries do, as does every free man, indeed, every sensible person.

We have not forgotten the stand of those who support our cause, nor should we forget it. I have spoken at length with the Arab kings and heads of state about strengthening Arab-European relations and helping the European countries that offer us the hand of friendship. I have called for more extensive dealings with them, and we shall always be in favour of strengthening these relations. There is affection and understanding between certain European countries and the Arabs, but these sentiments need actions if they are to increase and grow.

*Q. What about the statements on protecting oil?*

*A.* Protecting it against whom? And who is to protect it? We are not threatening anyone, and the only danger to oil comes from support for that state that is threatening the security and safety of the area. Is oil to be protected by supporting the aggressor and threatening the victims of aggression? Is it not easier and more sensible to deprive the aggressor of support? Then there will be no danger threatening oil and there will be no need for a foreign country to talk about its protection. It makes no sense for someone to offer to protect me from the danger of those he is supporting, and thereby encouraging them to commit aggression. But if what is meant is an external danger, there is no hurry. Let them wait until we ask for their protection. As the Arabic proverb says: "He who is not summoned does not answer".

All the dangers and problems that threaten the area and have repercussions throughout the world, derive from one source—the injustice and aggression that have befallen the people of the area. Those who have interests here, or who believe that their countries and people will be affected by what happens here, should make the strongest and sincerest effort to eliminate the root of the problem.

<sup>125</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hawadith* (Beirut), November 4, 1977, p. 28.



**Speech by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi praising the USSR for its support for the Palestinian cause (excerpts)<sup>126</sup>**

Moscow, November 4, 1977

The USSR has always been the friend and supporter of the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples in their unceasing struggle against Israeli aggression and Zionism, for the liberation of the Arab territories, and for our people's recovery of its national rights to return, to decide its own destiny, and to establish its independent Palestinian state. This was made clear by the decisive historical position stated in the speech of Secretary General Comrade Leonid Brezhnev and by the resolution on the Palestine problem and the Middle East crisis adopted by the Soviet Communist Party at its 25th Congress last year.<sup>127</sup> This resolution affirmed the USSR's support for the Arab peoples in their struggle against colonialism, occupation and aggression. It also warned of the dangers that will continue to exist as long as the Palestinian Arab people is deprived of its legitimate rights and of its right to establish its national state. It further mentioned the strength of the Palestinian-Soviet relations and the depth of the friendly links between them, which leads us to hope for further support and backing for the cause of our people and its national rights.

Comrades,

This unshakeable Soviet support for the struggle of our people, which has grown stronger in many fields, provides all struggling peoples in Asia and Africa and the countries of the Third World, with the assurance that they will be able to continue their struggle until such times as the world will enjoy firmly established peace based on justice, right and equality. In this context we salute the victories of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau.

We firmly support the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe who are struggling for their freedom and national independence and to

put an end to racial discrimination.

Comrades, your support for us in the international field has been fruitful and unambiguous, the most recent example being the Soviet-American statement on the Middle East crisis<sup>128</sup> issued after Comrade Andrei Gromyko's meeting with the American President Carter at the beginning of October.

We regard this statement, which affirms our legitimate rights, and the right of the Palestinian people to participate in the peace efforts on an equal footing with the other parties, as a clear indication of the effectiveness of the Soviet attitude and a step forward in the American attitude, and yet another example of the aid and backing your people and your party provide to the struggle of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

Comrades;

Through its mass struggle and its armed revolution inside and outside the occupied territory, our people has made an effective contribution to the international efforts to eliminate the hotbed of war and aggression in the Middle East area in accordance with the principles established by the United Nations Charter.

But these unceasing international efforts have come into collision with Israeli intransigence and arrogance and Israel's desire for expansion and aggression. This desire is embodied in the establishment of new Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, the enforcement of arbitrary laws and the escalation of the campaigns of persecution, repression and eviction directed against our people in the occupied territories. Nor has the Palestinian people been the only victim of this repression and persecution; progressive and democratic Jewish forces have also suffered from them.

American hesitancy and vacillation, as manifested in the attitude America has adopted since the issuing of the Soviet-American statement, have aided and abetted Israel's arrogance and intransigence, thereby increasing tension and the possibility of a new war in the Middle East area.

<sup>126</sup> Delivered during the celebrations of the anniversary of the October Revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 5, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>127</sup> Doc. 57 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>128</sup> Doc. 160 above.

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**Speech by President Sadat of Egypt stating his willingness to go to Israel to negotiate directly with Israeli officials (excerpts)<sup>129</sup>**

Cairo, November 9, 1977

Allow me to stop here for a moment, to talk to you, to our people and our nation about the latest developments relating to the [Geneva] conference, since it is being proposed in the Arab and international spheres, not as an aim in itself but as a means that can lead to the achievement of our objective. If we succeed in utilizing our resources and strength in order to place Israel before a decisive choice between a peace based on justice and legitimacy and a confrontation of unknown proportions or consequences, then for that confrontation the Arab nation must mobilize its entire material and moral resources. You are well aware of the series of efforts that have been made in recent months with the aim of convening the conference as soon as possible, specifically before the end of this year, provided it is well prepared for in advance in a manner that would ensure the success of the objective for which it is to be held. Such a preparation would lead us to arrive at a peaceful, just and comprehensive settlement within a reasonable period of time and would prevent the conference from turning into a forum for rhetoric or an arena for verbal tournaments, an exchange of accusations, and policies formulated with an eye to propaganda.

To be fair, I must mention that the United States has undertaken a large proportion of these peace efforts and that President Carter has devoted a great deal of his time and effort to this problem, to which he has assigned a level of priority higher than that of many other problems he is facing both at home and abroad. We greatly appreciate this gesture on his part because it is a reflection of a perspicacious vision of the nature of this conflict and of its regional and international consequences which will have world-wide reverberations if it is allowed to continue. In addition, there is the special responsibility borne by the

United States with respect to this very conflict, in view of what it has offered and is still offering to Israel by way of military, political, economic and diplomatic aid. Perhaps President Carter's greatest achievement in this regard is his understanding of the problem of the Palestinian people, for this is the problem which Israel, by resorting to fallacious propaganda and to her well-known position of power inside American society, has been able to cover up or to distort for the last quarter of a century. Suddenly, President Carter is able, in the space of a few months, to lift the veil from the eyes of the American people and to place the Palestine problem in its proper context. This applies equally to the political dimension of that problem, which relates to the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination and to establish its own state on its own soil and in its homeland, as well as to the humanitarian dimension, which has to do with removing the injustice done to more than a million Palestinians who have been forced to live in exile outside their country and their homes. Perhaps the United States' position regarding the Palestine problem as it is being crystallized and expressed by Carter needs further elaboration and refinement in order to rid it of the faults which from our point of view still persist in it. But the fact of the matter is that this position represents the first serious attempt to rectify the course of US policy and to make it rest upon clear principles which can be easily understood, dealt with and predicted as regards its future. We all know that last September 29, the United States, after intensive consultations with the various parties which began last February and ended in Washington in the last week of September, submitted a brief working paper dealing with the procedural aspects of a reconvened Geneva conference and allowing for the participation of legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people in the conference on a footing of equality with the other parties. In that sense, that paper was the first official definition of the new American attitudes towards the Palestine problem. On October 5, the United States once again formulated a new paper<sup>130</sup> under the influence of a feverish Israeli campaign in which Israel used all her visible and invisible weapons on the American scene. Israel flexed her muscles shamelessly and

<sup>129</sup> Speech made before the People's Assembly of Egypt. Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 10, 1977.

<sup>130</sup> Doc. 164 above.

unequivocally against President Carter and his aides with the object of forcing them to return to a policy of absolute support for Israel, right or wrong, as Johnson had once done, and of not taking a single step out of line with Israeli policy. In these circumstances it was natural that we would have our own remarks and reservations on such a paper. Accordingly, when we were informed of its contents on October 14, we did not hesitate to point out to the American side our remarks and reservations about it, doing so in all frankness, faithfulness and loyalty to our national objective, from which we do not deviate an inch, and in loyalty to the sons of this nation and to the spirits of its noble martyrs. In the meanwhile, a Soviet-American joint communiqué<sup>131</sup> was issued at the beginning of October. This communiqué dealt with the objective aspects of a peaceful settlement. Naturally, we do not view these communiqués as if they were divine revelations; rather we place them in their proper context, and we emphasize the point on which the views and interests of these two superpowers meet. For these two occupy a special status on the international level by virtue of their political, economic and military influence; but in this last quarter of the twentieth century, they cannot force their will upon anyone.

In any event, we consider that it is a positive sign that the two superpowers should direct their attention to the Middle East problem and consider it to be an urgent and pressing problem that should be given top priority over everything else. As a result of all these contacts and steps, the road to Geneva lay open, based upon new principles that, of necessity, differ from the Israeli conceptions. We felt that there was reason to believe that the most important and indispensable elements for the proper convening of the conference and for the correct course it was to follow had been fulfilled. I refer specifically to the two principal points: The first is the representation of the Palestinian people in a free and genuine manner whereby Israel would be prevented from having any say or power in the matter; secondly, the discussion of the Palestinian problem in its political and human aspects within the proper context and free from all mists and obscurity.

Now that the road to the conference had become open to a great extent, it remained for us to prepare for it adequately, seriously and with every feeling

of responsibility, regarding it not as the end of the road—for it is not that—but rather as a historic opportunity to force Israel to abandon the occupied territories as well as her expansionist dreams, and to forsake her opposition to the right of the Palestinian people to live in dignity in their own country like other peoples and nations, or else to reveal her true face for all the world to see and hear.

I am concerned to place before you and before the Arab nation, as we approach this critical stage, the broad outlines of policy that guide our quest for liberation. First, we are not afraid of any type of confrontation with Israel, for we have put her in her proper place, no longer exaggerating her role so as to raise her to the status of a great power that can say: So be it, and it is—nor underestimating her to the point of believing that she is a puny, powerless entity. Israel, after the glorious October war, merely shrunk to her true size, and we can now see her as an entity that can be put in its proper place and whose aggression can be deterred. No matter how powerful Israel may be beyond her own borders, and no matter how extensive are the networks that work for her and obey her directives on the international level, we too have the elements and strength that can surpass anything that Israel might mobilize in any confrontation. We have our own heritage of culture and of struggle which would allow us to stand fast, militarily, politically and psychologically. We have enough information about our adversary and his methods to ensure us to overcome him in any sphere. Over and above all this, we have our free will that is capable of protecting our interests and of distinguishing between what we can accept and what we must refuse. We accept what we accept and reject what we reject from the standpoint of our view of our objective and our persistence to achieve it, not under the pressure of fear, lack of confidence or uncertainty. Furthermore, in adopting one policy or another, we draw inspiration only from our eternal values, our deep-rooted heritage and our national dignity. Secondly, in all our moves, we are concerned with providing the Arab nation with its most potent weapon, namely, genuine Arab solidarity. For this is the expression of faith in the unity of goals, of destiny, of interests and of a strategic line, irrespective of individual judgements and of the circumstances that each of us thinks will lead to our objective.

<sup>131</sup> Doc. 160 above.

In this context, brothers and sisters, I am pleased to inform you that during my trip to Rumania, Iran and Saudi Arabia, my object also was co-ordination. I have received, and we are all happy to have with us here, a dear brother and a wonderful colleague in the struggle, our brother Yasir Arafat, who is sitting here with us. In Saudi Arabia, there was complete coordination with brother Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Our meeting continued today. Immediately before I came here, I received a phone call from brother Hafiz Asad and we agreed that I would visit him as soon as I have carried out some urgent tasks so that we can discuss the question of coordination and of Arab commitment in its clearest form. On the Arab scene, there is at present a preoccupation with a summit conference. As I said, Egypt has no objection. Egypt welcomes Arab meetings, and Arab solidarity and our Arab brothers. But I fear that it is premature to hold such a meeting at this time. By this I mean that at the last Arab summit conference in Rabat,<sup>132</sup> we reached agreement. There followed the Cairo conference<sup>133</sup> which resulted in an enduring Arab strategy embodying two principles: First, the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and secondly, the non-negotiability of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the creation of its own state, and that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. I am afraid that if some were to call for the convening of a summit conference, there would be nothing new, because, as I have just told you, we are now preparing for Geneva. Nothing new has happened and our commitment to Arab strategy stands. In any case, if the Arab brothers want to convene a summit conference, Egypt would have no objection at all. Egypt, in fact, will always be proud that the very first Arab summit was held on its soil, and that it is ready, any time, anywhere, to work for Arab solidarity and Arab brotherhood.

If Arab solidarity is necessary and required of all the sons of the Arab nation, it is an even more binding obligation upon those who bear a direct responsibility in the confrontation with Israel.

Therefore, we spare no effort in order to co-ordinate with our partners on the confrontation lines, and we exchange opinions and advice regarding every matter that has any bearing, either positively or negatively, on the cause. This will always be our policy. I have already mentioned my meeting with brother Yasir Arafat today, whom we are happy to have with us at present, and also my telephone conversation with President Hafiz Asad. Two days ago, I met with my brother King Hussain here for purposes of coordination and to work to unify the Arab position in particular. We agreed that we would go to Geneva in one united Arab delegation, and that we must co-ordinate its policies. Thirdly, in every step we take or move, we must concentrate on substance and not be diverted by concern with formalities or remain immobilized by some static policy that has no bearing on the core of the problem or the end result of the conflict. And if history is the best teacher, its pages would inform us that the true revolutionaries are those who clearly specify their objective and pursue it despite all sacrifices, not stopping at form and not diverting their attention from the core of the problem for which they are struggling by pursuit of external formalities or formulas that are irrelevant to the issue at hand. This phenomenon is more likely to occur wherever the cause is a just one, for in such a case it would be best not to be deadlocked by outward forms or waste time and effort in useless debate about it. Accordingly, we have taken it upon ourselves not to stop more than is necessary at matters that have to do with procedure or form, and to prevent Israel from achieving its purpose by refusing to play her game and by imposing upon her a total confrontation which penetrates directly to the heart of the matter so that discussion can, almost at once, proceed to the core of the conflict and its basic causes: Israel's occupation of Arab territories and the violation of the rights of the people of Palestine. We must pursue all this relentlessly. No one will then ask us or impose upon us what we do not view as of service to our total objective because, in defining that objective, we were neither excessive nor aggressive. Rather, everyone agrees that we adhered to international legitimacy, the rule of law and what civilized nations have adopted as a criterion to distinguish between right and wrong, truth and falsehood.

<sup>132</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974* and Appendix A below.

<sup>133</sup> See doc. 314 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

You have just heard me state that we do not care at all for procedural measures. I will tell you this in all frankness, to you, the Arab nation and the whole world. We are ready to go to Geneva and to sit together for the sake of peace, irrespective of all these procedural problems that Israel uses as a cover-up, so as to waste this opportunity or to annoy us to the point that we say "no" as we used to do in the past. Israel would then tell the world that she was the true advocate of peace. This will never be. I agree to any matter that has to do with procedure. Why? Because, in the end, when we go to Geneva, Israel will not be able to prevent me from holding on to the Arab territory occupied in 1967. Neither Israel nor any other power can prevent me from demanding our legitimate rights, the right of self-determination and the right of the Palestinians to establish their state. This is what Israel wants to avoid by attempting to play around with procedural questions, adding a word here and subtracting a word there, or issuing a cabinet statement in which they try to provoke the Arab nation as they used to do in the past. People would break down and some would be paralyzed. So we go out and declare that we do not want to go to Geneva. No, this will never happen. As I stand before you, before our people and the Arab nation, I tell you that I do not care at all for procedural issues, no matter how agitated or hysterical Israel might become. I am going to Geneva, and as I told you, neither Israel nor all the powers of the world can deflect me from what I want: the Arab territories of 1967, the rights of the people of Palestine and their right to establish their state. As long as this is my conviction, it is Israel that truly fears Geneva. No Arab should fear Geneva at all. Why? Because, as I told you, we exported our fragmentation, our fears, our attitude of defeatism, our suspicion and mistrust, all our problems to Israeli society. Why then should we bring all this back upon ourselves again? Never. I am ready to go to Geneva. In fact, I do not hide this from you, who are the people's representatives and I say this for our people and for the Arab nation to hear. You have heard me say that I am ready to go to the ends of the earth, if this means that any of my officers or men can be spared even a wound, let alone death. I truly say that I am prepared to go to the ends of the earth. Israel will be astonished

when they hear me say now, that I am ready to go to their very home, to the Knesset itself, and discuss matters with them.

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**Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Butros of Lebanon discussing the situation in South Lebanon and the Lebanese crisis as a whole<sup>134</sup>**

Mid-November, 1977

*Q. The large number of parties involved in the problem of the South and the intricacy of the factors that lie behind it, make it a problem too big for us to solve, and to do so may require a considerable time. What is the role of the Lebanese government vis-à-vis this situation at the present stage?*

A. The problem of the South really has got beyond us. It is a miniature version of the problem of Lebanon, and of course has many diverse aspects and ramifications, none of which can be ignored. Of course the fact that it is not restricted to Lebanon does not make it any easier to solve. But past experience does not encourage us to place the problem of the South in the hands of regional or international bodies, and to abandon our present method of solving it through cooperation with friends and brothers. For, in the light of our experience to date, the reference of a problem of this kind to such bodies has never led to positive results. The day may come when there is nothing for us to do but to follow just such a course, but we hope that we can prevent such a day arriving when we have to face up to such a possibility, for although our efforts have run into many and varied difficulties and complications, in spite of everything they have not so far reached deadlock.

*Q. There have been intensive Lebanese diplomatic contacts with the American ambassador, and just recently it has been observed that contacts have been made with the ambassador of the USSR. Was this development the result of a Lebanese or a Soviet diplomatic move?*

<sup>134</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Usbu' al-Arabi* (Beirut), 950 (November 14, 1977), p. 9.

A. The role of the USSR has always existed—it has not now come suddenly into the picture as your question suggests. It is a permanent factor as regards current problems. If open diplomatic contact with the USSR has become more conspicuous recently, this is because of passing circumstances. What is more, the Soviet ambassador was absent from his post on leave for more than two months. In trying to solve the problem of the South we shall not hesitate to refer to all quarters capable of playing a role and contributing to the success of the measures taken. There are countries that are certainly capable of helping us. We have asked them, and we shall continue to ask them, to employ their capabilities to help us in the course we are following.

*Q. In view of the difficulties, problems and pitfalls inherent in the situation in the South, which will doubtless demand a great deal of concentration, contacts, attention, time and so on, some people feel that we shall have to live with this problem until a solution becomes possible, as we must not neglect the other domestic problems that directly affect the daily life of the citizen, and whose solution must accompany the progress towards security that has been achieved in the rest of the country.*

A. It seems that we are destined at this stage of our history to spend most of our time insulating one problem from another. Every day we require insulators! We wanted, and we shall go on trying, to insulate the South from the Middle East problem, and now we find that we have to insulate national détente from the South! I can understand why people should be asking if we have to wait until the problem of the South is concluded before the Lebanese talk to each other and sit down together and agree to deal with the problem together. And if the problem of the South goes on for a long time, does everything have to come to a halt until a solution for it is found?

I have often asked this question myself, and my colleagues in the government are doing the same. The problem of the South is indeed huge, and whether we like it or not, it has repercussions on the domestic situation in Lebanon. But in spite of this, I believe that when it is clear to us that the problem of the South can be solved within a reasonable time, or that the solution must be postponed for reasons and circumstances I need not go into now, then we must turn our attention

to the problems of national harmony.

It is not an easy matter, because some Lebanese, who have suffered from the experiences they passed through, believe that the massive and undisciplined armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon, or parts of Lebanon, constitutes an element of pressure that impedes national détente or upsets the balance that is necessary if détente is to be reached. I understand this theory very well. But I believe that we should all of us transcend such considerations. For when the problem of the South takes definite shape so that it is possible to say whether or not an early solution of it is possible, we shall have to turn our attention to political détente. But for progress to be made, there is an essential condition. It is that we should face the problem in a realistic, courageous and frank spirit, and no party must try to exploit either the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, or the bloody incidents that have taken place here, to serve their own purposes or to take a stand on national détente. On the contrary, we must all bear in mind our national interests and everything that will safeguard them in the long run, or at least in the medium run.

*Q. There has been an uproar about the possibility of a security agreement with Syria. What is the truth?*

A. This has been going on for some weeks and months. Our Syrian brothers are here in Lebanon in the Arab Deterrent Forces, of which their army forms the overwhelming majority. This requires that there should be normal coordination between us in many fields. To those who are talking about a security agreement and other things, I would like to put the question: what do they mean by a security agreement? When they tell me what they mean, I shall know why they are raising this point. We and Syria have a long common history, and a long history of mutual dealings and coordination in many fields.

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**Telegram from King Hassan of Morocco to Arab League General-Secretary Mahmoud Riad concerning the visit to Israel by President Sadat of Egypt<sup>135</sup>**

Rabat, mid-November, 1977

May peace and the mercy of God be with you.

We have received your message expressing anxiety over the disunity of the Arab line and the danger of grave dissension within the Arab nation if the situation is not immediately rectified. Because of our sentiments and public policies, well-known to you, you have requested us to spare no effort to heal the rift in the Arab nation, and restore its unity. The grave circumstances through which we are passing do not allow for differences and dissension. They require from all of us greater sacrifice and self-discipline, and the restoration of Arab solidarity which alone allows us to confront the fateful battle we are now waging.

We take pleasure in noting, and at the same time informing you, that your feelings [on this matter] coincided with our own. Shortly before your message reached us, we had decided to undertake an initiative in this direction by sending emissaries to all our brethren and presidents of the Arab countries, whether taking part in the Tripoli conference or not.

The aim of this initiative is to inform the leaders of Arab countries of our point of view regarding the current situation and to express to them the fears which recent events have aroused in us. In particular, we would point out to them the danger of hasty decisions on policy. The resulting policies will certainly create only obstacles and failures for a long time to come, as regards the opportunity today available to the Arab nation to regain its freedom, dignity and total sovereignty.

Our hope is to see the harmony and concord which once characterized the Arab nation and were a source of our strength, replace conflict and violent statements. Such statements, on the whole, proceed from erroneous theories, are always characterized by violence and lead inevitably to

differences and divisions. Our hope remains great that we shall witness the achievement of our goals, for we believe that these hopes are based on sound and objective foundations, ignored only by saboteurs who have lost their moral vision. Arabs have consistently agreed on the necessity of seeking a settlement for the Middle East question through negotiations.

The conditions for a settlement were unanimously defined by all Arab leaders at the summit conference held in Rabat in 1974.<sup>136</sup> The essence of this definition is that a just and permanent peace must come about through the liberation of all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and that such peace cannot be achieved without negotiations in which all concerned Arab countries and forces take part. Although these conditions go beyond Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, they are taken into account by all countries of the world, and seen by the world conscience as the minimum necessary to guarantee peace and stability in the area.

In this context, we see it as our duty to tell you frankly that we have given our blessing to the initiative of our brother President Muhammad Anwar Sadat. Although this is a unilateral measure on his part, he has nevertheless remained faithful to the previous condition, in particular his frank commitment not to conclude any unilateral peace.

The opportunity offered today to the Arab world is unique. It could crown its continued struggle for liberation. History will no doubt judge severely the hasty policies that hinder this opportunity.

Please accept, Your Excellency, our appreciation and respect.

<sup>135</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anba'* (Rabat), November 14, 1977. The telegram was sent in response to a telegram sent to King Hassan by Mahmoud Riad in which he proposed "immediate efforts to regain Arab solidarity." (*al-Anba'*, November 14, 1977).

<sup>136</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

**Press interview statements by King Hassan of Morocco calling for peace with Israel and emphasizing that recognition of the PLO will discourage extremism in the Middle East (excerpts)<sup>137</sup>**

Rabat, mid-November, 1977

*Q. Morocco is not directly involved in the Middle East conflict. But you have often stated that you are very concerned about a final settlement for this conflict and that the establishment of clear and constructive relations between Israel and the Arab world occupies a great deal of your attention. What, in your view, are the most salient points of disagreement which impede the road to peace?*

*A. I believe that our point of departure should be the following. Contrary to what the Arabs believed in 1948, we are today facing a situation which cannot be denied, namely, that it is impossible to drive Israel into the sea. Therefore, a new historical formula should be established. An attempt at coexistence must also be made because the present state of affairs poses a continuing threat to world peace.*

There are three problems. First, the sort of peace to be achieved. Peace is not simply a formality. It is an atmosphere characterized by good neighbourliness. In case peace and good neighbourliness come into being between Israel and neighbouring Arab states, certainly there must be a period of time to allow for the dissipation of the effects of thirty years of hatred and aggression. Time must also be found for trust to arise or at least to create a sort of stability between Israel and its neighbours. But this cannot be achieved unless the first two conditions are satisfied, i.e. that Israel must withdraw from all occupied Arab territories. It is obvious that no Arab would wish to discuss the question of peace with Israel or even the question of relations of neighbourliness so long as his land remains under occupation.

*Q. But then the problems of security which would limit such a withdrawal would be raised?*

*A. In my view, the problems of security are not the most pressing ones in this regard. Israel must come to realize that illegal occupation cannot be an ultimate solution. On the other hand, the issue of security is a different one where Syria, Jordan and Egypt are concerned. From the geographical point of view, the problems of Israel's security are different as regards the three states.*

*Q. What about the West Bank of the Jordan?*

*A. Here we find ourselves confronting the third condition which makes it possible to search for a settlement for the Palestine problem. Up to the present moment, everyone has been concerned with formalities, be it the Israelis, the Americans or the Russians. In my view, the problem is entirely an Arab one. It is we Arabs who have the responsibility to find a homeland and a nation for the Palestinians. It is we Arabs too who must place the Palestinians in the framework of the geo-political map, under the umbrella of a permanent and common security, a security between Israel on the one hand and the Arab states on the other. But I affirm once again that the Palestinian problem is an Arab one.*

*Q. It appears that we have a vicious circle here. Do you not believe that when the PLO takes increasingly hostile attitudes towards Israel, this does not help in winning recognition for itself, nor does it encourage Israel to accept it as a negotiator?*

*A. You and I both lived the history of the past fifteen years, during which we heard three slogans: the first was that Muhammad Bin Yusuf, that is my late lamented father, would not return to his throne. The second was that France would not negotiate with the Algerian National Liberation Front. The third was that the United States would not negotiate with the Vietnamese. History has given the lie to all three slogans. The same applies to the PLO. We are wasting time. Everyone says the PLO will not be negotiated with but this will inevitably take place. In my view, the more time we waste, the more intransigent the PLO will become, and so its enemies will be furnished with weapons against it. I maintain that the PLO is more moderate than other organizations. Let us give it responsibility and let us recognize its representational character. The more*

<sup>137</sup> Interview published in *France-Soir* (Paris). Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Al-Anba'* (Rabat), November 19, 20 and 21, 1977.



we delay in this, the more powerful will become its extremist leftist wing, which receives a lot of money from the Arab states. Therefore, I believe it would be best to deal with the negotiator whom all Arab countries recognize, as well as the Arab League, in an official manner. The PLO has participated in all the Arab summits held up to the present, and thus one must deal with it and recognize some of its responsibilities in order to make it more realistic, for it is impossible to ignore the PLO and the people it represents.

*Q. So in your view, the PLO represents the more moderate wing?*

A. Yes.

. . . . .

*Q. You would like the other side to have unreserved trust then, because Israel would be expected to agree to have the Palestinians established along its borders before the Palestinians agree to any step?*

A. But why are the moderate Arab states, and God knows there are many—while the immoderate are very few—why are they not asked to guarantee the good behaviour of the PLO? I am certain that if asked, these states will do so.

. . . . .

*Q. Is it possible to assess the extent of your own and of Saudi Arabia's influence upon the PLO?*

A. It is not a question of us two alone, but there is also President Sadat, Tunis, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and Iraq. They have all joined in to try to find a reasonable solution despite the presence of ideological conflicts between Syria and Iraq. These states, which include Morocco, have a moderate influence.

. . . . .

*Q. It seems to me, Your Majesty, that you are arguing that all these tendencies have a great deal in common?*

A. This is what I believe. Not only do I see a unity to all these currents, but I also think that they can make this part of the world, or at least vast portions of it, by their good influence, free from atheism and materialism. This is the conflict at present. Who will be the victor in the battle to build unity on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea? Will it be the spirituality of the nations to whom prophets were sent, from Noah to Muhammad? This to include Jews, Christians and Mus-

lims? Where is materialism? We, the believers, must win this battle. If we remain disunited, we will not win: if we unite, we shall win.

*Q. In other words you condemn Soviet penetration in the area?*

A. Exactly. If we wish to be reasonable, this penetration will lead us to trust each other and not to ask ourselves, should we or should we not recognize the PLO? Because the real threat is graver than this.

*Q. [Regarding the moderate and extremist Arab positions].*

A. As you know, the Arab states usually adopt extremist stands in an individual manner. But I would like to assure you that when they meet at a summit or at the level of foreign ministers, these meetings usually end in a consensus of opinions, even on the part of those who are not in entire agreement. They confine themselves to recording their reservations in the minutes of the meetings. But all resolutions are adopted unanimously. Naturally, every head of state has his own way of looking at things. But at the governmental level, or at the level of foreign ministers, or at the level of heads of state, there is no difference.

*Q. [Regarding King Hussein's giving up the West Bank in favour of the PLO in conformity with the Rabat summit resolutions of 1974, and whether King Hussein bowed to Arab pressures in order to win esteem].*

A. The pressures were indeed very strong and unbearable. But they were of two kinds. I personally applied pressure upon my cousin, whom I consider a close friend. His Arab friends told him frankly that after Black September, and all that took place between him and the Palestinians in 1970, it was not in his interests to represent only a minority of a population whose majority is Palestinian. This, he was told, poses a threat to the regime in Jordan, where there are still people who have never forgotten the events of Black September. We felt that it would be better if the Palestinians were to rule themselves and that this was in his interest too. Let us suppose that King Hussein recovers the West Bank. Do you suppose that the PLO will remain outside that region? It will of course enter it and settle there. Dr. Habash and Hawatmeh will settle there, and before embarking on their secondary conflicts, they will attempt to topple the regime in Jordan.

This is an indubitable fact. They have not forgotten Black September. So I personally pressured my cousin and I believe that this pressure was in the right direction, because it was motivated by a feeling of solidarity. I was not alone in thinking along these lines. For King Faisal, may God rest his soul, Jordan was an essential key. Saudi Arabia at no time permitted any harm to come to Jordan. It was in this direction, which was the correct one, that the Saudis and President Sadat applied pressures upon King Hussein.

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**Interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt declaring that his planned visit to Israel will improve prospects for a Middle East peace settlement and reiterating that the Arab-Israeli conflict is "seventy percent psychological"**<sup>138</sup>

Cairo, November 15, 1977

*Q. [Rep. Wright]: Mr. President, we have come here to express our great interest in the achievements you have made in the effort you are making to resume negotiations, and we wish you success.*

*A.* I take this opportunity to welcome you here and to express to you my people's gratitude for the civilized understanding you have shown and for the aid we have received from you. You have come to this area today at a decisive moment. Since we started together on the peace process immediately after the October War, the impetus of the peace process has sometimes slowed down and sometimes stopped. But, through the efforts of my dear friend President Carter, and also through the efforts of the peace-loving countries, we hope to give renewed impetus to the peace process.

In this connection I must tell you that I have absolute confidence in President Carter. He is a trustworthy man whose word can be respected,

and he presents a true image of the American people.

Let us hope to give new impetus to the peace process and to establish peace in the most dangerous area of the world today. I mean the Middle East, the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. I do not want to deliver a lecture; I want our talk to be a dialogue, and I am ready to answer any questions you put to me.

*Q. [Rep. Wright]: Mr. President, you took a huge step with the framework of your initiative to reach and seek peace, when you declared your readiness to go to the Knesset<sup>139</sup> and talk there to all its members, should you be invited to go there. I have learned that yesterday Mr. Begin expressed the intention of sending you this invitation through the US ambassador in Israel, so that he may forward it to Mr. Eilts, the American ambassador in Egypt, so that he may invite you officially. We shall therefore be interested to learn any reactions to this, and if you will accept this invitation.*

*A.* Yes, I am sure you will have followed the recent steps that have been taken. These steps are aimed at the reconvening of the Geneva conference so that all parties concerned may be able to sit down together and sign a peace treaty that will bring permanent peace in the area. But I have reached the following conclusions. As I have said in my speech to the People's Assembly, when Dr. Kissinger was shuttling between here and Tel Aviv to conclude the second disengagement agreement, I remember that Henry used to come from time to time to change one word or one comma, or something like that. It really was funny. I said that it was not worth the cost of the fuel from Tel Aviv to Alexandria just to change a word here or a comma there. I told him at the time that I was always intent on the goal we were working for so that a word here or there did not matter to me in the least. Eventually I found that, as you know, there was a first American working paper for convening the Geneva conference. Then came the so-called American-Israeli working<sup>140</sup> paper, and the Israeli Cabinet met and discussed it for several hours. I said before that we should not waste time on discussing procedural matters, but go straight to the substance of the whole problem, which was the occupation of Arab territories in 1967, and the solution of the Palestine

<sup>138</sup> Interview conducted by a delegation representing the Democratic Majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. Members of the delegation were: Rep. Blanchard (Mich.), Rep. Quillen (Tenn.), Rep. Waxman (Cal.), and Rep. Wright (Tex.). Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 16, 1977.

<sup>139</sup> Doc. 283 above.

<sup>140</sup> Doc. 164 above.

problem. Very well.... But the discussions started and it was said that the first American paper was better than the second, American-Israeli paper, because of the difference in the wording. But I said that I was prepared to go to Geneva without bothering about little things like that because, as I told you, what I wanted was that we should sit down together and solve the problem by achieving a peace agreement establishing permanent peace in the area.

It seems that, as I have been told—as my friend here says—they are preparing to send an invitation through the American embassy. This is what I proposed to Walter Cronkite. He asked me how this invitation was to reach me yesterday, and what I said was broadcast live—I told him that it seems that they are going to hand over this invitation, as our friend here [Rep. Wright] said, to the American embassy in Tel Aviv which, in turn, will give it to Herman [Eilts] at the American embassy here. When this invitation arrives I shall be ready to go, for we should not waste time agreeing on procedural matters. I want to tell you that this Arab-Israeli conflict consists of 70 percent psychological problems and only 30 percent matters of substance. Therefore let us surmount these psychological problems and devote ourselves to dealing with the substance. For this reason I shall go to them in the Knesset, and if necessary, I shall discuss the matter with the 120 members of the Knesset so that I may give them the essential facts about this area, not from their point of view but from the opposing point of view, after which they will be able to take their decision.

*Q. [Rep. Quillen]: Mr. President, I recall the splendid message you addressed to the joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives when you visited America. I am really happy at this development, but when you go to Geneva do you think that the USSR's participation will create problems?*

*A.* I regard my visit to the Knesset as part of the preparations for Geneva. You have doubtless heard what I said before to the effect that we must not go to Geneva without thorough preparations, for we shall achieve nothing at all if there are not thorough preparations for Geneva. As I told you, we shall keep on sitting and disagree about one problem or another before we deal with the substance of the problem.

I therefore believe that the preparations for Geneva must be complete. It is quite true, as my

friend here said, that my relations with the USSR are somewhat tense, and up to this moment the USSR has been imposing an embargo on me since we started the peace process together in 1973—for nearly four years—to the extent that it has abrogated the old arms agreement with me, and the same applies to spare parts. It has refused to sell me replacements for the arms I lost in the October War, though it has replaced everything Syria lost in the October war, and moreover, three or four arms agreements have been concluded between them. You have done the same thing with Israel, you have replaced all her losses in arms. What is more, you have sent her more advanced armaments. In spite of this my attitude is that I hope that the USSR will not adopt at Geneva a trend similar to that it has adopted in bilateral relations and try to create problems for us. Let me tell you that I am not afraid of the USSR, I am really not afraid of any great power. This is because I feel that I am in the right, and that whatever agreement we succeed in reaching in Geneva, neither the USSR nor any other power will be able to prevent us accepting this agreement, as long as it involves peace based on justice. We shall only agree to what is consistent with our national aspirations and what can lead to the achievement of peace, and the USSR cannot impede or prevent the achievement of a solution.

*Q. [Rep. Wright]: Mr. President, you said that there must be thorough preparations, concentrating on matters of substance, before the Geneva conference is convened. There are two substantive problems:*

*One, the return of the areas occupied by the Israelis, and two the Palestine problem. As regards the Palestine problem, can you see any way of satisfying the Palestinians without establishing an entity on the frontiers of Israel that would be a threat to continued peace and to the security of Israeli territory? In other words, is it possible to find a way by which the aspirations of the Palestinians can be realized without establishing an independent state that would be regarded as a perpetual threat to Israel? It seems to me that this is the crux of the problem—if we can in some way achieve some kind of recognition of the Palestinians in a way which they do not become a danger to Israel, we shall have overcome one of the main problems.*

*A.* Yes, the Palestine problem, which we must solve if we are to achieve peace in the area, has two parts.

The first part is the political aspect which involves

recognition of the Palestinians now as a political movement by the United Nations, and all countries in the world, including President Carter himself, who advises that they should be given a homeland to solve the political aspect of the problem.

The second part is the human aspect, related to the refugees.

As regards the first part, they must have a homeland after 30 years in tents, dispersed here and there. They must have a homeland. The whole world agrees on this, as I told you, and President Carter has expressed the same view also. As regards this I think that we require some understanding from you in the US.

How is this political aspect to be achieved? How to solve this political problem of the Palestinians who constitute the crux of the problem? For the crux of the problem is not Sinai or the Golan Heights—the crux and essence of the problem is the Palestinian question—how can their aspirations be realized without giving them the right to have a state, especially when we have the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which could fulfil their aspirations, occupied by the Israelis in the 1967 war. In this connection I think that Israel has deliberately fostered a misunderstanding. You doubtless heard me when I said that this Palestinian state will have to be linked to Jordan and that this link could take the form, for example, of a confederation, a federation, or even a united Arab state, whatever form is agreed on by the two sides. And it must be announced before we go to Geneva. Let me tell you that the Israeli view that this state could create problems is a misunderstanding that Israel is deliberately trying to foster. How can a Palestinian state that will need the help of us in the Arab world for years and years, constitute a danger to Israel? They are exaggerating. In the last thirty years there have been four wars, three of which were started by Israel against all of us in the Arab world. Can a small state like the Palestinian state be a danger or a threat to Israel? They are exaggerating, because they always want to expand. I do not agree with this view put forward by the Israeli side. If we want to achieve permanent peace in the area, the Palestinians must be given a homeland and the right to self-determination and to have a state. I do not agree at all with what Israel says. They are heavily armed and the Palestinian state that will be established will not be a threat and a

danger to them. On the contrary, with all the arms they have, with the huge arsenal you have sent them, it is they who are a threat to the whole Arab world, not only to the Palestinian state; they are a real threat to us. You will remember that before the October War they said that they were capable of reaching any area in the Arab world, because you had supplied them with Phantoms. I do not agree at all with this misunderstanding that the Israelis are trying to foster with the sole aim of expanding their frontiers. Israel's real security lies in our agreeing to live together in this area, and that is why I am going to the Knesset, to tell them so. It is not a few kilometres in the Golan or Sinai or the West Bank that will create security for them; security can only be created through the will of all of us to live together in this area.

*Q. [Rep. Wright]: Mr. President, I think that if real peace is to mean more than the absence of armed conflict, it must be based on mutual understanding of the concerns of each side. You have expressed a genuine concern in the Arab world that Israel constitutes a threat to other states. Israel really does feel that she is threatened, and I believe that this feeling is genuine too. Would it be possible, in view of the ideas you propounded so eloquently, that in the event of the establishment of a state such as the Palestinian state, there could be a clear declaration by those who rule that country of their commitment to Israel's continuing to exist in peace in return for Israel's recognition of their right to do the same?*

A. This too is another point in the misunderstanding that Israel is trying to foster. When we sit down together around the table at Geneva—all the parties concerned, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians and Israel—when we sit down together around the table in Geneva, is this not recognition on the part of the Palestinians, when we sit down to negotiate a peace agreement and sign it?

What is more, Israel controls the land, and she has a state. She is recognized by the United Nations—140 states—and she is supported by the US—by you, that is to say. She is also supported by the Soviets. The Soviets' attitude to Israel is very clear, and they remind all of us in the Arab world of it. It is that Israel is a fact. That is the Soviets' attitude to Israel. The Israelis have all this—the land, recognition, the US—they have everything—aid from the greatest power in the

world. As for the Palestinians, for 30 years they have been denied even human rights. Not only have they been denied everything, even their human rights have not been respected. You can see what is happening to the refugees—it can be described as a “human tragedy”. If we reach an agreement Israel will be able to get all the guarantees she wants.

*Q. [Rep. Waxman]: I understand that an Arab summit conference is to be held in February as the result of the Tunis meeting. Do you regard this as the last possible date for going to Geneva? Secondly, I understand that you are to meet President Asad of Syria. What do you hope to achieve from this meeting?*

*A.* The Arab summit conference has to meet once a year, as was decided at the Rabat summit conference. This has absolutely nothing to do with a specific date for the Geneva conference—as I said, that is something quite different. As for my meeting with President Asad, it was agreed on before I made my speech. As you know, from time to time there are meetings between the confrontation countries, Syria and Jordan. King Hussein was with me ten days ago, and I recently visited King Khalid in Saudi Arabia. Asad contacted me and we agreed on this visit, before I made my speech and before I announced my initiative. This has nothing at all to do with what you suggested. It is perfectly natural that we should sit down together from time to time and discuss all aspects of the problem.

*Q. [Rep. Waxman]: It is reported that you will not go to Syria unless President Asad changes his attitude to going to Geneva?*

*A.* There is nothing between me and President Asad that could be described as conditions being imposed either by me or by him. We meet as brothers, as partners. I have never at all thought of imposing anything on President Asad, nor does he think of imposing anything on me.

*Q. [Rep. Blanchard]: It seems clear that you will lose a great deal if the negotiations do not go right. This also applies to President Carter. He told us that he has great confidence in you, and feels that you and the Israeli Prime Minister have confidence in him. What are your feelings about President Carter? Do you feel profound confidence in him?*

*A.* I have to tell you frankly that I have full confidence in President Carter. I have confidence in him. But I disagree with you on one point.

I hope that Begin has the same confidence in President Carter as I have. They are now talking of their challenge to the US, because they have received enough arms to enable them to fight for three or six months; it is not like what happened in the last war. I tell you plainly that I have complete confidence in President Carter. He is a man to be trusted, he inspires confidence, a man whose word is to be respected, and I am proud of this personal relationship. I repeat, I hope that Begin feels the same confidence as I do.

*Q. [Rep. Waxman]: As regards your statement of your confidence in President Carter, are you prepared to go to Geneva on the basis of President Carter's proposal—I mean on the basis of the working papers that have been sent to the Arab leaders?*

*A.* You have misunderstood me. I am prepared to go within the framework of any measures, because I do not want to waste time on procedural problems at a time when we have to deal with substantive matters. Therefore I am prepared to go to Geneva, and I have told my Parliament so.

*Q. [Rep. Waxman]: Will you go to Geneva on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 without PLO representation?*

*A.* No, not without PLO representation.

*Q. [Rep. Waxman]: So you are imposing a condition?*

*A.* I hope that you are not just repeating what Begin and the Israelis say. I am not imposing a condition at all. What I say is this: How can we get a permanent peace in Geneva without the Palestinians who are the crux and essence of the problem? How can we get a permanent peace? If the Palestine problem is not solved there will be no peace in the area. The problem is not the occupation of Sinai or the Golan Heights. It was the Palestine problem that started everything 30 years ago. So I am not imposing conditions, and I think that you should not adopt the view of Israel or Mr. Begin.

*Q. [Rep. Waxman]: I am not trying to adopt Israel's view. I am only pointing out that the UN resolution and the Soviet-American statement<sup>141</sup> refer to Palestinian rights and the need for them to be discussed at the conference. It seems to me that there is now a possibility of the conference not being held. Also, will the*

<sup>141</sup> Doc. 160 above.

*PLO be represented or not? Can the parties sit down together in Geneva without complicating the procedural problems that could be discussed within the framework of all the problem, including the Palestine problem?*

A. As I told you, my answer is the same. Are we going to Geneva to conclude a partial agreement, as Dayan says, that is to end the state of war and then postpone all the other problems? I say no, we shall go to Geneva to achieve a peace agreement that will establish permanent peace in the area. Therefore all parties must be represented, including the Palestinians.

Q. [*Rep. Wright*]: *Mr. President, as I understand it, Mr. Begin has declared that he is prepared for the Palestinians to be represented. Would you be satisfied if these representatives formed a part of a unified Arab delegation, instead of being a specific national group—to be more precise—the PLO? Would this change anything, as long as the interests of the Palestinians were represented?*

A. Excellent, excellent. That is a very good way of dealing with the whole problem. Let me tell you frankly, when I visited President Carter in the US last April, I was not in favour of the idea of a unified Arab delegation, I was opposed to it. We discussed this at length in the White House, but to relieve the tension and to find a way out, I accepted a unified Arab delegation, with the Palestinians included in it. And I agreed with President Carter's viewpoint on this when he sent me a message recently, I accepted a unified Arab delegation. What my friend here says is a good way of dealing with the problem.

Q. [*Rep. Wright*]: *Mr. President, we thank you for this. We thank you for advocating peace, and we hope that your present move will be successful.*

A. Always remember that when you in the United States are resolved to achieve peace, peace will be achieved. As for me, you may rest assured that my initiative was intended to seize this opportunity, which we must not miss. Convey to the American people the profound gratitude of myself and my people. For you have done much. Immediately after the ceasefire you helped us to reopen the Canal to international shipping. This is the real American way, and we shall never forget it. Nor shall we forget the warmth of the feeling we experienced when we visited the US. I hope you will convey this to your people and to my dear friend President Carter.

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**Statement by the National Command of the Baath Party of Iraq condemning the decision made by President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel<sup>142</sup>**

**Baghdad, November 15, 1977**

Mr. Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, has announced in a speech<sup>143</sup> to the Egyptian People's Assembly last week, that he is prepared to go to the occupied territory and enter into a dialogue with the Zionist enemy's leaders.

Diplomatic and informational circles attached to the Egyptian government have represented this announcement as an expression of the Egyptian's regime's serious intention to reach a peaceful settlement and an attempt to expose the Zionist enemy's obstinacy and lack of such serious intentions. Some of them, indeed, have gone so far as to claim that it has placed the enemy in a dilemma.

The National Command of the Baath Party, expressing as it does the conscience of the Arab nation, out of its respect for the long Arab struggle against the usurpations of Zionism, and out of its loyalty to the memory of the tens of thousands of Arab martyrs who have laid down their lives in defence of Arab rights, Arab territory and Arab national honour in the repeated wars and aggressive raids the enemy has carried out against the Arab nation, including Egypt, declares that it considers Sadat's conduct to be a grave deviation that it is impossible to disregard or keep silent about.

Rulers may be entitled to their individual opinions in the political and diplomatic fields, such individual views being subject to examination and scrutiny in every case and in the light of the attendant circumstances. But no ruler has the right to go so far as to impair the very basis of national rights and honour, especially as regards an issue such as that of Palestine, which no Arab ruler has the right to deal with on his own.

The National Command of the Baath Party is amazed that the head of an Arab state should permit himself to announce that he is prepared to go to the occupied Arab territory and enter into

<sup>142</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), November 16, 1977.

<sup>143</sup> Doc. 283 above.

a dialogue there with the usurping occupier. What leader in Arab history, or in human history, has followed such a course or taken such a step?

Even the diplomatic and informational circles attached to the regimes in favour of a peaceful settlement, talk of the enemy's obstinacy and his refusal to obey the resolutions of international bodies, and his rejection of even such formulas for a settlement as involve the gravest concessions on the part of the Arab regimes. The first and most important cause of this lies in this series of concessions the Arab regimes are making to the Zionist enemy and to its patron imperialism, and in their unlimited readiness to submit, stage by stage and step by step, to its pressures and those of US imperialism. Sadat's statements last week are one step closer to the abyss in this mistaken policy that has squandered the achievements of the glorious October war and led to the fragmentation and weakening of the Arab position.

Those who describe these policies as wise, shrewd and flexible are deceiving both the Arab masses and themselves. For the masses know perfectly well that these policies have achieved nothing for the Arab nation and those responsible for them cannot convince the masses that these policies of theirs are right or will achieve even the minimum of the desired goal.

The National Command of the Baath Party warns of the consequences of the continued pursuit of these policies and calls for a radical, frank and comprehensive reappraisal of them, for resolute insistence on legitimate Arab rights and for confrontation of the enemy with the Arabs' effective resources, military, economic and political. In this way alone can we oblige the enemy to submit. The National Command also warns of the consequences of the implementation of President Sadat's announcement. This would be a real national disaster, and the Arab masses and all their principled forces must prevent its taking place.

President Anwar Sadat's announcement is only the expression of a personal position, and by taking this step he is representing only himself. The Arab nation cannot accept this step or any of its possible results. Should such a step be implemented it is the duty of the Arab nation to resist it and to nullify any agreement or concession it may lead to. The Arab nation has the historical right to nullify any step resorted to by the rulers

on their own responsibility and in which they are not expressing the conscience, the rights and the honour of their people. The ruler is entitled to act when he represents the conscience, the rights and the honour of his people; when the opposite is the case he is acting on his own individual responsibility. Arab history, both ancient and modern, and the history of mankind, provide ample evidence of the truth of this.

The Arab nation, whose land has been usurped and tens of thousands of whose sons have been slaughtered by the Zionist usurpers, cannot accept these policies that are being pursued vis-à-vis the Zionist enemy and his occupation of Arab territory. The rulers who pursue these policies in fact represent only themselves and a small group of their supporters which does not have the right to represent the Arab nation and to deal with its fundamental problem.

The Arab masses everywhere and all struggling Arab forces are called on to condemn this announcement and to take action by all available means to prevent its implementation. They are called on to continue the struggle with all their strength and faith to recover their usurped rights and their lost honour.

Such an attitude is no cause for despair. On the contrary, it provides a strong justification and a powerful incentive for the continuation of the struggle so that the Arab nation may be the master of its destiny and be in a position to express its will in a genuine and authentic manner.

Victory to the Arab nation in its intrepid struggle to achieve its just goals!

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**Communiqué issued by the Nationalist Progressive and Unionist Convocation Party of Egypt condemning President Sadat and calling on him to renounce his decision to visit Israel<sup>144</sup>**

Cairo, November 16, 1977

The Political Committee of our party held a meeting at which the secretaries of the permanent committees as well as the Secretary-General were

<sup>144</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), November 25, 1977.

present, in order to study the latest development of the national cause as a result of the sudden announcement<sup>145</sup> by the President of the Republic in which he expressed his readiness and willingness to go to Israel and to meet with the Knesset members in occupied Jerusalem. The messages subsequently exchanged and the arrangements made for this visit were also discussed.

Those who attended this meeting decided to issue the following communiqué stating the party's view in this regard:

I. Our party's attitude to a peaceful solution—as outlined in its manifesto—is not one of rejection on principle. But it believes that such a solution must satisfy certain conditions which may be summarized as the recovery of occupied Arab lands and of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

II. The realization of such a peaceful solution depends essentially upon the build-up of self-sufficient Arab power which can then force Israel to accept these conditions.

III. The visit of the President to Israel, which came as a total surprise to the Egyptian as well as to the Arab people, does not enhance Arab power. Rather, for the following reasons, it weakens the Arab position and offers Israel an opportunity to bolster its own intransigent position.

1. Since the October War, Israel has received unprecedented US military aid. It is now ruled by the Likud, the Zionist group most prejudiced, aggressive and extremist in its pursuit of expansionist Zionist aims, and is led by Menahem Begin, the butcher of the infamous Deir Yassin massacre. Accordingly, at no time has Israel been more obdurate and arrogant towards Arab rights than it is today.

2. This visit takes place at a time when Israel, not content with the intransigent statements made by its leaders and their rejection of all proposals that approach a peaceful solution, including US and Joint US-Soviet proposals, is now reaffirming this policy in practice by its repeated attacks and continued shelling of South Lebanon and its arrogant persistence in Judaizing the West Bank and Jerusalem.

3. In response to the President's desire to unconditionally make this visit, Begin announced prior Israeli conditions for that visit, representing

a clear refusal to withdraw from the West Bank and to allow the creation of a Palestinian state. This response in itself ought to have made the President change his mind about this visit.

4. To go through with this visit to the Knesset in occupied Jerusalem would confer legitimacy upon Israel's claim that Jerusalem is its capital at a time when all states, including Israel's protector the United States, have refused to recognize that claim.

5. This visit, which furthers Israel's aims, namely to impose what it calls normal relations upon the Arab countries before peace is established, may be considered as an Egyptian concession without receiving even the promise of anything in return.

6. Egypt does not need this visit to add new proof of its genuine desire for peace now that the entire international community has come to believe in that desire. This move was met by Israel with greater intransigence, thus obstructing all the efforts being made to convene the Geneva conference. Therefore, this visit will merely increase Israel's bluster, conceit and intransigence.

7. Our conflict with Zionism is a fateful one. It has national, economic and cultural repercussions. It has lasted more than half a century. Tens of thousands of Arab martyrs have fallen and millions have been dispersed. It is not a matter of psychological delusions which can be dissipated by a friendly visit.

8. Ever since its inception, Israel has been seeking some form of recognition. The Arab position, even during its blackest days, had steadfastly refused this recognition. Now comes this visit at the highest level to offer Israel a form of complete recognition on the international level, while obtaining nothing, not even a promise of anything in return.

IV. Our party also believes that this visit will in effect release Israel from its diplomatic isolation. As a consequence, a number of states that had severed their relations with Israel will find no more justification for continuing to withhold these relations, now that the head of the largest Arab state, which is also the principal confrontation state against Israel, has visited Israel. Furthermore, the fact that Egypt has acted alone, as the President told a US Congressional delegation, and without prior consultation with the states that made up the October alliance and the remaining Arab states will probably lead to further fragmentation

<sup>145</sup> Doc. 283 above.



in Arab ranks and will drive Israel into greater obduracy.

Accordingly,

Our party, in issuing this communiqué, registers its objection to this visit which, in its view, can only weaken the unity of the Arab position and aggravate its contradictions. In return, it will lead to greater Israeli arrogance and intransigence. Our party calls upon the President to change his mind about this visit.

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### **Communiqué issued by the National and Regional Commands of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the National and Progressive Front Command and the Syrian government condemning the decision of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel<sup>146</sup>**

**Damascus, November 17, 1977**

Fellow citizens, Arab masses,

Our Arab nation was shocked, as was the world, when a few days ago the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt announced his intention<sup>147</sup> of visiting Israel to meet with the Zionist terrorist Menahem Begin and members of the Israeli Knesset, under the pretext of discussing with the enemy the means to arrive at peace in the region. During the visit of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt to Damascus, he affirmed his intention of responding to the invitation of Begin and of going through with the visit which came as a shock to the Arab nation when he announced it a few days ago. It is clear that in the past fortnight the preparations for the visit have been made.

The Syrian Arab Republic attempted to make the Egyptian President change his mind and did its utmost to convince him to abandon the idea of visiting Israel. The Syrian Arab Republic explained to the Egyptian President the dangers of making such a trip and its great adverse effects on the fateful Arab cause.

Syria stressed that this visit would damage our national struggle and the vast sacrifices offered by our Arab people throughout its long struggle against the Zionist occupation of Arab territory.

Syria further affirmed to President Anwar Sadat, in the course of lengthy arguments held with him during his visit to Damascus, the importance of safeguarding the unity of the Arab cause and the inexcusability of fragmenting it as well as the dangers that may attend any disruption in the Syro-Egyptian accord. This accord has always been a strategic objective of both sister countries and of the Arab nation, and the agreement between Syria and Egypt has always represented the surest guarantee of the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Arab masses.

The Syrian Arab Republic explained to President Sadat the gravity of his trip to Israel as regards the Palestinian cause, the crux of the Arab-Zionist conflict, and the adverse effects of that trip for Egypt itself, its prestige and its Arab and international status together with its repercussions on the balance of power in the Arab conflict against the Zionist enemy.

But these lengthy and comprehensive discussions with President Sadat were to no avail. No agreement was reached in the discussions held between President Asad and President Sadat, due to the insistence of the Egyptian President upon carrying out what he had announced, thus assuming personal responsibility for the consequences of this step before history and before the Arab nation.

Fellow citizens, Arab masses,

The decision taken by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and his insistence upon the visit to Israel is a painful blow against the Arab nation, an act of disobedience against its national will and a disruption of the harmony among its regions. At the same time, this decision does grievous harm to Arab Egypt and to the martyrs whom the noble Egyptian people has offered in its long struggle against the Zionist enemy with its expansionist and racist structure.

The Syrian Arab Republic, saddened and pained by President Sadat's decision, believes that his visit to Israel will provide the Zionist enemy with gains that it has been unable to achieve in the past thirty years in spite of all the aggressive wars it has waged against the Arabs. The Arab nation, which believes that the struggle against Zionist pressure in Palestine is a national liberation struggle, will not forgive any Arab official who takes any step that may encourage aggression, assure its continuation and confer legitimacy upon its occupation of Arab territories.

<sup>146</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), November 18, 1977.

<sup>147</sup> Doc. 283 above.

Fellow citizens,

In the days that followed President Sadat's announcement of his intention to visit Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic, together with all its leadership organizations, has studied this new situation and its developments with the greatest care and concern. In meetings held by the National and Regional Commands of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and the Central Command of the Progressive National Front and by the Council of Ministers of the Syrian Arab Republic, the situation was studied in all its aspects. There was hope that we would convince President Sadat to change his mind, but this hope was dashed by President Sadat during his visit to Damascus and it now appears obvious that his decision to go to Israel is irrevocable.

The Syrian Arab Republic believes that no individual in the Arab homeland, whatever his status, can take any decision regarding fateful national questions that can do harm to the cause as a whole and gives away to the enemy the gains it seeks to attain. Syria also believes that no Arab ruler is justified in taking such a step, for it touches upon the very existence of the Arab nation, its future and its honour.

Motivated by their concern for the unity of the Arab cause and their adherence to national responsibility towards our people and nation, the National and Regional Commands of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the Central Command of the Progressive National Front, the government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and Arab Syria, declare their rejection of the step that President Sadat has decided to take. In Syria's opinion this step constitutes a grave precedent which does incalculable damage to the Arab cause and Arab solidarity.

In confronting this grave situation new to the Arab arena, Arab Syria calls upon all Arabs throughout the great Arab homeland to shoulder their national responsibilities in standing up to the dangers resulting from the trip by an Arab ruler to Israel.

Syria further calls upon its fellow Arabs in the great Arab homeland to strive to foil and circumscribe these imminent dangers and to seek ways and means to restore to the Arab nation its strength, solidarity and national harmony so that it may challenge the schemes of the Zionist enemy aimed at continued occupation of Arab lands and

liquidation of the Arab national cause.

The step that the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt has decided to take requires that our Arab masses reappraise and reassess their position. For we are about to enter an era of great seriousness, an era which demands that we be armed with faith and consciousness, with a firm will for sacrifice against an enemy that does not hide his intention of continuing to occupy Arab lands.

The Syrian Arab Republic has expended many efforts and shown a great deal of flexibility in stressing its concern for Egypt and its national role. Syria believes that President Sadat's decision cannot negate Egypt's national role nor prevent the Arab people of Egypt undertaking its national responsibilities. The will of peoples is always the strongest in confrontation with any ruler or official.

## 291

**Communiqué issued by the People's General Congress of Libya declaring that the decision of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel is a crime against the Arab people and calling on him to reconsider this initiative<sup>148</sup>**

**Tripoli, November 17, 1977**

The People's General Congress suspended its ordinary sessions and met in emergency session to study the recent developments facing the Arab nation, especially President Anwar Sadat's announcement of his intention to visit the occupied homeland<sup>149</sup> and to hold talks with the terrorist Menahem Begin, leader of the Zionist gangs that have perpetrated all the massacres against the Palestinian people, most notably the infamous Deir Yassin massacre. He will also hold talks with the Israeli Knesset gang.

The Egyptian President's announcement came as an unbelievable shock to the entire Arab nation. Once more events have demonstrated that the idea of a visit is in itself a grave matter and a challenge to the pride and sentiments of the Arab nation, and will be registered as an act of shame and an unforgivable crime against past, present and future generations.

<sup>148</sup> Translated from the Arabic text supplied by the Arab Revolution News Agency (Beirut), November 18, 1977.

<sup>149</sup> Doc. 283 above.

Motivated by its consciousness of the historic responsibility shouldered by the Libyan Arab people, the conscience of the Arab nation, and by its desire to save whomever can be saved, the People's General Congress had decided to dispatch a special envoy to President Hafiz Asad of Syria in an attempt to make the Egyptian president change his mind about this grave idea. It has also sent another envoy directly to the Egyptian president to draw his attention to the fact that this act is an insult to the historic position of the Arab nation and to its sacrifices in its long struggle against the Zionists, a squandering of the blood of tens of thousands of martyrs who fell on the sacred battlefield and an affront to the Arab masses. Confronted with the Egyptian president's declared intention to undertake this trip, the People's General Congress, in shouldering its historic responsibilities before the Arab nation, declares:

1. That President Sadat's proposed action is a crime against the entire Arab nation which it can neither forgive nor ignore.

2. That by this action, the Egyptian president represents himself alone, that the Egyptian people and the Arab nation, absolving themselves of him, are not committed to any course of action he takes since no Arab ruler can act arbitrarily as regards the national cause. The Arab masses declare that they dissociate themselves from this act and reject it utterly because it amounts to a crime which the peoples of the Arab nation will not permit anyone to inflict upon it.

3. That the issue between us and the enemy is not one of peace as Sadat states, but of the enemy's occupation of Palestine and its environs. For were we to recognize the enemy's presence on Arab soil, there would be no problem regarding peace. The problem has to do with the enemy's very presence on Arab land.

4. The goal of liberation is a noble goal. The means to attain it must conform honourably with this noble goal. Even were Sadat able, through his trip, to recover for us a free and independent Palestine, the shame that attaches to such a method of liberation is a more weighty matter. We would rather that Palestine remain forever occupied than that this shame should become our destiny. We would rather die on our feet than lick the boots of the usurpers.

5. The Libyan Arab Republic, headed by the

leader of the revolution, our brother Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, has from the beginning and even since 1973, issued warnings against the gravity of taking the path of surrender that the Egyptian president has chosen. It has warned the Arab nation that once the chain of surrender begins, it will never end.

6. The Arab masses are today called upon more than ever before, not merely to define their position but also to take effective steps to restrain this ruler and wipe away that shame. The Arab regimes define their position towards the Egyptian regime. The Arab nation possesses vast resources capable of defeating the enemy and achieving liberation. It is not compelled to follow such an insulting course.

7. The Congress calls for a rejection of this step and for criticism of any agreement or concession that may issue therefrom. The Arab nation is capable of imposing the 3 "No's" of Khartoum<sup>150</sup> and must be better prepared for and more strongly attached to the goal of liberation.

8. In this decisive stage, the People's General Congress declares that it places the entire resources of the Arab Libyan Popular Socialist Republic at the disposal of Syria and the Palestine resistance, which reject surrender. For Syria represents more than ever before the sole pillar of opposition to the enemy. It also represents the pride and steadfastness of the Arab nation and its best hope for liberation. Therefore, the Congress calls upon the Arab masses and states to stand by Syria.

9. The Congress also calls for the creation of an Arab rejection front to pursue the struggle for liberation.

10. The People's General Congress declares that in case the Egyptian president's visit to the occupied homeland takes place, the Arab Libyan Popular and Socialist Republic shall withdraw its recognition of the Egyptian government since it has lost confidence and respect as a legitimate Arab government. Libya will also demand the expulsion of the Egyptian government from the Arab League for having contravened the League's Charter, and the removal of Arab League headquarters from the Egyptian capital forthwith. Libya shall also implement the provisions of the Arab boycott against Egypt.

<sup>150</sup> The Khartoum resolution of September 1, 1967 called for "no recognition, no negotiation, no peace" with Israel. See doc. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

In conclusion, the Congress calls upon the Arab nation to dress its wounds and unite its ranks, confront shame and surrender and stand united on the path of struggle and liberation. Victory and glory to our nation.

## 292

### **Communiqué issued by the Central Committee of Fatah condemning the decision of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel and calling for the active support of the Palestinian people**<sup>151</sup>

Beirut, November 17, 1977

The Central Committee of Fatah held several meetings over the past three days in which it reviewed current developments and events, especially news reports concerning President Sadat's probable visit to the Israeli Knesset.<sup>152</sup>

From its position of responsibility, Fatah wishes to clarify the following points:

I. From its position of struggle as regards the Palestinian and Arab arenas, Fatah rejects this visit which is to be regarded as a serious turn in events and a gain for the schemes of international Zionism and its imperialist allies, headed by the United States.

II. Fatah believes that if President Sadat goes ahead with his planned visit, this will place the Palestinian people and its armed revolution represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization in grave peril at all levels in its confrontation with the Zionist enemy. This enemy grows more obdurate and intransigent and declares openly and consistently that the Palestinian people has no rights, that there can be no independent Palestinian state and no total withdrawal from occupied Arab territories, and prepares for a new genocidal war against our people and our Arab nation.

III. Fatah reaffirms its solid commitment to the principles, resolutions and programmes passed by the sessions of our National Council which it cannot deviate from or abandon under any circumstances or before any historic stage. Rather,

we are faithful to these principles and shall safeguard and protect them under the gravest and most complex circumstances and in the darkest hours.

IV. Fatah, with faith in the historic role of the Egyptian people and its great army, and in their enormous sacrifices for the cause of Palestine and our people, as well as for Arab causes, calls upon President Sadat to refrain from taking this step which damages the interests and struggle of our Arab nation. This call comes from our faith in the importance of Egypt's role in the Arab arena and for the Arab position as a whole, a role which will always affect the future and destiny of our Arab nation.

V. Motivated by its concern for the unity of the Arab position in confronting Zionist aggression, a goal we have struggled and shall continue to struggle to achieve in the diverse Arab and international fields, and for the sake of enhancing, bolstering and fortifying the common Arab position of struggle, Fatah shall take far-reaching steps in the Arab and international arenas, basing itself upon the following principles which stem from our clear, firm and openly-declared policies:

(a) To abide by the resolutions of the Rabat<sup>153</sup> and Algiers<sup>154</sup> summit conferences which have provided a base for this stage of Arab and international action, in order to confront Zionist aggression, safeguard the national rights of the Palestinian people and ensure the withdrawal of the Zionist enemy from all occupied Arab lands.

(b) The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Its political activity stems from the resolutions of its National Council sessions and of the Rabat, Algiers and Cairo summits.

(c) Any solution that is not based upon the right of our Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of its independent Palestinian state on its soil as well as its right to return, is a solution that is to be rejected by our people and nation.

(d) Being aware of the gravity of the present situation and believing in the importance of Arab solidarity, we affirm our concern for the unity of the Arab position. Responsibility at this stage does not rest upon the Palestinian people alone,

<sup>151</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), November 17, 1977, p. 1.

<sup>152</sup> See doc. 283 above.

<sup>153</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>154</sup> Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

but upon the masses of our Arab nation and on all Arab regimes as well. These policies must be transformed into active support for the Palestinian people and its armed revolution as it confronts Zionist and imperialist schemes.

At these historic and decisive moments, the Fatah Central Committee salutes our people inside and outside the homeland and expresses pride in its steadfastness, its sacrifices and its heroic struggles. The Central Committee calls upon our people to unite behind the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leaders in order to confront future events. We are confident that the will of our people and Arab nation will triumph in its steadfastness and its continuing struggle. We are not alone. Our Arab nation and the free people of the world—all friends—the non-aligned, Islamic and Socialist countries stand with us.

Fatah, in declaring this responsible stand which is far removed from any emotionalism or outbidding, is motivated by our concern for the interests of our dispersed Palestinian people whose land has been usurped and who confronts our Zionist enemy with his constant pretensions against our people and nation.

Long live a free and Arab Palestine.

Long live the Arab struggle for its liberation.

Eternal glory for our noble martyrs.

## 293

### **Press conference statements by President Asad of Syria discussing his opposition to the intention of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel<sup>155</sup>**

**Damascus, November 17, 1977**

*Q. Could you explain to us, Mr. President, why you do not approve of President Sadat's visit to Israel?*

A. First I want to say that when we have met in the past we have reached an agreement, but this time we left our meeting disagreeing. This makes me profoundly sad, especially as we disagreed on something important—President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel. I am extremely grieved that I did not succeed in persuading him of the gravity

of this visit and its long-term repercussions on our Arab cause and the Arab situation as I see it. Of course, as you can imagine, this subject outweighed all other subjects in our talks.

*Q. Did you disagree with President Sadat about tactics or strategy? Or rather, was your failure to agree the result of a difference of opinion on how the goal should be reached, or on the goal itself?*

A. It is not easy to distinguish between tactics and strategy. If it is true that peace is strategy and the way to peace is tactics, it is impossible to distinguish completely between tactics and strategy, and our discussions yesterday included something of this. My view was that only sound methods could realize what may be called a successful goal, if I may use that expression. Peace is a goal we are striving and working for, but we must discuss the courses that will lead us to that peace. Of course, President Sadat thought that his course of action represents a sound tactic.

*Q. Are we to understand from this that this difference of viewpoints could mark the end of agreement between the allies of the October war and that Syria will go her own way?*

A. Certainly agreement between Syria and Egypt has always been a strategic goal of the two countries and of the Arab nation, and their agreement has always been the surest formula for the achievement of the aspirations of the Arab masses. Yet we have disagreed on this matter, as has now become clear to you, both from my meeting with you and from your meeting with President Sadat—as I understood a little while ago.

As I said just now, there is no definite line separating tactics and strategy. Successful strategy cannot be achieved through unsuccessful tactics. Peace is our goal here in Syria, as it is for our brothers in Egypt and for the Arab nation. But it seems to me that working for peace does not require a visit to Israel.

*Q. Assuming that this visit is successful to some extent, could Syria change her present viewpoint in the light of such success as might be achieved by this visit towards attaining the just and full peace that is the goal of Syria and the Arab nation?*

A. In fact my discussion with President Sadat yesterday was long and I may say, wideranging, and I stressed my conviction that this visit could not achieve any goal that was fully in the interests

<sup>155</sup> Made during a joint press conference with President Sadat; translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), November 18, 1977. For President Sadat's statements see. doc. 294 below.

of the Arab nation, either in Syria, Egypt or the Arab countries.

Of course President Sadat had a different view, and of course we shall continue to be as concerned for Egypt as we have always been for ourselves here in Syria. This is something unchanging.

*Q. What sort of letter were you given by the Libyan envoy?*

A. I would prefer that you find out about the contents of the letter from our brothers in Libya.

*Q. Egypt has defined her tactics for the coming stage. What are Syria's tactics for that stage, as regards attaining the goals she has set herself?*

A. We are always seeking the best and most effective formula for the achievement of the goal we aspire to. So far we have no new tactics or course of action. For years we have been pursuing clearly defined courses of action that are known to our Arab people and to the whole world. Up to this moment, we have changed nothing.

*Q. Then you have not yet despaired of the Geneva conference?*

A. As regards our courses as a whole and our means of action, this cannot be assessed as a separate topic. As I have just said, the totality of our policies, actions and means employed have not been altered.

*Q. So you will go to Geneva?*

A. As you can see, we are at present discussing something new, and it is not reasonable to say immediately what effect this new situation will have on the form of future action. This must be discussed, studied and examined: that is why I said that up to now, we have been moving within a specific framework of action. So far we have changed nothing, but this new situation will require us to undertake a new study, a new examination in the light of which we shall reach our conclusions.

*Q. Do you think that this disagreement could affect Arab solidarity as a whole? This disagreement between Syria and Egypt, could it not have a negative and direct effect on Arab solidarity as a whole?*

A. As you know, we have always stressed that solidarity is an effective formula for the achievement of the goals of the Arab nation and we are always seeking effective formulas.

*Q. Did you specifically ask President Sadat not to go to Israel, and if he is going in any case, did you ask him not to conclude a separate deal with Israel? And did you receive from him any assurance that he will not conclude such a deal?*

A. Before he came to Damascus, President Sadat declared that he would not conclude a separate peace, but he and I did not discuss the matter from this aspect. I did not think that the danger lay in the possibility of a separate peace being concluded, even if President Sadat had not denied that he had any such intention. I looked at the matter from a different aspect, the aspect of the various effects it could have on Arab action, on the Arab cause and on the achievements of the goal of peace in particular.

## 294

### Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt defending his decision to visit Israel<sup>156</sup>

Damascus, November 17, 1977

. . . . .

*Q. Mr. President, did President Asad approve of your going to Israel?*

A. . . . No. President Asad did not approve, and he does not agree with me on this point.

*Q. Why did President Asad reject this?*

A. This is his conviction and he is entitled to his own opinion, like anyone else. This does not mean that there is any fundamental difference between me and President Asad, but he does not approve.

*Q. Did you explain your visit to Israel to President Asad?*

A. Why should I spend a long time in explaining things when, as I said, we had discussed all aspects of the situation and all the problems related to it? Why should we devote more time to it than it deserves?

<sup>156</sup> Made during a joint press conference with President Asad of Syria; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 18, 1977. For President Asad's statements see doc. 293 above.

*Q. What did President Asad have to say on this matter?*

A. There was no need for me to explain anything to President Asad because he was already aware of it, having heard about it. We had not previously agreed on this question, and I had not informed him of it previous to my announcement. This is the truth. But I am going there to say to the Israelis on their own ground: If you want to live in this area, these are the facts. This is my aim.

*Q. What results do you expect from your visit to Israel?*

A. Let us wait and see. I promised nothing except to tell the Knesset the facts. I did not ask to meet the government but I did ask to meet the Knesset to put the facts before them. As I said before, it is for them to decide, because the other alternative would be terrible both for us and for them.

*Q. How will you solve the problem of Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference?*

A. We pray to God that we may be able to surmount that difficulty. It is not only a question of Palestinian representation, as I said before there is the psychological atmosphere. Seventy percent of our problem is the complexes that have been created in this area and have practically obscured the substance. Perhaps when we end these complexes we shall be able to see the substance more clearly and to approach it more easily and seriously.

There is a fact that everyone must realize, that without the Palestinians there can be no peace. Without a solution of the Palestinian problem there can be no peace. Quite simply, without the Palestinians there can be no Geneva conference.

*Q. Do you think that your visit to Israel might eliminate these complexes?*

A. Certainly, that is what I intend.

*Q. What makes you so sure of that?*

A. I say "certainly" to support my analysis, which is that I am going to Israel because of complexes. If you take it as meaning that I shall be one hundred percent successful, you are wrong, because I don't know what is going to happen. I am doing my duty. I am performing what is required of me; after that God will do as He wills.

*Q. Do you seriously intend to go to Israel?*

A. For Heaven's sake, this is the thousandth time I have been asked and answered that question.

Yes, I am going; I always say what I mean. You have known me for seven years as a president and you should know that I mean what I say. When there was defeatism all round me in all parts of the Arab nation before the October war, I did not pay the slightest attention, but decided to fight, along with my brother Hafiz, and we went our own way.

I want to say that this is my way of working; I am not two-faced and I do not pursue two policies at once.

*Q. Some people may explain your going to Israel as defeatism?*

A. We heard about defeatism before the October War—there were allegations and analyses, until we were fed up with all this talk. Let everyone keep his analysis to himself; things must be judged by their results.

*Q. Will you be going soon?*

A. Not yet. I have not received an official invitation. I have not received it yet. I may receive it after my return to Egypt today.

*Q. Is it true that you are going to Saudi Arabia soon?*

A. Why should I go there at present when there is nothing new to make that necessary? When I feel it is necessary for me to meet my brother King Khalid and my brothers there, I shall go.

*Q. The Arab summit conference has been fixed for February 15. Does that mean that the Geneva conference will be held before that?*

A. There is absolutely no connection at all between the summit and the Geneva conference.

*Q. Do you not think that the summit should be held before the Geneva conference?*

A. The summit is not going to be held before Geneva; I have said this quite frankly. If there were anything new the summit would have to be held before the Geneva conference, but the Arab strategy we agreed on in Rabat has two main aspects; the 1967 Arab territories and the solution of the Palestine problem and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and these two principles that constitute Arab strategy are sufficient; there is nothing new and nothing has been changed. If anything changes, of course, we shall have to go back to the Arab summit. But there has been no change.

Therefore there is nothing new. All the same,

I have declared that we welcome an Arab summit at any time, for it is always our policy to sit down together to solve and clarify many things.

*Q. Is it to be understood from what you say that you are convinced of the soundness of Arab solidarity at this stage?*

*A.* Certainly, Arab solidarity is not subject to defeatist analyses or emotion. We have got over that since October. I was saying yesterday as I was speaking with President Hafiz, we want to tell you that there is something called the October generation. What is past is over and done with. This October generation rejects defeatism, rejects suggestions that there are grounds for fear and alarm, rejects fanaticism and rigidity. It always knows where its goal lies and goes towards it.

*Q. When and how did you decide to make this trip, and who knew about it?*

*A.* The only one to know about it was the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy who accompanied me on my trip to Rumania, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As soon as I returned from the trip I took my decision on this question, which had been ripening in my mind all the time.

295

**Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee condemning the visit by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to Israel<sup>157</sup>**

Beirut, November 18, 1977

Masses of the Palestinian people;  
Masses of the Arab nation;

The decision taken by President Sadat<sup>158</sup> constitutes a renunciation of the dearest and most sacred goals of our nation and our people and a disavowal of the sacrifices of the hundreds of thousands of martyrs who have fallen for Palestine and the Arab territories.

President Sadat's move discards all the principles of Arab solidarity, the resolutions of the Arab

summits and the gains of the Ramadan War achieved through the heroism and sacrifices of Arab fighters, headed by the great Egyptian army.

The Arab nation will never forgive any Arab ruler such a step, which is a dangerous deviation and a denial of our historic struggles which have always centred on the cause of Palestine and the liberation of Jerusalem.

The Palestinian leadership hereby rejects the step of President Sadat and affirms their adherence to the resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council at its successive sessions, and to its political programmes. They call on the masses of the Arab nation to condemn this dangerous move which puts the very existence of our nation, its future and its honour in jeopardy. They call on all Arab countries and their governments to define and make known their attitudes to this situation.

296

**Statement by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat condemning the visit by President Sadat of Egypt to Israel<sup>159</sup>**

Beirut, November 18, 1977

President Sadat's decision to visit the Israeli Knesset<sup>160</sup> and to deliver a speech in occupied Jerusalem came as a surprise to me personally especially as what he said in his speech to the Egyptian Popular Assembly was not in the written text; when he announced his intention of visiting the Israeli Knesset he was deviating from the original text.

President Sadat is taking this grave step on his own, and, to the best of my knowledge, without any of the Arab leaders knowing anything about it.

This individual decision is a rash and dangerous deviation from the course of Arab struggle as a whole, and its grave and negative consequences will not be restricted to the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian people; it will have repercussions on the national attitude of the Arab nation to the usurping Zionist entity.

President Sadat's visit to the Israeli Knesset in

<sup>157</sup> Issued after a meeting of the Executive Committee with representatives of the various sectors of the resistance; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 18, 1977.

<sup>158</sup> See doc. 283 above.

<sup>159</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 19, 1977, p. 2.

<sup>160</sup> See doc. 283 above.



occupied Jerusalem will have a negative effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict and seriously endanger the Arab nation. For this visit is a real and major gain for Zionism and imperialism which have dispersed the Palestinian people and usurped its homeland.

297

**Statement issued by the Royal Cabinet of Saudi Arabia expressing surprise at the decision of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel and calling for Arab unity<sup>161</sup>**

Riyad, November 18, 1977

The Arab cause is passing at present through a difficult phase. The difficulty is compounded by an atmosphere of stalemate and suspicion and actions with uncertain consequences which in their methods are uncoordinated with the general Arab position.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in defining its position towards the Arab cause in its current phase, proceeds from its clear Arab and Islamic policy and its well-known and historic standpoints which derive from the Algiers and Rabat summit resolutions calling for a withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem, and for the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to return to its homeland and to set up its own independent state on its soil.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was surprised to learn of the intention of H.E. President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, to visit Israel.<sup>162</sup> His Majesty King Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz responded at that time by writing to His Excellency to clarify to him the position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in this regard, doing so in a frank and unambiguous manner. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, proceeding from the Arab summit resolutions, which not only specified the objectives but also the means to arrive at them, considers that the principles of Arab solidarity furnish the proper framework and starting point that must be followed by any Arab

effort which may be undertaken to solve the Arab problem.

Accordingly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that any Arab initiative in this matter should proceed from a unified Arab stand.

298

**Statement issued by the People's Assembly of Egypt praising the visit of President Sadat to Israel and describing it as a major step towards peace<sup>163</sup>**

Cairo, November 19, 1977

We, the representatives of this people, who express its will, stand in one rank behind our leader Anwar Sadat. We bless this initiative which seeks to confirm the seriousness of our desire for peace. In our estimation, it is a positive step of an unconventional nature which opens wider horizons for peace. We bless it as an expression of our desire that the entire world witness the intention between us and Israel to reach a just peace that comprises the entire region. This will not be a peace obtained at any price nor built upon a separate truce, since President Sadat has declared that Egypt refuses these two alternatives. The only peace whose banner Egypt is raising today is a peace that recovers for the Palestinian people its legitimate rights and for the Arab nation its occupied land.

Egypt, in undertaking this historic initiative, does so from a position of strength, not weakness, in a spirit of courage and not vacillation, for the sake of peace not war, and in the interests of the entire Arab nation and of world peace.

Egypt is proposing this initiative in order to prove to this and to the following generations that, in seeking peace, we left no door unopened, no obstacle which we did not try to overcome, no opportunity which we did not try to make use of. Egypt has faced four wars and endured enemy fire when it met the challenge of war. Today, Egypt is confronting stabs in the back and campaigns of slander from some of its friends, and endures them also as it meets the challenge of peace.

<sup>161</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), November 19, 1977.

<sup>162</sup> See doc. 283 above.

<sup>163</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 20, 1977.

Directing the battle for peace in effect requires the same degree of strength, capability, courage and flexibility required in military battles. We appreciate the fact that some Arab objections have been raised against this initiative. This does not surprise Egypt, despite the fact that these objections represent a return to the vocabulary of slander in the dictionary of Arab politics. Egypt will rise above such behaviour. If these objections are calculated to try to impose patronage on Egypt, then Egypt will reject such patronage. We wish to record the fact that Egypt has paid more than its due share to the Arab cause, doing so in the currency that accepts no overbidding, hypocrisy or deception. It has paid it in the blood of its sons.

However, if these objections are motivated by fear or anxiety, then Egypt regards them as being reservations that will be settled by the final results. If the Arab nation trusted the Egyptian will in waging the battles of peace, it should all the more trust it in confronting the challenge of peace.

Sadat has declared that the Egyptian initiative is a decisive step which ultimately represents a final test of intentions, presented by Egypt to the entire world in its drive to establish a just peace in the region. Within these limits, Egypt appreciates differing viewpoints regarding the results of this step and will reassess them in the light of the positions adopted by the Israeli side which would reveal its true intentions towards a just peace, be they positive or negative.

But Egypt will never forgive any doubts cast upon its motives. Let everyone know that Egypt is not proposing this initiative as a climax to 30 years of struggle, but as a continuation of 30 years of sacrifices. We have waged four battles for war. Let us now wage the fifth for peace.

**Statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen calling on President Sadat to reconsider his decision to visit Israel (excerpts)<sup>164</sup>**

Aden, November 19, 1977

We must not forget the dangers that will no doubt threaten the unity and solidarity of the Arab people as a result of direct negotiations with Israel undertaken by any Arab state or the exchange of visits with its Zionist leaders. For this will bestow upon the Zionist enemy gains it had been unable to achieve in thirty years, despite all the wars waged against the Arab people in which Arab blood was shed in defence of Arab rights.

Accordingly, we, together with the Palestinian people, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and with the people of other Arab countries and its progressive forces, call upon President Sadat to change his position and to address himself to the Arab peoples, who possess the full right and capability to strengthen and safeguard the future of Arab struggle against the imperialist and Zionist enemy.

We believe that if President Sadat, by responding to this Arab plea, would place all the Arabs before their true responsibilities in seeking mature and successful means to achieve the objectives of the Arab peoples and recover their legitimate rights, the Zionist enemy will thus be prevented from achieving its goals through negotiating with the Arabs and exchanging visits with their leaders.

<sup>164</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, 14 October (Aden), November 20, 1977.

## 300

**Communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers of Jordan regretting the decision of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel and calling on the Arab world to act with moderation (excerpt)<sup>165</sup>**

Amman, November 19, 1977

In this Arab front, Egypt occupies a special place and has a principal role which it created for itself with the blood of its martyrs and the sacrifices and suffering of its people over the years. This was embodied by the Egyptian military operation of the Suez Canal crossing in 1973, after the many years of bitter defeat and shame.

President Mohammad Anwar Sadat's decision to visit Israel<sup>166</sup> came as a shock to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan at a time when it had undertaken efforts to coordinate Arab action and bolster Arab ranks. Nevertheless, this is not the first time that Jordan has been startled to learn suddenly of grave decisions taken on the Arab level of consequence to Jordan itself and to the entire Arab nation. Jordan has always been open and positive-minded. It has always shunned complex fears and negativism as regards the means to be followed in the struggle to recover Arab rights and to strive at the international level to end the occupation of Arab land and establish a just and honourable peace. Therefore, since Jordan is living through this problem in all its aspects, it believes that the ideal means to attain these objectives lies in consultations, cooperation, co-ordination of common efforts and far-sighted action.

Jordan believes that unilateral action in the sphere of the common cause and in confronting Israel, is comparable to negativism and to abandoning courageous and decisive confrontation. Unilateralism weakens Arab ranks. Negativism entrenches and strengthens occupation locally and internationally. Both have adverse effects not solely upon states but upon the people of Palestine and the entire Arab nation.

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, motivated

by its consciousness of its national responsibilities as a confrontation state, and by virtue of its intimate identification from the beginning with the cause of Arab struggle for the sake of Arab Palestinian rights, calls upon the Arab nation at the present delicate juncture to weigh its reaction to the Egyptian initiative and to the future of Arab relations very carefully. The greatest danger that can threaten the Arab cause and the concept of one Arab nation would be to fall victim to internal conflicts, fragmentation and disunity due to emotionalism, rashness, and the adoption of negative and emotional stands. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan urges all sister Arab states, especially official Arab circles, not to entrench the negative effects that may ensue from these recent developments and to avoid campaigns of slander that touch upon questions of honour. It further urges them to contain the divisions in Arab ranks and not to deepen them, to contain all conflict, and to work anew to rebuild a unified Arab position based upon constructive dialogue and common effort.

## 301

**Speech by President Sadat of Egypt before the Israeli Knesset discussing the establishment of peace between the Arabs and Israel<sup>167</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 20, 1977

Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen,

Peace be upon you, and the mercy of God.

Peace to us all, God willing, on Arab land and in Israel. Peace in every corner of this wide world, made complex by its bloody conflicts, agitated by bitter contradictions and threatened time and again with destructive wars waged by man to destroy his fellow man. In the end, and from the ruins of what man has built and the corpses of human victims, there can be neither victor nor vanquished. The one who is truly vanquished is always man himself, the noblest of God's creatures, created by God in order, as Gandhi the apostle of peace put it, "to strive on his feet to build life and worship God."

<sup>165</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai'* (Amman), November 20, 1977.

<sup>166</sup> See doc. 283 above.

<sup>167</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 21, 1977.

I have come to you today with a steady purpose so that we can build a new life and establish peace, so that all of us living in this land of God, Muslims, Christians and Jews, can worship God and Him alone, and follow his commandments and counsel, which are love and truth and purity and peace.

I apologize to all those who, when they first heard me announce my decision<sup>168</sup> to the whole world before the Egyptian People's Assembly, were astonished, indeed astounded. In fact, some were led to believe by this abrupt surprise that my decision was nothing more than a verbal manoeuvre for the consumption of world public opinion. Some others described it as a political tactic to mask a true intention, to wage a new war.

As a matter of fact, one of my aides at the presidential bureau contacted me late at night after I had returned home from the People's Assembly, to ask me anxiously: What do we do, Mr. President, if Israel really extends an invitation to you? I answered calmly: I shall accept at once.

I have declared that I will go to the ends of the earth, I will go to Israel, because I want to set forth the full facts before the people of Israel.

I apologize to all those who were astounded by my decision or who suspected the motives underlying its announcement. No one had imagined that the head of the largest Arab state which bore the major burden and principal responsibility in the question of war and peace in the Middle East region, could announce his decision and readiness to go to the land of the enemy. For we are still in a state of war. In fact, we have all been suffering the effects of four cruel wars in the space of thirty years, and the families of the victims of the October 1973 war are still living through the tragedies of widowhood, of loss of children, of the martyrdom of fathers and sisters.

Furthermore, I did not discuss this decision, as I have already announced, with any of my colleagues and brothers, the heads of the Arab states or of the confrontation states. Those who got in touch with me after the announcement raised objections because a state of total suspicion and mistrust between the Arab states and the Palestinian people on the one hand and Israel on the other, still exists in the hearts of all. It is enough to remember that the many months in which peace could have been established have gone to waste

over vain disputes and discussions regarding the procedural aspects of convening the Geneva conference. All are an expression of total suspicion and total lack of trust.

To be honest and frank with you, I arrived at my decision after lengthy thought, knowing well that it was a perilous undertaking. For, since God has fated me to assume responsibility for the people of Egypt and to participate in responsibility for the destiny of the Arab and Palestinian peoples, the first dictate of such responsibility is to exhaust all means in order to spare my Arab Egyptian people and the Arab nation as a whole, the calamities of further wars of destruction and ruin, whose effects are known only to God.

After deep thinking, I became convinced that faithfulness to my responsibility before God and the people dictates that I should go to the ends of the earth, indeed, to come to Jerusalem to address the Knesset members, who are the representatives of the Israeli people, revealing to them all the facts that I have pondered in my heart and to leave you thereafter to decide for yourselves, and may God then do with us what He pleases.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In the life of nations and peoples, there are moments when those who are noted for their wisdom and foresight must look beyond the past, with all its complexities and residues, in order to set forth courageously towards new horizons.

Those, who like us, shoulder the burden of responsibility, should be the first to have the courage to take fateful decisions that rise to the greatness of the occasion. We must all rise above all forms of prejudice, illusion and obsolete theories of superiority. It is important to remember at all times that only God is infallible.

In stating that I wish to spare all the Arab people the calamities of new and tragic wars, I declare to you, in perfect sincerity, that I hold the same sentiments and the same responsibility as regards every person in the world, and assuredly as regards the Israeli people. The victim of war is man. The soul that is killed in war is a human soul, whether it be Arab or Israeli. The wife who becomes a widow is a human being who is entitled to live in a happy family, whether she be Arab or Israeli. Innocent children who lose the loving care of their fathers are all our children, whether they live in an Arab land or in Israel. They are

<sup>168</sup> Doc. 283 above.

entitled to, and we are primarily responsible to provide them with, a happy present and a beautiful future.

For the sake of all this; for the sake of protecting the lives of all our children and our sisters; for the sake of making our societies productive, peaceful and secure; for the sake of human development, happiness and the achievement of the human right to live a life of dignity; for the sake of our responsibilities towards future generations; for the sake of a smile on the face of every child born in our land; for the sake of all this, I took my decision to come to you, despite all the risks involved, in order to give this address.

I have borne and still bear the requirements of historic responsibility. For this reason, I announced several years ago, and to be precise on February 4, 1971, that I was ready to sign a peace agreement with Israel. This was the first such announcement made by an Arab official since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Motivated by all that the responsibility of leadership dictates, on October 16, 1973, before the Egyptian People's Assembly, I called for the holding of an international conference in which a just and permanent peace would be established. At that point, I was not in the position of one who was begging for peace or who was requesting a ceasefire.

Inspired by all these motives, to which the obligation of history and of leadership commits us, we signed the first and then the second disengagement agreement in Sinai. We then moved on, knocking on all doors, both open and closed, in an attempt to find a particular path towards a permanent and just peace. We opened our hearts to the peoples of the world so as to make them understand our motives and aims and to convince them that we were truly advocating justice and attempting to build peace.

With all these motives, I decided to come to you with an open mind, an open heart and a conscious will, so that we can build a permanent peace based on justice. Fate willed that my trip to you, my trip to peace, should coincide with the great Islamic feast-day of al-Adha, the feast of sacrifice, when Abraham, may peace be upon him, the ancestor of Arabs and Jews, surrendered to God when God ordered him and

obeyed the summons with all his soul, not out of weakness, but moved by a great spiritual force and a free choice to sacrifice his dear son and by his firm and unshakable faith in sublime principles that give life a deeper significance. Perhaps this coincidence holds a new meaning in all our hearts. May it become a real and hopeful indication of security and peace.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let us be frank with each other. Let us use straightforward language and clear ideas that admit of no ambiguity. Let us be frank with each other today as the whole world, in the east and in the west, follows the progress of these unique moments which can become a radical turning point in the course of the history of this region of the world, if not the world as a whole. Let us be frank with each other when we answer the major question: How is it possible to achieve a permanent and a just peace?

I come to you with my own clear and forthright answer to this major question, so that the people in Israel and throughout the world may hear it as well as those whose sincere prayers have reached my ears, in the hope that the results expected by millions of people from this historic meeting may be realized.

Before I announce my answer, I would like to assure you that this clear and forthright answer is based upon a number of facts which everyone must inevitably acknowledge.

The first fact is that there can be no happiness for some at the expense of misery for others.

The second fact is that I have never and will never employ two kinds of language. I have never and will never employ two sorts of policy, and whoever I am meeting with, I always use one language, one policy, one position.

The third fact is that the direct confrontation and the straight path are the shortest and most successful means to arrive at a clear objective.

The fourth fact is that the call for a just and permanent peace which is based on respect for UN resolutions has now become a call espoused by the entire world, and has become the clear expression of the will of the international community, be it in official capitals where policy and decisions are made or on the level of world public opinion which affects the making of policy and decision.

The fifth fact, perhaps the most notable and

<sup>169</sup> See doc. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

<sup>170</sup> See doc. 292 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

clearest of them all, is that the Arab nation, in its pursuit of a permanent and just peace, does not do so from a position of weakness or instability. On the contrary, it possesses assets of strength and stability to render its word expressive of a genuine desire for peace, emanating from a civilized awareness of the fact that, in order to avoid a veritable catastrophe, it behooves us, yourselves and the entire world to hold that there can be no alternative to the establishment of a permanent and just peace, a peace that is neither shaken by the storm nor undermined by mistrust, ill-will and distorted motives.

Having set forth these facts which I wanted to place in their proper context as I see it, I would also like to warn you in all sincerity against certain ideas that you might be entertaining. Frankness impels me to tell you the following:

1. I did not come to you to conclude a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not pertinent to Egyptian policy. The problem is not Egypt and Israel. No separate peace between Egypt and Israel or between any confrontation state and Israel will establish a permanent and just peace in the region as a whole. In addition, even if peace were to come about between all the confrontation states and Israel without there being a just solution to the Palestine problem, this will never secure the permanent and just peace that the entire world today is insisting upon.

2. I did not come to you to seek a partial peace, in other words, that we end the state of war at this stage and then postpone the entire problem to a later stage. This is not the radical solution that will lead us to permanent peace. Related to this is the fact that I did not come to you to reach agreement about a third Sinai disengagement agreement, or an agreement about Sinai, Golan and the West Bank. This would only mean that we have postponed the act of setting fire to the fuse to a later date. It would in fact mean that we lack the courage necessary to meet the challenge of peace and that we are too weak to assume the burdens and responsibilities of permanent and just peace.

I came to you so that we can together build a permanent and just peace, to avoid shedding one drop of blood, Arab or Israeli. It is for this reason that I declared my readiness to travel to the ends of the earth.

At this point, I return to answer the major

question: How do we achieve a permanent and just peace? In my view, and I say this to the whole world from this platform, the answer is neither impossible nor even difficult, despite the fact that long years have passed, filled with blood revenge, with bitterness and hatred, with whole generations brought up on total separation and deep-rooted enmity. The answer is neither difficult nor impossible if we follow the straight path in all sincerity and faith. You want to live with us in this region of the world and I tell you in all sincerity: We welcome you amongst us in all peace and security. This in itself marks a tremendous turning point and is one of the signs of a historic and decisive change. We used to reject you and we had our reasons and motives. That is true. We used to meet with you in any place. That is true. We used to refer to you as "so-called Israel." That is true. At international conferences or agencies, our representatives did not, and still do not, exchange greetings. That is true. This has happened and still happens today. For any talk, we used to make it a condition that there had to be a mediator who would meet with each side separately. That is true. In fact, this is how the discussions regarding the first and then the second disengagement agreements took place. Our representatives who met at the first Geneva conference did not exchange a single word directly. That is true and all this has happened. But I tell you today, and I declare to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in a permanent and just peace. We do not wish to surround you nor be surrounded by you with destructive rockets or with the missiles of hatred and bitterness. I have declared more than once that Israel has become an established fact recognized by the world. The two superpowers have undertaken responsibility for her security and for the protection of her existence. And since we really and truly seek peace, we really and truly welcome you to live amongst us in security and peace.

Between us and yourselves, there was a high and massive wall which you attempted to build over a period of a quarter of a century. But this wall was shattered in 1973. It was a wall made up of a psychological warfare continuously being inflamed and escalated. It was a wall made up of the threat of force, of force capable of sweeping the entire Arab nation from one end to the other. It was a wall made up of your proclaiming that

we had become a nation with a body but no spirit. In fact, some of you said that even in fifty years the Arabs would not rise again. It was a wall that perpetually threatened us with the long arm that is capable of reaching any point at any depth. It was a wall threatening us with extinction and annihilation if we attempted to exercise our legitimate rights to liberate our occupied territories. We must, both of us, confess that this wall fell in ruins in 1973. But there remains another wall. This other wall constitutes a complex psychological barrier between yourselves and us. It is a barrier of suspicion, aversion, fear of deception; a barrier of illusions that surround every behaviour, act, or decision, a barrier of cautious and erroneous interpretation of every event or statement.

This psychological barrier is the one I once described in official statements as constituting seventy per cent of the problem. Today I ask you, by paying you this visit, the following question: Why not join hands, in truth, faith and sincerity, to destroy this wall together? Why not unite our wills, in truth, faith and sincerity, to remove together all suspicions of fear, of perfidy, of distorted intentions and concealment of truth and intentions? Why do we not face this together with the courage of men and the boldness of heroes who offer their lives for the sake of a noble aim? Why do we not face the challenge together, in courage and boldness, to build a towering structure of peace that defends and does not threaten, that lights for our future generations the lamps of a human mission dedicated to construction, development and the betterment of mankind? Why bequeath to this generation the after-effects of bloodshed, violent death, of orphanhood and widowhood, of broken families and the wailing of victims? Why not have faith in the wisdom of the Creator as He revealed it in the proverbs of Solomon the Wise: "Deceit is in the heart of those who ignore evil; but to the counsellors of peace is joy." (Proverbs 12:20); and "Better is a dry morsel and peace therewith than a house full of sacrifices with strife." (Proverbs 17:1) Why not repeat together the Psalms of the Prophet David: "Unto thee I will cry, O Lord... Hear the voice of my supplications when I cry unto thee, when I lift up my hands toward Thy holy oracle. Draw me not away with the wicked and with the workers of iniquity, who speak peace to

their neighbours, while mischief is in their hearts. To each according to his deeds and according to the wickedness of his endeavours." (Psalms 28:1-4). "Seek peace and pursue it." (Psalms 34:14). Gentlemen,

I tell you in truth that peace will remain a word without substance unless it be based on justice and not on the occupation of other people's lands. It is not fair that you ask for yourselves what you deny to others. In all frankness, and motivated by the same spirit which led me to come to you today, I tell you that you must finally forsake all dreams of conquest and forsake the belief that force is the best means to deal with the Arabs. You must learn well the lessons of confrontation between us and yourselves. Expansion will avail you of nothing. To put it clearly, our land can admit of no bargaining. It is not subject to negotiation. Our patriotic and national soil is to us like the sacred valley where God spoke to Moses, upon whom be peace. None of us has the right or can accept to surrender an inch of it or to accept the principle of discussion and negotiation concerning it. I tell you in truth also that today there lies before us a proper opportunity for peace. It is an opportunity that time cannot bring again, if our struggle for peace is true and genuine. If we lose or waste it, the curse of humanity and of history will fall upon him who conspired against it. What is peace, as far as Israel is concerned? It is to live in this region with her Arab neighbours in security and peace of mind. This is a logic which I can accept. That Israel should live within its borders, secure from any aggression, is a logic to which I can assent. That Israel should obtain all the guarantees that can secure her these two facts is also a demand to which I can assent. In fact, we declare that we accept all the international guarantees you may imagine and from any side you desire. We declare that we accept all the guarantees you want from the two superpowers or from either of them, or from the Big Five or from some of them. I again declare in full clarity that we accept any guarantees you desire because we in return, shall obtain the same guarantees. In sum, then, when we ask what peace is as far as Israel is concerned, the answer would be that Israel would live within its borders with the Arab neighbours in peace and security and in accordance with all the guarantees she demands, and which would also be obtained by

the other side. But how is this to be achieved? How can we arrive at this result so that we can attain a permanent and just peace? There are certain facts that must be faced with all courage and clarity. There are Arab territories that have been occupied and remain occupied by Israel's armed power. We insist upon total withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem, the Jerusalem that I have come to visit as the city of peace, a city that has always been and will always remain a living embodiment of coexistence among the faithful of the three religions. It is not acceptable that anyone should think of the special status of Jerusalem in the context of annexation and expansion. It must, rather, be a city that is free and open to all men of faith. More important than all this is that the city should not be denied to those who have for centuries chosen it as a place of residence and a home. Instead of reactivating the Crusades, we should revive the spirit of Omar Ibn al-Khattab and of Salah al-Din, that is, the spirit of tolerance and respect for rights.

The places of Muslim and Christian worship are not merely places where religious duties and ceremonies are performed. They act as a true witness of our uninterrupted presence in this place, politically, spiritually and culturally. No one should err by underestimating the importance and the respect that we, both Christians and Muslims, have for Jerusalem.

Let me tell you without any hesitation that I did not come to you to present you, under this dome, with a request for the withdrawal of your forces from the occupied territories. Full withdrawal from the Arab lands occupied after 1967 is a self-evident matter about which we cannot accept argument and no one need request anything from anyone else.

Any talk of a permanent and just peace, any step we take to safeguard our life together in this region of the world in peace and security, is meaningless so long as you remain in forcible occupation of Arab territory. No peace can be valid or be secured which is accompanied by occupation of the land of another. Yes, this is a self-evident fact which admits of no argument or discussion, if our intentions are pure and our struggle to establish a permanent and just peace for our generation and for future generations is a genuine one. As regards the Palestine problem,

no one denies that it is the core of the entire issue. No one in the world today accepts slogans, raised here in Israel, that ignore the existence of the people of Palestine, or indeed demand: Where is this people?

The problem of the people of Palestine and of its legitimate rights is today no longer ignored or denied by anyone. Indeed, it would not even be rational to think that it can be ignored or denied. It is a reality which the international community, both Eastern and Western, has come to accept, support and recognize in international documents and official statements. It would be useless for anyone to deafen his ears to its clamour that is heard by day and night. It would be equally useless for anyone to blind his eyes to that problem's historic reality. Even the United States, your principal ally, the one most committed to protect the existence of Israel and her security and the one that has furnished and still furnishes Israel with every type of aid: moral, material and military—I say, even the United States has chosen to face facts and to recognize that the Palestinian people have legitimate rights and that the Palestine problem is the very crux and substance of the conflict; that while this problem remains in suspension and without solution, the conflict will increase and escalate to reach new dimensions. In all truth I tell you that peace cannot be made without the Palestinians and that it would be a grave error of incalculable dimensions if we were to ignore this problem or set it aside.

I shall not speak at length of events of the past, since the issuing of the Balfour declaration some sixty years ago. You know the facts well. And while you have found the legal and moral pretext to create a national home on land that did not in its entirety belong to you, there is all more reason for you to understand the determination of the people of Palestine to create their state anew in their homeland.

When some extremists demand that the Palestinians should abandon this noble objective, the truth of the matter is that they are asking them to abandon their identity and their every hope for the future.

I salute those voices that have been raised in Israel demanding recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people for the sake of reaching a secure peace. Accordingly, I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that it would be useless to deny recognition



of the Palestinian people and of its right to establish its state and to return.

We Arabs have had this experience before with you and with the reality of the Israeli presence. The conflict carried us on from one war to the next, from victims to more victims, until today we arrive, both you and us, at the brink of a terrible abyss and a frightening catastrophe if we do not seize the opportunity together for a permanent and just peace. You must face reality in a courageous manner, as I have faced it. No problem can be solved by fleeing from it or by treating it arrogantly, nor can peace be established by attempting to impose illusory conditions upon which the whole world has turned its back, declaring its consensus as regards the necessity of respecting justice and truth. There is no need to embark on a vicious circle where Palestinian rights are concerned. It is no use inventing obstacles. The march of peace will only be delayed or peace itself will be destroyed.

As I have already told you, there can be no happiness for some at the cost of misery for others. Direct confrontation and the straight path are the shortest and best means to arrive at a clear objective, and at a direct confrontation of the Palestine problem. The employment of one language to deal with it and to bring about a permanent and just peace means that the Palestinian state must be established.

Given all the international guarantees you seek, there is no need to fear a fledgling state which needs aid from all countries in the world in order for it to come into being. When the bells of peace ring out, no hand will be found to beat the drums of war. And if such a hand is found, the noise made will not be heard. Let us imagine together a peace agreement in Geneva whose glad tidings we can then announce to a world that thirsts for peace, a peace agreement made up of the following elements:

1. An end to Israel's occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

2. Fulfilment of the basic rights of the Palestinian people and its right to self-determination, which includes its right to establish its state.

3. The right of every state in the region to live in peace within secure and guaranteed borders, through procedures to be agreed upon which furnish international borders with the appropriate security arrangements in addition to the appropriate

international guarantees.

4. All states in the region would be committed, in the management of relations amongst them, to the principles and aims of the UN Charter, especially as regards not resorting to the use of force and to settling disputes between them by peaceful means.

5. An end to the state of war that exists in the region.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Peace is not a signature appended to a few lines of writing. Peace is a new way of writing history. Peace is not a competition where one calls upon it as a means to defend personal whims or to cover up ambitions. Peace in its essence is a huge struggle against all ambitions and whims. Perhaps the experiences of history, both ancient and modern, will teach us all that missiles and fleets and nuclear weapons cannot establish security but that, on the contrary, they destroy everything that security might build.

For the sake of our people, for the sake of a civilization created by man, it is our duty to protect man wherever he may be from the dominion of the force of arms. We must give the dominion of humanity all the force of morality and principles which elevate the status of man. Allow me, from this platform, to address my appeal to the people of Israel. I address my true and sincere words to every man, woman and child in Israel. From the people of Egypt who bless this sacred mission of peace, I carry to you a message of peace, a message from the people of Egypt who do not know what prejudice is, whose sons, Muslims and Christians and Jews live together in a spirit of amity, love and tolerance. Such is Egypt whose people have entrusted me with this sacred mission, the mission of security and peace. I address every man, woman and child in Israel: encourage your leadership to struggle for peace. Let all efforts be directed to building the towering structure of peace instead of building fortresses and shelters fortified with rockets of destruction. Come forward to present from this region to the entire world a new image of man, an example to modern mankind, the man of peace in every position and place. Convey the glad news to your children. What has passed is the last of wars and an end to suffering. What is come is a new beginning of a new life, a life of love, of virtue, of freedom, of peace.

You, bereaved mother, and you, widowed wife,

and you, a son who has lost a brother or a father, all you victims of war, fill the earth and sky with the hymns of peace. Fill your hearts with hope. Make this hymn a reality that lives and prospers. Make hope your guiding law of action and struggle. The will of peoples is part of the will of God.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Before arriving here, I turned towards God Almighty with every beat of my heart and every sentiment of my conscience as I performed the feast-day prayers in the Aqsa Mosque and as I visited the Church of the Resurrection. I turned to God Almighty, praying that he would inspire me with strength and affirm the certainty of my faith that this trip would accomplish the aims I pray for, for the sake of a happy present and an even happier future.

I chose to forsake all precedents and traditions as these are known among warring states. Despite the fact that Arab territories remain under occupation, when, in point of fact, the announcement of my readiness to go to Israel has been a great shock to the sensibilities of many people and astounded the minds of many, and many doubted my intentions—despite all this, I sought inspiration for my decision with all the purity and goodness of faith and with the sincere expression of my people's desires and intentions. I chose this difficult path which, in the view of many people, is the most difficult path of all. I chose to come to you with an open heart and an open mind. I chose to give this momentum to all the international efforts that are being made for peace. I chose to present to you, in your very home, the facts as they are, free from all prejudice and caprice. I did not come here to manoeuvre or to win a round, the most dangerous of rounds and battles in modern history. This battle for a just and permanent peace is not only my battle, nor is it only a battle of the leadership of Israel. Rather, it is a battle for every citizen in our land who is entitled to live in peace. It is a commitment of conscience and responsibility in the hearts of millions. Many people wondered, when I first proposed this initiative, about my views regarding what this trip might accomplish and my expectations therefrom. As I answered my questioners, so I declare before you: I did not think of making this trip from the standpoint of what it might achieve, but I have come here to convey a message. Have I conveyed the message? Let God be my

witness; Oh God, I repeat with Zakhariah, "Love truth and peace." I draw inspiration from the verses of God the Almighty, the Wise, in the Koran: "Say, we believe in God and in what is revealed to us; in that which was revealed to Abraham and Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob and the tribes; and in that which God revealed to Moses, Jesus and the prophets. We discriminate against none of them. To Him we have surrendered ourselves." The Almighty has spoken the truth. Peace be upon you.

### 302

#### **Communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers of Algeria stating that the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel contradicts the interests and unity of the Arab people<sup>171</sup>**

Algiers, November 20, 1977

In these difficult times, the Arab world is living through a decisive era in its history, since recent developments which we have noted may have the effect of threatening the foundations of its unity and solidarity. It is necessary for us to note that what is generally referred to as the Middle East crisis, is in reality a manifestation of an imperialist phenomenon and the result of a policy founded upon aggression and expansion. Israel, which is based upon a reactionary and racist ideology, is practising settler colonialism, which not only denies the right of a whole people to exist but, in addition, wages a war of expansion at the expense of other Arab peoples in the region. In consequence, its objective is an imperialist dialectic exemplified by its opposition to the Arab national liberation movement and in restraining the momentum of the Arab revolution towards progress and unity.

Israel has thus become a principal factor in the imperialist strategy in this part of the world, a proof of the danger posed by Israeli policy to the whole Arab world and to its destiny.

The struggle of the Arab peoples against Israel has always proceeded within the context of the larger struggle for liberation in the Third World. The Arab peoples, linked by a common destiny

<sup>171</sup> Translated from the Arabic text supplied by the Algerian News Agency (Beirut), November 21, 1977.

and aspirations, have waged a common struggle for the sake of recovering the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, and simultaneously, of recovering all occupied Arab territories.

This long struggle has enshrined throughout its history the great values and traditions of the struggle for freedom and moulded Arab solidarity in an effective manner whenever the Arab nation has been exposed to grave dangers. As a result of the sacrifices of the Arab peoples, and especially of the fraternal people of Palestine, the Palestinian people was able to impose its presence as an undeniable reality for the entire international community. Everyone now believes that any solution of the Middle East crisis must inevitably lie through the Palestinian people's recovery of its national rights.

Is it necessary to recall the fact that this unified struggle manifested itself during the various meetings of the Arab heads of state, especially during the sixth and seventh Summits, which laid down the strategy of the Arab struggle? As far as Algeria is concerned, faithful to its own principles it will continue to comply with the resolutions of these two conferences, which bound together all Arab states in the search for a solution to the Middle East crisis.

Any initiative that takes place outside this framework might affect the solidarity of the Arab world and its unity of action, and can only harm the Arab cause and the higher interests of the entire Arab nation.

This initiative takes place at a time when the enemy is pursuing, with obstinacy and contempt, its policy of *fait accompli*, continuing to deny the existence of the Palestinian people and to refuse to recognize its legal representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization. Such an initiative can only weaken the struggle waged by the Arab world with so much sacrifice and dedication for the past thirty years.

Therefore, this initiative is a factor making for divisions and ambiguities, with hateful consequences of benefit only to the enemies of the Arab nation. At the same time, it delays the course towards progress, unity and real awakening. In this connection, the Algerian government wishes to point out that while independent states enjoy sovereignty and are thus more conscious of their own particular interests, nevertheless no one has been delegated to talk or negotiate on behalf of

the Arab nation with the Zionist state, not to mention mortgaging the future of our peoples. This is especially true of the future of the fraternal Palestinian people which is never far from our minds and remains one of our most intense concerns. Algeria, which correctly bases itself upon its own experience of anti-imperialist armed struggle, condemns the interference of former imperialist forces in the affairs of the Arab world, at times with the connivance of Arab regimes.

In these moments of grave peril to the Arab world, Algeria believes that, now more than ever before, it is the responsibility of all to remain united in order to preserve the gains of common struggle and to fortify that struggle until the just cause of the Arab peoples is victorious.

### 303

#### **Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the implications of his joint meeting with Prime Minister Begin of Israel<sup>172</sup>**

**Jersusalem, November 21, 1977**

*Q. In addition to agreeing in principle that the dialogue between the two countries will continue, did the two of you, during the course of President Sadat's visit, work out specific, practical details for the continuation of this dialogue even before the Geneva peace conference?*

*A. Well, for sure, we had a big survey of all the problems that we are facing. We gave great importance to the convening of the Geneva conference, but not more than this. The time was so short.*

*Q. Mr. President, why aren't you inviting the Prime Minister of Israel to visit Cairo at this stage?*

*A. Well, after I was invited here by the Prime Minister, and after I addressed the Knesset and the Israeli people through the Knesset, the Prime Minister has got the full right to come and address our parliament there in Cairo. For certain reasons that we discussed together, we have found that we postpone this issue for the future.*

<sup>172</sup> Excerpted from the English text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, November 22, 1977, p. 4. For Prime Minister Begin's statements at the same press conference see doc. 184 above.

*Q. Mr. President, my name is Abie Nathan. I am from the "Voice of Peace"—the peace ship that sailed into the Suez Canal, thanks to your permission, early this year. My question to you, sir, is: How did you get the idea and who were the leaders around the world who encouraged you to take this bold initiative for peace to help bring our peoples together? And when can I hope to come with an Israeli football team to Cairo to play with the Cairo eleven?*

*A. Well, for the first part of the question, about this initiative, and if I have already discussed this with any other leader—well, my answer is this: It started before I started my last trip to Rumania, Iran and Saudi Arabia. I didn't discuss it with anyone except my foreign minister and, for sure, our Security Council in Egypt. The whole situation needed action. The peace process needed momentum again, and these are the motives behind this initiative.*

*Q. A common key question to Mr. President Sadat and Mr. Prime Minister Begin: After so many conversations, did you really reach an agreement on the meaning of the word "security" concerning Israel and the neighbouring countries? The second question is directed to Mr. President Sadat: The Arab hospitality is very well known all over the world. Did you feel a little bit embarrassed about the fact that you had to postpone the invitation of Mr. Begin to Cairo?*

*A. Well, the first question about security—with the Premier and with the Knesset today, the various parties we agree upon the principle, upon security. We agree. But the meaning of security—we differ on it. I think through Geneva we can reach an agreement; and let us hope what I have said already today in the Knesset—let us hope that the two slogans that I want everyone to say are: "Let us agree upon security." I think those are the main issues.*

*For the second question, on hospitality—very sly—either I am an Arab and hospitable or not. No. As I said before, we have discussed this, Premier Begin and me, and we agreed together to postpone it for the time being.*

*Q. Mr. President, as you prepare to leave Israel, do you have a message for the people of Israel, with whom you are, after all, still at war?*

*A. If I may say anything through you to the people of Israel, I must say this: that I am really deeply grateful for the very warm welcome and the marvellous sentiments that they have shown me.*

*Q. Mr. President, I am Shmuel Segev from "Maariv". The Israel government has allowed many Egyptian journalists to come and cover your visit. Will you now be prepared to open the doors of Egypt for Israeli journalists?*

*A. When Mr. Begin visits us for sure you will be coming.*

*Q. Not before?*

[Interjection by Prime Minister Begin: See you in Cairo, Mr. Segev.]

*Q. I have two questions. First, after all your talks, are you now both convinced of the sincerity of the desire for peace of each of you? The second question: Did you fix a date for the reconvening of the Geneva conference?*

*A. For the first question, yes. For the second question, we shall be working in the very near future for the reconvening of the Geneva conference.*

*Q. Mr. President, what psychological and what substantive progress have you made in Israel on your visit?*

*A. Well, maybe you have heard me say before that one of the main motives behind this visit to Israel was to give the peace process new momentum and to get rid of the psychological barrier that, in my idea, was more than 70 per cent of the whole conflict, and the other 30 per cent is the substance. For the substance, as I told you, we have made a very big survey, but the time is so short to have progress in this way.*

*Q. I have two questions for President Sadat. The first: After your meeting with the delegation of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, you were quoted as saying, "The Soviet Union will for sure make difficulties for me, and I am making my calculations so that this attitude should not create any obstacles at Geneva." Mr. President, was the Soviet Union, in the circumstances, blocking the road to Geneva?*

*A. You must have heard of the communiqué<sup>173</sup> that was issued by the Soviet Union and the United States for the convening of the Geneva conference. What I told the committee you mentioned is this: That my relations with the Soviets are strained and it appears that whatever I do doesn't go to their liking at all. For instance, the visit here also, and their comments, doesn't go to their liking at all. I fear that the same attitude*

<sup>173</sup> Doc. 160 above.

could be adopted in Geneva, and they are one of the co-sponsors. But in the same answer I said that whenever the parties concerned reach an agreement, no one, either a big power or a small power, can prevent us from fulfilling it as much as we have agreed upon it.

*Q. Egypt agreed to a joint venture with the black-listed US Ford Motor Company. Mr. Mohammed Mabruk, head of the Arab Boycott of Israel, attacked the government of Egypt. Don't you think, Mr. President, that the time has come to put an end to the boycott?*

*A. Well, I have an idea on this. I consider all these are side issues. Let us try to solve the main issue: then all the side issues, automatically, will be solved.*

*Q. Mr. President, I thought it was significant that you went out of your way this morning to congratulate Mr. Peres on his speech. You called it constructive. Could you tell us what precisely in Mr. Peres' speech you found constructive?*

*A. I said that and I also said that in spite of the fact that we differ on several issues. Don't forget that. I said, "...in spite of the fact that we differ on several issues," but his speech was still constructive.*

*Q. You repeated several times in the Knesset this morning that whatever happens again between Egypt and Israel, the solutions must be sought not through war. Does this repeated statement cancel your previous repeated statements in Egypt that if you cannot get back the territories by diplomatic means, you will get them back by force of war?*

*A. For sure, I must tell you quite frankly that I am issuing this after I made my visit here and at the same time when we are preparing for Geneva. Well, after we had this new momentum and this new spirit, let us agree that whatever happens between us we should solve it together through talks rather than going to war. Because, as I told you, really, I was very deeply touched when I saw the children, the Israeli children, hailing me here. The Israeli women. Really, I was very touched, and the same thing happens in Egypt also. Maybe you know that my people now are 100 per cent behind me. They don't want any war. They want that we settle our differences on the table. But mark this. I said also in the Knesset, and I differed with Premier Begin about it, he considered this as a condition, I said that the issue of the withdrawal from the occupied territories*

should not be even put on the table, except for the details of it, not as a principle. We differ on this. But when I made my statement, this is behind it. I mean this will be automatically, in Geneva, negotiated and decided.

*Q. Mr. President, have you discussed today with the West Bank personalities the political future of the West Bank, and do you think they should participate in Geneva? When are you going to visit King Khaled?*

*A. Well, for the first question, I received them. They were very kind to come and apologize for those who are abusing me in the outside world, from their patriots. I was very happy and elated when I prayed yesterday in al-Aksa, and I met with our Arab citizens. I was very happy and elated regarding their representation. I should not say anything about this because the Palestinians should decide this for themselves. About the visit to Saudi Arabia: Whenever there is any issue, there are very close contacts together, and whenever there is any need to discuss anything, I may go at any time or King Khaled may come to Cairo at any time. We do not have protocols and so on between us.*

*Q. Mr. President, now that you are more acquainted with the facts of the Nazi Holocaust do you have a better insight into Israel's determination to maintain appropriate security positions against the extremist elements that are openly committed to the destruction of the Jewish state?*

*A. As you have heard me saying just now, security is one of the two main issues or two main slogans that should be raised now. I quite agree, I quite understand the point of view of security for the Israelis, but on the other hand, it shouldn't be through any compromise on land, because that would mean expansion. And in my idea (we shall discuss this thoroughly afterwards), a few kilometres here or a few kilometres there will not provide security. The intention is what provides security.*

*Q. Mr. President, you have faced very strong attacks from much of the rest of the Arab world for your visit here. You've even been faced with the threat of assassination for what you have done. What do you say to these people?*

*A. I shall not be saying anything to those people. I think I shall be telling my people in Egypt what has happened here. I shall be giving a speech before the parliament a few days after my arrival. I need not answer all those who have attacked me. Let me remind you that after the disengage-*

ment agreement for one whole year I was much more vehemently attacked than I am now.

*Q. I have a question for both Prime Minister Begin and for President Sadat, and the premise is the same for both questions. Since there are 23 other Arab countries with millions and millions of miles and plenty of money. And since Israel's territory is so small, by comparison. And since, as President Sadat just said, some of this land was not acquired by what he termed expansion, but was actually acquired by defensive war, after it was started, does Premier Begin believe that any of this land should be given up, in view of the biblical injunction not to surrender one inch of land acquired with the help of God. And my question to President Sadat, would a larger demilitarized Sinai with joint development of the oil resources or the other resources of the area and with economic development and cooperation required to help his battered economy. Wouldn't this and tourism be better for Egypt and for Israel than giving up any of the land? Or is vanity to win territory more important?*

*A. Two words only for my answer. Our land is sacred.*

*Q. Mr. President, do you have any plans to meet with President Assad and persuade him maybe to join you?*

*A. From time to time we do meet in the Arab world. I was asked in Damascus, before I came here whether President Assad tried to put pressure on me not to complete this visit. I told them that no one puts pressure on the other. This is our way.*

*Q. The fact that you have come on this visit, is it really a breakthrough towards peace?*

*A. We have always been speaking and indeed the most important thing today is that we should go to Geneva. And that is what we have been talking about, going to Geneva.*

*Q. I come from Australia, which last week was a much shorter visit than yours from Cairo. May I ask you, since you have been here in the last 24 hours, do you feel closer to reconciling the just rights and needs of the Israeli people and the just rights and needs of the Palestinians?*

*A. I am sure that the progress that we started through my visit here will enable us to solve all the problems. For example, we consider that there is an urgent problem of security. I also consider that the Palestinian state is very important, in spite of our difference upon this issue. We can*

*decide in Geneva on all these. If you ask me am I optimistic or pessimistic, I can tell you I am optimistic.*

[Closing remarks by Prime Minister Begin].

Well, ladies and gentlemen. May I take this opportunity to thank Prime Minister Begin, the Israeli people and President Katzir for the very warm welcome that was accorded to me here. We are in a crucial moment. Let us hope, all of us, that we can keep the momentum in Geneva; and may God guide the steps of Premier Begin and the Knesset, because there is a great need for hard and drastic decision.

I already took my share in my decision to come here, and I shall be really looking forward to those decisions from Premier Begin and the Knesset. All my best wishes to my friend Premier Begin and his family, and all my deep gratitude to the Israeli people, whose welcome I can never forget. Thank you.

### 304

#### **Statement by President Sadat of Egypt promising the Israeli people peace<sup>174</sup>**

*Jerusalem, November 21, 1977*

At the end of my visit to Israel, which lasted more than thirty hours, I take this opportunity to send my greetings to the Israeli people and to President Katzir. I was deeply touched by my warm reception and I feel you treated me and my delegation honourably. At the King David Hotel, I held a meeting with Prime Minister Begin. Before that, I made a speech in the Knesset and then met with various parliamentary blocs.

After all these meetings, I can say to the Israeli people through the President: Let us today proclaim no more war, but peace. No more war, so that every mother, every woman, both here and in my country can be reassured. We say that we shall achieve peace through round-table negotiations. We have fought four wars in thirty years. I differ with the Israeli Premier and with Knesset members regarding the significance of security and

<sup>174</sup> Statement made during a visit made by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to President Katzir of Israel. Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 22, 1977.

their interpretation of it. But I agree, in principle, that security should be guaranteed to both Israelis and Arabs alike.

I would like to thank the President of Israel and ask him to convey to his people my deep gratitude for the fine treatment we received. I ask his wife to convey to the Israeli woman my best wishes and admiration. I would like you to inform the Israeli people that we shall not know any more wars. May God guide our steps towards peace and security.

### 305

#### **Statement by President Sadat of Egypt calling for security and peace between Egypt and Israel<sup>175</sup>**

Jerusalem, November 21, 1977

In the name of God,

I would like to deliver to you a message from the people of Egypt. As you know, I was, for about ten years, speaker of the People's Assembly in my country. My principal aim in coming here is to discuss all matters. I have listened to everything you have said, and allow me to say, honestly and faithfully, that I have heard talk of a Palestinian state and of security. One member spoke of Sinai and of the need to persist in peace efforts.

I would like to tell you that I would like this dialogue to last twenty four hours in order to discuss all subjects in all their aspects, but time is limited.

My principal aim is to put a limit to the obstacles that have existed in the past. I would like to say that there is a long history involved and that if we were to comment upon and reply to every point raised, there would be no time to do so. But let us concentrate on the principal issue, which is security. It is a basic issue. As I said yesterday, we are ready and will raise no objections to any force or forces that can be agreed upon to guarantee your security. The second issue is that the October war must be the last war. If we agree on these two principles, all problems can be solved by peaceful negotiations. If we agree to this, and it becomes our point of departure, then we will be making progress. I would like to inform you that I have

come here to talk to you and to tell you that trust must be mutual so as to enable us to pursue the policy we have begun. As regards the first point, namely, security, I am confident that one can take certain measures to safeguard security and offer guarantees. We have no objections to this, nor would we object to a United Nations role in this regard. I tell you in all frankness that you must face the reality of this complex problem. In all sincerity, I tell you that you must adopt decisions based upon those two principles: security and no more war. These decisions will be difficult but you must adopt them.

Your responsibility is not confined solely to this generation but extends to future generations as well. Each young man and woman must be given the chance to build a family life in peace, sincerity and hope.

You must also seek the guidance of God in coming to your decisions, which will be very difficult ones. When I came here to visit you, I wished to give you an example because this step is unprecedented in history: two countries in a state of war, and you occupy a part of Arab territory, and yet I have come to talk to you, to your government and to the opposition. This is the beginning of the road that will solve the problems in the region. I am confident that every young man who has aspirations for his future wishes to take the correct decision at the right time.

### 306

#### **Official statement by a responsible source in the PLO condemning Sadat's speech to the Knesset and calling for Arab unity to confront his policy<sup>176</sup>**

Beirut, November 21, 1977

President Sadat's visit to Israel, his speech to the Knesset<sup>177</sup> and the replies of Begin<sup>178</sup> and Peres,<sup>179</sup> have made it clear that speech-making and flattery of the enemies of our nation are not the way to recover Arab rights, but can only lead to a surrender of these rights to the Zionist enemy.

<sup>176</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 21, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>177</sup> Doc. 301 above.

<sup>178</sup> Doc. 181 above.

<sup>179</sup> Doc. 182 above.

<sup>175</sup> Speech made to the Likud Coalition members at the Knesset. Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 22, 1977.

The immense national concessions offered by Sadat in his speech have been met with greater intransigence on the part of the enemy and its greater determination to maintain its occupation of Arab and Palestinian territories.

By accepting these slaps in the face in the Knesset, Sadat has given the enemy what no Zionist has ever dreamed of obtaining, either in the past or the present.

The logic that governed the visit has been invalidated on the floor of the Knesset by the words of Menahem Begin and Shimon Peres, who realized that Sadat's visit was nothing but an act of surrender to the demands of Zionism, both historical and current.

The Palestine revolution, which has condemned Sadat's visit, sees his proposals as a further slap in the face to our national struggle and believes that these concessions can only lead to a total collapse.

The Palestine revolution firmly and resolutely rejects this move directed against our struggle and the struggle of the Palestinian people, and affirms its inflexible intention of maintaining its struggle against the course of surrender and retreat, believing that the Arab nation will never yield or surrender.

The Palestine revolution, which has always resisted the policy of throwing itself into the arms of the enemy, reaffirms that the logic of Arab strength alone can liberate the land, and that what was taken by force can only be recovered by force.

The Palestine revolution sincerely calls for the unity of the Arab combatant forces on a strong, unambiguous and clear national basis, so that it may be possible to define the attitudes and forces required to protect our Arab and Palestinian struggle.

**Communiqué issued by the Central Committee of the Socialist Union and the Council of Ministers of Sudan praising the decision of President Sadat of Egypt to visit Israel<sup>180</sup>**

**Khartoum, November 21, 1977**

An emergency session of the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union and Council of Ministers was held at noon on 11, Dhu al-Hijja, 1397 A.H. (November 21, 1977) at the headquarters of the Sudanese Socialist Union with President Ja'far Muhammad Numairi in the chair. At this meeting, the situation in the whole Arab region was reviewed as well as the rapid progress of events. The meeting studied in detail the comprehensive speech delivered by the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Muhammad Anwar Sadat, before all the peoples of the world, which placed them before their historic responsibility to establish the foundations for a just peace that can safeguard the basic rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to self-determination and to establish its own state, as this is the crux of the conflict.

It was the opinion of this meeting that the speech of President Muhammad Anwar Sadat was a specific and frank reaffirmation of the principles of Arab struggle and a decisive commitment to its objectives which aim at total withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands and at safeguarding the basic rights of the Palestinian people. President Sadat stressed that the Arab nation, in its persistent and serious endeavours to achieve a just and permanent peace, does not move from a position of weakness and vacillation, but rather from a history of struggle rich in sacrifice, bolstered by a frank and legitimate right and a conscious and responsible awareness of its commitment to the consolidation of world peace in general and of the Middle East peace in particular.

Using clear and decisive language, President Sadat affirmed that his initiative was not designed to win any gains for Egypt alone, but was bound by the objectives and aims of the Arab struggle as determined by Arab kings and presidents at Arab summit conferences.

<sup>180</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Akhbar* (Cairo), November 22, 1977.



The Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Union and the Council of Ministers, in welcoming that speech, take this opportunity to express their feelings of esteem and admiration for the great Egyptian people which has always been and will always be where it has chosen to be, namely in the vanguard of the confrontation, whether in war or in peace. It has waged the most violent battles amidst seas of blood and under skies filled with fire, sustaining grievous sacrifices willingly and offering the lives of its sons and the sustenance of its children so that the Arab nation can remain a great one, with a mission and a civilization at this crossroads of continents and a focus of attention because of its history and its faith, its wisdom and its acts, its structure and its progress, its prosperity and its affluence, its freedom, dignity and national independence.

The people of Sudan and its leadership, cognizant of the vanguard role of Egypt in the Arab struggle, concerned for and mindful of the future of this struggle lest it fall into the futility of suspicion and fragmentation, and heedful of the sensitive character of the current period through which the struggle is passing, rejects any doubts that may be cast upon Egypt's capability, its great people, its faithful leaders and its heroic role. It urges an end to campaigns of distrust which serve merely to deepen the division in our nation and are of benefit solely to its enemies. It affirms the fact that the future of the Arab nation depends upon its solidarity and cohesion to guarantee the realization of its aspirations to liberation, reconstruction and progress. God alone grants success.

308

**Statement issued by the Central Political Council of the Nationalist and Progressive forces of Lebanon calling on all Arab forces and countries opposed to President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel to take concerted action to confront that move (excerpts)<sup>181</sup>**

Beirut, November 23, 1977

The Council discussed at length the wide-scale campaign of condemnation of Anwar Sadat's

dangerous and treasonable move, as exemplified in the attitude of Syria, the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese nationalist movement, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Democratic Yemen, within the framework of comprehensive mass condemnation of Anwar Sadat's actions in the course of his capitulationist visit to Israel.

The Council stressed the importance of all aspects of this campaign, examining the steadfastness which this dangerous deviation requires on the part of the Arab forces that have joined in rejecting Anwar Sadat's move; especially those forces that have common frontiers with the Zionist enemy.

In the light of the above, the Council once again called on all nationalist Arab forces not to be content with condemning Anwar Sadat's move but to draft as soon as possible, a programme for comprehensive Arab confrontation of the capitulationist solution which has culminated in this move. In this connection it has to be stressed that it is the right and, indeed, the responsibility of all nationalist Arab forces to participate in framing this programme so that it may form the real basis of their unity. It must also be stressed that it is the duty of all these forces to employ their resources—each according to its circumstances—in the implementation of this programme and ensuring its success.

309

**Joint Syrian-PLO communiqué condemning Egyptian President Sadat's visit to Israel and resolving on efforts to combat its consequences (excerpts)<sup>182</sup>**

Damascus, November 23, 1977

A PLO delegation headed by Mr. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Palestine Revolution, visited Damascus on November 21–22, 1977.

<sup>181</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), November 24, 1977.

<sup>182</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 23, 1977, p. 10.

In the course of these meetings the two sides discussed Anwar Sadat's capitulationist visit to the Zionist entity and its consequences, which constitute so grave a danger to the Arab nation and the cause of Palestine as to demand total confrontation by the Arab nation. In the context of the present stage in the history of the Arab nation and its national liberation struggle against the Zionist enemy and its ally, US imperialism, this treasonable visit comes as part of a comprehensive plan to impose a full surrender meeting all Zionism's terms, including recognition of the legality of the occupation, peace with the Zionist entity and the liquidation of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent national state in their land. What happened during the visit and during Sadat's meetings with the Zionist leaders, is proof of his full readiness to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of the Zionist entity disregarding all that is most sacred to the Arabs and their history of struggle, making light of the martyrs who laid down their lives for the Arab nation, and forsaking Arab rights, Arab territory and Arab destiny. One of the aims of Sadat's visit was to break the total isolation of Israel at the international level and to deprive the countries of the world of all justification for not recognizing her. Moreover, all this has come at a time when the Zionist enemy is still usurping Palestinian rights, occupying Arab territories, disregarding international principles and the resolutions of the United Nations, arrogantly pursuing its ambitions and continuing its aggression. In the light of these facts agreed on by the two sides, the following was resolved:

1. The two sides declare their outright condemnation of this visit and their readiness to apply all their resources to the elimination of its consequences. The two sides call on the great Egyptian people and its intrepid army, which has given thousands of martyrs and made the most costly sacrifices in defence of the honour of Egypt, Palestine and Arabism, to resist this treason to the Arab nation by which Sadat's regime hopes to deprive Egypt of her national role by carrying out the schemes of imperialism and Zionism.

2. The two sides call on all Arab states to condemn Sadat's visit and to resist its consequences. The two parties declare that their attitude to every Arab state will be defined in the light of

that state's attitude to the visit and to these moves and contacts. We appreciate the attitude of all the Arab and friendly states that have condemned this treasonable visit, and we call on them to prepare for dialogue and solidarity, and to draw up the necessary plans to eliminate the consequences of this calamity.

3. The two parties stress the importance of joint efforts to establish real Arab solidarity to confront Sadat's imperialist-Zionist conspiracy, and of providing Arab Syria and the PLO with the most advanced forms of support, military, political and economic. This will be the real measure of the soundness and nationalism of any Arab position.

4. The two parties agreed to make joint efforts and moves at the international level to expose Sadat's policy and its dangers to security in this area and the world in general. They also agreed that the only aim of the Sadat-Begin plan is to impose a *fait accompli* on our nation, and thus to impede all genuine efforts to reach a just peace on the basis of full withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the safeguarding of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to return, to self-determination and to establish their independent state.

Arab Syria and the PLO have constantly insisted that their efforts to achieve the just peace that the world seeks, a peace compatible with the interests of the Arab nation, must never be confused with the concept of coercion and surrender embodied in Sadat's recent trip. Arab Syria and the PLO will continue to apply themselves to ensuring the achievement of a just peace in accordance with the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summits and with the will of the international community, as embodied in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in recent years.

5. As soon as possible, the two sides will contact those who support Arab rights and the cause of Palestine, in particular the non-aligned countries, the Islamic countries and the countries of the socialist camp, so as to develop their support and coordinate positions at the international level with a view to repelling and thwarting this imperialist-Zionist attack.

. . . . .

## 310

**Speech by President Sadat of Egypt before a joint session of the People's Assembly and the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union announcing the results of his visit to Israel (excerpts)<sup>183</sup>**

Cairo, November 26, 1977

I announced my decision and wanted to bear the responsibility for it before the people, before history and before you. I did not doubt for a moment that that decision would have an unusual impact nor did I doubt that comprehension of the dimensions of that decision would be no easy matter had I asked for the opinion of my brothers, the Arab kings and presidents. I announced my decision in all conviction and faith that if this had to be my last task as president of the republic, I would still carry it out and come here to you, who are the legitimate authority, to submit my resignation. This is because of my absolute belief that it is the most sacred and purest of missions, despite my knowledge that in some quarters there will be one-upmanship, shady deals, and slander.

This is what I frankly told President Hafiz Asad when I visited Syria, three days before I went to Jerusalem. Today, brothers and sisters, I appear before you now that this historic trip has been concluded, to give you an account. The first and greatest objective of the peace trip has, thank God, been achieved. The barriers of suspicion, mistrust and fear have been destroyed. Yes, indeed, I affirm with complete happiness that the first and greatest objective of that historic trip has been accomplished, which is to destroy the barriers of suspicion, fear, mistrust and hatred. We and they have begun to behave in a civilized manner, as responsible leaders responsible before their people and before future generations, which have a natural right to live a life of security and dignity. We agreed to move on from a phase where we threatened with fire to an era of dialogue, right and truth, and from the language of the gun and death to the language of dialogue for the sake of life. I did not ask for peace from a position of weakness or supplication. You heard

me saying to the Knesset that the Arab nation in its quest for a just and permanent peace, does not do so from weakness or supplication. On the contrary, it possesses the needed strength and stability to make its word a manifestation of a sincere desire for peace. I also said that our land is sacred and that you must forever abandon your aggressive dreams of aggression and your belief that force is the best way to deal with the Arabs. You must fully absorb the lessons of confrontation between us. Expansion will get you nowhere. Our land is not subject to negotiation or argument. Our national soil is our sacred duty. None of us can or wants to concede an inch of it or accepts the principle of discussion or bargaining about it. You have heard me say all this to the Knesset, as did the whole world and the people of Israel also. I also said to them that we insist upon total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, including Arab Jerusalem. There can be no proper peace where there is occupation of someone else's land and no peace without the Palestinians and without recognition of the Palestinian people's right to establish their state and to return. I said that even if we were to arrive at peace agreements between Israel and all the confrontation states, without solving the Palestinian problem, peace could not come about. You have heard me say all this, as did the world and also the people of Israel. In the Knesset Committee meetings with all the parliamentary groups, I told them: There are difficult decisions that you have to take and they are inescapable. We have ourselves been the first to take this decision, which is historically unprecedented. I concentrated on a discussion in the proper manner to deal with our major problem and in a radical fashion.

I told them, we want the land because it is our right. They said, we want security. I said, yes, you can have that but without expansion. I told them, we want a Palestinian state and a solution to the Palestinian problem on its soil. They said they wanted their state to be protected from danger. I replied, you have a right to this. In the end, we agreed that there shall be no more wars after that of October and that we shall solve all problems by sitting down at a table like civilized beings, discussing matters with other civilized beings. If we do not get anywhere, then I will come back to you so that you can be associated with me in taking a decision.

<sup>183</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), November 27, 1977.

Brothers and sisters,

The outcome of the talks I had with government officials and members of the various political blocs showed that:

1. It is no longer possible for any Israeli official to doubt the sincerity of the Arabs' desire for a just peace.

2. There is unanimity in Israel and at the international level that Israel must take an initiative in reply to the great step I have taken.

3. The facts of the problem have become very well known to Israeli public opinion, without any deceit or misrepresentation. Perhaps the most important point that has become clear to every Israeli is the right of the Palestinian people to establish its state on its land and to return to its homes, not to threaten Israel's security, but to exercise its natural right to a peaceful life within the kind of national entity its wants.

4. The Arab position has won international support that we could not have obtained in dozens of years, even through the most extraordinary efforts.

5. A large number of Israeli officials are now convinced that the Arabs will never accept any settlement that does not include the liberation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

6. The visit has not led to the waiving of any of the national or historical rights of the Arab nation. The legal situation between us and Israel is still what it was before the visit. The measures that were taken and the events that took place during the visit cannot be interpreted as meaning that we accept a situation we did not accept before. You will observe that in my speech to the Knesset, I made a point of stressing our insistence on our right to Arab Jerusalem and our refusal to recognize Israel's annexation of it.

It will perhaps be asked: If the legal situation has not changed, what has changed? The answer to this is that an essential change has taken place in the psychological atmosphere surrounding the problem, inasmuch as there is now a real hope of putting an end to wars and suffering in the area. There is also now a possibility of making a just peace in this part of the world. Therefore what has been said about ending war applies to the future if the objective conditions that we regard as the indispensable basis for ending war are met.

7. I certainly made a point of not committing the Egyptian people to anything that could affect their legal and historical rights, or restrict their movement in the present or in the future. But first and foremost I made a point of not committing any other Arab party to anything at all. On the contrary, on more than one occasion I drew attention to the fact that I was not speaking on behalf of any of our Arab brothers, let alone committing myself to anything that committed them or prejudiced their rights.

8. Many of the pro-Israel pressure groups in other countries have been totally neutralized. Some of them, indeed, have been turned into a force actually exerting pressure on Israel. The extent of this change will become clear to all in the next few weeks. It may perhaps be asked what specific and tangible results we have obtained from this bold step... I say in reply that of course it was not to be expected that we should reach a full and comprehensive settlement of the conflict in two days. Also, there was no question of our concluding a separate agreement with Israel. Had this been on the cards, nothing would have been easier. Within these limits it was not planned or anticipated that we should reach agreement on all aspects of the conflict. But the agreement with the Israeli authorities did make it possible that all of us should seriously examine objective questions at the conference and not waste our time on procedural problems.

Secondly, when we discuss Israel's theory of security at the conference, we shall avoid discussing the idea of the taking possession or annexation of territory, restricting ourselves to the framework of ensuring security for all in a situation where justice prevails.

This, in brief, was what happened in Israel. Today, as I stand before you, you have heard me state that the basic and major objective was to remove the psychological barrier whose legacy has been suspicion, mistrust, fear, lack of confidence and the hysteria that affects one side when the other side is mentioned. It was impossible for us to begin in Geneva, as I have already stated here, when we felt this way towards each other. You heard me say how we used to have differences during the second disengagement agreement and how Dr. Kissinger would travel from Tel Aviv to Alexandria to change one word or add a comma. This of course was the result of the psychological

barrier that existed between us. Even more than this, things turned out as I had expected. No official can feel what I feel as I live through these circumstances. At a meeting with Israel's Defence Minister Ezer Weizman, he asked me: Why did you want to attack us in the past ten days? I said: Not at all. You began manoeuvres and we, following our policy since the October war and the policy of civilized countries cognizant of their responsibilities, responded when you began your manoeuvres. Gamasy began his manoeuvres at the same level. He said: Here are all the intelligence reports right before me, and he showed them to me. He said: They all indicate that you were about to make a surprise attack. He was extremely nervous. I told him: Not at all. Take note of the fact that any action you take, we shall reply to it at once. You carried out a manoeuvre. Gamasy at once began a counter-manoeuve on the same scale as Israel. On a previous occasion, I told him, you sent out a pilotless aircraft. It was a pilotless electronic plane, which then returned. The same day, Gamasy ordered two Egyptian aircraft with pilots to overfly the Israeli positions. This is the psychological barrier I spoke about. For the past ten days, they had been very nervous and tense, tense ever since the October war and the performance of the Egyptian officers and soldiers in that war, and of the whole Egyptian military. They have been extremely tense ever since. This explains the statement made by Israel's Chief of Staff, Gur, who said that my initiative in taking this trip to the Knesset is an act of deception intended to mask a new attack. Strategic and tactical deception is possible and I have a full right to practice it, but I shall never deceive anyone in the moral sense.

So, finally, brothers and sisters, I do not want to prolong my speech much longer. I merely wanted to present to you, who are the legislative authority, and to the Egyptian family, a full report of what has taken place. As I mentioned already, today, God willing, I shall ask the Foreign Minister to get in touch with the UN Secretary General, the two superpowers, the Arab parties to the conflict and the confrontation states as well as Israel, to say that Cairo welcomes them at any time as of next Saturday, so that we can take action to solve the problem. As I promised you,

the full details will be presented to you. I want you to convey to the people in your constituencies my infinite gratitude and pride in this people—to every man and every woman who came out in their millions to express their true sentiments and to show me, in the spirit of a single family, how pleased they were with my return and with our victory, a consummation of our victory in October. I shall never forget the Egyptian woman during my reception. She rose to the highest level of responsibility. To all of them I say, to every man, woman, youth and child in the land of Egypt, to every man who has given completely of himself and to every woman who offered her son in the noblest of conflicts and the noblest of struggles, who overcame her weakness in Egypt's greatest moments, to every woman who has turned her breast to the bullets of imperialism ever since the revolution of 1919, to every mother, sister or wife of those who laid down their lives for our great Egypt in the immortal days of October, to all the people I say: We have sworn before God and before our conscience that we shall not allow any harm to come to them as long as we are capable of making peace. Noble people of Egypt, our Egyptian family. This is my promise to you.... We shall not retreat from the struggle for peace. We shall not worship the idols of traditional solutions, the idols of juvenile thinking and the idols of self delusion while engaged in our national struggle. We shall destroy these idols and reduce them to rubble and dust. This is our pledge. I pledge my life to you to my last breath. With you, God willing, I shall take the plunge so that life can triumph over the enemies of life.

"Lord, do not cause our hearts to go astray after you have guided us. Grant us Your own mercy; You are the generous Giver." Peace be upon you and the blessings and mercy of God.

311

**Statement by a responsible source in the PLO rejecting President Sadat's proposal for a meeting of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict**<sup>184</sup>

Beirut, November 27, 1977

President Sadat's proposal for a meeting of all the parties concerned with the Middle East conflict is unacceptable. There were no new elements in Sadat's speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly.

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**Statement made by Minister of State Abd al-Aziz Hussain of Kuwait cautioning against disunity in Arab ranks (excerpt)**<sup>185</sup>

Kuwait, November 27, 1977

The Council of Ministers reviewed Arab and international political affairs and took note of the contacts made and messages sent in the past few days as regards developments in the Arab cause and the diverse positions adopted. It also took note of the substance of a number of reports and analyses and in this light discussed various probabilities.

The Council, in affirming Kuwait's declared policy of adherence to the resolutions of Arab summit conferences, especially the Rabat summit, continues to follow the development of events and contacts. At the same time, Kuwait was astonished by the contacts made with the enemy and deeply regrets the results and consequences of these steps as evidenced by the profound deterioration in Arab relations. Kuwait calls upon all who work in the field of Arab politics to work to arrest further collapse in these relations and to recognize the importance of the unity of Arab ranks at this grave period through which our Arab nation is passing.

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**Speech by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria analyzing the effects of the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel and stressing its grave repercussions on Arab nations (excerpts)**<sup>186</sup>

Damascus, November 27, 1977

Mr. Speaker, Gentlemen,

Today our nation is facing a critical, decisive and dangerous stage in its national conflict with the Israeli enemy. This danger is embodied in the visit by the Egyptian president to Jerusalem and its actual and probable consequences.

The immediate Arab reaction was one of shock and disbelief followed by anger and anxiety as regards its momentous consequences, but the Arab nation has now come to see more accurately and sensibly the past and present course of events as a result of that turning point represented by the Egyptian president's visit to Jerusalem.

The question is asked, Why did the Egyptian president agree to visit the enemy? Why did he choose this moment to do so?

We clearly perceive that there is growing support in world public opinion for the Arabs and their legitimate struggle to recover their occupied lands and the rights of the people of usurped Palestine. As this world campaign gathers strength, so does the campaign to pressure and contain the Israeli enemy. The enemy has thus been placed in a difficult position in which he cannot ignore world public opinion, nor the developments in the Arab and international spheres. These developments weaken the enemy's ability to carry out his plan which is based on the following points:

1. The liquidation of the Palestine problem.
2. The establishment of peaceful and normal economic, political and cultural [relations].
3. The arrangement of some kind of settlement for the occupied Egyptian and Syrian territories in the framework of the Israeli concept of security.

Despite the enemy's efforts to develop its military capability and break its international isolation, the Arabs, despite all the conditions they have suffered, are making slow but certain progress towards the

<sup>184</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), November 27, 1977, p. 3.

<sup>185</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Siyasa* (Kuwait), November 28, 1977.

<sup>186</sup> Speech made before the Syrian People's Assembly. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus) November 28, 1977.

realization of their objectives as set forth in the Algiers and Rabat summits:

1. Total withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

2. Safeguarding the inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine, including its right to return and self-determination.

Arab progress has manifested itself in the following ways;

1. The growing economic power of the Arabs.

2. The steps taken in the field of achieving progress and eradicating under-development.

3. The growing awareness of the importance of Arab unity and of the common Arab position.

4. A clear support for Arab rights and objectives by world public opinion.

All this has taken place despite the negative aspects that have appeared on the Arab scene such as the state of Arab fragmentation, the events in Lebanon and the growth of regional interests.

All the positive developments for the benefit of the Arabs took place despite the fact that the efforts expended were not up to the level of the resources available.

In this context, I would like to note that the Arab and international policy pursued by Syria in the framework of the resolutions of party congresses and their leadership as well as the directives issued by H.E. the president of the republic, have played an important role in achieving the progress made by the Arabs during the past stage. This is because our emphasis on the national dimensions of the conflict and thus on the importance of Arab solidarity in this conflict, as well as our emphasis on the international dimensions of the situation in this region and our efforts to win the support of world public opinion, count among the positive aspects of the gains that have been realized.

Mr. Speaker,

The enemy has never been blind to these developments, and while it is natural for the enemy to work in pursuit of his policies and objectives, it is unnatural to find some in the Arab arena who serve his ends and help him to achieve them. The enemy has adopted the following tactics:

1. Efforts to fragment the Arabs and to increase division in the Arab position.

2. To create a state of despair and a feeling of importance and of inability to confront him.

3. To defuse hostility.

4. To remove one of the confrontation powers from the arena of conflict, which would have considerable material and moral impact on the Arab world.

5. To constantly threaten to resort to force.

There have been numerous international efforts to help Israel carry out its plan. The efforts focused on President Anwar Sadat. The first attempt, after the October war, resulted in the first [Sinai] agreement on disengagement, the second attempt in the [second] Sinai agreement; then came his entanglement with the Jerusalem visit.

This trip has achieved the following gains for the enemy:

1. He has succeeded in eliminating the state of hostility, causing the Egyptian government to withdraw [from the conflict] and establishing a *de facto* peace and normal relations.

2. Winning recognition, *de facto* and *de jure*, for the Israeli state and for Jerusalem as its capital. The visit of a head of state to an enemy state, his saluting the Israeli flag and his embracing of all those who dispersed our people and occupied our land, the speech in the Knesset,<sup>187</sup> the wreath placed on the tomb of the Unknown Israeli Soldier, his use of the phrase "my friend" in reference to the enemy prime minister, and his direct messages and contacts—all these constitute a *de facto* and *de jure* recognition.

3. To create great divisions in the Arab homeland. No one expects this event to pass without sharp and violent confrontation throughout the Arab world.

4. To end the state of war while Arab lands remain under occupation and the problem of Palestine still lacks even the minimum guarantees for its solution.

5. To deliver a pointed insult to the Arab nation now that an Arab head of state has made this visit.

6. To break out of the international isolation imposed upon Israel. Now that the President of Egypt has visited Jerusalem, many states will no doubt feel no reservations about restoring their severed relations.

Mr. Speaker, Gentlemen,

The Israelis well know that the liquidation of the Palestine cause and the implementation of the

<sup>187</sup> Doc. 301 above.

Israeli concept of security can come about only through the establishment of normal relations. This is why they have concentrated on this question; for in this way they can achieve total economic, cultural and political domination of the Arab world. The Arabs will become a labour force in the Israeli economy as is presently happening in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

One of the principal objectives of world Zionism is to dominate the economy of the Middle East, including the Arab economy, and this is to take place in diverse ways.

Under these peaceful and normal relations, the Arab citizen, whether he is a worker, peasant, professional, merchant or intellectual, will be no more than a tool serving the Israeli economy. Furthermore, the state of peace as understood by Israel means the opening of the region to millions of Jewish immigrants from all over the world and the purchase of lands in the Arab world, as took place in Palestine, so that Jewish immigrants can live in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt and constitute a base for a new Israeli expansion in the framework of building the Jewish state from the Nile to the Euphrates.

It is from this angle that we should view the danger of the Egyptian President's visit to Jerusalem and the policy he is pursuing. This policy will achieve for the Israelis at Arab hands what Israel itself has failed to achieve in the past decades. The scheme has been unmasked, not through the visit, but through what has preceded and followed it. This becomes obvious when one examines the following:

1. President Sadat overstepped the boundaries of the unified Arab position as represented by the resolutions of the Arab summits which defined not only the objectives but also the means to realize them. He thus tried to eliminate the conflict's national dimensions.

2. The Egyptian President called yesterday for what he termed a preparatory meeting<sup>188</sup> which is intended to serve as a cover for an Israeli visit in the context of completing the implementation of the scheme that has been agreed upon.

3. The Egyptian President told the American television network ABC that he has decided to conclude a bilateral agreement with Israel, claiming that this does not conflict with a comprehensive

settlement.

4. He has accepted the concept of security as put forth by the Israelis both in his speech and in his subsequent statements.

The Israeli news media and their supporters in the world have tried to focus attention on President Sadat's speech and his promise not to sign a separate peace treaty, as well as his announced intention to adhere to Arab lands and the Palestine cause in an attempt to deceive Arab public opinion by diverting people's attention towards the speech and away from the visit, its aims and its circumstances.

These media have failed to remember that the Arab citizen, because of his national sentiments and his sensitivity to the Arab-Israeli conflict, cannot be deceived for the following reasons:

1. In his press conference, when the Egyptian President was asked for his views of the speeches made in the Knesset, he replied that "speeches do not express realities; realities are only expressed in closed meetings." With these words, he tried to reassure the Israelis that certain phrases change nothing.

2. The question at issue is not any speech—had it been so, he could have delivered it by way of the UN—but rather the dangerous implications of the visit to Jerusalem by an Arab head of state and the agreement reached prior to the visit itself concerning a number of questions.

3. In any event, a few days after that speech and his promises, the Egyptian President revealed his second move in his speech before the Egyptian People's Assembly,<sup>189</sup> when he invited the Israelis to Cairo under the pretext of a working committee. He also declared on the NBC television network that he intended to sign a bilateral agreement with Israel.

4. The Egyptian President abandoned his commitment to the cause of Palestine when he announced that he had abandoned the principle that the Palestine Liberation Organization represents the people of Palestine, and had accepted local autonomy under Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza.

5. The most dangerous aspects of this visit are the removal of Egypt from the arena of conflict and the pursuit of a policy which has led to deep divisions in the Arab homeland.

<sup>188</sup> Doc. 310 above.

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid.*



A gamble made for peace does not consist of showing all one's cards and handing over all one's weapons to the enemy, but of being in control of all these factors.

Gentlemen,

If the Israelis, under the pressure of Arab solidarity and international pressure, and with the possibility of a military flare-up, still persisted in their policies, in expansion and aggression, you can imagine how the enemy will react to President Sadat's policy of abandoning the Arab nation and its solidarity and of creating deep divisions in the Arab arena, and his declared abandonment of the use of all means, including the armed forces, to liberate the territories.

Mr. Speaker, Gentlemen,

In confronting this emergency arising from the visit made by the Egyptian President to the occupied territories, the following is required of us:

1. To mobilize Arab public opinion in order to confront the serious threat to its national destiny.

2. To create a cohesive Arab position around a general line, with the object of:

- (a) Foiling the consequences of the Sadat visit and the general plan of which this visit was a part.

- (b) Working to build the widest base for Arab solidarity around this line.

- (c) Emphasizing the national character of the conflict between us and the Israeli enemy so that responsibility for confronting this stage will always remain an Arab one.

In the light of these principles, the Syrian government will carry out a series of contacts and meetings with sister and friendly states and with various international forces—including the mini-summit meetings and the Popular Congress which will both be held in Libya in the next few days. The circumstances we face are not easy. Rather, they are highly complex. Whatever difficulties may confront us—and I do not wish to underestimate their importance—we shall overcome them, for we are fighting for a cause built on right and justice, and we have faith that our nation, which has undergone many centuries of injustice and aggression, will be able to overcome all difficulties.

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**Speech by King Hussein of Jordan cautioning the Arab nation against disunity following the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel (excerpt)<sup>190</sup>**

Amman, November 28, 1977

Our government has already announced in an official statement that President Sadat's visit came as a surprise to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and that that initiative took place at a time when Jordan was sincerely and persistently working to build a unified Arab position, beginning with the Arab confrontation states, i.e. Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, within a framework of comprehensive and firm Arab solidarity. Our view has been and still remains that solidarity among the Arab confrontation states and unified positions are the only means to achieve a peaceful and just settlement, and are the sole means to win world support for Arab rights and to apply the necessary international pressure upon the opponents of a just settlement and of legitimate Arab rights, inside and outside Israel. Thus, President Sadat's sudden decision to visit Israel<sup>191</sup> came on the eve of a preliminary agreement for which Jordan was working together with our brothers, the aim being to hold a meeting of Arab confrontation states which would set down the strategy of common action in a framework of rationality and flexibility, together with a sure commitment to Arab territories and to all the legitimate Palestinian rights. All our brothers have shared with us this sense of psychological shock as regards that unilateral decision, as well as the significance and symbolism attached to the fall of the barrier that separates the Arabs and Israel, before the liberation of Arab lands, before a just and honourable solution to the Palestinian problem and before Israel has declared its readiness to respond to Arab rights and demands in the context of a comprehensive settlement. We know that all consequences and ramifications of the Palestine problem affect us directly in Jordan, as they affect our brothers who live in immediate

<sup>190</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai'* (Amman), November 29, 1977.

<sup>191</sup> Doc. 283 above.

proximity to Israel and in the larger Arab homeland.

Nevertheless, I would like to state on this occasion that President Sadat's initiative came as a result of his own assessment of the Arab and international situation and was a reflection of Arab realities and conditions. It is this atmosphere of division of opinion, confusion and chaos, as well as the lack of sense of responsibility and the tendency to out bidding and emotionalism, which drive officials in the Arab world to adopt unilateral positions for which they have to suffer criticism and censure so long as they believe that these positions serve the interest of their people and nation. And while we have our own reservations towards the Egyptian initiative, as regards both substance and form, we understand the motives that impelled President Sadat to adopt that decision, a decision, moreover, which requires infinite courage and transcending the many traditions, customs and psychological barriers upon which we have built our positions towards Israel and towards our treatment of the Palestine question. We lived in a state of nervous tension as we watched that historically unique visit. We relived all the sorrows of the past, and the image of Jerusalem rose before us, the site of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the tomb of Hussain Ibn Ali, standard-bearer of the Arab revolution and the first among Palestine's noble martyrs. We recalled to mind the images of our children who have fallen in defence of its Arab character and for the sake of the cause of justice. Arab Jerusalem rose before us, and all the relatives behind the wall of occupation. We shared their terrible sorrows in their courageous steadfastness, and our hearts were with them. Despite all this, President Sadat's speech there and his public encounters with Israeli officials, besides being a unique historical event, presented a direct confrontation between the Arab viewpoint and the prejudiced and intransigent Israeli mentality with its fears, its greed and its illusions. No one in the whole Arab nation can deny the courage and daring of this confrontation, nor the zeal shown in piercing the barriers that impede peace and a just settlement. Moreover, no one can deny that this confrontation refuted the principal argument that Israel had employed as a pretext before the world, in order to foster illusions about true Arab intentions, to obstruct just solutions and to wreck the search for a just peace with purely formal excuses and legalistic complexities.

Fellow citizens,

All the reservations or legitimate objections that may be made regarding the Egyptian initiative should not be transformed into a wall of boycott among the Arab states or between some states and Egypt. For Egypt has played a role of enormous historic importance in the Arab renaissance, their progress and their anti-imperialist struggle, as well as a thirty-year old confrontation with Israeli racism and aggressive expansionism. The Egyptian people has suffered such pains and sacrifices as cannot be ignored or made light of, for the sake of the Arab cause and of Egypt's special responsibilities in the Arab homeland. Furthermore, it is neither logical nor acceptable, according to Arab standards of morality and basic principles of patriotic endeavours, for Arab sides to exchange charges of treason in the context of Arab action and of individual judgements no matter how extreme or how unusual such judgements may be. It is unacceptable that it should be said that Arab leadership can change overnight from being heroes of a battle to being deviationists from the national line.

The Arab homeland is at present witnessing a new state of affairs, a new reality, that cannot be ignored. Wisdom and higher Arab national interests decree that leaders and leaderships must rise above the effects of these recent developments and above any reactions or psychological shock. National interests require that conscious leaders work to prevent an irreparable and irreversible fragmentation of the Arab homeland which would cause the values of national unity, membership in a single nation and confrontation of the single common danger to be lost. If, God forbid, such a final rupture were to take place, the result would be disastrous to the nation and to the whole Arab culture. The fraternal leaders of the Arab nation must urge each other to contain this fragmentation, restore solidarity and rechannel these individualistic tendencies in a framework of cooperation, dialogue and sincerity. If boycott is entrenched, this will not rectify the error but will merely deepen divisions, reinforce individualistic tendencies and cause a further shift away from the context of Arab unity. Likewise, we will not succeed in attaining our rights or even some of them if the efforts made to achieve liberation and a just peace are individualistic and partial and ignore the exigencies of common action.

The enemies of our cause and our rights are

shrewd enough to infiltrate our divisions and exploit them in order to foil the course of a just peace and to encourage dissension in the Arab homeland. There is no other way to face these dangers but through wisdom, perspicacity, rationality and avoidance of emotionalism, no matter how sincere our fears may be.

The responsible leaders are those who face challenge together, and external and internal dangers in a spirit free from temporary emotionalism or passing considerations. They must apply a mature vision of the future, clarity in the perception of objectives and a transcendence of temporary considerations, no matter how important they may appear at the time, for the sake of the needs of the future and of long-term objectives.

I call upon my brothers, the Arab leaders, at this critical and sensitive juncture, to work courageously together to unite our ranks, prevent destructive division and make a common effort to rebuild a common position, no matter how difficult this may be. For the requirements of a long struggle to end occupation and to safeguard Palestinian national rights, indeed to protect the national and cultural existence of our nation, stipulate this common action as well as a profound vision of the future.

. . . . .

### 315

#### **Letter from the Central Command of the Palestine Rejection Front to the PLO Central Council condemning the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel and reiterating its refusal to participate in the Central Council meeting (excerpt)<sup>192</sup>**

November 30, 1977

We salute you in the name of the revolution.

The contingents of the Palestine Rejection Front received an invitation from brother Khalid Fahum, president of the Palestine National Council, to attend the session of the Central Council to be held in Damascus on November 30, 1977, for the purpose of reviewing political developments in the wake of the visit by the traitor Anwar Sadat to the occupied Palestinian territories.

The Central Command of the Front of Palestinian Forces that reject capitulationist solutions, after examining this invitation, reaffirmed its own adherence to its earlier resolutions which stipulate non-attendance in the membership and activities of the Central Council. This means that we boycott such meetings as a matter of course. At this time, we take the opportunity to set before the members of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization, our full views concerning both Sadat's recent treasonable step and the totality of the policies followed by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

1. In condemning and denouncing this visit, we affirm that Sadat would not have performed this shameful deed against our cause and our Palestinian masses, had not the Palestine Liberation Organization given its blessing to his actions from the beginning.

2. Condemnation of Sadat's treasonous step by the parties concerned should not be confined to steps of this kind, but should extend to the erroneous and dangerous policy which brought matters to this juncture and delivered the worst blow in our nation's recent history. We are referring specifically to the role of the PLO leadership in this context. The Palestine Liberation Organization has been used as a blind shelter by regimes working for a settlement as they moved towards treason and surrender to the Zionist-imperialist enemy, turning their backs upon all the glorious sacrifices of our Palestinian and Arab masses in half a century of selfless sacrifice.

3. We hold the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization chiefly responsible for Sadat's crime because of its policy of concessions, negotiations and losing bets on imperialist solutions, as if these solutions were to be regarded as coming from a neutral party in the conflict in the area.

All the policies pursued by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization have followed this pattern, especially its contacts with the Zionists in several European and US capitals, its readiness to attend the Geneva conference and its continued dealings with Arab reaction where its policies were tied to those of reactionary regimes. The most notable example of this policy is the acceptance of the resolutions of Riyadh and Cairo.

<sup>192</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra Mustamirra* (Beirut), 37/4, November 30, 1977, p. 3.

We in the Palestine Rejection Front hold fast to our earlier positions and policies as regards capitulationist solutions suggested for the Arab-Zionist conflict in the region. Recent developments call for our stronger adherence to our positions, the correctness and soundness of which have been confirmed by the treason of parties to the settlement who have led a campaign of slander against the progressive and radical positions and policies of the Rejection Front. In fact, quite a large number of members of the Central Council were among those who waged this campaign against us.

What is specifically required of you and of all forces and regimes that have agreed to these settlement measures, is the reassessment of their course of action, completely frank self-criticism before the masses, and the adoption of a clear public stand against settlement in all its forms.

. . . . .

We in the Palestine Rejection Front, as we set these observations before you, are fully aware, as are all the angry masses who reject this course of treason, that what Sadat has committed constitutes a direct challenge to our national rights in Palestine and shows contempt for our people and cause. As a result we must shoulder our full responsibilities in order to halt this crime, by establishing an alliance with all Arab revolutionary and progressive forces that have declared that this step is aimed against us, the Palestinian people and all the Arab masses. Nor should this involve merely issuing statements and making speeches, but rather the creation of a national, progressive and popular Arab front to mobilize the masses against Sadat's conspiracy and his grave deviation.

. . . . .

We in the Palestine Front rejecting capitulationist solutions, address this message to the Central Council to place before you your historic, national and patriotic responsibilities to safeguard the Arab character of Palestinian territories which Sadat has abandoned to the Zionist enemy. We again call upon you to reassess your past policies which have divided the unity of Palestinian ranks and thus are to blame for weakening the Palestine revolution. A strong Palestinian position can only be achieved on the basis of rejecting settlement, conciliation, recognition and negotiations, rejecting

the Geneva conference, rejecting resolution 242 and rejecting any dealings with the reactionary regimes.

In closing, we hereby submit the following practical proposals as declared by the Central Command of the Front of Palestinian Forces that reject capitulationist solutions as a means of confronting Sadat's conspiracy:

1. To work to isolate the Egyptian regime on the local, Arab and international levels, and to sever political and diplomatic ties with it.

2. To refuse to receive any official Egyptian envoy that may be sent to explain Sadat's mission and its treasonable consequences; to work for a boycott of every Egyptian or Arab official or journalist who took part in that shameful trip, and to prevent him from entering the Arab countries or from attending any Arab conferences or meetings, whether official or popular.

3. To refuse to participate in the forthcoming Arab summit if Sadat or any representative of the Egyptian regime attends it, on whatever pretext.

4. To work for the removal of the headquarters of the League of Arab States, and its related institutions from Cairo to any Arab capital whose regime is striving for the unity of the Arab position in confronting the policy of surrender and imperialist designs.

5. To work for the removal of the headquarters of Arab organizations, unions and popular institutions and their branches from Cairo to the capitals of progressive and nationalist Arab regions.

6. To call upon the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization to desist from any direct or indirect contacts with the Egyptian regime, to end all contacts both secret and open between its envoys abroad and Zionist officials, and to definitively abandon the idea of settlement, out of concern for a united Palestinian stand and the continuity of the revolution.

. . . . .

8. To urge the progressive regimes and the Arab popular forces to achieve a qualitative leap in the sphere of building a progressive Arab front, in order to rise to this grave situation precipitated by Sadat, and to combat the general tendency towards a settlement in the region.

9. To work towards the convening of a popular congress which would set down the political and popular measures to be taken with a view to

mobilizing the energies of the Arab nation in the battle of steadfastness and confrontation against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

10. To support the Egyptian patriotic and progressive forces so as to enable them to take the initiative in isolating the Egyptian regime from the Egyptian masses in preparation for its overthrow and the establishment of a patriotic and progressive regime in its place.

We hope that all comrade members of the Central Council will come round to the view that the time has come to adopt a critical attitude, to assess the course of past policy, and to learn lessons of the past, in a manner that will allow us to draw up a sound national programme to confront the conspiracies threatening our cause and our revolution.

### 316

#### **Letter from Acting Foreign Minister Ghali of Egypt to General Dayan of Israel inviting Israel to Cairo for a meeting preparatory to the Geneva conference.<sup>193</sup>**

Cairo, late November 1977

I wish to inform you of the initiative undertaken by the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, to invite the parties to the conflict in the Middle East, the co-chairmen of the Geneva peace conference, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to Cairo for an unofficial meeting.

The purpose of this meeting would be to prepare for the Geneva conference and to ensure its success in reaching a comprehensive settlement on the Middle East conflict so as to attain a just and permanent peace in the region.

Therefore, I write to invite you to name your delegates to this unofficial meeting to be held in Cairo at a date to be specified, no earlier than December 3, 1977.

<sup>193</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), November 29, 1977.

### 317

#### **Press interview statements by President Numairi of Sudan declaring his support for the policy of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)<sup>194</sup>**

Early December, 1977

*President Numairi:* The decision to make peace is more difficult than the decision to make war.

The Algiers and Rabat summits did not impose any restrictions for the implementation of Arab strategy. Freedom of action was left to the confrontation states to achieve their aims in the manner they saw fit, within the framework of this strategy. Should the decision be war, it is the right of these countries to take it. Thus, the Arab countries did not object when Egypt opted for the war decision. But when Egypt decides to opt for the peace decision, we find some Arab countries objecting this decision. If the war decision is a decision, the peace decision is also a decision.

President Anwar Sadat did not violate the Arab consensus, which had allowed the confrontation states the freedom to plan the strategy which they saw fit for the solution of the Middle East problem.

The Sudanese people, both on the popular and official levels, stand behind President Anwar Sadat and the Egyptian people.

Every Sudanese man and woman, everywhere, listens only to Egyptian radio broadcasts for his news.

Meetings and hysterical slogans declaring opposition to President Anwar Sadat's policy are neither objective nor logical. These meetings, in spite of their official nature, address only matters of form, not of substance. They concentrate on criticizing Sadat's going to Jerusalem and his meeting with the Israelis. This is not the crux of the matter.

The principal question being posed now in the Arab arena is: Is there to be a solution to find a just peace for the area or not?

Examining what Sadat has said and what he intends to do, we find him taking positive steps towards a just peace. He has demanded the rights

<sup>194</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 11, 1977.

of the Arabs in Jerusalem, and the rights of the Palestinians to found a national home, and announced that Egypt will not sign a separate peace treaty with Israel.

The Arabs must not stop the efforts of President Sadat in his move towards peace.

*Q. What is Sudan's position as regards Egypt's boycott of some Arab countries? Will this affect Sudan's move to consolidate Arab relations?*

A. Perhaps you mean to ask why Sudan did not react quickly? I can tell you that in my estimation, the Tripoli conference was inconclusive and rash, which is why it ended in so many frantic decisions. Egypt responded by severing diplomatic relations with some Arab countries. Sudan's role has been and still is, like Egypt's, to unite the Arab countries on a single line. Sudan's role is therefore a cautious one, and this implies slowness and requires deliberation. But Egypt does not accept, indeed, she rejects, the resolutions of Tripoli. That is her right and even her duty, and I cannot discuss her decision on the boycott. However, I am studying the decisions that I have to take, especially since I am still engaged in gathering this single family together by contacting the Arab countries. I hope these steps will bring about a new phase to safeguard Arab solidarity, whether towards peace or towards war.

In spite of all this tension and excitement pervading the area, I have great hopes that Iraq, Syria, Algeria and Palestine will go to Cairo to take part in the preparatory conference. I further expect the forthcoming Cairo conference to be of importance: Firstly, because it will be a preparatory conference, in the full sense of the word, and not a hasty and emotional conference, as people think, but will last for a long time.

Secondly, it will be a political conference based upon objectivity as well as serious studies and discussions. Recommendations for new studies will no doubt result, as required by the Geneva conference. Thus, no gaps will be left that might affect the success of the real conference for which we are all aiming, namely the Geneva conference.

Thirdly, the Cairo conference will take place between the Arabs and Israel. This will mark the first time that the outside world will not intervene. The Arab world, as the interested party, should be the one to face up to the require-

ments of its battle, without go-betweens, whether for war or peace. I repeat: I hope Syria, Iraq, Algiera and Palestine will take part especially since the Arab League no longer has any role.

*Q. What is your opinion of the Arab unions and organizations that attack Egypt?*

A. These are solitary and mercenary resolutions. Their members do not work for the cause of the Arabs but for personal interests. There is a simple question I want to put to these organizations and unions, and that is: where is the popular base on which they depend? Have their rank and file taken part with them in formulating these resolutions? Of course not. Another question: why do some Arab countries interject politics into professional questions? It so happened that there was a dentistry conference held in one of those Arab countries. The organizers of the host country wanted to insert many political recommendations into it, which caused the delegates of Egypt and Sudan to withdraw. What is the connection between politics and dentistry? I don't know.

What is happening now in the Middle East is closely connected with events in Africa. In the Sudan, for instance, we have no aggressive intentions against our neighbour Ethiopia; but the rising Soviet influence has begun to establish a foothold in Ethiopia, a brother country. Soviet strategy, we know, is to control the Horn of Africa and to re-establish its influence in the Middle East by gaining control over Sudan and Egypt. The role played by the Soviet Union in the world is thus the cause of our anxiety.

### 318

#### **Statement by the PLO Central Council declaring its position on the visit to Israel by President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)<sup>195</sup>**

**Damascus, December 1, 1977**

The Central Council of the PLO met in Damascus on November 30, 1977 with Mr. Khalid al-Fahum in the chair. Mr. Abu Ammar, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Palestine revolution, and the members of the Executive Committee, were present.

<sup>195</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), December 1, 1977, p. 1.

The Executive Committee presented a comprehensive review of the current Arab situation and the grave consequences for Arab struggle of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and occupied Palestine.

As a result of its discussion and analysis of Sadat's visit, the Council decided that Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity during the Id al-Adha both in itself, and because of its multiple ramifications, is a grave violation of the principles of Arab struggle against the Zionist-imperialist aggression that started in Palestine at the beginning of the century. This aggression seriously escalated in 1948, with the declaration of the establishment of the state of the Zionist enemy at the expense of our people, who were expelled from their homes, and in the subsequent wars of aggression, which revealed that the ambitions of the Zionist enemy are not restricted to Palestine but apply to the whole Arab area. The dangers involved in Sadat's visit are different from the previous trials and tribulations that Arab struggle has had to face in this period which have arisen from the nature of the conflict and the opposition of hostile forces. For this visit is an attack from the inside on the very essence of the Arab attitude to the conflict; it is an embodiment of Zionist thinking and involves the renunciation of Palestinian Arab rights. It divides Arab ranks and contravenes the Charter of the Arab League and the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in particular the Algiers and Rabat summits, and aims at removing Egypt from the front of conflict with the enemy.

This capitulationist policy, which led to the visit, and has been followed by an invitation to the Zionist enemy to attend a meeting in Cairo, constitutes a new threat to the Palestine revolution and high treason to the Palestinian Arab cause. Sadat's insistence on pursuing a policy of yielding to the terms of the enemy and of US imperialism is the greatest blow aimed at the Palestinian cause since its inception. For this policy has put the cause entirely at the mercy of US imperialism and the Zionist enemy, its base and principal tool in the Middle East. Sadat's visit also allows the Zionist entity to relax and recover its breath before starting on the implementation of a new stage in its schemes aimed at completing its domination of Arab territory, exploiting Arab resources and rendering the Arab area politically and economically subservient to the enemy and to its supporter and protector, the forces of imperialism, headed by the US. The visit also defies

the United Nations resolutions on the Palestine problem, which affirm the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return, to self-determination and to the building of its independent state in its land, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In the light of the above analysis of Sadat's capitulationist visit, the Central Council resolves the following:

1. The PLO, on the basis of its Charter and of its adherence to the resolutions of its National Council and the political declaration issued by the thirteenth session of the National Council, affirms its resolute condemnation of Sadat's visit to the occupied homeland and its determination to resist Sadat's move and all subsequent measures including the Cairo meeting called by Sadat, which the PLO rejects in both form and substance.

2. The Palestine Central Council is proud to salute the attitude to Sadat's visit of all mass organizations and nationalist bodies of our people in the occupied homeland, which attitude it regards as proof of our masses' rejection of this visit and of their determination to resist its consequences. The Council calls on the masses to strike with an iron hand at any attempt to withdraw from the framework of the PLO.

. . . . .

6. The Council believes that strengthening the strategic relationship between the PLO and Arab Syria and ensuring the cohesion of all nationalist Arab forces and regimes, constitute the central link in the steadfastness of the Arab nation in the face of the new conspiracy, in resisting it and eliminating its consequences.

The Council calls on all the Arab states to provide the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front with the support it needs to perform its duty of defending Arab territory and Arab rights.

7. The Council calls for effective action to strengthen and develop all forms of cooperation and coordination between the nationalist Arab forces and the socialist countries, headed by the friendly USSR.

8. The Central Council calls for redoubled efforts to encourage the Islamic and African countries and the non-aligned countries to resist Sadat's policy which opens the door to the forces of Zionism and imperialism in our area, in Africa and in the countries of the Third World.

Eternal glory to our noble martyrs.

Revolution until victory.

## 319

**Speech by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat pledging the continuation of the Palestinian struggle despite the setback caused by the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel (excerpt)<sup>196</sup>**

Tripoli, December 2, 1977

The gravity of President Sadat's action lies not merely in the trip itself, despite our condemnation of it, but rather in its effects on the international and Arab level and in what preceded and what will follow it, namely, the attempt to draw Egypt out of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to isolate the proud people of Egypt and its great army from the Arab region, by inciting sectarian sentiments and by blaming the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, for Egypt's economic deterioration.

More dangerous still, on the national level, is the fact that it is a step aimed against the Palestinian cause and an attempt to liquidate it through concessions that no one has the right to offer. This is because any concession can only serve the interests of the imperialist-Zionist scheme that seeks to subject our region to US influence so that not a single nationalist regime will exist on Arab soil and no voice will be heard calling for liberation or the defence of our nation's interests and rights in liberating Palestine, its usurped homeland.

From here, and motivated by our position of responsibility, and in the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in the name of the revolution of the Palestinian people and of all martyrs of the Arab nation, we say *No* to this step and *No* to any other Arab leader who tries to harm that cause or stab this people in the back. From this position of responsibility, we proclaim to all, that those who decide the fate of the land and the people of Palestine are those who carry the guns, the revolutionaries who carry forward the spotless banner which was handed on to them by earlier generations, without resort to

concessions or bargaining. From this position of national and historic responsibility towards the struggle of our people, standing here in this conference I declare to our people and to the entire Arab nation, as I say to those who have become impotent and fearful, and tossed their cards cheaply away, as I say also to world public opinion which has supported us and stood with us; I say to friends and foes alike: if this generation of our people is not able, because of the balance of Arab and international forces, to liberate its land, still it is not this generation's right to stab the cause in the back and to close the doors of liberation in the face of coming generations.

My fellow Arab leaders,

From this position of grave responsibility, allow me to lay before you certain facts from which I will deduce our policy and through which we can arrive at what is required of us at this serious stage.

1. Our revolution began on January 1, 1965, during our darkest hour, for the sake of liberating the whole of our Palestinian soil. It benefited from our resources as a Palestinian Arab vanguard and the support of a strong and capable Arab front to help it and open before it all fronts and to fight with it to attain the strategic goal embodied in our call for a democratic Palestinian state.

2. After the national October war, waged jointly by the great Egyptian army, the heroic army of Syria and the forces of the Palestine revolution, together with other Arab brethren, new facts were created. We had two choices; either we would resort to negativism, from which we had reaped nothing but blood and destruction, or we would deal with the facts without endangering the national and historic rights of our people.

We chose the second alternative and laid down a transitional plan for our struggle which was confirmed by the Algiers and Rabat summits. This was a plan followed by all serious revolutions. Its historic value lies in the fact that it linked the transitional plan with the strategic line in a way such that all constituent elements were interconnected, with no room for concessions or bargaining.

In all frankness, fellow Arab leaders, one reason why we moved in this direction was our concern for all Arabs, especially Egypt and its people, and for the unity of the Arab position. Naturally, our first priority in making this choice was the

<sup>196</sup> Speech made at the Tripoli Steadfastness and Confrontation Summit; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), 283/219, (December 12, 1977).



interests of our people and the future of our struggle.

The same courage with which we carried arms to launch our revolution made us follow this realistic policy that is far removed from surrender or from harming the historic rights of our people. The soundness of our approach is confirmed by statements which the Zionist enemy has made, even after Sadat's visit to our usurped homeland, rejecting absolutely our people's national rights, and its right to self-determination and to create its independent state on the soil of its homeland. This does not prevent us from admitting before you that certain of our actions were negative as we pursued that path. However, I tell you frankly and boldly, and this is directed both at you and at other Arab regimes that are not represented here: Let him who is free from guilt cast the first stone; but how many stones must others receive as well.

My fellow Arab leaders,

We are not here to settle accounts with each other. Let us examine the past only to the extent that it can help us to take bold and decisive steps to face Sadat's visit to our usurped land and our occupied Jerusalem and to face the future with strength and determination in order to contain the consequences of this visit.

I ask you here: Does not our Arab nation expect us to issue a historical statement recording our attitude to Sadat's visit to Israel, and are we not here to pronounce our innocence of a crime committed at the expense of our nation and the honour of its struggle?

This is indeed required of us, so that the Arab nation can be clear in its mind and determine its policy frankly and clearly. But this is not enough. The visit that Sadat made to the Zionist enemy is the expression of a US plan aimed against us all as a nation, as regimes and as a civilization. Our position regarding it should be more important than the statement itself, than all condemnations and speeches. Accordingly, I submit to you the thinking of the Palestine revolution as represented by the PLO regarding what we can do in the short and long terms, so that our plan will proceed on solid and realistic ground.

First, our strategic line has been and remains the total liberation of our national Palestinian soil. Palestine will remain Arab, Arab, Arab no matter how long it takes and how grievous the sacrifices may be.

Secondly, we back you in formulating any plan you see fit for the sake of total liberation, taking into account our potentialities as well as those of our friends in the world. But we must begin now, not later, because this is our people's most cherished aspiration and the only road to salvation from the sorrows they face now and have faced in the past as they live patiently and steadfastly under occupation and outside Palestine.

Thirdly, we shall continue with our revolution. Our struggle will not end and our determination to prolong it will not weaken. All that we hope from you is that your conference, which represents the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation, should make of each state a Hanoi for the Palestine revolution, beginning with Syria, the principal confrontation state, and all the way to Tinduf and Sumatra.

Fellow Arab leaders,

This is our view of our long-term common goals. We are prepared to shoulder our responsibilities which mean nothing more than our existence as an organization of fighters, faithful and steadfast, as well as the strength of the cause we are honoured to represent as a vanguard entrusted with its protection against all conspiracies.

There remains that which is required of us now to arrest the deterioration. In all frankness and with an open heart we submit our ideas to you. Discussions about them should transcend all vestiges of the past and rise to the level of the gravity of the event we are living through. A setback may overtake our nation if we limit ourselves to discussing formalities and the goal of this conference fails to become a discussion of substantive issues and realities.

1. We must realize that whatever may affect one of us will affect the other. This is the goal of the US plan in the region. Let us therefore declare the creation of our national front for opposition and confrontation united in solidarity and joint responsibility through a common pact in which an attack on any member of the front is to be regarded as an attack on all, and let us lay down a practical plan of implementation.

2. The announcement of the establishment of a north-eastern front made up of Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Iraq, whereby aid is furnished to this front militarily, materially and politically by other front members, where each party bears its full responsibilities to strengthen

this front so that it can foil any adventurous attempt made by any other Arab regime that wishes to follow in Sadat's footsteps and be another link in its chain.

3. This front must constitute a solid, self-reliant base. At the same time, it must be capable of attracting any other Arab forces that feel it to be their national and patriotic duty to join us directly. The cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs. Everyone should shoulder his responsibilities.

4. We must strengthen and consolidate our relations with the Soviet Union, with the socialist countries, with all friendly states in Africa and in the non-aligned bloc and with the Islamic states, who stand by our rights and support the policy of steadfastness represented by this front. The Soviet Union has an international status which must receive our appreciation and attention so that it may be our ally against the US-Zionist project of surrender.

5. Among our top priorities should be support for the Syrian front with all our military and economic resources as well as support for the Palestine revolution so that it will not be limited in its freedom of action to face the dangers of the present stage.

Fellow Arab leaders,

Allow me finally to note that President Sadat's visit to the Zionist enemy and its grave consequences must not obscure our vision so that we see only this condemned trip and its dangerous consequences and ramifications and thus discount a stage of our political struggle during which we were able to achieve several victories on the international scene through political action and to win gains for our people by our objective and realistic presentation of our people's rights in international forums and among world public opinion.

Therefore, and without overbidding, let us record the strategic position which deals with the substance of the issue and the total liberation of our land, but let us formulate these views and measures as you see fit so as not to conflict with our declared policy as stated in international forums and to our Soviet and other friends among the world's nations. Thus our direction will not conflict with the international support for our rights and our freedom of action will not be constrained at any level, political or diplomatic.

Fellow Arab leaders,

I have already taken much of your time. In the name of our steadfast people, both inside and outside our occupied homeland, I salute you once more. We pledge our faithfulness to the trust. We shall not abandon our responsibility; we will keep our fingers on the trigger. If a company of martyrs falls in battle, another company of heroes will carry the fighter's torch aloft. I appeal to you to be practical and objective and not to bargain away or surrender anything. Let the world know that a just peace cannot take place by bypassing our Palestinian people and its rights to its land. Everyone will know that our revolution is capable of further mobilizing the energies of our Arab nation, as we have demonstrated at an earlier stage, transforming them into revolutionary energy capable of smashing any rottenness in the Arab homeland. Even were it to stand alone, the Palestine revolution would not allow anyone to harm or bargain away its cause. All those who bargain and conspire will receive a harsh reckoning at the hands of their peoples. Fellow Arabs, we are faced with two choices: to be or not to be. We have decided to struggle, to be steadfast and to fight. It is better for us to die as revolutionary fighters who do not bargain their cause away whatever the difficulties, conspiracies and sacrifices may be.

To end my remarks, allow me to thank my brother, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, for his invitation to this conference and to thank my fellow fighters the Arab leaders and state representatives from among the revolutionary leadership in the Arab homeland.

Long live Palestine, free and Arab. Long live the Arab struggle for its liberation. Eternal glory to our noble martyrs. Revolution until victory

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**Six-point programme agreed to by the various Palestinian organizations calling for the formation of a "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" in opposition to Sadat's negotiations with Israel<sup>197</sup>**

**Tripoli, December 4, 1977**

In the wake of Sadat's treasonous visit to the Zionist entity, all factions of the Palestinian Resistance Movement have decided to make a practical answer to this step. On this basis, they met and issued the following document:

We, all factions of the PLO, announce the following:

*First:* We call for the formation of a "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" composed of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Democratic Yemen, Syria and the PLO, to oppose all capitulationist solutions planned by imperialism, Zionism and their Arab tools.

*Second:* We fully condemn any Arab party in the Tripoli Summit which rejects the formation of this Front, and we announce this.

*Third:* We reaffirm our rejection of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

*Fourth:* We reaffirm our rejection of all international conferences based on these two resolutions, including the Geneva Conference.

*Fifth:* To strive for the realization of the Palestinian people's rights to return and self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian national state on any part of Palestinian land, without reconciliation, recognition or negotiations, as an interim aim of the Palestinian Revolution.

*Sixth:* To apply the measures related to the political boycott of the Sadat regime.

In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unificatory document:

—The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah: Abu Ayyad [Salah Khalaf].

—The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Dr. George Habbash.

—The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Nayef Hawatmeh.

—The P.F.L.P.—General Command: Ahmad Jabril.

—Vanguards of the People's Liberation War, Saiqa: Zuhair Muhsin.

—Arab Liberation Front: Abdul-Rahim Ahmad

—Palestinian Liberation Front: Talaat Ya'qoub.

—P.L.O.: Hamed Abu-Sitta.

321

**Press statement by the Iraqi delegation to the Arab summit in Tripoli explaining its reasons for withdrawing from the conference (excerpts)<sup>198</sup>**

**Tripoli, December 5, 1977**

1. Iraq attended the Tripoli conference out of awareness of her national responsibility to confront the challenges of colonialism and Zionism, which want to impose capitulationist settlement on the Arab nation through agents and those who have followed the course of settlement.

Although Iraq called for the convening of a summit conference in Baghdad on December 5, 1977, when she saw that a serious Arab meeting was needed to set matters on a correct course capable of confronting the dangers of the Arab situation that has arisen from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's treasonable journey—nevertheless, because of her awareness of her national responsibility, she immediately accepted the invitation to attend a summit conference in Tripoli.

2. During the conference Iraq made serious and sincere efforts to overcome previous differences and conflicts in the hope of achieving a loftier goal—the establishment of a national front; and we showed great flexibility in this regard.

3. We are prepared to shoulder full national responsibility within the framework of a true national front based on a clear and sound charter including a long-term programme of struggle. This position was stated in the letter of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, President of the Iraqi Republic, to the heads of the Arab states taking part in the conference, and to the PLO. We are not prepared to take part in a front, based on a

<sup>197</sup> Announced by Fatah Central Council member Salah Khalaf at a press conference in Tripoli; Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 5, 1977, p. 4; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), VII, 3 (Spring, 1978), p. 188.

<sup>198</sup> Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Baghdad), December 6, 1977.

policy of settlement, Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and the Geneva conference. We have rejected this basis from the start with the utmost conviction, and [*word unclear*] the conflict between the Arab nation, Zionism and imperialism.

4. Iraq is not prepared to adopt a subservient attitude and to support and justify the deviant attitudes adopted in the previous stage which have reduced the Arab situation to its present state of collapse.

National duty requires that these attitudes and policies be courageously and sincerely abandoned. This is the will of the masses.

6. Iraq proposed that the conference should discuss the principles mentioned in the letter of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as a basis for the establishment of a progressive national front. The most important of these principles were:

(a) The abandonment of the former programme of action which was based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and Geneva; the abandonment of any direct meetings with the Zionist enemy.

(c) Every effort must be made to support the Palestine revolution and the Nationalist Movement in Lebanon so that they may fulfil their roles in confronting the Zionist enemy.

(e) Commitment to the principles of the Arab nation, which the masses have advocated throughout their struggle—rejection of the principles of negotiation, recognition and peace with the Zionist entity and of bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people and insistence on the liberation of all of the Palestinian homeland and the occupied Arab territories as a strategic goal of their struggle.

(f) The full mobilization of the energies and capabilities of the masses of the Arab nation in the political, military, economic, financial and other fields, and their concentration towards a true confrontation of the Zionist enemy.

(g) Unanimous agreement among all contingents of the Palestine resistance on a programme of struggle until liberation as the only means to recover Palestine.

(h) The adoption of an unambiguous policy in the relations between the Palestine resistance and the Syrian regime that will ensure the former's independence and freedom in moving towards the achievement of its goals.

8. In the light of this attitude and with the aim of focusing on the positive elements in the general attitude of the conference, we submitted a proposal aimed at securing the following:

(a) The conference's agreement on the need to form a progressive national front.

(c) An invitation to the heads of the Arab states attending the Tripoli conference and the PLO to attend a meeting to be held within a month in Baghdad to draft a charter for the Front.

10. Inasmuch as we believe that continued pursuit of this negative course is incompatible with our political line, our principles and the aspirations of our masses, who believe in liberation as their destiny for the defence of their honour and their national rights, we have decided to withdraw from the conference. However, we shall persist in our sincere efforts to establish a progressive national front at the official and popular levels on the basis of a charter including a programme of struggle as well as specific commitments to be met by the participating parties.

## 322

### **Statement by the Arab countries opposed to the visit to Israel by President Sadat of Egypt analyzing the effects of the visit and outlining moves to confront its consequences<sup>199</sup>**

**Tripoli, December 5, 1977**

At the invitation of brother Muammar Qadhafi, a summit conference<sup>200</sup> was held in Tripoli, the capital of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya, from

<sup>199</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), December 6, 1977.

<sup>200</sup> See docs. 319–322 above.

Dhu al-Hijja 22–25, 1397 A.H., December 2–5, 1977. The conference was attended by Their Excellencies:

1. President Houari Boumedienne, of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic,
2. President Hafiz Asad of the Syrian Arab Republic,
3. Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Secretary General of the People's General Congress of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya,
4. Abdel Fattah Ismail, Secretary General of the Unified Political Organization—the National Front, representing the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen,
5. Yasin Ramadan, representing the President of the Iraqi Arab Republic,
6. Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

The statement was signed by all of the above with the exception of Mr. Ramadan, the Iraqi delegate, who withdrew from the conference before the final session.

Inspired by the sentiments of full national responsibility, the conference studied the dimensions of the present period through which the Arab cause in general and the Palestinian cause in particular are passing, and the US-Zionist plans aimed at imposing capitulationist settlements on the Arab nation, prejudicing the established national rights of the Palestinian people, liquidating the Arabs' national achievements and striking at the Arab liberation movement in preparation for the subjugation of the Arab area, gaining control of its destiny and binding it to world imperialism.

The conference also studied President Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity, as part of the implementation of these hostile plans.

The conference reviewed the consequences of this visit which flagrantly violates the principles and goals of the national struggle against the Zionist enemy, neglects the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and contravenes in the most serious degree the Charter of the Arab League and the Arab summit resolutions. This visit has also removed Egypt from the front of conflict with the Zionist enemy. Thus the conference holds that President Sadat is rendering a great service to Zionism and US imperialism and their plans and perpetuating

their base and tool in the Arab area, the Zionist entity.

The conference, pledging to the Arabs the continuation of struggle and steadfastness and confrontation, and its commitment to the objectives of Arab struggle, expresses its deep faith and total confidence that the Arab nation—which has launched revolutions and defeated difficulties and plots during the course of its long history of heroic struggle—today is able to respond with strength to those who have misused its honour, sold its rights, stabbed its solidarity and abandoned the principles of its struggle. With faith that its abilities in liberation, progress and victory are bestowed by God, the conference records its confidence in Palestinian national unity within the framework of the PLO.

## 323

**Memorandum issued by the municipal councils, societies, trade unions, clubs and notables of the West Bank and Gaza Strip condemning the visit of President Sadat of Egypt to Israel and his attempt to bypass the Palestine Liberation Organization as representative of the Palestinian people<sup>201</sup>**

December 8, 1977

At a time when our Palestinian cause, with its patriotic, national and humanitarian dimensions, is facing a decisive stage the effects of which are not confined to the life and national unity of our Palestinian people, but encompass the entire Arab nation, and after our cause had won worldwide attention as a result of the Palestinian people's struggle and steadfastness in its camps, in the occupied territories and wherever else it lives dispersed throughout the world, and as a result also of the Arab people's struggle against Zionist and imperialist challenge, we were shocked by President Sadat's visit to Israel on November 19,

<sup>201</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa*, Special Supplement (Beirut), December 9, 1977. The memorandum was signed by the following:

Mayors of Nablus, Anabta, Qalqilya, Araba, Halhul, Ramallah, Betunia, Silwad, Jericho, Tulkarm, Jenin, Salfit, Hebron, Dura, Bireh, Bir Zeit, Bani Zeid; the deputy mayors of Bethlehem and Beit Jala; member of the municipality of Beit Sahur, Atallah Rashmawi; Family Revival Society; Youth Social Centers in Jalazun camp (Ramallah), Tulkarm camp, Arrub camp, Qalandia camp, Dihesha camp; Ladies' Benevolent Society, Jericho; Arab Womens' Union Association, Bireh; Womens' Progress Society, Ramallah; Family Planning and Protection Society, Bireh and Ramallah; Friends' Benevolent Society, Jenin Benevolent Society; Chambers of Commerce in the West Bank, Tulkarm Chamber of Commerce; Qalqilya Chamber of Commerce; Qalandia Camp Benevolent Society; Employees' Club, Jerusalem; Al-Hilal Athletic Club, Jerusalem; First Ramallah Scout Troop; Palestine Red Crescent, Bireh; Bireh Youth Club; Bani Zeid Athletic Club; Orthodox Club, Ramallah; Construction and Institutional Workers' Union, Ramallah and Bireh; General Union Labour Syndicates, Nablus; Union of Engineers, Jerusalem; Tulkarm Workers' Union; Bethlehem Workers' Union; Palestine Red Crescent, Tulkarm; Union of Benevolent Societies, Jerusalem; President of the Arab Graduates Club, Jerusalem; President of the Union of Engineers in the West Bank; Tulkarm Union of Doctors; Volunteer Work Committee, Ramallah and Bireh; President of the Union of Doctors in the West Bank; Electric Company Workers, Jerusalem; Clothing Workers' Union, Jerusalem branch; Arab Orthodox Club, Beit Sahur; President of the Lawyers' Guild, Gaza; President of the Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem.

1977, and the dangers attendant upon that visit.

We declare our dissatisfaction with President Sadat's step because of its probable consequences and dangers, and because he omitted in his Knesset speech<sup>202</sup> any mention that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. We further declare that the Palestine Liberation Organization is fully justified in adopting and indeed must adopt the position it has as regards that trip and that this position is a clear reflection of the position of the Palestinian people. However, out of a sense of responsibility, we note that President Sadat committed himself not to resort to a unilateral solution with Israel and declared his adherence to the Arab character of Jerusalem, the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, the return of the refugees to their homes and granting the Palestinian people the rights to determine its destiny and create its independent state.

We call to mind the world's commitment to UN resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution no. 3236 of November 22, 1974<sup>203</sup> as well as the resolutions of the summit conferences of Algiers<sup>204</sup> and Rabat<sup>205</sup> which hold that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere. Accordingly, we declare our adherence to these resolutions and affirm our commitment to the resolutions of the thirteenth session of the Palestine National Council held in Cairo.<sup>206</sup> We call upon all quarters to respect the commitment of the people of the world, including our Palestinian people. We condemn any attempt to damage the legitimate rights of our people, principally its right to determine its own destiny.

Based on these facts, we affirm the following principles:

1. While declaring our views as regards the visit of President Sadat to Israel, we affirm our belief in Egypt's role and its sacrifices for the sake of the cause of Palestine and of the Arab struggle. We affirm the depth of the alliance between our people and the people of Egypt and our unshakable belief in the central role of Egypt

<sup>202</sup> Doc. 298 above.

<sup>203</sup> Docs. 331-333 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

<sup>204</sup> Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>205</sup> See Appendix A below.

<sup>206</sup> See docs. 228 to 231 above.

in the battle for Arab liberation, and we salute the struggle of its people and their great sacrifices.

2. The savagery of the battle, in the shadow of the current imperialist attack upon the gains of our people and of the Arab people, calls for the launching of a broad Arab offensive to include all Arab states that reject all forms of imperialist attack upon the region, as well as all popular Arab organizations and the Palestine Liberation Organization. All economic, political and military resources must be mobilized to confront this attack and put an end to conspiracies against all our national gains in the Arab homeland and to deepen the alliance of this front with all anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist forces.

3. Our Palestinian people in the occupied territories are perfectly clear in affirming their belief in the unity of the Palestinian people both inside and outside. They further affirm the unity of Palestinian representation by the Palestine Liberation Organization which is the sole body authorized to speak in the name of this people. We condemn any attempt to establish an alternative or parallel leadership.

4. The rights of our Palestinian people, reaffirmed in various United Nations resolutions, are rights that are not subject to negotiation. Foremost among these rights is this people's legitimate right to self-determination on its land in total freedom. Accordingly, we reject all forms of tutelage, whatever their source, as well as all types of settlement that infringe upon the independence of this people or its will. Thus we also reject any forced relationship between the Palestinian state and any other party, so long as this conflicts with the freedom of our people to exercise self-determination.

5. From the occupied territories we salute the struggle of all Arab peoples and salute all forces that have supported our just struggle. But first and foremost, we salute the struggle of our people outside, led by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and call for a firm stand against all attempts to undermine Arab solidarity as built upon the will of the Arab nation to rid itself of the imperialist attack and Zionist aggression.

## 324

**Political statement issued by the Arab People's Congress defining measures to confront the policies of President Sadat of Egypt<sup>207</sup>**

**Tripoli, December 9, 1977**

The Arab People's Congress convened under the slogan of confronting the lackey Sadat regime's conspiracy against the Palestinian cause, condemning the policy of abandoning the historic national rights of the Arab nation, and rejecting all formulas and methods leading to the recognition of the enemy Zionist entity; and under the slogan of responding to the challenge with a unified militant stand expressing the anger of our Arab nation, and of rooting out treason and traitors in defense of the national right, so as to safeguard the honour, dignity, and values of the nation and the sacredness of the struggle. The Arab People's Congress, for all political, popular and professional organizations in all countries of the Arab nation, met in Tripoli, in the Libyan Arab Popular Socialist Jamahiriyya from 25 to 28 Dhu'l-Hijja 1397 A.H., corresponding to 5 to 8 December 1977.<sup>208</sup> With seriousness and a sense of historic responsibility, the popular congress studied the situation that has arisen from Sadat's shameful and dishonourable visit to the usurper Zionist entity, in the light of imperialist moves under the leadership of the United States of America, Zionism and reaction, which intend to liquidate the Palestine question and to return the Arab nation to the sphere of imperialist and Zionist military and economic hegemony. They also intend to liquidate the Arab progressive regimes and to strike at the democratic, social and economic gains of the masses.

The Arab People's Congress sees Sadat's treacherous visit to the Zionist enemy entity as a natural result of the policy of capitulationist solutions. It is a phase in the Sadat regime's policy of patriotic and national deviation which is closely linked to all the plans of imperialism, under the leadership of the United States of America, for the containment of the Arab nation with its wealth of natural resources and its economic, strategic and

<sup>207</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), December 10, 1977.

<sup>208</sup> See docs. 319–322 above.

human potential. Further, it is a phase in the policy of consolidating the dominance of the Zionist entity over the Arab Palestinian land and its human and economic potentialities, of releasing it from its international isolation and allowing it to expand in other parts of the Arab land.

The Arab People's Congress believes that this treacherous visit is bound to isolate the people of Egypt from its historic role in the Arab struggle. It stabs the Palestinian Arab people in the back while it is still in the heat of the battle both inside occupied Palestine, where steadfast resistance continues, and outside Palestine where it is escalating its struggle in the face of imperialist and Zionist plans and conspiracies for its liquidation.

A realization of the capitulationist tendency and an abandonment of national rights, this visit gives reactionary Arab forces, allied imperialism and Zionism the opportunity to openly declare their enmity against the armed Palestine revolution, to concede, negotiate and desert. The visit also embarrasses our friends among the progressive countries and forces of the world.

Conscious of all these facts, shouldering its national and historic responsibility, and with fateful and revolutionary insistence an achieving all the national and social aims of the Arab liberation revolutionary movement, the Arab People's Congress condemns the treasonable visit and the policy of capitulation and surrender. It salutes, and supports completely, the Tripoli communiqué<sup>209</sup> issued by the summit conference of the Arab progressive countries, which carry the responsibility of steadfastness and support of the Palestine resistance; it considers the communiqué a historic document defining the unitary progressive path of Arab struggle.

The Arab People's Congress hails the unity, confirmed during the summit, of the Palestine revolution's contingents within the framework of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It further hails the rise of the unified national front and the cohesion between the PLO and the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Congress sees in the communiqué a firm expression of the unity of the forces of the Arab revolution in facing the Zionist enemy, confronting the imperialist conspiracy and aborting all the formulas for the proposed capitulationist solutions.

It confirms the rejection of political settlements and insistence on liberation as the only demand of the Arab nation, one which it must realize through its will and personal abilities.

The Arab People's Congress resolves to confront Sadat's treason with clearcut measures and a national settling of accounts as the practical and firm answer to US imperialism, Zionism, reaction and its agents.

The following resolutions were adopted:

I. To take immediate measures against imperialist interests in the Arab homeland, and especially US interests, through the economic potentialities that are being furnished to them, as these interests serve the renegade Egyptian regime and the reactionary regimes in the Arab homeland. Striking at military and economic imperialist interests in the Arab homeland should, therefore, constitute a priority in the programme of confrontation against the Sadat regime, capitulationist regimes and the Zionist imperialist front.

II. To crystallize the revolutionary liberation struggle in the Arab and Egyptian arenas and to support its nationalist forces so as to enable them to face up to reaction and its regimes. The Arab masses would then be able to bring down these renegade, capitulationist and lackey façades.

III. To work to adopt practical measures to confront Sadat's regime. This confrontation would be a means to challenge and arrest the policies of capitulation. The Arab masses and progressive national regimes should take practical measures to demonstrate to the lackey Egyptian regime, and to all capitulationist regimes, the true ability of the masses and revolutionary regimes to overturn all capitulationist solutions and their applications. These measures are:

1. To withdraw recognition of the Egyptian regime.

2. To expel the Egyptian regime from the Arab League.

3. To transfer the seat of the Arab League from the capital of the Sadat regime to another Arab country.

4. To apply the boycott laws now in force against the Zionist enemy to institutions, companies, bodies and persons undertaking relations with the Zionist enemy and its institutions and

<sup>209</sup> Doc. 322 above.



companies, in particular after the regime's transformation of the Egyptian arena into a field for Zionist monopolies.

5. To transfer all mass institutions, whether syndicates, unions or Arab associations, from the capital of the Egyptian regime to other Arab countries which, due to their serious and real national orientation, are better qualified to receive them; to make those national institutions instruments of struggle for the realization of the Arab masses' aspirations to liberation and unity.

6. Sadat's treason is as much a national political crime as a criminal act according to Egyptian and Arab League law. The Congress resolves to set up a national court to try this lackey renegade. It requests the Permanent Secretariat of the Congress to immediately take the necessary measures to try Egypt's lackey renegade ruler, the traitor of the struggles of the Arab nation, together with all the agents and traitors who have been and still are in contact with the Zionist enemy.

#### IV.

1. To admit to the universities of progressive Arab countries, Palestinian and Arab students already expelled or to be expelled from Egyptian universities by the regime of the traitor Sadat.

2. The formation of an information committee emanating from the Secretariat of the Congress, to undertake to clarify to world public opinion, through all information media, that we seek a real and just peace. The only just peace is the one that restores rights to its legitimate owners. The conflict is not between us and the Jews; it is between us and Zionism, the racist aggressive movement of expropriators.

3. In response to the needs of the present phase, the Congress resolves to transfer the Preparatory Committee of the Arab People's Congress into a General Permanent Secretariat, located in the city of Tripoli. The Secretariat shall consist of

1. The Libyan Arab Socialist Popular Jamahiriyya
2. The Syrian Arab Republic
3. The Popular Democratic Algerian Republic
4. The Iraqi Republic
5. The Democratic Republic of Yemen
6. The Palestine Liberation Organization
7. The Lebanese National Movement
8. The Egyptian Arab national-patriotic forces

The Congress empowers the General Secretariat to take the measures it deems necessary to confront

developments and eventualities, and to consider itself in permanent session until the second congress is convened.

It considers the political document of the Congress as the starting point for intellectual and political effort towards the establishment of the revolutionary progressive popular front against the reactionary Zionist-US imperialist onslaught.

325

### **Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the Cairo conference and the roles of the US and the USSR in the search for peace<sup>210</sup>**

**Cairo, December 10, 1977**

*Q. Are you hopeful that the Cairo conference will produce a set of principles for a comprehensive settlement that will commend themselves to some of the other Arab leaders in this area?*

A. We are working. I have already proposed this Cairo meeting to work toward this end. Instead of starting discussing procedural arrangements in Geneva, we should agree upon all these points and prepare the whole approach and the land, like the Secretary said, for Geneva to succeed.

*Q. What do you expect of the American role?*

A. Someone said that after my initiative and after I visited Jerusalem that the American role is of less importance. I say no. The American role after my visit is much more confirmed, like I said it before. And no one can imagine that in 30 hours' visit to Jerusalem and having discussions with the Israelis responsible have solved already the 30 years'—the last 30 years'—difficulties that we had among us. So the American role, as I said, is confirmed rather than minimized.

*Q. How long do you think the Cairo meeting will go on for? When do you think a Geneva conference could now be convened?*

A. Let us hope that they reach the end that we are agreed upon; that is, preparation for Geneva.

<sup>210</sup> Excerpted from the text *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington), no. 2010, (January, 1978), pp. 40–41. For US Secretary Vance's statements at the same press conference see doc. 192 above.

The time is open. The discussion also is open. That is what I have agreed already today with Secretary Vance. Really, you should always skip any fixing of dates or so, as much as the Cairo conference is working and preparing and paving the way toward Geneva. The peace process is in momentum, and that is what we are after, all of us.

*Q. Do you need the United States' help to negotiate with Israel, or will you take care of all the negotiations yourself?*

A. The United States is, number one, cochairman. Number two, the United States enjoys the confidence of me and the Israelis. And this is of great importance, because as I told you, whenever we need to bring our discussions to, I mean, a proper way, or whenever there is a gulf between us, the United States for sure can bring us together.

*Q. Could you please tell us whether or not you are pleased with the Israeli response to your initiative that has resulted—the Israeli response over the past 2 weeks?*

A. Not yet. They haven't answered.

*Q. What specifically do you want the Israelis to do at this stage?*

A. I shouldn't say it before the microphones and so forth.

*Q. At what point do you expect Syria and Jordan to come back into this process?*

A. In the meeting we have arranged their places for them to come, and whenever they choose to come we shall be very happy to have them with us. I told King Hussein yesterday and I told him to take his time. I'm not urging him.

*Q. Are you at all upset or dismayed at the continuing criticism of your initiative by some Arab governments and by the Soviet Union?*

A. Not at all. It has happened before, even much more vehement than this time you remember after the second disengagement agreement; for one year and a half they continued, but it doesn't worry me at all. And, unfortunately, this is our habit.

*Q. There is a great deal of speculation that if the other Arab leaders do not approve a set of principles for a comprehensive settlement that you will then seek a separate peace with Israel. Is that accurate or not?*

A. Not at all, not at all. I would have fulfilled

it either before Jerusalem or during my visit or after that. Really, our aim will always be a comprehensive settlement.

*Q. Is it contemplated that this conference will expand to the foreign minister level in the next month or so?*

A. Let us hope so. But this will depend upon the development after the meetings take place here, and it is a possibility, yes.

*Q. Have you agreed with King Hussein on the Palestinian question?*

A. King Hussein and I agree to the strategy that has been adopted by the Arab summit in Rabat. This strategy contains two points: number one, the withdrawal from the land occupied after 1967; number two, solving the Palestinian question, all the aspects of the Palestinian question. It is not a humanitarian question anymore. Part of it is humanitarian—I mean the refugee problem—but still the solving of the problem in itself. So King Hussein and I, when we have our discussions, we have discussed all these issues according to this strategy.

*Q. At what point do you expect to bring the Palestinians into the discussions?*

A. Let me say this. We are ready to have them with us; their place will be prepared for them whenever they choose to come.

*Q. Back in 1973 the whole idea of having cochairmen at the Geneva conference was that the United States was the closest friend of your enemy Israel and the Soviet Union was thought to be the closest friend of Egypt. Have events moved so fast, has your relationship with Moscow changed so much that this structure is no longer useful?*

A. I fear that you are not following what is happening really. My difficulties with the Soviet Union were long before the October war. And on this same issue they wanted to be my spokesman or my guardian. And I refused. And I still refuse this. This has happened long before the October war and continued after the October war.

*Q. [Inaudible] Rabat summit decision about the Palestinians, that Rabat decision to which you refer, that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the Palestinians. Is it true, still now, for you?*

A. That the PLO is the representative? Yes.

Yes, in spite of the fact that the Tripoli conference in its decisions<sup>211</sup> has canceled this.

*Q. Did you ask Mr. Vance this morning for specific help on preparing the agenda for the Cairo conference?*

*A.* I must tell you this. We are in constant contact exchanging points of view all the time. But there is nothing specific that I asked the Secretary today. We have discussed the whole thing and all the alternatives.

*Q. You said that the Tripoli conference<sup>212</sup> had canceled the understandings of the Rabat conference. In what way?*

*A.* In the field of the PLO and in the field of working toward a peaceful settlement because we have agreed in Rabat to push the peace process to achieve those goals.

*Q. Do you mean that after Tripoli, that the PLO is no longer the sole representative of the Palestinian people?*

*A.* No, I didn't say this at all. I said that in spite of the fact that they have canceled this in Tripoli, King Hussein and I are sticking to the Rabat decisions.

### 326

#### **Speech by Cairo conference chairman Abd al-Majid, head of the Egyptian delegation, at the opening session of the conference<sup>213</sup>**

Cairo, December 12, 1977

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I announce the opening of the first meeting of the Cairo conference, in preparation for the Geneva conference. Allow me to make a few opening remarks in the name of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the name of the Arab Republic of Egypt, I welcome all of you to the Cairo conference, in preparation for the Geneva conference. We are meeting here at a historical site that has witnessed

seven thousand years of history. We sincerely hope today to see the dawn of a new era for the region and the whole world. The presence of the UN representative, the representative of the world community, has a great significance to our society and to this meeting. Peoples and governments all over the world, in fact, fully support our efforts in preparing for the coming peace conference.

No one forgets that the peoples of this area have suffered for over thirty years; lives have been lost and blood shed. It is time that we seize this opportunity and strive, with a sense of responsibility, towards achieving a durable and just peace in the Middle East. The conflict in the Middle East, the essence of which is the Palestine question, reached an important turning point when President Sadat urged Israel to take part in the efforts aimed at the speedy realization of a just and comprehensive peace.

Egypt has entered a new age, free from the yoke of narrow-minded ideas and other psychological complexes and formalities. Egypt has avoided formalities in order to open the way before a sincere effort aimed at the realization of a just peace and respect for international law. We have thus proved our commitment to achieving a just peace. Let us not forget that peace is indivisible, and that the continuation of the state of no-war, no-peace is a great danger to peace and security. The whole world and the international community really hope that Israel will share Egypt's sincere desire for a just and comprehensive peace. We expect concrete measures without delay.

The edifice of peace must be based upon international law, the aims and objectives of the UN Charter and UN resolution 242 which lays out the framework of a comprehensive settlement. Prompted by such noble goals, President Sadat called for the convening of this unofficial preparatory conference to effectively prepare for the Geneva conference, thus enabling the delegations to the conference to achieve what the whole world seeks.

We are certain that the outcome of this meeting will lead to constructive results. Having bypassed the bridges of fear and mistrust, we shall all be able to avoid any hindrance and unify our efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive peace.

We are certain to achieve our clear aims and realize what our people expect of us, due to the

<sup>211</sup> See docs. 320 to 322 above.

<sup>212</sup> See doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*.

<sup>213</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 15, 1977. The conference was attended by delegations representing Egypt, Israel and the United States. A UN delegation attended on an observer basis.

immense developments that followed Egypt's initiative. It is important to emphasize that the invitations extended to the other concerned parties, we mean Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the PLO and the Soviet Union, still stand and we truly hope that they will take part in this preliminary phase which prepares for the Geneva conference. Their contributions here would be fully welcomed.

Before I end my remarks, I would like to remind you of what President Sadat said in the Knesset on November 20th. He said: "I have come to you boldly to build a new life and establish peace."<sup>215</sup>

Gentlemen,

Let us establish with full clarity that we are determined to spare future generations the horrors of war and that our final goal is the realization of total peace that guarantees the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, so that peace and justice will reign again in the Middle East. Thank you.

### 327

**Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia following talks between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance<sup>215</sup>**

Riyad, December 12, 1977

His Royal Highness, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal met Mr. Cyrus Vance, US Secretary of State, on the occasion of his visit to the Kingdom on 4.1.980 AH [*sic*] (14.12.77 AD) and discussed with him current developments in the Middle East, the efforts being made to solve the problem, and his assessment of these developments and efforts.

In his assessment, His Royal Highness expressed the opinion that things should be judged by their results. A final assessment of the elements of the situation would be premature, although his Highness' talks with the US Secretary of State led His Highness to be optimistic about the expected results. This optimism is, however, mixed with caution.

His Highness confirmed that the optimism of

the Saudi Arabian Kingdom about any expected results can only be complete if Arab solidarity is achieved. This latter is considered by the Kingdom as the essential starting point in order to achieve the results hoped for by the Arab nation: Israel's express acceptance of withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and her recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to self-determination.

### 328

**Press interview statements by Crown Prince Fahd Bin Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia discussing his country's position on the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations<sup>216</sup>**

Riyad, mid-December 1977

*Q. Today grave events are shaking the Arab world, psychologically, spiritually, ideologically and in its destiny. Thus it stands stunned, questioning and bewildered, not knowing its way or where to go. How did its destiny and its circumstances suddenly become separated from the rising tide of history which had been bearing the Arabs along, causing such a change in the course of events and in the path of history? What is Your Highness' opinion?*

*A. In my opinion, this question cannot be answered by any one person or persons. It is a question that involves the Arab people's past, present and future. These events today affect not only the destiny of one Arab country, but all Arab countries and peoples, and perhaps the contemporary world as well. I am an official in a position of responsibility, but first and foremost I am an Arab Moslem citizen who deeply feels the grandeur of his values, ideals and history. I feel the uniqueness of my nation, and I fully realize that the Arab nation does not consist of this generation alone, but of past and future generations as well.*

*I also feel that because of my official responsibility—and I think this applies to any responsible official in the Arab world—I cannot force my opinions, understanding and vision of events, or my evaluation of them, upon this nation's history and future.*

<sup>214</sup> Doc. 301 above.

<sup>215</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), December 16, 1977.

<sup>216</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Riyad* (Riyad), December 21, 1977.

I refrain from such actions in recognition of my true limitations in the march of history. What is happening today is grave and stunning, and the Arab peoples have the right to ask questions and to insist in asking them. I am confronted with these questions everywhere when I meet the people. They often ask questions, and more often they argue. We are linked to our great Arab nation both by membership and in our destiny, and they and I would be flouting our religion, our sacred law and our reality, and abandoning our existence and our interests, if we were to break this tie. Neither I nor anyone else can shed light on the full scope of this question which you have brought up today. The features of the present situation and of current events show, however, that what is happening is very serious and will affect our destiny to its utmost limits.

The efforts made by our Arab nation at various levels of experience and responsibility are enormous. I fear most of all that these efforts might wither, be swept away, or create turbulence in the heart of the Arab nation.

I fear that Israel will obtain her own separate peace, and that the battle will become an Arab one, of the Arab against himself and against his brother.

The fiercest battle involves the animosity and verbal abuse which surround the Arabs with an abhorrent hatred that cuts them off from the modern world, which adopts reason, wisdom, authority and patience as its method of work. What the Arab world needs most at this critical moment in the life of our nation is unity and deep serious dialogue. All aspects of profit and loss can be determined, and all policies evaluated, through such calculations.

Peace in this world is the goal of all peoples who detest war and destruction. Why should peace in this region of our world lead to Arab disunity, which in our opinion is even more destructive than war? Any war, and any real step towards peace, can only happen and bear positive fruit in the context of an Arab policy united in word and thought.

I do not understand how it is that with us the strength of unity so quickly turns into rigid disension and violent fragmentation. With such a rupture and such differences we shall always be the losers, whether in war or in peace. All Arab leaders and chiefs are aware of this self-evident

truth in Arab history through the ages. We feel grief and deep pain when we find our brothers forgetting this fact during critical events. We shall never cease to do all in our power to repair the rupture and bring unity and lucidity back into the Arab struggle. Victory can then be achieved for this nation, based on our deep faith in what I have mentioned, with the grace of God.

*Q. Does Your Highness believe that Israel will achieve the peace she is striving for while she is still expropriating and dispossessing a people of its homeland? Is any Arab ruler entitled to give Israel this people's rights and thus compromise the future?*

A. There is in your question a frankness which tempts me to answer in the same spirit. Peace can never be achieved so long as Arab territories and the rights of the Palestinian people are usurped. No peace will be achieved that is not built upon justice and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The whole world has come to realize these obvious facts. Israel is gravely mistaken if she gambles on Arab disagreement, disunity and divergences to gain both land and peace.

No leader, president or responsible official can, by any logic of history, grant the rights of one people to another. I do not think that there is anyone who claims this right for himself.

I am also fully confident that the Arab people knows that the Palestinian people is part of it. This is a deep historical link and it will continue in future generations, whatever circumstances or changes may arise.

*Q. Don't the leaders of Israel and their supporters in the world foresee the future? Do they see only the Arab rulers and ignore the existence of the peoples and their aspirations?*

A. I do not know the calculations of the rulers of Israel and their supporters in this regard. If they ignore the peoples they are taking a dangerous risk and a terrible gamble. Future events, changes with time and the vast historical background and reality of the Arab people confirm this. In point of fact, the logic of history dictates that it is totally wrong to ignore or be indifferent to this people, or that any generation, ruler or responsible official can bestow legitimacy upon the violation of a right. Before God, history and my responsibility, my only choice is to give this complex problem,

in all its dimensions, all my energy and effort at the level that it requires. I can never lose sight of the development of the Arab peoples during its long and glorious history.

*Q. We often hear that Saudi Arabia has fallen short in supporting the confrontation countries. We hear this from citizens, writers, and politicians of these countries. Is it true?*

*A.* Let me tell you that here in Saudi Arabia we do not make a distinction between confrontation states and non-confrontation states. We hold that we are one nation and one body. Should any member complain, other members are affected and concerned.

We perform what we see as our duty towards our nation and our brothers. That is my answer to any such talk or questioning. It has never been our custom to talk about a duty performed. Whatever we may have already given, we always hope to give more. We never consider our contribution as a favour, for it is our destined obligation. Allusions and insinuations can in no way divert us from our friendship for and ties with the Arab people. We shall always be faithful to that people and to the Arabs in every land. We belong to them and they belong to us, in sisterly Egypt and Syria, in Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and everywhere in this Arab homeland.

We do not put politics before faith and we do not deny the links of kinship, history, suffering and hope that join us. We shall always insist on this friendship, adhere to it and act through it. God willing, He shall never abandon our Arab nation. Our path is fixed along the lines I have described, engraved in our hearts by a deep-rooted faith and our long history, whatever events or changes in circumstances may occur, and irrespective of all differences of opinion.

*Q. It is often said in the Arab world that, as an ally of sisterly Egypt and President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, Saudi Arabia has created the impression prevalent in both the Arab and non-Arab worlds, that there is a unity of course and a special friendship between Saudi Arabia and the Arab Republic of Egypt. While Saudi Arabia was not consulted about President Sadat's initiative, people see that nevertheless she is in a position to offer President Sadat opinions and advice in dealing with the problem, in a spirit free of the extremism that is tearing the Arabs apart and destroying their power.*

*What is Your Highness' opinion in this regard?*

*A.* Our friendship and respect for the great Egyptian people in its long history is self-evident. No policy or policies can change this. They are our people, our kinsmen. We respect their wishes, and no one, I think, blames us in that. We are hurt by what hurts them and made happy by what makes them happy. This spirit is not based on momentary visions or relations. It represents a unified existence, history and destiny. This is what we should point to, in sincerity and friendship and in every way possible. Our Arab people in Egypt is one with our Arab people everywhere in the Arab homeland. The interests of this nation require that we respect peoples, deepen our friendship with them and avoid dissension and discord. President Sadat's initiative, as he has said more than once, was his own responsibility. To avoid embarrassments and differences of opinion, he did not consult with anybody in what he considered the road to peace.

As for the Kingdom's ability to offer advice, and as brothers to Egypt and President Sadat, not for one moment have we or will we stop meeting with sisterly Egypt. Nor will we refrain from offering our opinions and judgement regarding what we think serves the interests of this nation and achieves just peace as well as the rights of the Palestinian people and the restoration of its usurped land. This is our attitude not only towards President Sadat but also towards all brother Arab kings and presidents in this context. I express the opinion of His Majesty King Khalid and these are his instructions.

We pray that God may bring our efforts to positive conclusions for the good of this nation.

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**Statement by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi criticizing statements by US President Carter concerning the PLO<sup>217</sup>**

**Beirut, December 16, 1977**

Mr. Carter has come out with a statement in which he attacks the PLO,<sup>218</sup> accusing it of inflexibility and obstinacy because of its refusal to recog-

<sup>217</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 17, 1977.

<sup>218</sup> Doc. 196 above.

nize Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and to recognize Israel's right to exist. He forgets that the US is alone in supporting Israel in her rejection of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, which have been acknowledged in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, the latest being resolutions 3236 and 3375.

Moreover, the US is the only member of the Security Council which has rejected these rights, by using the veto against a balanced resolution drafted by the Security Council in January 1976.<sup>219</sup>

We also recall that it was Mr. Carter who distorted the Soviet-American joint statement<sup>220</sup> in his speech at the last session of the General Assembly and went so far as to ignore this statement in an American-Israeli joint statement,<sup>221</sup> in response to Zionist pressures.

Finally Mr. Carter encouraged President Sadat's initiative of visiting occupied Jerusalem, which has impaired international efforts for peace in the area.

Since the establishment of Israel the US has been employing its imperialist policy to dominate the area and to support Israel's expansionist and aggressive schemes.

In asking the PLO to adopt what he calls a flexible attitude, Mr. Carter is disregarding the fact that the PLO is struggling for the just cause of a people which has been evicted from its land, and that it is Israel who is occupying this people's territory, not vice versa. He forgets that Israel has not offered the slightest concession or made the least move towards recognizing our rights. On the contrary, American-Israeli policy still aims at inducing the Arabs to renounce their national rights and the soil of their homeland.

What then are the "peace initiatives" that Mr. Carter refers to?

Why does he not call on Israel to take such initiatives and make such concessions? We have always taken the initiatives required of us by world opinion to indicate our desire to achieve a just peace.

The resolutions of the Palestine National Council on the establishment of an independent state on any part of our land that is liberated, and the report and recommendations of the Committee of

Twenty-three, which was endorsed by a large majority of the General Assembly, are incontrovertible proof of the flexibility of the PLO which the US has, as usual, met with rejection and the use of the veto in the Security Council.

We regret to observe that Carter has returned to Kissinger's policy of dividing the Arab countries and sowing dissension among them, so as to impose partial or individual settlements, and to the pursuit of Kissinger's secret diplomacy to enable Israel to continue her occupation and expansion.

We asked for the Soviet-American statement to be entered as a United Nations Document, but the US refused. This shows that the US is prepared to renege on her undertakings even with respect to a great power like the USSR, and that it does not want peace in the Middle East, but rather the subjection of the area to its influence and domination.

In view of this the PLO will continue to meet its responsibilities by taking action towards achieving a valid and just peace in the area through cooperation and coordination with both Arab and friendly and peace-loving international forces—a peace which can only be achieved through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the return of our people to its land, and its right to self-determination under the leadership of the PLO.

### 330

#### **Press conference statement by President Sadat of Egypt assessing his meeting with Prime Minister Begin at Ismailiya**

**Ismailiya, December 26, 1977**

[The press conference was held jointly with Prime Minister Begin. For full text see Doc. 200 above.]

<sup>219</sup> Doc. 15 in *International Documents on Palestine 1976*.

<sup>220</sup> Doc. 16 in *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup> Doc. 17 in *Ibid.*

**Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee commenting on the meeting in Ismailiya between President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel<sup>222</sup>**

Beirut, December 26, 1977

The Executive Committee of the PLO today held a meeting chaired by Abu Ammar, Chairman of the Executive Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Palestine revolution.

The Committee discussed recent developments in the area in the light of the Sadat regime's continued pursuit of a capitulationist course, including the Ismailiya meeting with Menahem Begin and the Israeli officials. The Committee stressed that the capitulationist course and the liquidationist plans drawn up and approved at the meetings in Washington, occupied Jerusalem, Cairo and Ismailiya are attempts doomed to failure, because they will not succeed in coercing the national will of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. They will never succeed in impairing our people's determination to recover its national rights, first and foremost, its right to return, to self-determination and to establish its independent national state on the soil of its homeland.

The struggling Palestinian people can never bargain over or relinquish the rights which they have consolidated by their long struggle and the most costly sacrifices, and the legitimacy of which has been confirmed by the international community.

The Committee studied the two statements that were issued and the press conference that was held during the Ismailiya meeting.<sup>223</sup> In this connection the Committee wishes to make the following clear to Arab and international public opinion:

I. The statement issued by Sadat and Begin clearly reveals the details of the liquidationist conspiracy they hope to impose on the people of Egypt, the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. The preparations to conclude a separate peace between Sadat and Israel are only part of a comprehensive plan aimed at destroying all the national achievements of the Egyptian people, Arab rights, and above all the national rights of

the Palestinian people.

Sadat and Begin have disclosed that the deal they are trying to conclude consists of exchanging part of the territory of Arab Egypt against the total relinquishment of Palestine and the Golan, and acceptance of the historical lie put about by the propagandists of Zionism to the effect that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of the so-called Greater Land of Israel. In the statement he made in Arab Egypt itself, Sadat was not ashamed to declare that the identity of the Arab territory of Palestine, and in particular the West Bank and Gaza, could be negotiated and bargained over with the occupying Zionist invaders who are counterfeiting its identity and even its name.

II. The statement by Sadat and Begin has shown up and unmasked the plan worked out for the Arab area by the United States, Israel and Sadat. The first step in this plan is to complete the isolation of Egypt from the Arab world, to impose on her the terms of total surrender and to pave the way for the conclusion of an open alliance with the Zionist enemy against the Arab forces of Steadfastness and Confrontation, as Begin frankly and clearly admitted in his statement to the press.

III. The statement by Sadat and Begin discloses that Sadat is prepared to relinquish Egypt's interests and national independence. For he declares his approval of the Israeli terms for peace, which would mean Egypt's opening her doors to economic, cultural and intellectual invasion, as well as abandoning the military potential of the Egyptian army, which has always been, and will continue to be, the pride of the Arab nation.

IV. The statement by Sadat and Begin is on Sadat's part treason to the right of the Palestinian people to return to its homes and possessions from which Zionism evicted it through oppression and aggression. It is also a violation of the United Nations resolutions which have affirmed the rights of the Palestinian people, the usurpation of which was the cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict before 1967. By pursuing this policy Sadat is playing fast and loose with the most sacred Arab cause, so that it is the duty of every Arab, both inside and outside Egypt, to resist his policy by all available means.

V. The statement of Sadat and Begin constitutes a concession by Sadat as regards the Arab character

<sup>222</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 26, 1977, p. 4.

<sup>223</sup> Doc. 200 above.



of Jerusalem, in defiance of the rights and feelings of all Arabs and Muslims.

VI. The statement in which Begin attacked the PLO, in the presence of Sadat, and on the soil of Arab Egypt, demonstrates the extent to which Sadat has gone in renouncing the cause of Palestine and the rights of her struggling people. But the PLO wishes to stress that attacking and ignoring it are part of the conspiracy concocted by the United States, Israel and Sadat against the rights of the people of Palestine and a just peace in the Middle East. The fact that the PLO is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people has been established by the guns of our fighters, by the national will of our people and the Arab nation, and by the international community. The PLO also derives its legitimacy from the justice of its cause and the legitimacy of our people's struggle to recover its inalienable rights, the achievement of which is the precondition of a just peace in the Middle East area.

VII. The capitulationist peace that the United States is trying to impose on the Arab area through Sadat and Begin will be a disaster to the just peace that the international community desires and that the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative, is struggling to achieve. What Sadat and Begin are doing will only further complicate the Middle East crisis. They are creating new elements liable to ignite the explosive situation in the Middle East area and to threaten international peace and security.

In view of its commitment to the resolutions of the Tripoli summit,<sup>224</sup> the Executive Committee will, in coordination and cooperation with the member states of the national Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, continue its efforts to thwart the American-Zionist settlement which is being carried out by Sadat's regime at the expense of the Palestine cause and the national interests of the people of Egypt. The basis of this settlement is that in return for bargaining over a separate peace in Sinai, the national rights of the Palestinian people will be waived.

The Executive Committee also discussed the moves that certain suspect quarters in the occupied territory are making towards reneging on the national consensus in an unsuccessful attempt to secure acceptance of the Carter-Begin-Sadat plan

aimed at liquidating the cause of Palestine and the national rights of our people. The Executive Committee stresses that these moves, which have been condemned by our people both inside and outside the occupied territory and by the national patriotic bodies and forces, will never impair the unity of our people and its support for the PLO, its sole legitimate representative. Our people will know how to isolate, condemn and penalize any element that tries to discredit its national goals and its heritage of struggle.

The Executive Committee also reviewed the results of its contacts at the Arab and international levels and took a number of decisions with regard to continuing the encirclement of the dangerous consequences of the American-Israeli conspiracy that is being implemented. The Executive Committee decided to continue its strenuous efforts to ensure the fullest coordination and cooperation with Syria and the countries of the Tripoli summit with a view to reinforcing Arab capability to confront and frustrate all hostile schemes directed at liquidation.

Moreover, at this critical stage, when the Arab liberation movement is confronting the most dangerous conspiracy directed against the present and future existence of the Arabs, the Executive Committee calls on the Arab nation, at the official and popular levels, to redouble its vigilance and caution and to escalate its struggle by all available means against this conspiracy, and to assume the full responsibility for confronting it, by providing practical aid and support to the National Front. It also calls on liberals throughout the world, and on the forces that love freedom, progress and a just peace, to resist this conspiracy which is being implemented under the guise of a bogus peace and which can only result in a threat to the peace in the area.

In this connection the Executive Committee salutes all Arab and friendly states and forces that have condemned this imperialist-Zionist conspiracy. It also salutes the friendly USSR for its firm support for the national rights of our people, for its decisive rejection of the Carter-Begin-Sadat conspiracy and its consequences and for the way it has exposed the objectives of that conspiracy.

<sup>224</sup> Docs. 320 to 322 above.

332

**Communiqué issued by the Cabinet of Jordan commenting on Israel Prime Minister Begin's declaration to the Knesset of his government's intention to retain all occupied Palestinian territories<sup>225</sup>**

Amman, December 28, 1977

The report<sup>226</sup> by Israel's Prime Minister in the Knesset [today] is the first official announcement of the proposed project. It is an extension of the Israeli position of the past ten years which has led, by its intransigence, to the failure of peace efforts undertaken by the UN and various international parties. This time, the Israeli government has announced frankly, categorically and clearly that it intends to keep all occupied Palestinian territories under firm occupation and to bestow upon this occupation an official character, rather than declare its intention to withdraw completely in accordance with UN resolutions and within the framework of total peace.

The most notable feature of this declared Israeli position is that it comes in response to an unprecedented peace initiative taken by an Arab party, at a time when the entire world expects Israel to rise to the level of this initiative by announcing its willingness to join in talks for the complete withdrawal from all occupied territories within the framework of a comprehensive settlement. Arab sides have expressed their willingness to reach such a settlement in order to achieve a comprehensive and just peace in the area.

The government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan refuses absolutely to cooperate in the application of such a settlement which would involve handing over Arab territories to Israel, recompensing aggression and abandoning Palestinian and Arab rights.

<sup>225</sup> Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Rai'* (Amman), December 29, 1977.

<sup>226</sup> Doc. 205 above.

333

**Statement by Director Abu Sharar of PLO Unified Information concerning recent American statements about the Palestine question<sup>227</sup>**

Beirut, December 29, 1977

The PLO's position is firm and cannot be changed in spite of persistent American attempts to get 'around it.

Our aim is to continue the struggle, in all forms and through all means, in order to obtain our right of establishing the independent state, return and self-determination.

Begin's plan,<sup>228</sup> which Carter considers a step forward, is not merely an attempt to make occupation look attractive and to retain it, but is also an insult to the Arab nation and an underrating of its capabilities.

We believe that the United States must come to realize the danger threatening its interests in the area if Carter is to abandon his attitude of absolute support for Zionist policy in the area.

334

**Television interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt expressing disappointment at US President Carter's position on Palestinian self-determination<sup>229</sup>**

December 29, 1977

. . . . .

*Q. It seems that it wasn't an easy mission, seeing that Israel's Prime Minister, Menahem Begin, said that twice the talks in Ismailiya nearly failed. What was the nature of the confrontation between you?*

*A. Well it was not a confrontation in the exact sense of the word. After my visit to Jerusalem, we dropped the word "confrontation" from our vocabulary, in the sense in which we once used it. What happened was a difference of opinion. As I said once before, in this new epoch and in*

<sup>227</sup> Statement given to Reuter News Agency; translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), December 29, 1977, p. 9.

<sup>228</sup> Doc. 205 above.

<sup>229</sup> Interview granted to ABC and CBS; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), December 30, 1977.

this new climate, we must sit together, discuss the difference and solve it. Begin himself made a very important statement when he said: "Everything is subject to negotiation, except the destruction of the State of Israel." That is a good thing, since nobody wants to destroy Israel. So anything can be discussed at the negotiating table.

But the most important thing is this barrier, this psychological barrier that existed, and not just for 15 years. I am a religious man; I read the Koran even before my primary education began. The barrier may have been in existence for thousands of years.

*Q. There have been many reactions, Mr. President, to the statements that Carter made last night in a press conference,<sup>230</sup> in which he announced that he does not support your demand concerning the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.*

*A. Has he said he does not support me? Very well, President Carter might be adopting a new position. But that was my opinion and I cannot say at all that President Carter agreed with me on this question. To be candid, I say: No, he did not agree with me on that. But that has been my opinion ever since I met President Carter last April, and until this moment, my opinion is unchanged. Why? Because now we are aiming at establishing peace, permanent peace, once and for all.*

Without solving the Palestinian problem, which is the essence of the whole conflict in the area, we shall not be able to establish peace.

*Q. Menahem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, said that Israel will negotiate with representatives of the Palestinians in the negotiations that will start next January. Have you agreed to have Palestinian representatives in these negotiations?*

*A. We never agreed to this at all and there was absolutely no mention of Palestinian representation. Because if that was mentioned, we would have to ask about those who are going to speak in the name of the Palestinians and the way they will be represented. No discussion of this subject took place in Ismailiya.*

*Q. Menahem Begin said in his press conference—perhaps it was a slip of the tongue—that we want to*

*discuss the future of Palestinian Arabs with the Egyptians and to negotiate the representation of the Palestinian Arabs, and that we will do that in the first week of January. Was it a slip of the tongue?*

*A. I do not think it will be the first week of January, but around the 15th as Dayan has some engagements and our foreign minister has many engagements. I think the negotiations will start around January 15. However, we suggest, and we told this to Begin, that Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians sit together with the Israelis to decide what should be done about this problem.*

*Q. Which Palestinians?*

*A. We have not agreed who will represent the Palestinians, but this is our suggestion in principle. Why Egypt and Jordan? Because Egypt held the Gaza Strip and the Jordanians held the West Bank. So we must sit together, Egypt and Jordan with the Palestinians and Israelis, and decide upon the whole problem, discussing the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.*

*Q. Has King Hussein indicated whether he will take part in these negotiations?*

*A. I have in fact, sent him a complete report on the Ismailiya talks and he knows what went on during my talks in Jerusalem because he came here after that. After the Ismailiya talks, I hope he will receive a complete report today or tomorrow at the latest. His participation in the talks is for him to decide. But from what I know of King Hussein, after visiting Egypt following the Jerusalem trip, he has no objections or problems about coming here.*

*Q. Mr. President, was what President Carter said yesterday in his press conference<sup>231</sup> about not supporting you concerning the establishment of an independent Palestinian state a surprise to you?*

*A. Certainly, I would have liked Mr. Carter to have supported me. I don't think anybody has the right to object to the word "self-determination" and I don't know why Carter did that. But President Carter is entitled to his own opinion, so am I and so are the Israelis. Let us hope that in the near future we will be able to reach a kind of solution to this problem.*

*Q. Do you think that the matter is merely one of "hints" about territory and about the independent state?*

<sup>230</sup> Doc. 203 above.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

A. I really think so. As I said yesterday, in my television talk before my people, a step has been achieved after my visit to Jerusalem and the Ismailiya talks. As regards the Palestinian problem, we have differences and we disagree about them, in Israel and in Egypt. They talk about a kind of self-rule and we talk about self-determination. In itself, this is a great advance. Forty days before my visit to Jerusalem, nobody then knew exactly the fate of the Palestinians. Begin, his government and even the opposition and every individual in Israel were saying that it is liberated Israeli territory. Well, if such progress has been achieved after 40 days, and the difference has become confined to that between a kind of self-rule and self-determination, I would say that this is encouraging progress for the future.

*Q. Have you been disappointed by Carter's declarations?*

A. Certainly I was disappointed. I want us to direct all our efforts towards ending this ordeal and this problem in the Middle East, to offer a bright future for our coming generations.

*Q. You are talking in terms of a period of two months. That is, you think it is possible to reach an agreement within two months. Don't you think there might be some delay, and that more time may be needed?*

A. It might be delayed for some time, but I think that 1978 is the year of decision.

*Q. Do you feel that the statements made by President Carter could make the negotiations more difficult?*

A. Yes, it will make them more difficult. Carter himself is a dear friend and I trust him completely, and he knows it. But there are difficult questions

in this conflict, not only in content but also in the psychological climate. He has made my task very difficult, if he did really state that. I did not hear these statements last night, but it will make my task difficult. We will, however, continue; and I hope, as I said yesterday to Chancellor Schmidt in our press conference,<sup>232</sup> to be able to grant peace to future generations.

*Q. What is it that keeps the negotiations going towards a settlement and what is it that you are looking forward to?*

A. I have to tell you: let's wait until the two committees, political and military, meet. Let me hear from them after one or two meetings. I will know the real situation then, to be able to find a way. Just as I undertook my initiative in which no one believed and of which nobody anticipated the consequences, let us wait until the political and military committees meet. I shall then be in a position that would enable me to take any other initiative required by the situation.

*Q. What surprised you in President Carter's statements?*

A. Well, what surprised me was that he ignored the importance of the Palestinian question, which is, as I have said, the essence of the whole problem. If it is to be ignored, in that case we will not be seeking the establishment of peace, which is what we are looking for now. It is not a second disengagement agreement, or a partial agreement; it is peace once and forever. And this is what embarrasses me.

<sup>232</sup> For Chancellor Schmidt's statements see doc. 202 above.

# Appendices



## APPENDIX A

### Resolutions of the seventh Arab summit conference (excerpts)<sup>1</sup>

Rabat, October 29, 1974

The seventh Arab summit conference, having reviewed the resolutions of the sixth Arab summit conference held in Algiers, the recent developments in the Arab and international positions and the gains achieved at all levels by joint Arab action, having discussed the general situation from all its aspects, and having taken note of the report of the council of foreign ministers and of the reports of the Arab League Secretary-General, resolves the following:

#### *I. The goal of the Arab nation at the present stage.*

The conference reaffirms the following resolutions of the sixth Arab summit conference:

A. The total liberation of all Arab lands occupied in the aggression of June 1967, without surrendering or excluding any part of these territories or compromising national sovereignty over them.

B. The liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem and the rejection of any situation which may compromise total Arab sovereignty over the Holy City.

C. Commitment to the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the decisions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

D. The cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs. No Arab party can forsake this commitment, as affirmed in the resolutions of previous Arab summit meetings.

#### *II. The foundations of joint Arab action.*

A. The strengthening of the Arab states' self-sufficient powers at the military, economic and political levels and the continued build-up of the military power of the confrontation forces together with furnishing the needs for this build-up.

B. Achieving an effective Arab political, military and economic coordination with the aim of attaining complete Arab unification on all levels.

C. The rejection of any attempt made to conclude any partial political settlements, because of the national character and unity of the cause.

D. The commitment of all Arab states to the liberation of all occupied Arab lands and the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

E. The pursuit of policies aimed at isolating Israel politically and economically, and at the cessation of all political, military, economic and human aid it is receiving from any quarter in the world.

F. The avoidance of secondary Arab battles and conflicts so that all efforts may be directed against the Zionist enemy.

#### *III.*

Following intensive and detailed consultations among their excellencies the Arab kings, presidents and rulers regarding the general Arab position and the problem of Palestine in particular, in their national and international contexts;

Having heard the statements made by His Majesty King Hussain of Jordan and His Excellency brother Yasir Arafat, leader of the PLO, as well as the statements made by Arab kings, presidents and rulers, in an atmosphere of frankness, sincerity and total responsibility;

In cognizance of common national responsibilities required of Arab rulers at the present stage in confronting aggression and facing the tasks of liberation demanded by the unity of the Arab cause and the struggle for its sake;

In full recognition of the persistent Zionist schemes and efforts directed at eliminating the

<sup>1</sup> The full text of the 7th Arab summit conference resolutions, with the exception of the resolutions on Palestine (Doc. 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1974*), was not made public until 1977. Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), November 30, 1977.

Palestinian presence and eradicating the national Palestinian entity;

In the light of its belief in the necessity of foiling these schemes and efforts and of responding to them by supporting and strengthening the national Palestinian entity, and by commitment to meeting the needs of its growth and enhancing its effectiveness, so as to enable it to recover the full rights of the Palestinian people and to shoulder its responsibilities within the framework of collective Arab commitment by close cooperation with its brothers; proceeding also from the victories won by the Palestinian struggle in confronting the Zionist enemy and at the Arab and international levels as well as at the UN, together with what this demands by way of continued common Arab action in order to enhance and entrench these great victories;

And having reached a consensus regarding all the above matters, whereby the conference was able to end all differences among brothers in the framework of enhancing Arab solidarity;

The seventh Arab summit conference resolves the following:

A. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to return to its homeland and to exercise self-determination.

B. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to set up its independent national authority under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on any part of the soil of Palestine to be liberated. The Arab states shall undertake to support this authority, when it is established, in all fields and at all levels.

C. To support the Palestine Liberation Organization in the exercise of its responsibilities on the national and international levels, within the framework of Arab commitment.

D. To call upon the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization to draw up a framework regulating relations among them in the light of these resolutions and with a view to their implementation.

E. To require all Arab states to commit themselves to safeguarding Palestinian national unity, and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.

(The delegation of the Republic of Iraq expressed its reservations concerning items A and D above).

#### *IV. In the political sphere.*

Proceeding from the goals and principles enunciated at the sixth Arab summit held in Algiers and out of concern for the continuation of political activity serving the specific objectives of the Arab struggle and determining the development of our foreign relations with various world forces, the conference resolves the following:

A. In the sphere of international organizations and forums:

1. To make use of the UN and its agencies in order to expose Israel, and to work to obtain more resolutions regarding the Palestine and Middle East problem which would serve to isolate Israel on the political and international levels as regards world public opinion; to attempt to arrive at more effective measures that can reveal the manoeuvres of Israel and its refusal to comply with resolutions of international organizations, and to draw world public attention to these manoeuvres and this refusal, making clear Israel's responsibility for impeding efforts to arrive at a just peace.

2. To bolster cooperation with the non-aligned bloc and to work to implement the resolutions of the fourth non-aligned summit conference; to propose the question of implementing the sanctions cited in article 7 of the UN Charter against Israel and to call for its expulsion from the UN, all this to be done at the conference of foreign ministers of non-aligned states to be held in the summer of 1975 in preparation for proposing the matter before the thirtieth session of the UN General Assembly.

3. To continue to work in order to bolster Arab cooperation with Islamic governments and peoples and to expend greater effort with Islamic states that have relations with Israel with a view to severing such contacts; to work more effectively to enhance the role of the Islamic world in its support for the just Arab position in the Arab-Zionist conflict.

4. To increase cooperation in all spheres between the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity.

5. To propose the problem of Palestine as a separate item of the agenda at the twenty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly.

The conference reviewed the question of the Palestine cause at the UN and the success of the call by the Palestine Liberation Organization, the



representative of the Palestinian people, to join in the deliberations that accompany the submission of the Palestine problem to the General Assembly.

It resolved:

I. To employ all means necessary to support and to ensure the success of the principles cited in the political resolutions to be issued by the UN General Assembly and which is to include an affirmation of the following:

A. The basic and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, rejecting any usurpation or squandering of such rights.

B. The right of the Palestinian people to determine its destiny without foreign interference, and the safeguarding of its national independence and of its right to return to its homeland.

C. The right of the Palestinian people to use all means to attain its basic rights in accordance with the aims and principles of the UN.

II. That the debate on the question of Palestine at the UN General Assembly should take place on November 13, 1974. The Arab League Secretary General is to convey this resolution to the President of the General Assembly and to the UN Secretary General.

III. That the debate on the question of Palestine at the General Assembly should be attended by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, chairman of the seventh Arab summit conference, and by His Excellency President Sulaiman Franjeh of Lebanon, chairman of the current session of the Arab League Council, in order to affirm Arab solidarity regarding the question of Palestine.

IV. That Arab representation should be at the level of foreign ministers in way of support for the cause of Palestine and of demonstrating Arab solidarity concerning it.

V. That letters be sent by His Majesty the chairman of the seventh Arab summit conference to foreign states with a view to obtaining their support for the cause of Palestine at the UN and on the international level.

. . . . .

#### *VI. In the military sphere.*

The conference examined the estimates for annual military aid of the confrontation states and took note of the following commitments: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to pay 400 million dollars; the State of Kuwait to pay 400 million;

the United Arab Emirates 300 million; the State of Qatar 150 million; the Republic of Iraq 100 million; the Sultanate of Oman 15 million; the State of Bahrain 4 million. The total will thus come up to 1369 million dollars, to be paid annually.

The conference also noted that the heads of the delegations of the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Tunis and the Popular Democratic Republic of Algeria will inform the Secretary General of the Arab League of the size of their contributions, and that the delegation of the Libyan Arab Republic will consult its government regarding its views on the matter and transmit them to the Secretary General.

The conference resolved the following:

A. That each of these states should pay its contribution directly to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization at a ratio determined by estimates of their needs as presented to the conference.

B. That the Secretary General should inform the states concerned of this ratio.

. . . . .

#### *VII. Afro-Arab relations*

A. The convening of an Afro-Arab conference.

The conference examined the question of Afro-Arab cooperation and resolved the following:

1. To agree to the convening of an Afro-Arab summit.

2. That the Secretary General of the Arab League should contact African states in order to determine their views on this question. In case of agreement, the necessary arrangements are to be made to convene an Afro-Arab conference of foreign ministers to prepare for the summit conference.

3. To send a delegation composed of the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Egypt and Mauritania to visit African countries as a means of bolstering Afro-Arab solidarity and to acquaint them with the resolutions of the seventh Arab summit in this regard.

. . . . .

#### *VIII. The Euro-Arab Dialogue*

The conference examined the question of the Euro-Arab dialogue and took note of the stages covered and the contacts made between the

Arab and European sides. It resolves its agreement upon the following:

A. That the Euro-Arab dialogue should commence in the framework of the principles embodied in the statement of the sixth Arab summit directed to Western Europe.

B. The conference records its appreciation for the positive stance taken by some members of the European community regarding the question of Palestine and hopes that other European states may take a similar stand in support of Arab rights.

C. To give importance to the Arab meeting to be held on November 12, 1974, to determine a unified Arab stand regarding that dialogue and to see that representation at it may be at the appropriate level.

D. That the necessary measures be taken to enter an effective stage of that dialogue in order to arrive at tangible cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields and for the benefit of both parties.

. . . . .

*XII. In the field of organization.*

The conference examined the question of following up the resolutions of the summit conference and resolved that the foreign ministers should follow up the implementation of these resolutions at the two sessions of the Arab League Council.

. . . . .

## APPENDIX B

## Egypt's Cabinet in 1977

<i>Head of State</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Financial and Economic Affairs</i>	Abd al-Munim Qaysuni
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Social Services</i>	Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister; Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, War and War Production</i>	Muhammad Gamasi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Production, Electricity and Energy</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Labour and Vocational Training</i>	Abd al-Latif Baltiya
<i>Tourism and Aviation</i>	Ibrahim Nagib
<i>Social Affairs and Social Security</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>National Assembly Affairs</i>	Ahmad Fuad Muhy al-Din
<i>Petroleum</i>	Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal
<i>Transport, Communications and Maritime Transport</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah Mahmud
<i>Local Government, Youth, Popular and Political Organizations</i>	Muhammad Hamid Mahmud
<i>Education</i>	Mustafa Kamal Hilmi
<i>Interior</i>	Sayyid Husayn Fahmi
<i>Trade and Supply</i>	Zakariya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah
<i>Agriculture and Irrigation</i>	Abd al-Azim Abu al-Ata
<i>Industry and Mineral Resources</i>	Issa Shahin
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Gamal Utayfi
<i>Planning</i>	Muhammad Mahmud Imam
<i>Justice</i>	Ahmad Samih Talaat
<i>Housing and Construction</i>	Hasan Muhammad Hassan
<i>Economy and Economic Cooperation</i>	Hamid Abd al-Latif Sayih
<i>Health</i>	Ibrahim Gamil Mustafa Badran
<i>Finance</i>	Mahmud Salah al-Din Hamid
<i>Waqf and Azhar Affairs</i>	Muhammad Mutawalli Abd al-Hafiz Shadrawi
<i>State for Scientific Research and Atomic Energy</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Maabud Gubayli
<i>State for War Production</i>	Gamal al-Din Muhammad Sidqi
<i>State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Muhammad Mahmud Riyad
<i>State for Agriculture and Sudan Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Husayn
<i>State for Administrative Development</i>	Ali Abd al-Magid Abdu
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs and Oversight</i>	Albert Barsum Salama

## NEW CABINET: FEBRUARY 1

*Prime Minister and Minister of Interior*  
*Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs*  
*Deputy Prime Minister, War and War Production*  
*Deputy Prime Minister, Financial and Economic Affairs*  
*Deputy Prime Minister, Production and Energy*  
*Deputy Prime Minister, Social Development and Services*  
*Economy and Economic Cooperation*  
*Finance*  
*Trade and Supply*  
*Planning*  
*Industry and Mineral Resources*  
*Petroleum*  
*Agriculture*  
*Irrigation*  
*Transport, Communications and Maritime Transport*  
*Tourism and Aviation*  
*Housing and Construction*  
*Education*  
*Health*  
*Justice*  
*Labour and Vocational Training*  
*Social Affairs*  
*Information and Culture*  
*Waqf and Azhar Affairs*  
*National Assembly Affairs*  
*Local Government, Youth, Popular and Political*  
*Organizations*  
*State for Scientific Research and Atomic Energy*  
*State for Foreign Affairs*  
*State for Cabinet Affairs and Oversight*  
*State for Administrative Development*  
*State for War Production*  
*State for Agricultural and Industrial Cooperatives, Water*  
*Resources and Sudanese Affairs*

Mamduh Salim  
Ismail Fahmi  
General Muhammad Abd al-Ghani Gamasi  
Abd al-Munim Qaysuni  
Ahmad Sultan  
Muhammad Hafiz Ghanim  
Hamid Abd al-Latif Sayih  
Muhammad Salahaddin Hamid  
Zakariya Tawfiq Abd al-Fattah  
Muhammad Mahmud Imam  
Issa Shahin  
Ahmad Izz al-Din Hilal  
Ibrahim Mahmud Shukri  
Abd al-Azim Abul al-Ata  
Abd al-Fattah Abdulla  
Muhim Ramzi Istinu  
Hasan Muhammad Hasan  
Mustafa Kamal Hilmi  
Dr. Ibrahim Gamil Badran  
Ahmad Sami Talaat  
Abd al-Latif Bultiya  
Amal Uthman  
Abd al-Munim Mahmud Sawi  
Shaykh Muhammad Shaarawi  
Ahmad Fuad Muhy al-Din  
  
Muhammad Hamid Mahmud  
Ahmad Abd al-Maabud Gubayli  
Muhammad Riyad  
Albert Barsum Salama  
Ali Abd al-Magid Abdu  
Gamal al-Din Sidqi  
  
Abd al-Aziz Husayn

## CHANGES: APRIL 21

*Planning*

Dr. Abd al-Razzak Abd al-Magid

## OCTOBER 25

*Transport, Communications and Shipping**Interior**Housing and Construction**Labour and Vocational Training**National Assembly Affairs**Cabinet Affairs and Oversight**State**State**State*

Abd al-Sattar Mugahid

Muhammad Nabawi Ismail

Hasballah Muhammad Qafrawi

Saad Muhammad Ahmad

Ahmad Fuad Muhy al-Din

Issa Shahin

Butros Ghali

Naim Abu Talib

Ali Silmi

## NOVEMBER 17

Resignation of Ismail Fahmi

*Foreign Minister*

Mahmud Riyad

Resignation of Mahmud Riyad

*Foreign Minister*

Butros Ghali

## DECEMBER 24

*Foreign Minister*

Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil

## APPENDIX C

## Israel's Cabinet in 1977

*Head of State*

Ephraim Katzir

## CARETAKER CABINET

*Prime Minister*

Yitzhak Rabin (Labour—Mapai)

*Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs*

Yigal Allon (Labour—Ahdot Ha'vodah)

*Defence*

Shimon Peres (Labour—Rafi)

*Education*

Aharon Yadlin (Labour—Mapai)

*Labour*

Moshe Baram (Labour—Mapai)

*Commerce and Industry*

Haim Bar-Lev (Labour—Mapai)

*Police*

Shlomo Hillel (Labour—Mapai)

*Health*

Victor Shemtov (Mapam)

*Tourism*

Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)

*Immigrant Absorption*

Shlomo Rosen (Mapam)

*Housing*

Avraham Offer (Labour—Mapai)

*Transport*

Gad Yaacobi (Labour—Rafi)

*Finance*

Yehoshua Rabinowitz (Labour—Mapai)

*Justice*

Haim Zadok (Labour—Mapai)

*Agriculture*

Aharon Uzan (Labour—Mapai)

*Without Portfolio*

Israel Galili (Labour—Ahdot Ha'vodah)

*Without Portfolio*

Gideon Hausner (Independent Liberal)

The portfolios of Interior, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs were vacant following the dismissal of the three ministers from the National Religious Party on December 19, 1976.

## JANUARY 18

*Housing*

Shlomo Rosen (Labour—Mapai)

*Interior*

Shlomo Hillel (Labour—Mapai)

*Religious Affairs*

Haim Sadok (Labour—Mapai)

*Social Welfare*

Moshe Baram (Labour—Mapai)

## NEW CABINET: JUNE 21

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Menahem Begin (Likud—Herut)
<i>Finance</i>	Simha Erlich (Likud—Liberal)
<i>Defence</i>	Ezer Weizmann (Likud—Herut)
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Moshe Dayan (Independent)
<i>Interior and Police</i>	Yosef Burg (NRP)
<i>Industry and Commerce</i>	Yigael Horowitz (Likud—Laam)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Ariel Sharon (Likud—Shlom Zion)
<i>Education and Culture</i>	Zevulun Hammer (NRP)
<i>Construction and Environment</i>	Gideon Patt (Likud—Liberal)
<i>Energy and Infrastructure</i>	Yitzhak Moda'i (Likud—Liberal)
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Aharon Abu-Hatzeira (NRP)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	David Levi (Likud—Herut)
<i>Health</i>	Eliezer Shostak (Likud—Laam)

## CHANGES: OCTOBER 16

<i>Minister Without Portfolio</i>	Moshe Nissim
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## OCTOBER 24

<i>Deputy Prime Minister</i>	Yigael Yadin (DMC)
<i>Justice</i>	Shmuel Tamir (DMC)
<i>Transport and Communications</i>	Meir Amit (DMC)
<i>Labour and Social Betterment</i>	Yisrael Katz (DMC)

## APPENDIX D

**Jordan's Cabinet in 1977**

<i>Head of State</i>	King Hussain ibn Talal
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mudar Badran
<i>Education</i>	Abd al-Salam Majali
<i>Information</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Health</i>	Muhammad Bashir
<i>Tourism</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Justice</i>	Ahmad Abd al-Karim
<i>Agriculture</i>	Salah Jumaa
<i>Reconstruction and Development</i>	Hasan Ibrahim
<i>Labour</i>	Issam Ajluni
<i>Islamic Affairs</i>	Kamil Sharif
<i>Supplies</i>	Marwan Qasim
<i>Interior</i>	Sulayman Arar
<i>Communications</i>	Abd al-Rauf Rawabida
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Ibrahim Ayyub
<i>Culture</i>	Sharif Fawwaz Sharaf
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Dabbas
<i>Trade and Industry</i>	Najm al-Din Dajani
<i>Public Works</i>	Said Binu
<i>Transport</i>	Ali Suhaymat

## CHANGES: FEBRUARY 9

<i>Health</i>	Abd al-Rauf Rawabida
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The portfolio became vacant when Muhammad Bashir was killed in a helicopter crash.



## APPENDIX E

## Syria's Cabinet in 1977

*Head of State**Prime Minister**Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs**Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs**Deputy Prime Minister, Public Services**Defence**Interior**Local Administration**Public Works and Water**Euphrates Dam**Education**Culture and National Guidance**Justice**Communications**Supply and International Trade**Economy and Foreign Trade**Social Affairs and Labour**Health**Tourism**Higher Education**Housing and Utilities**Industry**Transport**Power**Finance**Information**Agriculture**Oil and Mineral Resources**Waqfs**State for Presidential Affairs**State for Cabinet Affairs**State for Foreign Affairs**State for Planning Affairs**State**State**State**State*

Hafiz Asad

Abd al-Rahman Khulayfawi

Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Jamil Shaya

Fahmi Yusufi

Mustafa Tlas

Adnan Dabbagh

Taha Khayrat

Nazim Qaddur

Subhi Kahhala

Shakir Fahham

Najah Attar

Adib Nahawi

Umar Sibai

Muhammad Ghubash

Muhammad Imadi

Anwar Hamada

Madani Khiyami

Ghassan Dhalhub

Muhammad Ali Hashim

Muharram Tayyara

Shutaywi Sayfawi

Numan Zayn

Ahmad Umar Yusufi

Sadiq Ayyubi

Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad

Ahmad Qabalan

Isa Darwish

Abd al-Sattar Sayyid

Adib Milhim

Husayn Ahmad Kuwaydir

Abd al-Karim Aadi

George Huraniyya

Sharif Qush

Diya Malluhi

Zuhayr Abd al-Samad

Yusuf Juaydani

**APPENDIX F****Palestine Liberation Organization****EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN 1977**

Yasir Arafat—Chairman (Fatah)

Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)

Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)

Adib Abd Rabbu (DFLP)

Abd al-Wahhab Kayyali (Arab Liberation Front)

Talal Naji (PFLP—General Command)

Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)

Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)

Abd al-Aziz Wajih (Independent)

Elia Khoury (Independent)

Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (West Bank)

Abd al-Jawwad Salih (West Bank)

Walid Qamhawi (West Bank)

**CHANGES: APRIL 16**

Yasir Arafat (Fatah)

Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)

Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)

Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (West Bank)

Adib Abd Rabbu (DFLP)

Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (ALF)

Talal Naji (PFLP-General Command)

Majdi Abu Ramadan (Independent)

Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)

Ahmad Sidqi Dajani (Independent)

Hamad Abu Sitta (Independent)

Abd al-Jawwad Salih (Independent)

Alfred Tubasi (Independent)

Habib Qahwaji (Independent)

Walid Qamhawi (West Bank)

### Voting on UN General Assembly resolutions, 32nd session

[illegible]

RESOLUTION	5	14	20	35	40		91			105D	161	171
					A	B	A	B	C			
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y
Fiji	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	A
Finland	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	A	N	A	A
France	Y	N	A	N	A	A	Y	A	A	N	A	A
Gabon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gambia	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP
German Democratic Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Germany, Federal Republic	Y	A	A	N	N	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
Ghana	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Greece	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Grenada	NP	Y	NP	Y	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP
Guatemala	A	NP	A	A	A	N	Y	A	A	N	A	N
Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y
Guyana	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Haiti	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Honduras	Y	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	Y	A	A	A	NP
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	Y	A	A	A	N	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
India	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Iraq	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ireland	Y	A	A	N	A	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
Israel	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	NP	N	N
Italy	Y	A	A	N	A	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
Ivory Coast	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A
Jamaica	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Japan	Y	A	A	N	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y
Lesotho	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia	Y	Y	Y	NP	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP
Luxembourg	Y	A	A	N	N	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	A	NP	NP	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP
Malta	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	A	NP	NP	NP	A	Y	Y
Mongolia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nepal	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	NP
Netherlands	Y	A	A	N	N	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
New Zealand	Y	A	A	A	A	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A

RESOLUTION	5	14	20	35	40	B	A	91 B	C	105D	161	171
Nicaragua	A	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	A	A	A	A	A
Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Norway	Y	A	A	A	N	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
Oman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panama	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
Papua New Guinea	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	NP	NP	NP	Y	A	A
Paraguay	Y	NP	A	NP	A	A	Y	A	A	NP	Y	A
Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Portugal	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A
Qatar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Romania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Samoa	Y	NP	A	Y	A	A	NP	NP	NP	NP	A	A
Sao Tome and Principe	Y	Y	NP	Y	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Seychelles	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Sierra Leone	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y
Singapore	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Africa	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP
Spain	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Surinam	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
Swaziland	Y	Y	NP	A	NP	NP	Y	A	A	A	Y	Y
Sweden	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A	A	N	A	Y
Syrian Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Togo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trinidad and Tobago	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ukrainian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
USSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom	Y	A	A	N	N	N	Y	A	A	N	A	A
United Republic of Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Republic of Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y
United States	A	N	N	N	N	N	Y	A	N	N	N	N
Upper Volta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	NP	NP	NP	A	Y	A
Venezuela	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	NP	NP	NP	Y	Y	Y
Viet Nam	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yemen	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zaire	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y



## H. Chronology

### *January*

- 3 Assassination of Palestinian leader Mahmud Salih in Paris.
- 8–10 Foreign ministers of Arab confrontation states and oil-producing states meet in Riyadh.
- 9 Abu Daud (Muhammad Daud Auda) is arrested by French authorities on suspicion of organizing the attack on Israel's athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich.
- 11 Israel recalls its ambassador to France in response to the release of Abu Daud.
- 15 King Hussain of Jordan and President Sadat of Egypt meet in Cairo and call for a separate Palestinian delegation at Geneva.
- 18–19 Demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria following announcement of price increases on basic commodities.
- 21–23 Lebanese Front conference at Sayyidat al-Bir calls for the distribution among various Arab countries of Palestinians residing in Lebanon.
- 22–23 Palestine Central Council meets in Damascus and recommends starting dialogue with Jordan.

### *February*

- 15–21 US Secretary of State Vance visits Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
- 22–23 Jordan and the PLO hold their first official meeting since September 1970.
- 27–28 Egypt, Syria and Sudan form a unified political command.

### *March*

- 6–8 Prime Minister Rabin of Israel visits Washington for talks with US officials.
- 7–9 Afro-Arab summit conference in Cairo.
- 8 King Hussain of Jordan meets with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat.
- 12–20 Palestine National Council holds its thirteenth session in Cairo.
- 16 US President Carter in a speech at Clinton, Massachusetts, calls for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland.
- 16 Lebanese nationalist leader Kamal Junblat is assassinated.

### *April*

- 3–9 President Sadat of Egypt visits France, W. Germany and the US.
- 4–8 PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat visits the USSR.
- 8 Prime Minister Rabin of Israel hands in resignation following disclosure of an illegal US bank account. Since head of caretaker government cannot resign under law, takes extended holiday.
- 18–22 President Asad of Syria visits the USSR.
- 24–26 King Hussein visits the US.

*May*

- 9 US President Carter and President Asad of Syria meet in Geneva.
- 11-13 Rumania's President Ceausescu visits Cairo.
- 16-22 Islamic foreign ministers conference in Tripoli.
- 17 Likud Party victory in Israel's election.
- 19 Summit conference in Riyadh attended by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, President Asad of Syria and President Sadat of Egypt.

*June*

- 8-11 Egypt's Foreign Minister Fahmi visits the USSR.
- 15 Communiqué issued by the Commonwealth heads of state calling for a Geneva conference with legitimate representation for the Palestinians.
- 17 US Vice President Mondale, in a speech to the World Affairs Council, maintains that the Palestinians should be given a homeland in return for recognition of Israel's right to exist.
- 21 Israel's Knesset votes to accept new cabinet headed by Menahem Begin as Prime Minister.
- 27 US State Department issues policy statement stating that Israel must withdraw from all occupied areas as laid down in UN Security Council resolution 242.
- 29 EEC issues a declaration on the Middle East calling for a Palestinian homeland.

*July*

- 2, 3, 16 Israeli troops enter South Lebanon and attack Lebanese villages.
- 2-5 OAU 14th summit conference meets in Libreville (Gabon) and reaffirms that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
- 9-10 After talks in Egypt King Hussain of Jordan and President Sadat of Egypt announce the need for a link between Jordanians and Palestinians.
- 16-25 Prime Minister Begin visits the USA.
- 21-24 Border fighting breaks out between Egypt and Libya.
- 25 Representatives of Syria, Lebanon and the PLO meet in Chtaura and agree to implement the Cairo agreement of 1969.
- 26 Israel's new cabinet gives legal status to 3 illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

*August*

- 1-11 US Secretary of State Vance tours the Middle East visiting Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
- 2 Major Saad Haddad, rightist militia commander in South Lebanon, rejects the entry of the Lebanese army into the area.
- 2-4 PLO Chairman Arafat visits Damascus, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
- 14 The government of Israel announces its intention to extend full government services to residents of the West Bank and Gaza.
- 25-30 Prime Minister Begin of Israel visits Rumania.
- 27 Lebanese Front issues a 12-point manifesto declaring that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is an obstacle to Lebanese national unity.
- 28-31 PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat visits the USSR.



*September*

- 3 Israel's Minister of Agriculture Sharon reveals plans to settle 2 million Jews in a "security belt" in the occupied Arab territories.
- 3-9 The Arab League Council holds its 68th session in Cairo at foreign minister level.
- 16-26 Heavy fighting breaks out in South Lebanon between Palestinians, Lebanese and Israelis.
- 17 Israel's government approves three new West Bank settlements.
- 19 Palestine National Council meets in Damascus.

*October*

- 1 The US and the USSR issue a joint statement on the Middle East.
- 5 US President Carter and Israel's Foreign Minister Dayan issue a working paper which calls for a joint Arab delegation to the Geneva conference with Palestinian participation.
- 29-31 President Sadat of Egypt visits Rumania.

*November*

- 1 US withdraws from the International Labour Organization.
- 6 Greek Catholic Archbishop Cappucci of Jerusalem released from prison in Israel.
- 9 Israeli air raids over South Lebanon cause 110 deaths.
- 9 President Sadat of Egypt in a speech to the People's Assembly announces his readiness to go to Israel.
- 12-14 Arab foreign ministers' conference meets in Tunis.
- 16 President Sadat visits Damascus and declares that President Asad is opposed to his visit to Israel.
- 17 Egypt's Foreign Minister Fahmi resigns.
- 19-21 President Sadat of Egypt visits Israel, delivers speech to the Knesset on the 20th.

*December*

- 5 Egypt cuts diplomatic ties with Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen.
- 2-5 Heads of Arab states opposed to Egyptian President Sadat's initiative attend summit conference in Tripoli.
- 7-8 King Hussain visits Syria and Egypt.
- 9-15 US Secretary of State Vance visits Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
- 14-26 Cairo conference in session; attended by delegations from Egypt, Israel, the US and the U.N.
- 15-19 Prime Minister Begin of Israel visits the USA.
- 20 Israel's Defence Minister Weizmann arrives in Cairo for preparatory talks with President Sadat.
- 22 Israel's Knesset approves Prime Minister Begin's proposal of limited autonomy for residents of the occupied areas.
- 24-26 Prime Minister Begin of Israel visits Ismailiya for talks with Egypt's President Sadat.
- 28 Israel's Knesset adopts Prime Minister Begin's peace plan for the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai.



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